Unity of the proposition
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In
History
The problem was discussed under this name by
The difficulty is to explain how the predicate does this. If, as Plato thinks,
The problem was discussed much later by Francis Bradley. If we assume that a sentence consists of two objects and a relation that connects them, and we represent this by three names, say John, loving, Mary, how do we express the fact that John loves Mary? For "John", "loving" and "Mary" would name the objects they do, even if this were not a fact. This is known as Bradley's regress.
Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein
The problem became significant in the early development of
The difficulty was discussed in detail in The Principles of Mathematics by Russell, who saw no resolution.
- There appears to be an ultimate notion of assertion, given by the verb, which is lost as soon as we substitute a verbal noun, and is lost when the proposition in question is made the subject of some other proposition. ...Thus the contradiction which was to have been avoided, of an entity which cannot be made a logical subject, appears to have here become inevitable. This difficulty, which seems to be inherent in the very nature of truth and falsehood, is one with which I do not know how to deal with satisfactorily. ...I therefore leave this question to the logicians with the above brief indication of a difficulty. (§ 52)
Consider e.g. "A differs from B". The constituents of this proposition are simply A, difference and B. The proposition relates A and B, using the words "is ... from" in "A is different from B". But if we represent this contribution by words for relations, as e.g. "A <R> difference <R> B" we are back to a list of terms, we are essentially back at Bradley's regress.
- A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguishable from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account of the distinction. (§ 52)
Ludwig Wittgenstein addresses the problem early on in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In section 2.01 he claims that "states of affairs" are combinations of objects. In section 2.03 he explains that nothing is needed to link the objects, since the objects hang together. The arrangement of words that in the sentence corresponds to the arrangement or structure of objects in the state of affairs expressed by the sentence. This is the so-called picture theory of the proposition.
See also
- Bradley's regress
- Third man argument
References
- ^ Silverman, Allan (14 July 2014). "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bibliography
- Candlish, S., "The Unity of the Proposition and Russell’s Theories of Judgment", in Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy, ed. Monk & Palmer (Bristol 1996).
- Davidson, D., Truth and Predication, (MIT Press 2005).
- Gaskin, R., The Unity of the Proposition, (Oxford 2008).
- Gibson, M., From Naming to Saying. The Unity of the Proposition, (Oxford 2004).
- Joachim, H., The Nature of Truth, (Oxford 1906)
- Linsky L., "The Unity of the Proposition", Journal of the History of Philosophy 1992, 30.
- Russell, B., The Principles of Mathematics, (Oxford 1903).