Wuzi
| Wuzi | |
|---|---|
Hanyu Pinyin | Wúzǐ |
| Wade–Giles | Wu2-tzŭ3 |
| IPA | [ú.tsì] |
| Middle Chinese | |
| Middle Chinese | /ŋuo t͡sɨX/ |
| Old Chinese | |
| Zhengzhang | /*ŋʷaː ʔslɯʔ/ |
| Chinese military texts |
|---|
| Part of a series on |
| Chinese legalism |
|---|
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The Wuzi is a classic Chinese work on military strategy attributed to Wu Qi. It is considered one of China's Seven Military Classics.
It is said there were two books on the art of war by Wu Qi, but one was lost, hence leaving the Wuzi as the only existing book carrying
The philosophical content of the work mainly consists of a synthesis between
Military theory
The present text of the Wuzi consists of six sections, each focusing on a critical aspect of military affairs: Planning for the State; Evaluating the Enemy; Controlling the Army; the Tao of the General; Responding to Change; and, Stimulating the Officers. Although each chapter is less concentrated than the traditional topic headings would suggest, they depict the subject matter and general scope of the book as a whole.[2]
As a young man, Wu Qi spent a formative three years as a student of Confucianism. After gaining several years of administrative experience, he came to believe that, in order for benevolence and righteousness to survive in his time, military strength and preparation were necessary. Without a strong military to defend the just, he believed that Confucian virtues would disappear, and evil would dominate the world. Because of his emphasis on the importance of the military for safeguarding civil rights and liberty, the author of the Wuzi states that commanders must be selected carefully, ideally from those possessing courage and who excelled in military arts, but who also possessed good civil administration skills, and who displayed Confucian virtues, particularly those of wisdom and self-control.[3]
Because armies in the
Harmony and organization are equally important to each other: without harmony, an organization will not be cohesive; but, without organization, harmony will not be effective in achieving collective goals. There are three steps to achieving a disciplined, effective fighting force: proper organization; extensive training; and, thorough motivation. It is only after the creation of a disciplined, cohesive army that achieving victory becomes a matter of tactics and strategy. Much of the Wuzi discusses the means to achieve such a force.[5]
Regarding the Legalist theories of achieving desired action through the proper exercise of reward and punishment, the Wuzi states that rewards and punishments are, by themselves, insufficient: excessive reward may cause individuals to pursue profit and glory at the expense of the group, while excessive punishment can lower morale, in the worst cases forcing men to flee service rather than face the consequences of failure. In addition to reward and punishment, the general should inculcate (essentially pseudo-Confucian) values into his soldiers: men fighting for what they believe is a moral cause will prefer death to living ignominiously, improving the chances of success for both the individual soldier and the army as a whole. It is only with the combination of both moral focus and effective rewards and punishments that the army will become a disciplined, spirited, strongly motivated force.[6]
The Wuzi advises generals to adopt different tactics and strategy based on their assessment of battlefield situations. Factors affecting appropriate tactics and strategy include: the relative terrain and weather of the engagement; the national character of the combatants; the enemy commander's personal history and characteristics; and, the relative morale, discipline, fatigue, number, and general quality of both friendly and enemy forces. In gathering this information, and in preventing the enemy from gaining it, espionage and deception are paramount.[7]
Authorship
Because of the lack of archaeological evidence, there is no consensus among modern scholars concerning the date that The Wuzi was composed, and/or last modified. A work known as Wuzi was one of the most widely referenced books on military strategy among the records that existed in the
The most systematic study of the Wuzi's date of composition and authorship, based on historical references and the book's content, concludes that the core of the work was likely authored by Wu Qi himself, but was likely subject to serious losses of content, revisions, and accretions after his lifetime. This theory assumes that Wu Qi's disciples initially continued amending the text, but cannot account for some content that seems to have been inserted as late as the Han dynasty (possibly in an effort to "update" the work).[10] The following five points summarize this study's conclusions regarding the Wuzi's date of composition.
Historical references
The writings of Wu Qi were known to be in wide circulation by the late
The Wuzi shares both concepts and whole passages with other works dated more conclusively to the
Perspective / occupation of writer
Wu Qi was both a civil and military leader, and excelled in both occupations. This dual role was common until the early
Archaeological support
Qing scholastic criticism discounted the possible authenticity of the text based on its mention of military practices then considered anachronous to the
Remaining criticisms
Remaining criticisms which the defenders of the Wuzi's authenticity cannot account for center on the book's description of cavalry as a major, important branch of the military. Because the use of cavalry (presumably) did not become important until the (very) late-
Modern scholars conclude that the most satisfying conclusion, accounting for the above facts, is that the text was substantially created by "Wu Qi himself, but that in the course of transmission and revision, later Warring States strategists (and probably Han students)... added passages on cavalry and otherwise emended some of the terminology."[15] By being a work which was the product of a famous historical figure, but amended by future generations of strategists, the Wuzi's composition is very similar to most of the other Seven Military Classics.
See also
Notes
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 454.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 202.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. pp. 202–203.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 203.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 204.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 204.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. pp. 204–205.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. pp. 191–192.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 455.
- ^ Li Shou-chih and Wang Shih-chin Wu-tzu Ch'ien-shuo. Peking: Chieh-fang-chun ch'u-pan-she. 1986. pp. 3–12.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. pp. 453–454.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 454.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 454.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. p. 454.
- ^ Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books. 2007. pp. 454–455.