Albert Kesselring
Albert Kesselring | |
---|---|
OB South | |
Battles/wars | World War I
World War II
|
Awards | War crimes |
Criminal penalty | Death; commuted to life imprisonment; further commuted 21 years' imprisonment |
Albert Kesselring (30 November 1885 – 16 July 1960) was a German military officer and convicted war criminal who served in the Luftwaffe during World War II. In a career which spanned both world wars, Kesselring reached the rank of the Generalfeldmarschall (Field marshal) and became one of Nazi Germany's most highly decorated commanders.
Kesselring joined the Bavarian Army as an officer cadet in 1904, serving in the artillery branch. He completed training as a balloon observer in 1912. During World War I, he served on both the Western and Eastern fronts and was posted to the Army Staff, despite not having attended the War Academy. Kesselring served in the Reichswehr after the war, but was discharged in 1933 to become head of the Department of Administration at the Ministry of Aviation, where he became involved in the re-establishment of the German aviation industry and the laying of the foundations for the Luftwaffe, serving as its chief of staff from 1936 to 1938.
During World War II, he commanded Luftwaffe forces in the German invasions of
After the war, Kesselring was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death for ordering the murder of 335 Italian civilians in the Ardeatine massacre, and for inciting and ordering his troops to kill civilians as part of reprisals against the Italian resistance movement. The sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. A political and media campaign resulted in his release in 1952, ostensibly on health grounds. He published his memoirs, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag ("A Soldier to the Last Day"), in 1953. Kesselring accepted the honorary presidency of three veterans' organisations: the Luftwaffenring, consisting of Luftwaffe veterans; the Verband Deutsches Afrikakorps, the veterans' association of the Afrika Korps; and, most controversially, the right-wing Der Stahlhelm before dying in 1960.
Early life
Albert Kesselring was born in Marktsteft, Bavaria, on 30 November 1885,[Notes 1] the son of Carl Adolf Kesselring, a schoolmaster and town councillor, and his wife Rosina,[2] Carl's second cousin. Albert's early years were spent in Marktsteft, where relatives had operated a brewery since 1688.[3]
Graduating from the Christian Ernestinum Secondary School in
In 1910, Kesselring married Luise Anna Pauline (Liny) Keyssler, the daughter of an apothecary from Bayreuth.[6] Their marriage was childless, but in 1913 they adopted Rainer, the son of Albert's second cousin Kurt Kesselring.[7] In 1912, Kesselring completed training as a balloon observer in a dirigible section—an early sign of an interest in aviation.[3] Kesselring's superiors considered posting him to the School of Artillery and Engineering as an instructor because of his expertise in "the interplay between tactics and technology".[6]
World War I
During World War I, Kesselring served with his regiment in
In 1917, he was posted to the
Between the wars
Reichswehr
After the war, Kesselring was involved in the demobilisation of III Royal Bavarian Corps in the
From 1919 to 1922, Kesselring served as a
Luftwaffe
Kesselring was discharged from the Reichswehr in 1933 against his wishes, and appointed head of the Department of Administration at the Reich Commissariat for Aviation (Reichskommissariat für die Luftfahrt), the forerunner of the
Promotion in the Luftwaffe was rapid; Kesselring was promoted to Generalmajor on 1 October 1934, and Generalleutnant on 1 April 1936.[16] Like other generals of Nazi Germany, he received personal monthly payments from Adolf Hitler, in Kesselring's case 6,000 ℛ︁ℳ︁, a considerable sum at the time.[17][Notes 2]
At the age of 48, Kesselring learned to fly, following the old military doctrine that officers should not ask their men to do anything they would not do themselves.[16] He later stated that first-hand knowledge of all aspects of aviation was essential to being able to command airmen, although he was well aware that latecomers like himself did not impress the old pioneers or the young aviators.[19] He qualified in various single- and multi-engine aircraft and continued flying three or four days per week until March 1945.[20]
Following the death of Generalleutnant
Kesselring's main operational task during this time was the support of the
Impact on Luftwaffe doctrine
In the area of aerial doctrine, Kesselring has been described by James Corum as a "worthy successor" to Wever.[25] Like many ex-Army officers, Kesselring saw the importance of air power in the tactical role, providing support to land operations.[15] In the historiography of the Luftwaffe, Kesselring and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff are usually blamed for neglecting strategic bombing while over-focusing on close air support for the army. However, the two most prominent enthusiasts for the focus on ground-support operations (either close air support or air interdiction) were Hugo Sperrle and Hans Jeschonnek. These men were long-time professional airmen involved in German air services since their early careers.[26]
Kesselring strongly supported the program to produce a long-range heavy bomber.[25] As chief of staff he supported new technologies and training for bomb aimers and navigators to carry out effective long-range bombing missions and at high altitudes.[27] In March 1939 Kesselring expressed his doubt this could be done accurately at night or in bad weather. German scientists succeeded in proving otherwise, and developed a successful radio navigation system.[28]
The Luftwaffe was not pressured into ground support operations due to demands from the army, or because it was led by ex-army personnel.
World War II
Poland
In the
The tactical and operational focus of the Luftwaffe in the first days of the campaign was not a repudiation of strategic bombardment. The planned strategic bombing of Warsaw (Operation Wasserkante), scheduled to commence on 1 September, was postponed due to bad weather.[32] By the time the weather cleared, the army support operations were going so well there was a reluctance to shift emphasis.[33]
The Luftwaffe had difficulty locating the dispersed Polish airfields, and only 24 Polish aircraft were destroyed on the ground.[34] The counter-air campaign was not as successful as it may have been due to faulty fuses on bombs–a lesson soon rectified.[35] Air superiority was accomplished by destroying communications, which increased the pace of the army advance and enabled ground forces to overrun Polish airstrips and early warning sites. Sporadic Polish aerial resistance continued until 14 September.[36] The Polish Air Force earned Kesselring's respect and he considered that Polish pilots and aircraft were not inferior.[37] Kesselring himself was shot down during the campaign, the first of the five times he was shot down during World War II.[38]
Although not under Bock's command, Kesselring's purpose was to support Army Group North in closing the Polish Corridor from the third day, with emphasis thereafter on supporting the 3rd Army as it advanced along the Vistula to isolate Warsaw from the east.[39] From 8 September Kesselring began interdiction operations against bridges as German forces advanced on Warsaw. When a powerful Polish counter-attack created a crisis, he contributed Fliegerdivision 1 to the Battle of the Bzura. The division contained 70 per cent of his dive-bombers and was assigned to Löhr on 6 September.[40] The air attacks assisted in the destruction of two Polish armies.[41]
On 16/17 September the air fleets were notified of the Soviet invasion of Poland. Luftflotte 1 support operations against troop concentrations ceased in central and southern Poland to avoid friendly-fire incidents. Kesselring attempted to crush Polish resistance by making a series of air attacks against Warsaw in the final week of September. With the military campaign virtually over, Polish resistance was confined to the Hel Peninsula, Warsaw, and Modlin. Kesselring's air fleet was assigned to the north of the city. In the ensuing attacks, approximately 10 per cent of the city's buildings were destroyed and 40 per cent damaged. The bombing killed between 20,000 and 25,000 civilians.[42] Kesselring insisted that only military targets were attacked, but the lack of precision munitions made the bombing indiscriminate and militarily ineffective.[43] For his part in the Polish campaign, Kesselring was personally awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross by Hitler.[44]
France and Low Countries
Kesselring's Luftflotte 1 was not involved in the preparations for the
![Kesselring holds his Generalfeldmarschall's baton](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c2/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-2006-0107%2C_Albert%2C_Kesselring%2C_Wilhelm_Speidel%2C_Hermann_G%C3%B6ring.jpg/170px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-2006-0107%2C_Albert%2C_Kesselring%2C_Wilhelm_Speidel%2C_Hermann_G%C3%B6ring.jpg)
Kesselring was more heavily committed in the Low Countries, with elements of his air command underpinning the attack on the Netherlands—
The Battle of the Netherlands commenced on 10 May 1940. Kesselring's air operation was successful against the small Belgian Aviation Militaire, which was rendered ineffective, and Royal Netherlands Air Force, though the Dutch harassed the Luftwaffe until their surrender.[47] The paratroopers, while initially successful, ran into fierce opposition in the Battle for The Hague, and the Battle of Rotterdam.[49] The Luftwaffe lost 54 per cent of the transport aircraft committed; 125 destroyed, 53 bogged down, and 47 severely damaged. Some 4,000 paratroops (1,200 prisoners) became casualties.[50]
On 14 May 1940, responding to a call for assistance from Student and demands for the bombing of the city by Georg von Küchler, commanding the 18th Army, Kesselring ordered the bombing of Rotterdam city centre. Fires raged out of control, destroying much of the city.[51][52] An estimated 800 civilians were killed and 78,000 made homeless.[53]
Wartime Allied newspapers predicted that Kesselring "will go down in history as the man who directed the bombing of the helpless Dutch city of Rotterdam, and slaughtered thousands of civilians."[54] Under the Hague Convention of 1907, bombardment itself was not forbidden since Rotterdam was not an undefended city, but other aspects of the bombardment may have violated the laws of war.[55] Historians are divided as to whether the bombing was an act of terror or served a tactical purpose.[56][55]
After the surrender of the Netherlands on 14 May 1940, Luftflotte 2 attempted to move forward to new airfields in Belgium while still providing support for the fast-moving ground troops. The Battle of France was going well, with
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f1/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-2005-0103-505%2C_Albert_Kesselring.jpg/220px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-2005-0103-505%2C_Albert_Kesselring.jpg)
Göring promised the encircled enemy could be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Kesselring and Richthofen protested. They argued their commands had suffered heavy losses in two weeks of incessant fighting and the fighter and dive-bombers would be forced to operate at their maximum range. Neither man was confident of gaining air superiority. The protests were disregarded. It left the burden of preventing the Allied evacuation of Dunkirk to Kesselring's air fleet. Hampered by poor flying weather and staunch opposition from the Royal Air Force (RAF), the German operation failed.[59]
Kesselring and his air commanders turned their attention to the final phase of the battle for France;
For his role in the campaign in the west, Kesselring was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal) during the 1940 Field Marshal Ceremony.[62]
Battle of Britain
Following the campaign in France, Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 was committed to the Battle of Britain. Luftflotte 2's headquarters was located in Brussels. Kesselring's air fleet was numerically the strongest in the Luftwaffe in mid–1940. He controlled formations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France north of the Seine.[63] Kesselring was initially responsible for the bombing of southeastern England and the London area, but as the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 assuming responsibility for the night-time "blitz" attacks while Luftflotte 2 conducted the main daylight operations.[64]
Kesselring was sceptical about attacking Britain. He advocated capturing Gibraltar (Operation Felix), encouraging the British Government to negotiate, and then turning against London if necessary. Sperrle favoured attacking ports and shipping. Göring overruled them because he was sure the RAF Fighter Command was weak and could be defeated quickly. The Luftwaffe air fleet commanders did not collaborate with each other to devise an air superiority plan, much less conduct inter-service conferences with the army and navy to develop a joint strategy. Kesselring, in particular, did not understand how the RAF fighter defences worked, and even after the war held the naïve assumption Fighter Command could simply have been destroyed in dogfights.[65]
The first phase of the battle—the Kanalkampf (Channel Battles) was marginally successful. Operation Eagle and the 18 August battles failed to break British air defences.[66][67] The German attacks on RAF airfields reached a peak in the first week of September 1940. On the third day, Göring met with Sperrle and Kesselring. Göring was convinced Fighter Command was exhausted and favoured attacking London to draw out the last of the British fighter reserves. Kesselring enthusiastically agreed; Sperrle did not.[68] Kesselring urged Göring to carry out an all-out attack,[69] based on the unproven assertion that Fighter Command had been virtually destroyed. Sperrle dismissed Kesselring's optimism and put British strength at the more accurate figure of 1,000 fighters. Nevertheless, Kesselring's perception prevailed.[70] The disagreement between the two air fleet commanders was not uncommon, and although they rarely quarrelled, their commands were separate and they did not coordinate their efforts. Instead, they fought separate campaigns.[71]
The focus of air operations changed to destroying the docks and factories in the centre of London.[72] The change in strategy has been described as militarily controversial. The decision certainly relieved the pressure on Fighter Command, but wartime records and post-war analysis have shown that Fighter Command was not on the verge of collapse as assumed by German intelligence.[73][74][75][76]
On 7 September Kesselring's air fleet was still the largest in the Luftwaffe. At his command were 1,311 aircraft from an operational German total of 1,895. Eight days later his air fleet alone carried out a daylight air attack on London which is considered the climax of the battle.[77][69] In staging a two-pronged, predictable set-piece attack, he played into Fighter Command's hands. As one analyst wrote, Kesselring was "back where he started" before the battle.[78] The consequences for Luftwaffe airmen were severe on 15 September 1940. German aviators met a prepared enemy[79] and lost 5.5 per cent of the committed force. In the afternoon loss rates of German bomber crews reached 18 per cent of the force sent out. German crew losses were seven times that of the British.[80] Furthermore, Fighter Command did not commit its reserve during the main attacks as the German command predicted.[81]
Luftflotte 2 continued
The air fleet played a large role in the Birmingham and Coventry Blitz, with support from Luftflotte 3, which provided 304 of the 448 bombers in the attack. Surviving German records suggest that the aim of the Coventry raid was to disrupt production and reconstruction critical to the automotive industry, but also to dehouse workers.[86] In the area of operations of 'Luftflotte 2 were two other armament hubs—both the port of Hull and industrial city of Sheffield were heavily bombed by units under the air fleet's command.[87][Notes 3] Many of the fleet's units were involved in the attack known as the Second Great Fire of London, on 29/30 December 1940.[90][Notes 4]
Invasion of the Soviet Union
Results will demonstrate an officer's fitness to be a field marshal, and no one will then ask about his origins, whether he came from the army or the air force. But one piece of advice I will give to all airfield marshals: do not become a one-sided technician, but learn to think and lead in terms of all three services.
Albert Kesselring[92]
Although earmarked for operations against the Soviet Union, Luftflotte 2 remained in the west until May 1941. The maintenance of pressure on British cities was a deception measure to mask the eastward deployment of the Luftwaffe.[93] German airfield construction had also fallen behind schedule and they could not host combat units until May, although they were ready for the commencement of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941.[94] Kesselring arranged with Göring for Luftflotte 2 to be allocated additional transport to allow it to keep up with fast-moving armoured columns.[95] The failure of German logistics left only 15 per cent of the Luftwaffe's 100,000 vehicles operational by the end of 1941.[96]
Luftflotte 2 operated in support of Army Group Centre, commanded by Bock, continuing the close working relationship between the two. Kesselring's mission was to gain air superiority, and if possible air supremacy, as soon as possible while still supporting ground operations. For this, he had a fleet of 1,223 aircraft,[97] which made up half of the Luftwaffe's commitment.[98] Kesselring later remarked he "instructed my air force and flak generals to consider the wishes of the Army as my orders."[99]
The German attack caught large numbers of
With air supremacy attained, Luftflotte 2 concentrated on ground operations, particularly guarding the flanks of the armoured spearheads, without which the rapid advance was not possible. When enemy counterattacks threatened, Kesselring threw the full weight of his force against them. Now that the Army was convinced of the value of air support, units were all too inclined to call for it. Kesselring now had to convince the Army that air support should be concentrated at critical points. He strove to improve army–air cooperation with new tactics and the appointment of Oberst Martin Fiebig as a special close air support commander.[102]
By 26 July, Kesselring had reported the destruction of 165 tanks, 2,136 vehicles and 194 artillery pieces.
In late 1941, Luftflotte 2 supported the final German offensive against Moscow,
In the initial stages, Kesselring's air fleet carried out effective support operations. On 3 October, it claimed 679 vehicles were destroyed in 984 sorties, and 450 vehicles and 22 tanks the following day.[108] The bad weather that hampered ground operations in Operation Typhoon from October on impeded air operations even more, but Luftflotte 2 continued to fly critical reconnaissance, interdiction, close-air support and aerial resupply missions.[109] The intensity of attacks was evident in the number of combat operations flown: 690 on 7 October, and 537 on 10 October, and approximately 900 on 12 and 13 October. The 10 October missions resulted in claims of 450 vehicles and 150 artillery pieces destroyed.[110] Over-confidence in victory caused the withdrawal of Kesselring's air fleet to the Mediterranean. The air corps belonging to Luftflotte 2 were sent to Germany or other sectors.[111]
Between 22 June and 5 December 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 2,093 aircraft. Soviet sources give Red Air Force total aircraft losses as 21,200, of which at least 10,000 were destroyed in air combat.[112] Despite the impressive statistics, on 5 December, the Red Army began a large-scale counter-offensive which ended the threat to Moscow and Barbarossa. The decision to remove Kesselring's air fleet in November irretrievably weakened German air power in the Soviet Union. The air supremacy Germany enjoyed in June and July 1941 dissipated due to the strain of maintaining a presence along a 2,000-mile (3,200 km) front. Increased commitments in other theatres prevented the Luftwaffe from fielding adequate reserves to sustain prolonged periods of close air support along the Eastern Front. The Red Air Force remained a viable threat which only heightened as the war continued.[113]
Mediterranean and North Africa
![Kesselring in Afrika Korps style desert uniform](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9f/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1989-089-00%2C_Nordafrika%2C_Rommel%2C_Bayerlein%2C_Kesselring.jpg/170px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1989-089-00%2C_Nordafrika%2C_Rommel%2C_Bayerlein%2C_Kesselring.jpg)
In November 1941, Kesselring was appointed
In 1941 it was clear whoever controlled
Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 made an immediate impact. The offensive formally opened on 20 March 1942. One-third of the bombing effort was directed against airfields. Conflicting Axis priorities, insufficient forces, and concentration of force, coupled with British determination to reinforce and supply Malta, defeated Kesselring. After May 1942 the British air defences were not seriously threatened, and by August, the air battle over the island had subsided.[118][119] Kesselring's air fleet flew 11,000 sorties against the island from early April to 10 May, placing the garrison and population in dire straits.[116] Approximately 30,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged and 1,300 civilians were killed.[120] The Allied losses in airmen, fighter aircraft, warships and transport ships were high.[121] The effectiveness of the attacks brought the population to the brink of starvation.[122] Axis shipping losses fell to 20–30 per cent.[116]
Through suppressing Maltese–based forces, Kesselring managed to deliver an increased flow of supplies to Generaloberst
For the
Kesselring was critical of Rommel's performance in the Battle of Bir Hakeim, a vital position held by the 1st Free French Brigade that formed the southern pivot of the British Gazala Line. Rommel called for, and Kesselring provided, air support, but the infantry assaults failed to capture the position. Kesselring attributed this to faulty coordination between the ground and air attacks. The Luftwaffe lost 14 aircraft on 3 and 4 June, and Kesselring was concerned that the Army planned to have the Luftwaffe starve the position out. After a ground assault led by Rommel in person, and air strikes by 124 Stukas and 76 Junkers Ju 88s escorted by 170 Bf 109s, Bir Hakeim was evacuated by the Free French on 10 June.[127] For Rommel's capture of Tobruk on 21 June, Kesselring brought in additional aircraft from Greece and Crete. In June over 260 German aircraft were in North Africa, and 7,035 sorties were flown.[128] Over 33,000 prisoners were taken when Tobruk fell.[128] For his part in the campaign, Kesselring was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords,[129] but he lost his one-rank advantage over his subordinates; Rommel was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall on 22 June, and Ugo Cavallero became a Marshal of Italy on 1 July, followed by Ettore Bastico on 12 August.[130]
![Map of Battle of Gazala](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/27/Map_of_siege_of_Tobruk_1942.jpg/220px-Map_of_siege_of_Tobruk_1942.jpg)
In the wake of the victory at Tobruk, Rommel persuaded Hitler to authorise an attack on Egypt instead of Malta, over Italian and Kesselring's objections.[131] Cavallero's diary and Generalmajor Friedrich von Mellenthin's account in Panzer Battles support this version of events, but on 24 June 1942 Bastico and Kesselring approved Rommel's request to pursue the British Eighth Army into Egypt.[132] The Malta operation never had the wholehearted support of OKW, and historians remain doubtful that it would have been successful.[133] The parachute troops assembled for Operation Herkules were sent to Rommel.[134] The failure to eliminate Malta was a crucial blow to Axis ambitions in North Africa.[135] Kesselring claimed he had recognised and pressed for the elimination of Malta by invasion, and blamed Rommel, the OKW and the Italians for the failure to act.[136]
Things went well at first, with Rommel winning the Battle of Mersa Matruh.[137] But as Kesselring and Italian commanders argued, the logistical difficulties mounted and the result was the disastrous fighting of the First Battle of El Alamein and Battle of Alam el Halfa. When Rommel arrived at Alamein he had only 6,500 men and 85 tanks–only 1,500 of the infantry and 55 of the tanks were German.[138]
Kesselring supported Rommel's decision to withdraw.[139] He considered Rommel to be a great general leading fast-moving troops at the corps level of command, but felt that he was too moody and changeable for higher command. For Kesselring, Rommel's nervous breakdown and hospitalisation for depression at the end of the North African campaign only confirmed this.[140]
Kesselring was briefly considered as a possible successor to Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of Staff of the OKW in September 1942, with General der Panzertruppe Friedrich Paulus replacing Generaloberst Alfred Jodl as Chief of the Operations Staff at OKW. That Kesselring was considered for this appointment demonstrated the high regard in which Kesselring was held by Hitler. Nevertheless, Hitler decided that neither Kesselring nor Paulus could be spared from their current posts.[141] In October 1942, Kesselring was given direct command of all German armed forces in the theatre except Rommel's German-Italian Panzer Army in North Africa, including General der Infanterie Enno von Rintelen, the German liaison officer at the Italian Comando Supremo. Kesselring's command also included the troops in Greece and the Balkans until the end of the year, when Hitler created another army group headquarters under Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, naming him Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief South East.[142]
Tunisia
Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, precipitated a crisis in Kesselring's command. He ordered Generalleutnant Walther Nehring, the former commander of the Afrika Korps who was returning to action after recovering from wounds received at the Battle of Alam el Halfa, to proceed to Tunisia to take command of a new corps (LXXXX Corps). Kesselring ordered Nehring to establish a bridgehead in Tunisia and then to press west as far as possible so as to gain freedom to manoeuvre.[143] By December, the Allied commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was forced to concede that Kesselring had won the race; the final phase of Torch had failed and the Axis could only be ejected from Tunisia after a prolonged struggle.[144]
With the initiative back with the Germans and Italians, Kesselring hoped to launch an offensive that would drive the
The question of
By this time, Kesselring was derisively nicknamed "Smiling Albert" by the Allies,[Notes 5] but was known as "Uncle Albert" by his troops. He was one of the most popular generals of World War II with the German rank and file. His popularity was enhanced by frequent, often unannounced, visits to the front line.[3] Hans von Luck wrote that Kesselring was respected because he was the only senior commander to visit the front in North Africa.[153]
Italian campaign
Sicily
Kesselring expected that the Allies would next invade Sicily, as a landing could be made there under fighter cover from Tunisia and Malta.
The Allied invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943 was stubbornly opposed.[157] Kesselring hoped that the Allied invasion fleet would provide good targets for U-boats, but they met with few successes.[158] Pressure from the Allied air forces forced Luftflotte 2, commanded since June by Richthofen,[156] to withdraw most of its aircraft to the mainland.[159] Unaware that Guzzoni had already ordered a major counterattack on 11 July, Kesselring bypassed the chain of command to order the Hermann Göring Panzer Division to attack that day in the hope that a vigorous attack could succeed before the Americans could bring the bulk of their artillery and armoured support ashore.[160] Although his troops gave the Americans "quite a battering", they failed to capture the Allied position.[161]
According to Kesselring, he flew to Sicily himself on 12 July to survey the situation and decided that no more than a delaying action was possible and that the island would eventually have to be abandoned. Nonetheless, he intended to fight on, and he reinforced Sicily with the
Kesselring managed to delay the Allies in Sicily for another month; the Allied conquest of Sicily was not complete until 17 August.[166] His evacuation of Sicily, which began a week earlier on 10 August, was perhaps the most brilliant action of the campaign. In spite of the Allies' superiority on land, at sea, and in the air, Kesselring was able to evacuate not only 40,000 men, but also 9,605 vehicles, 94 guns, 47 tanks, 1,100 tons of ammunition, 970 tons of fuel, and 15,000 tons of stores. He was able to achieve near-perfect coordination among the three services under his command while his opponent, Eisenhower, could not.[167]
Allied invasion of Italy
With the fall of Sicily, OKW feared that Italy would withdraw from the war, but Kesselring remained confident that the Italians would continue to fight.
On the advice of Rommel and Jodl, Hitler decided that the Italian Peninsula could not be held without the assistance of the Italian Army.[170] The plan was not to give up the whole of Italy and retreat to the Alps, but to hold the Po Valley.[171] Kesselring was ordered to withdraw from southern Italy and consolidate his forces with Rommel's Army Group B in Northern Italy, where Rommel would assume overall command. Kesselring was slated to be posted to Norway.[173]
![German soldiers in uniform with helmets, serving as crew of an anti-tank gun](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c0/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J15460%2C_Italien%2C_Soldaten_beim_Laden_einer_Pak.jpg/220px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J15460%2C_Italien%2C_Soldaten_beim_Laden_einer_Pak.jpg)
For his part, Kesselring was convinced that all was well, that the Italians would continue to fight, and that there was no threat to his troops or his communications.[174] He was appalled at the prospect of abandoning Italy, which he felt was completely unnecessary, as he was certain that Italy south of the northern Apennine Mountains could be held for six to nine months.[175] This assessment was based on his belief that the Allies would not conduct operations outside the range of their air cover, which could only reach as far as Salerno. Kesselring submitted his resignation on 14 August 1943,[176] but SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, the Supreme SS and Police Leader in Italy, intervened on Kesselring's behalf with Hitler. Wolff painted Rommel as "politically unreliable", and argued that Kesselring's presence in southern Italy was vital to prevent an early Italian defection. On Wolff's advice, Hitler refused to accept Kesselring's resignation.[173]
Mussolini was rescued by the Germans in
Italy now effectively became an occupied country, as the Germans poured in troops, although neither side accorded it that status.[181][Notes 6] The Allies accorded Italy the status of "co-belligerent" rather than that of an ally, which meant that Italians could still be tried for war crimes.[183] According to his memoirs, Kesselring blamed the Allies for the tragedy that unfolded in Italy. He felt that Hitler would have been willing to allow Italy to withdraw from the war had the Allies agreed to respect its neutrality and not use it as a base for operations against Germany.[184]
Salerno
![Map of Italy with coloured lines across the waist](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/61/ItalyDefenseLinesSouthofRome1943_4.jpg/220px-ItalyDefenseLinesSouthofRome1943_4.jpg)
Kesselring claimed in his memoirs that his command was already "written off",[185] but he intended to fight. Eisenhower had excellent intelligence through Ultra, the decryption of German Enigma machine signals and Japanese Purple diplomatic messages, and from the Italians themselves, and was aware of the German plans to withdraw from southern Italy. He therefore adopted a risky strategy of making a series of landings in Italy rather than concentrating his forces. Kesselring inadvertently misled him better than the best deception plan could have.[186]
At the
Kesselring had been defeated but gained precious time. Already, in defiance of his orders, he was preparing a series of successive fallback positions on the Volturno Line, the Barbara Line and the Bernhardt Line.[191] The port of Naples was therefore denied to the Allies until October.[192] The Apennine Mountains run along the centre of the Italian Peninsula, and therefore the rivers and gorges radiate down to the sea on both coasts. The mountains gave the Germans good observation, and allowed them to conduct a classic reverse slope defence, with the forward slopes thinly manned, but covered by machine guns with interlocking fields of fire, minefields, and in some cases deliberately flooded valleys. Allied artillery was reduced in effectiveness due to the poor observation of well-concealed German positions, and the need to fire at high angles to clear the mountain tops. The onset of wet autumn weather and inadequate road network also favoured the defence. Low cloud cover hampered observation from the air, and muddy roads slowed the delivery of ammunition and supplies to forward areas.[193]
Only in November 1943, after a month of hard fighting, did the Allies reach Kesselring's main position, the Gustav Line. This was the narrowest part of the peninsula.[194] Kesselring estimated that it could be held with just eleven divisions, with a couple of mobile divisions in reserve to guard against an Allied amphibious landing, whereas the position in the Northern Apennines would require up to twenty divisions.[195] Kesselring accepted the risk of being outflanked by an amphibious landing, which he believed would be Eisenhower's best move. He was not aware that the necessary amphibious lift had been sent to the Indian Ocean for Operation Buccaneer, a landing in southern Burma, which was eventually cancelled.[196] According to his memoirs, Kesselring felt that even more could have been accomplished if he had been given access to the troops held "uselessly" under Rommel's command.[197]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-316-1195-07%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring_mit_Offizieren.jpg/220px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-316-1195-07%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring_mit_Offizieren.jpg)
In November 1943, Kesselring met with Hitler. Kesselring gave an optimistic assessment of the situation in Italy and gave reassurances that he could hold the Allies south of Rome on the Gustav Line. Kesselring further promised that he could prevent the Allies from reaching the Northern Apennines for at least six months. As a result, on 6 November 1943, Hitler ordered Rommel and his Army Group B headquarters to move to France to take charge of the Atlantic Wall and prepare for the Allied attack that was expected there in the spring of 1944. On 21 November 1943, Kesselring resumed command of all German forces in Italy, combining Commander-in-Chief South, a joint command, with that of Army Group C, a ground command.[198][199] "I had always blamed Kesselring", Hitler told a conference in August 1944, "for looking at things too optimistically ... events have proved Rommel wrong, and I have been justified in my decision to leave Field Marshal Kesselring there, whom I have seen as an incredible political idealist, but also as a military optimist, and it is my opinion that military leadership without optimism is not possible."[200][Notes 7]
The Luftwaffe scored a notable success on the night of 2 December 1943 when 105 Junkers Ju 88s
Cassino and Anzio
![Kesselring surrounded by German paratroopers](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-580-1983-19A%2C_Italien%2C_Truppeninspektion_durch_Albert_Kesselring.jpg/170px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-580-1983-19A%2C_Italien%2C_Truppeninspektion_durch_Albert_Kesselring.jpg)
The first Allied attempt to break through the Gustav Line in the Battle of Monte Cassino in January 1944 met with early success, with the British X Corps breaking through the line held by the 94th Infantry Division and imperilling the entire Tenth Army.[202] Kesselring rushed his reserves, the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions, to the Cassino front. They were able to stabilise the German position there but left Rome poorly guarded.[203]
Kesselring wrote in his memoirs that he felt that he had been out-generalled when the Allies landed at Anzio.[204] A few days before, he had told Jodl that he did not consider a mid-winter Allied amphibious operation likely.[203] Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, advised that it was out of the question for four to six weeks.[205] Although taken by surprise, Kesselring moved rapidly to regain control of the situation, summoning Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen's Fourteenth Army headquarters and the 65th and 362nd Divisions from northern Italy, the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions from the Cassino front, and the 26th Panzer Division from Tenth Army. OKW contributed some troops from other theatres,[206] and by February Kesselring was able to take the offensive at Anzio. His forces were unable to crush the Allied beachhead, and in his memoirs, Kesselring blamed himself, OKW and Mackensen for avoidable errors.[207]
Meanwhile, costly fighting at
One disadvantage of the geography of the Italian peninsula that otherwise favoured the defence was that it constricted the German line of communication. The Allies took advantage of this with
On 11 May 1944 General Sir Harold Alexander, commanding the Allied Armies in Italy, launched Operation Diadem,[213] which finally broke through the Gustav Line and forced the Tenth Army to withdraw.[214] Due to fuel and transportation shortages, units had to be moved piecemeal.[215] Kesselring appealed to the Kriegsmarine to move more supplies by sea and urged his corps and division commanders to conserve ammunition.[216] In the process, a gap opened up between the Tenth and Fourteenth Armies, threatening both with encirclement. For this failure, Kesselring relieved Mackensen of his command, replacing him with General der Panzertruppe Joachim Lemelsen.[217]
Fortunately for the Germans,
For his part in the campaign, Kesselring was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds by Hitler at the
Actions affecting population and cultural objects
Kesselring, during the campaign, as far as he was able, attempted to avoid the destruction of many artistically important Italian cities, including Rome, Florence,
Kesselring supported the Italian declaration of Rome as an open city on 14 August 1943,[223] after Rome was bombed for the first time on 19 July with over 700 civilian deaths. The unilateral declaration was never accepted by the Allies as the city remained centres of government and industry, and while the Americans supported accepting the open city status of Rome, the British remained implacably opposed. The replacement of the American Eisenhower with the British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as theatre commander loosened restrictions at that level.[224] As a result, Rome was bombed by the Allies many times.[225]
For Kesselring, the open city status held many advantages, as it promised a means of quelling unrest in Rome and scored a propaganda triumph. Moreover, as Operation Strangle took its toll, trains ceased to move through Rome and German vehicle convoys routinely bypassed the city.[226] Kesselring later wrote that when the fighting drew close to Rome in May 1944, there were considerable tactical advantages to be had from defending the Tiber bridges,[227] but the German ambassador to the Vatican, Ernst von Weizsäcker, urged Kesselring not to do so, and Kesselring withdrew from Rome without mounting a defence there, saving the city. After the Allies occupied Rome, the open city declaration was disregarded, and they made full use of Rome for military purposes.[228]
Kesselring tried to preserve the monastery of Monte Cassino by avoiding its military occupation even though it offered superb observation over the battlefield. Ultimately this was unsuccessful, as the Allies believed the monastery would be used to direct the German artillery against their lines. On the morning of 15 February 1944, 142
War crimes
By 24 September 1943, Herbert Kappler, the German police attaché who represented the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) in Rome, had learned that Heinrich Himmler wanted him to round up and deport the Jews of Rome. Kappler was concerned about a rise of anti-German sentiment among the Italian population. The German consul in Rome and then senior embassy diplomat, Eitel Friedrich Möllhausen, also learned of the order.[233] According to writer Robert Katz, who interviewed Möllhausen in 1968, Kappler suggested that they go to Kesselring to recommend that the Jews should be used for forced labour on fortifications in Rome (as he had done with those in Tunisia). If Kesselring would agree to that solution, Kappler would consider his orders to be countermanded. In his memoirs of 1948 Möllhausen recounts that he and Kappler met with Kesselring within an hour. Upon hearing how many men Kappler would need for the roundup, Kesselring declared that he could not spare a single man, and approved of the idea of using Jewish labour.[234]
On 9 October Möllhausen was advised that the Roman Jews were to be deported and that he had not to interfere in any way.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7c/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J27567%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring%2C_Oberst_Ferdinand_Hippel.jpg/220px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J27567%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring%2C_Oberst_Ferdinand_Hippel.jpg)
On 22–23 March 1944, a 15-man American
In Rome on 23 March 1944, 33 policemen of the Police Regiment Bozen from the German-speaking population of the Italian province of South Tyrol and three Italian civilians were killed by a bomb blast and the subsequent shooting.[Notes 9] In response, Hitler approved the recommendation of Mackensen, who was responsible for the sector including Rome, that ten Italians should be shot for each policeman killed. The task fell to SS Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler who, finding there were not enough condemned prisoners available, made up the numbers using Jewish prisoners and civilians taken from the streets. The result was the Ardeatine massacre.[244]
The fall of Rome on 4 June 1944 placed Kesselring in a dangerous situation as his forces attempted to withdraw from Rome to the formidable
On 17 June, Kesselring issued a directive, "New Measures for Combating Partisans" (Bandenbekämpfung), in which he authorised measures of "utmost severity", while extolling his troops to act irrespective of "mistaken" actions they may be responsible for.[246] The order promised indemnity to soldiers who "exceed our normal restraint in the choice of severity of the methods against the partisans".[245][246] He also authorised construction of transit camps to hold suspected partisans and civilians.[246] Three days later, Kesselring issued an order authorising reprisals against the civilian population and public executions of captured partisan leaders.[247]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/70/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-316-1195-20%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring_in_PKW.jpg/220px-Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-316-1195-20%2C_Italien%2C_Albert_Kesselring_in_PKW.jpg)
Subsequently, massacres were carried out by the Hermann Göring Panzer Division at Stia in April, Civitella in Val di Chiana in June and Bucine in July 1944,[248] by the 26th Panzer Division at Padule di Fucecchio on 23 August 1944,[249] and by the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Reichsführer-SS at Sant'Anna di Stazzema in August 1944 and Marzabotto in September and October 1944.[250][251][252]
In August 1944 Kesselring was informed by Rudolf Rahn, the German ambassador to the rump Italian Social Republic (RSI), that Mussolini had filed protests about the killing of Italian citizens. In response, Kesselring rescinded his order and issued another edict to his troops on 21 August, acknowledging incidents that had "damaged the German Wehrmacht's reputation and discipline and which no longer have anything to do with reprisal operations", and launched investigations into specific cases that Mussolini cited. Between 21 July and 25 September 1944, 624 Germans were killed, 993 wounded and 872 missing in partisan operations, while some 9,520 partisans were killed.[245] During the occupation of Italy, the Germans and their fascist allies are believed to have killed some 22,000 Italian civilians.[253]
Throughout July and August 1944, Kesselring conducted a stubborn delaying action, gradually retreating to the Gothic Line. There, he was able to halt the Allied advance.[254] Holding the Allies south of the Arno River for so long was another defensive success.[255] Some partisan bands declared the area they occupied to be independent republics, including Domodossola in northern Italy on 26 September. Four days later Kesselring instructed Wolff to conduct an "anti-partisan week". By the end of October, 1,539 partisans were dead, another 1,248 were captured, 1,973 suspects had been arrested, and 2,012 had been handed over to Organisation Todt. A further blow to the partisans came from Alexander. In a radio broadcast on 13 November, he conceded that the Germans would not be driven from their positions until spring, and asked the partisans to lay down their arms until then.[256]
Casualties of the Gothic Line battles in September and October 1944 included Kesselring himself. On 23 October 1944, his car, travelling at night under blackout conditions, collided with a towed artillery piece coming out of a side road. Kesselring suffered serious head and facial injuries. He was taken to hospital in Ferrara, and did not return to his command until January 1945.[257]
Central Europe
Furthermore, we knew that in command of these forces was Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, one of the ablest officers in the Hitler armies. He had served with distinction in the German artillery, and the air force and had been on the General Staff prior to the war. Kesselring was well-qualified, both as a commander and an administrator, and he conducted the Axis operations in Italy with great skill for two years, after which he was transferred to the Western Front in Germany. I was glad to see him go. He was quick to reorganise his forces and shift reserves to meet our attacks ...
Mark Clark[258]
As he later wrote, after he recovered from the car accident, Kesselring was summoned by Hitler to relieve Generalfeldmarschall Rundstedt as
The
The triangle was already under attack from two sides by Lieutenant General
As Germany was cut in two, Kesselring's command was enlarged to include Army Groups Centre, South and South-East on the
Chaotic surrender
Meanwhile, in Italy, Wolff and Vietinghoff, now commander of Army Group C, had almost concluded a preliminary surrender agreement with the OSS chief in Switzerland, Allen Dulles. Known as Operation Sunrise, these secret negotiations had been in progress since early March 1945. Kesselring was aware of them, having previously consented to them, although he had not informed his own staff.[269] According to his memoirs, Kesselring did later inform Hitler.[270] At the last minute, Kesselring had a change of heart and decided not to accept the agreement, as he felt it might imperil Army Group G.[269] On 30 April, he relieved both Vietinghoff and his chief of staff, General der Panzertruppe Hans Röttiger, putting them at the disposition of the OKW for a possible court martial. They were replaced by General der Infanterie Friedrich Schulz and Generalmajor Friedrich Wenzel respectively.[271]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3b/Gero_von_Schulze-Gaevernitz_visits_German_headquarters_in_Bolzano.jpg/220px-Gero_von_Schulze-Gaevernitz_visits_German_headquarters_in_Bolzano.jpg)
The next morning, 1 May, Röttiger reacted by placing both Schulz and Wenzel under arrest, and summoning Lemelsen to take Schulz's place. Lemelsen initially refused, as he was in possession of a written order from Kesselring which prohibited any talks with the enemy without his explicit authorisation. By this time, Vietinghoff and Wolff had concluded an armistice with Alexander, who was now a
North of the Alps, Army Group G followed suit on 6 May. According to his memoirs, Kesselring now decided to surrender his own headquarters. He ordered Hausser to supervise the SS troops to ensure that the surrender was carried out in accordance with his instructions. Kesselring then surrendered to an American major at
In his post-war memoirs, Kesselring said he envisaged making a start on the rehabilitation of Germany following the end of the war.
Post-war
Trial
By the end of the war, for many Italians, the name of Kesselring, whose signature appeared on posters and printed orders announcing draconian measures adopted by the German occupation, had become synonymous with the oppression and terror that had characterised the German occupation. Kesselring's name headed the list of German officers blamed for a long series of atrocities perpetrated by the German forces.[277]
The Moscow Declaration of October 1943 promised that "those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected therein."[278] However, the British, who were the driving force in moulding the war crimes trial policy that culminated in the Nuremberg trials, explicitly excluded high-ranking German officers in their custody.[277]
The British held two major trials against the top German war criminals who had perpetrated crimes during the Italian campaign. For political reasons it was decided to hold the trials in Italy,[279] but a request by Italy to allow an Italian judge to participate was denied on the grounds that Italy was not an Allied country.[280] The trials were held under a royal warrant dated 18 June 1945,[281] thus under British military law. This decision put the trials on a shaky legal basis, as foreign nationals were being tried for crimes against foreigners in a foreign country.[282] The first trial, held in Rome, was of Mackensen and Generalleutnant Kurt Mälzer, the military commandant of Rome, for their part in the Ardeatine massacre. Both were sentenced to death on 30 November 1946.[283]
Kesselring's own trial began in Venice on 17 February 1947.
Kesselring was arraigned on two charges: the shooting of 335 Italians in the Ardeatine massacre, and incitement to kill Italian civilians.
The planned major trial for the campaign of reprisals never took place, but a series of smaller trials were held instead in
The only trial of German generals held by U.S. military tribunals in Italy was that of General der Infanterie
Several officers, all below the rank of general, including Kappler, were transferred to the Italian courts for trial. These applied very different legal standards from the British—ones which were often more favourable to the defendants.[297] Ironically, in view of the repeated attempts by senior Wehrmacht commanders to shift blame for atrocities onto the SS, the most senior SS commanders in Italy, Wolff and Heinrich Himmler's personal representative in Italy, SS-Standartenführer Eugen Dollmann, escaped prosecution.[294] In 1964, after Dulles had retired as head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Wolff was convicted of genocide by a German court. He was released in 1969.[298]
Commutation and release from prison
The death verdict against Kesselring generated outrage in the United Kingdom, where Kesselring was viewed sympathetically by his former foes, including the former Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and Alexander, who sent a telegram to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in which he expressed his hope that Kesselring's sentence would be commuted.[299] "As his old opponent on the battlefield", he stated, "I have no complaints against him. Kesselring and his soldiers fought against us hard but clean."[300] Alexander had expressed his admiration for Kesselring as a military commander as early as 1943.[173] In his 1961 memoirs, Alexander paid tribute to Kesselring as a commander who "showed great skill in extricating himself from the desperate situations into which his faulty intelligence had led him".[301]
Alexander's sentiments were echoed by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese, who had commanded the British Eighth Army in the Italian Campaign. In a May 1947 interview, Leese said he was "very sad" to hear of what he considered "British victor's justice" being imposed on Kesselring, an "extremely gallant soldier who had fought his battles fairly and squarely".[302] Churchill remarked that "Kesselring was a good general, with a competent staff" in Triumph and Tragedy, the final volume of his History of the Second World War.[303] Lord de L'Isle, who had been awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry at Anzio, raised the issue in the House of Lords.[304]
The Italian government refused to carry out death sentences, as the death penalty had been abolished in Italy in 1944 and was regarded as a relic of Mussolini's Fascist regime. The Italian decision was very disappointing to the British government because the trials had partly been intended to meet the expectations of the Italian public.[304] The War Office notified Lieutenant General Sir John Harding, who had succeeded Alexander as commander of British forces in the Mediterranean in 1946, that there should be no more death sentences and those already imposed should be commuted. Accordingly, Harding commuted the death sentences imposed on Mackensen, Mälzer and Kesselring to life imprisonment on 4 July 1947.[305] Mälzer died while still in prison in February 1952,[306] while Mackensen, after having his sentence reduced to 21 years, was set free in October 1952.[307]
In May 1947, Kesselring was moved from Mestre prison near Venice to Wolfsberg, Carinthia.[308] While in Wolfsberg he was approached by a former SS major who had an escape plan prepared. According to Kesselring, he declined the offer on the grounds that it would be seen as a confession of guilt. Other senior Nazi figures did manage to escape from Wolfsberg to South America or Syria.[309] In October 1947 he was transferred for the last time, to Werl Prison, in Westphalia.[308]
Kesselring resumed his work on a history of the war that he was writing for the
An influential group assembled in Britain to lobby for his release from prison. Headed by
Meanwhile, in Germany, the release of military prisoners had become a political issue. With the establishment of
In July 1952, Kesselring was diagnosed with a cancerous growth in his throat.[318] During World War I, he had frequently smoked up to twenty cigars per day but had quit smoking in 1925.[20] Although the British were suspicious of the diagnosis, they were concerned that he might die in prison as Mälzer did, which would be a public relations disaster. Kesselring was transferred to a hospital, under guard.[318] In October 1952, he was released from his prison sentence on the grounds of ill health.[319] His release unleashed a storm of protest in Italy.[320]
Later life
In 1952, while still in the hospital, Kesselring accepted the honorary presidency of three veterans' organisations. The first was the Luftwaffenring, consisting of Luftwaffe veterans. The Verband deutsches Afrikakorps, the veterans' association of the Afrika Korps, soon followed. More controversial was the presidency of the right-wing veterans' association, Der Stahlhelm. The leadership of this organisation tarnished his reputation.[321] He attempted to reform the organisation, proposing that the new German flag be flown instead of the old Imperial Flag; that the old Stahlhelm greeting Front heil! be abolished; and that members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany be allowed to join. The response from the organisation was unenthusiastic.[322]
Kesselring's release caused an outcry and indignation in the
Kesselring's memoirs were published in 1953, as Soldat bis zum letzten Tag (A Soldier to the Last Day). The English edition was published a year later as A Soldier's Record. Kesselring's contentions that the Luftwaffe was not defeated in the air in the Battle of Britain and that Operation Sea Lion—the invasion of Britain—was thought about, but never seriously planned, were controversial.[261] During the 1950s, in the absence of other sources, military historians often used memoirs as sources.[324] An important flaw in his memoirs was a reluctance to criticise others, to the extent of representing decisions with which he strongly disagreed at the time as being the product of consensus.[324]
The book sold well,[324] but critics were cautious. While recognising his talents as a general, Die Zeit noted that Kesselring "clearly never posed himself the question: 'Where does blind obedience end and a sense of responsibility start to take effect, if not at the highest levels of command?'"[325] Reviewing the English edition, Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., who had commanded the US 3rd Infantry Division, VI Corps and Fifth Army in Italy, reviewed the book for The New York Times. He noted the esteem in which Kesselring was held by his enemies, but also the "thread of self-justification for the indifference of himself and fellow officers to Nazi excesses."[326] In 1955, Kesselring published a second book, Gedanken zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Thoughts on the Second World War).[327]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2f/Propaganda_gegen_Altnazis_im_Westen%2C_Berlin_1957.jpg/220px-Propaganda_gegen_Altnazis_im_Westen%2C_Berlin_1957.jpg)
Kesselring protested what he regarded as the "unjustly smirched reputation of the German soldier".[261] In November 1953, testifying at a war crimes trial, he warned that "there won't be any volunteers for the new German army if the German government continues to try German soldiers for acts committed in World War II".[261] He enthusiastically supported the European Defence Community and suggested that the "war opponents of yesterday must become the peace comrades and friends of tomorrow".[261] On the other hand, he also declared that he found "astonishing" those who believe "that we must revise our ideas in accordance with democratic principles ... That is more than I can take."[261]
In March 1954, Kesselring and Liny toured Austria, ostensibly as private citizens. He met with former comrades-in-arms and prison-mates, some of them former SS members, causing embarrassment to the Austrian government, which ordered his deportation. He ignored the order and completed his tour, before leaving a week later, as he had intended.[328] His only official government service was on the Medals Commission, which was established by President Theodor Heuss. Ultimately, the commission unanimously recommended that medals should be permitted to be worn—but without the swastika.[329] He was an expert witness for the "Generals' Trials". The Generals' Trials were trials of German citizens before German courts for crimes committed in Germany, the most prominent of which was that of Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schörner.[328]
Kesselring died in a
In 2000, a memorial event was held in Bad Wiessee marking the fortieth anniversary of Kesselring's death. No representatives of the Bundeswehr attended, on the grounds that Kesselring was "not worthy of being part of our tradition". Instead, two veterans groups, the Deutsche Montecassino Vereinigung (German Monte Cassino Association) and the Bund Deutscher Fallschirmjäger (Association of German Paratroopers), took on the task of remembering Kesselring. To his ageing troops, Kesselring remained a commander to be commemorated.[333]
Baton
Kesselring's Generalfeldmarschall's baton was seized by a private serving as a scout with the US 2nd Armored Division, the first US division to enter Berlin, in July 1945. He was ordered to search castles that had been used by high-ranking German officers and found the baton. It remained in his possession until his death in 1977, when it passed to his widow, and then to his son, who put it up for auction by Alex Cooper auctioneers in 2010. Expected to fetch between US$10,000 and $15,000, it was sold to a private bidder for $731,600.[334][335]
Footnotes
- eszett (Keßelring), a variant his father preferred.[1]
- ^ Many other generals received significantly more: Erhard Milch, Gerd von Rundstedt and Günther von Kluge each received a total of 250,000 ℛ︁ℳ︁; Ewald von Kleist was given 480,000 ℛ︁ℳ︁; and Wilhelm Keitel asked for and got a tract of confiscated land worth 730,000 ℛ︁ℳ︁.[18]
- ^ KG 1 and KG 2 flew in full strength.[90] Both bomber wings were under Kesselring's command.[91]
- ^ The nickname "Smiling Albert" was bestowed on Kesselring by the Allies. It is not used by German writers.[3] It was used during the war. In 1941, newspapers referred to him as "the keep smiling general".[150] By 1943, news sources were referring to him as "Smiling Albert".[151][152]
- ^ Two parts of Italy were annexed by Germany: South Tyrol and the area around Trieste.[182]
- ^ Hitler's opinion of Rommel may have declined after the 20 July 1944 bomb plot.[200]
- ^ Between June 1940 and April 1945, 59,796 Italian civilians and 4,558 Italian servicemen died in Allied air raids.[212]
- ^ Although sometimes described as an SS unit, Polizeiregiment Bozen was not incorporated into the SS until a month after the 23 March 1944 bombing.[243]
Notes
- ^ Macksey, Kesselring – The Making of the Luftwaffe, p. 15.
- ^ a b "Albert Kesselring" (in German). Deutsches Historisches Museum. Archived from the original on 2 November 2007. Retrieved 3 November 2007.
- ^ a b c d Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 16.
- ^ a b c Corum, The Luftwaffe, p. 331.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 18.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 17.
- ^ Macksey, Kesselring – The Making of the Luftwaffe, pp. 13, 243.
- ^ a b Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, p. 21.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 17.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 19.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 19–20.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 22.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 19–26.
- ^ Hooton, Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm 1933–39, pp. 30–31.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 24.
- ^ a b Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 44.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 23.
- ^ Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth and Reality, p. 155.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 31.
- ^ a b Gellately (ed), The Nuremberg Interviews, p. 320.
- ^ Corum, The Luftwaffe, p. 236.
- ^ Zabecki, Germany at War, p. 690.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 25.
- ^ a b c Corum, The Luftwaffe, p. 235.
- ^ a b Corum, The Luftwaffe, p. 248.
- ^ Corum, The Luftwaffe, p. 241.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 16.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 10.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 175, 177.
- ^ Grynkewich, "Handmaid" of the Army? The American Perception of German Bombardment Doctrine prior to the Battle of Britain, p. 63.
- ^ Grynkewich, "Handmaid" of the Army? The American Perception of German Bombardment Doctrine prior to the Battle of Britain, pp. 63–64.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 30.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Gray and Cox, Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, p. 148.
- ^ Hooton, The Gathering Storm, p. 87.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 44–46.
- ^ Macksey, Kesselring – The Making of the Luftwaffe, p. 16.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 182–185.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 177, 184–185.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 31.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 187–188.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 55.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 25, 231.
- ^ Hooton, The Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power, pp. 62–63 and Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, p. 195.
- ^ a b Hooton, The Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power, pp. 68–69.
- ^ a b Hooton, The Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power, p. 69.
- ^ Amersfoort and Kamphuis, May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands, p. 131.
- ^ van den Doel, Not a Bridge Too Far, pp. 362–370, 378–382.
- ^ Hooton, Blitzkrieg in the West, p. 52.
- ^ van den Doel, Not a Bridge Too Far, pp. 382–388.
- ^ Hooton, Blitzkrieg in the West, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, p. 249.
- ^ "Smiling Albert". The News. Vol. 41, no. 6, 284. Adelaide. 18 September 1943. p. 2. Retrieved 23 June 2019 – via National Library of Australia.
- ^ a b van den Doel, Not a Bridge Too Far, pp. 348–356.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 56.
- ^ Corum, Wolfram von Richthofen, pp. 196–197.
- ^ Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, pp. 290–295.
- ^ Corum, Wolfram von Richthofen, pp. 206–208.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 263–264.
- ^ Hooton, Phoenix Triumphant, pp. 267, 291.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle: War Crimes Trials and Cold War Politics, 1945–1960, p. 231.
- ^ Price, Battle of Britain Day, pp. 17–18.
- ^ Ray, The Night Blitz, p. 88.
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, pp. 123, 125.
- ^ Price, The Hardest Day, p. 229.
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 211.
- ^ Stansky, The First Day of the Blitz, p. 26.
- ^ a b Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 52.
- ^ Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, p. 439.
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 216.
- ^ Stansky, The First Day of the Blitz, p. 26
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, pp. 368–369.
- ^ Price, Battle of Britain Day, p. 12.
- ^ Overy, The Bombing War, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Overy, The Battle of Britain, p. 38.
- ^ Price, Battle of Britain Day, p. 13.
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 333.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Price, Battle of Britain Day, pp. 114, 116.
- ^ Price, Battle of Britain Day, pp. 116, 119.
- ^ Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 364.
- ^ Wood and Dempster, The Narrow Margin, p. 120.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, pp. 33–34.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, p. 37.
- ^ Goss, The Luftwaffe's Blitz: The Inside Story: November 1940 – May 1941, pp. 48, 52.
- ^ Goss, The Luftwaffe's Blitz: The Inside Story: November 1940 – May 1941, pp. 223–245.
- ^ Goss, The Luftwaffe's Blitz: The Inside Story: November 1940 – May 1941, p. 223.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, pp. 294–295.
- ^ a b Goss, The Luftwaffe's Blitz: The Inside Story: November 1940 – May 1941, p. 225.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, p. 294.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 64.
- ^ Murray, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 76–77.
- ^ National Archives, Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933–1945, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Boog, The Invasion of the Soviet Union, p. 359.
- ^ Overy, The Air War, 1939–1945, p. 52.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, pp. 92–96.
- ^ Glantz, Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia, 1941, p. 32.
- ^ Major Ratley III, A Lesson Of History: The Luftwaffe and Barbarossa, p. 51.
- ^ Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941, pp. 42–43, 85.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 65.
- ^ a b Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941, pp. 89, 93, 97–98.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, p. 97.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Bergström, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, pp. 48, 50.
- ^ Glantz, Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia, 1941, p. 135.
- ^ Muller, The German Air War in Russia, pp. 51–53.
- ^ Bergström, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, p. 91.
- ^ Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941, pp. 233–234.
- ^ Bergström, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, p. 93.
- ^ Bergström, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, pp. 93–94.
- ^ Bergström, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, pp. 116–117.
- ^ Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II and Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Power, 1941–1945, pp. 72, 215.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, p. 369.
- ^ Stangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring: Great Commander or War Criminal?, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b c Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 127.
- ^ Levine, The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, pp. 20–30.
- ^ Hooton, Eagle in Flames, pp. 210–217.
- ^ a b Jellison, Besieged, pp. 102–103.
- ^ Spooner, Supreme Gallantry, p. 11.
- ^ Spooner, Supreme Gallantry, pp. 3, 5.
- ^ Holland, Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege, pp. 315–340.
- ^ a b Playfair et al., British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb, pp. 193–195.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 109, 128.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, pp. 665–670.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, pp. 683–684.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, pp. 686–689.
- ^ a b Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, p. 699.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 236.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, p. 710.
- ^ Levine, The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, p. 24.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, pp. 709–710.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, p. 720.
- ^ Playfair et al., British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb, p. 338.
- ^ Ehlers, The Mediterranean Air War, pp. 200–222.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, pp. 79–80.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, pp. 711–715.
- ^ Levine, The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Stumpf, Germany and the Second World War, p. 786.
- ^ Gellately (ed), The Nuremberg Interviews, p. 321.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, p. 32.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 33.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, pp. 261, 293.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, p. 344.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, pp. 477–479.
- ^ Schreiber, The End of the North African Campaign, pp. 1104–1107.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, p. 666.
- ^ Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, p. 677.
- ^ Levine, War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, pp. 79–80.
- Cairns Post. No. 12, 383. Queensland, Australia. 29 October 1941. p. 1. Retrieved 23 June 2019 – via National Library of Australia.
- ^ "Battle of Africa – Kesselring's Job". The Daily Telegraph. Vol. IV, no. 24. New South Wales, Australia. 25 April 1943. p. 11. Retrieved 23 June 2019 – via National Library of Australia.
- ^ "Up the Boot". Time. 19 April 1944. Retrieved 14 April 2020.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 88.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 46.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 80–82.
- ^ a b Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 161.
- ^ Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 107–108.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 160.
- ^ Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 57.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 163.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 174.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 204.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 237.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 163–164.
- ^ a b Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 190.
- ^ Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 195.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 409–417.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 61.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 67–68.
- ^ a b Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 60–61.
- ^ a b Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, p. 306.
- ^ a b Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 171.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 316.
- ^ Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, pp. 310–311.
- ^ Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, p. 320.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 63–66.
- ^ Carrier, The Regio Esercito in Co-Belligerency, p. 106.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 523–532.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 534–535.
- ^ Pezzino, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied, p. 326.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 63–64.
- ^ Lingen, Hitler's Military Elite, p. 171.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 81.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 177–178.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 177.
- ^ Gooderson, A Hard Way to Make a War, pp. 162–163, 221–223.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 112–117.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 130.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 102.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 135–136.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 182–183.
- ^ Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, p. 319.
- ^ Gooderson, A Hard Way to Make a War, pp. 221–223, 234–236.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 235.
- ^ Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, p. 318.
- ^ Gooderson, A Hard Way to Make a War, pp. 239–240, 249–250.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 186–187.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 244–245.
- ^ Mavrogordato, Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy, p. 321.
- ^ a b Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 245–246.
- ^ Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 319–322.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 315–319.
- ^ a b Bennett, Ultra and Some Command Decisions, p. 136.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 192–193.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 319.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 363–364.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 193–194.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, pp. 383–384.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 442.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 445.
- ^ Mark, A New Look at Operation Strangle, pp. 176–180.
- ^ Schreiber, The End of the North African Campaign and the War in Italy, 1943 to 1945, p. 1126.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 42–44.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 97–100.
- ^ Mark, A New Look at Operation Strangle, pp. 180–182.
- ^ Bennett, Ultra and Some Command Decisions, p. 138.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 189–190.
- ^ Matthews, Clark's Decision to Drive on Rome, pp. 359–363.
- ^ Citino, In the Mountains, p. 1056.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 39.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 209.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, p. 290.
- ^ Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 278–280.
- ^ Tengrove, Allied Strategy and the Open City Question: Rome 1942–1944, pp. 22–29.
- ^ Lytton, Bombing Policy in the Rome and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of World War II, pp. 53–60.
- ^ Tengrove, Allied Strategy and the Open City Question: Rome 1942–1944, pp. 31–32.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 203–204.
- ^ Tengrove, Allied Strategy and the Open City Question: Rome 1942–1944, p. 34.
- ^ Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 441.
- ^ Gellately (ed), The Nuremberg Interviews, p. 325.
- ^ Gellately (ed), The Nuremberg Interviews, p. 324.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 37.
- ^ Breitman, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b Katz, The Möllhausen Telegram, pp. 227–229, 233.
- ^ Breitman, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Pezzino, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied, p. 325.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 115.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 97–100.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 117–120.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 133–136.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 187–188.
- ^ a b Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 169–174.
- ^ Raiber, Anatomy of Perjury, p. 41.
- ^ Raider, Anatomy of Perjury, pp. 80–83.
- ^ a b c d Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 43–44.
- ^ a b c Blood, Hitler's Bandit Hunters, p. 246.
- ^ Blood, Hitler's Bandit Hunters, p. 247.
- ^ a b "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 9, 13 March 1946". Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. Archived from the original on 19 August 2007. Retrieved 21 November 2007.
- ^ Mitcham, Rommel's Lieutenants, p. 121.
- ^ "Italy convicts Nazis of massacre". BBC. 13 January 2007. Retrieved 4 April 2009.
- ^ Rising, David (10 January 2012). "Sant'Anna di Stazzema Massacre by 16th SS-Panzergrenadier Division 'Reichsfuehrer SS' Probe Shelved". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 5 October 2012.
- ^ Popham, Peter (15 January 2007). "Italy convicts Nazis for civilian massacre". The Independent. Archived from the original on 21 October 2020. Retrieved 19 October 2020.
- ^ Armellini, Alvise (5 April 2016). "New study: Number of casualties in Nazi massacres in Italy nearly double as previously believed". Haaretz. Retrieved 30 June 2019.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 255–259.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 279–280.
- ^ Holland, Italy's Sorropw, pp. 444–446.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, p. 387.
- ^ Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 184.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 221.
- ^ DeGuingand, Operation Victory, p. 444.
- ^ a b c d e f "Smiling Al". Time. 19 April 1954. Retrieved 14 April 2020.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 27.
- ^ a b Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 244.
- ^ MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 244.
- ^ MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 264–265.
- ^ MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 444–445.
- ^ MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 458–459.
- ^ Sangster, Field-Marshal Kesselring, p. 152.
- ^ a b Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 513–521.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 289.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 525–526.
- ^ Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, pp. 526–534.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 290–291.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 63.
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 287.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 62.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 78.
- ^ "The Moscow Conference, October 1943". Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. Archived from the original on 8 April 2009. Retrieved 11 April 2009.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 76–77.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 80–81.
- ^ See "Royal Warrant of 18 June 1945". Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. Retrieved 26 April 2017.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 73.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 87–89.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 109.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 107.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 92–96.
- ^ a b "Case No. 44 The Trial of Albert Kesselring". University of the West of England. Archived from the original on 5 December 2008. Retrieved 11 April 2009.
- ^ Bloxham, Genocide on Trial , p. 77.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 110–118.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 118–119, 354–355.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 307.
- ^ Pezzino, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied, p. 329.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 84.
- ^ Pezzino, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied, pp. 329–330.
- ^ "Noteworthy War Criminals. Second World War Europe. Generals and Senior Officers. UNWCC". phdn.org. Retrieved 26 April 2023.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 297.
- ^ Lingen, Conspiracy of Silence, pp. 94–95.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 128–129.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 359.
- ^ Alexander, The Alexander Memoirs 1940–1945, p. 125.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 130.
- ^ Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 85.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 131.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 91.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 242.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 250.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 147.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 366.
- ^ Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 64–67.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 150–152.
- ^ von Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 308.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 160–162.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 211–212.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 178–181.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 199.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 239.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 242–243.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 248.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 238.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 244–246.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 272.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 257–258, 405.
- ^ a b c Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 280.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 281.
- ProQuest 113106250.
- ^ Kesselring, Gedanken zum Zweiten Weltkrieg.
- ^ a b Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, pp. 274–278.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 269.
- ^ Lingen, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag? Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, p. 220.
- ^ Macksey, Kesselring – The Making of the Luftwaffe, p. 245.
- ^ As reported in (in Italian) Arrigo Petacco, La seconda guerra mondiale – I protagonisti, Armando Curcio Editore, Roma, Vol. 8, p. 198.
- ^ Lingen, Kesselring's Last Battle, p. 301.
- ^ Rodricks, Dan (12 December 2010). "Nazi baton fetches over $700,000 at auction in Towson". The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved 25 October 2022.
- ^ "High price for Nazi baton". The Sydney Morning Herald. 14 December 2010. Retrieved 7 September 2018.
References
- OCLC 59027464.
- Bennett, Ralph (January 1981). "Ultra and Some Command Decisions". Journal of Contemporary History. 16 (1, The Second World War: Part 1): 131–151. S2CID 159810230.
- Bergström, Christer (2007). Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July-December 1941. Midland/Ian Allan. OCLC 237026201.
- Blood, Philip W. (2006). OCLC 488509257.
- OCLC 47677194.
- OCLC 22107. Archived from the original(PDF) on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 31 January 2011.
- OCLC 729640781.
- OCLC 58052021.
- OCLC 470604674.
- Carrier (2018). "The Regio Esercito in Co-Belligerency, October 1943 – April 1945". In Sica, Emanuele; Carrier, Richard (eds.). Italy and the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives. History of Warfare. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. pp. 95–125. OCLC 1090168867.
- OCLC 396153.
- OCLC 358946.
- OCLC 949193796.
- OCLC 1054399357.
- OCLC 36485848.
- OCLC 1099627893.
- ISBN 978-0-7146-8257-0.
- OCLC 1276427.
- Wood, Derek; Dempster, Derek (2010). The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power. Barnsley: Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1848843-141.
- van den Doel, H. W. (2010). "Not a Bridge Too Far: The Battle for the Moerdijk Bridges, Dordrecht and Rotterdam". In Amersfoort, Herman; Kamphuis, Piet (eds.). May 1940: The Battle for Nertherlands. History of Warfare. Leiden; Boston: Brill. pp. 343–394. OCLC 631516792.
- OCLC 711869.
- Ehlers, Robert (2015). The Mediterranean Air War: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. OCLC 909724566.
- Fellgiebel, Walther-Peer (2000). Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939–1945 — Die Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkrieges aller Wehrmachtteile [The Bearers of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross 1939–1945 — The Owners of the Highest Award of the Second World War of all Wehrmacht Branches] (in German). Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas. OCLC 165216920.
- Fisher, Ernest F. (1977). Cassino to the Alps (PDF). United States Army in World War II: The War in the Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army. OCLC 2463467. Archived from the original(PDF) on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 14 June 2014.
- OCLC 60671776.
- Garland, Albert N.; Smyth, Howard McGaw (1963). Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (PDF). United States Army in World War II: The War in the Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army. OCLC 396186. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
- Gellately, Robert, ed. (2004). The Nuremberg Interviews. New York City: Alfred A. Knopf. OCLC 53477178.
- Gooderstein, Ian (2008). A Hard Way to Make a War. London: Conway. OCLC 1108173506.
- OCLC 490961870.
- Grynkewich, Alexus G. (Summer 1997). "Handmaid of the Army? The American Perception of German Bombardment Doctrine Prior to the Battle of Britain". Airpower Journal. 11 (2). Air University Press: 58–69.
- Hardesty, Von (1992). Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941–1945. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. ISBN 1-56098-071-0.
- Hardesty, Von; Grinberg, Ilya (2012). Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II. Kansas: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 978-0-7006-1828-6.
- Holland, James (2008). Italy's Sorrow. London: Harper. OCLC 851763559.
- Holland, Matthew (2003). Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege. London: Phoenix. ISBN 0-304-36654-4.
- Hooton, Edward (1994). Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe. Arms & Armour. OCLC 974279361.
- Hooton, Edward (1997). Eagle in Flames: The Fall of the Luftwaffe. Weidenfeld Military. OCLC 925346621.
- Hooton, Edward (2007). Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm 1933–39. Vol. 1. London: Ian Allan. OCLC 213379848.
- ——— (2007). Luftwaffe at War: Blitzkrieg in the West. London: Chevron/Ian Allan. OCLC 696860718.
- Howe, George F. (1957). Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (PDF). United States Army in World War II: The War in the Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Department of the Army. OCLC 23304011. Archived from the original(PDF) on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 14 June 2014.
- Levine, Alan (2008). The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, 1942–43. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole. OCLC 973688587.
- Jellison, Charles Albert (1984). Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940–1942. Hanover, New Hampshire: for University of New Hampshire by University Press of New England. OCLC 11370592.
- OCLC 845643771.
- OCLC 44573336.
- Kesselring, Albert (1955). Gedanken zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (in German). Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag. OCLC 4225015.
- Kesselring, Albert (2007). The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring. Greenhill Books. OCLC 438493348.
- Levine, Alan (2008). The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines, 1942–43. Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-81173-458-5.
- OCLC 610997062.
- ISSN 1438-8332.
- Project MUSE.
- OCLC 263605489.
- OCLC 910966211.
- Lytton, Henry D. (1 April 1983). "Bombing Policy in the Rome and Pre-Normandy Invasion Aerial Campaigns of World War II: Bridge-Bombing Strategy Vindicated – and Railyard-Bombing Strategy Invalidated". Military Affairs. 47 (2): 53–60. ProQuest 1296644342.
- OCLC 963582.
- OCLC 4656727.
- OCLC 974591405.
- Mark, Eduard (October 1988). "A New Look at Operation Strangle". Military Affairs. 52 (4): 176–184. JSTOR 1988449.
- Matthews, Sidney T. (1987) [1960]. "Clark's Decision to Drive on Rome". In Greenfield, Kent Roberts (ed.). Command Decisions (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. pp. 351–363. OCLC 1022563809. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
- Mavrogordato, Ralph S. (1987) [1960]. "Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy". In Greenfield, Kent Roberts (ed.). Command Decisions (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. pp. 303–322. OCLC 1022563809. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
- OCLC 259254630.
- OCLC 415492217.
- ISBN 978-1-877-85313-5.
- OCLC 8846379.
- ISBN 978-1-903365304.
- ISBN 978-1-57488-716-7.
- ISBN 978-0-393-02008-3.
- Overy, Richard J. (2013). The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945. London & New York: ISBN 978-0-7139-9561-9.
- Pezzino, Paolo (2018). "Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Punishment of War Crimes Committed in Italy by the Germans After 8 September 1943". In Sica, Emanuele; Carrier, Richard (eds.). Italy and the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives. History of Warfare. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. pp. 325–355. OCLC 1090168867.
- OCLC 276341649.
- Plocher, Herman (1965). Fletcher, Harry (ed.). The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941 (PDF). USAF Historical Studies. US Air Force Historical Research Agency. OCLC 313376298. Retrieved 11 November 2007.
- OCLC 247081483.
- OCLC 973510537.
- Raiber, Richard (2008). Anatomy of Perjury: Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Via Rasella, and the Ginny mission. Newark: University of Delaware Press. OCLC 171287684.
- Ratley III, Lonnie (March–April 1983). "A Lesson Of History: The Luftwaffe and Barbarossa". Airpower Journal. 34 (3). Air University Press: 51–66.
- Ray, John (2004). The Night Blitz: 1940–1941. -London: Cassell Military. OCLC 44152972.
- Sangster, Andrew (2015). Field-Marshal Kesselring: Great Commander or War Criminal?. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars. OCLC 905844022.
- OCLC 1003297359.
- OCLC 190588403.
- Spooner, Tony (1996). Supreme Gallantry: Malta's Role in the Allied Victory, 1939–1945. London. )
- Stansky, Peter (2007). The First Day of the Blitz. OCLC 1091606801.
- Stumpf, Reinhard (2001). "The Air War in the Mediterranean Area 1942–1943: Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean". Volume VI: The Global War. OCLC 914353129.
- Trengove, G. J. (1990). "Allied Strategy and the Open City Question: Rome 1942–1944". War & Society. 8 (2): 17–37. ISSN 0729-2473.
- OCLC 61285725.
- OCLC 938893948.
External links
- "Albert Kesselring 1885–1960" (in German). Deutsches Historisches Museum. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
- "Kesselring testifies at Nuremberg Trial" (in English and German). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Accession Number: 2001.358.1 RG Number: RG-60.2945 Film ID: 2375. Retrieved 8 September 2019.
- Newspaper clippings about Albert Kesselring in the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW