Đỗ Mười
Đỗ Mười | |
---|---|
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam | |
In office 22 June 1988 – 8 August 1991 | |
Preceded by | Võ Văn Kiệt |
Succeeded by | Võ Văn Kiệt |
Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam | |
In office December 1969 – 2 July 1976 | |
Prime Minister | Phạm Văn Đồng |
Minister of Construction | |
In office June 1973 – November 1977 | |
Preceded by | Trần Đại Nghĩa |
Succeeded by | Đồng Sĩ Nguyên |
Personal details | |
Born | Nguyễn Duy Cống 2 February 1917 Thanh Trì District, Hanoi, French Indochina |
Died | 1 October 2018 Hanoi, Vietnam | (aged 101)
Nationality | Vietnamese |
Political party | Communist Party of Vietnam (1939–1997) |
Đỗ Mười (Vietnamese:
Đỗ Mười was an advisor to the Central Committee from 1997 until 2001, when the institution of Advisory Council of the Central Committee was abolished. He was a delegate to the
Early life and career
Đỗ Mười, also known as Đỗ Bảo, was born on 2 February 1917 in Dong Phu,
During the
At the 4th Party Congress, the first since the reunification of Vietnam, Đỗ Mười was elected to the Politburo as an alternate member.[6] In July 1977, the Committee for the Transformation of Industry and Trade was established with Nguyễn Văn Linh serving as chairman and Đỗ Mười serving as deputy chairman.[7] The goal of the committee was to initiate the socialist transformation of southern Vietnam by socialising the economy through nationalisation and collectivization.[7] The codename for the campaign was X2.[7] Linh did not serve long as chairman and he was accused of "Rightism"[7] and was replaced by Đỗ Mười in February 1978.[7] Đỗ Mười was given the post because the Party leadership had been impressed by his work in the socialist transformation drive of North Vietnam in the 1950s.[7] At the time, Đỗ Mười was renowned by his motto; "Capitalists are like sewer rats; whenever one sees them popping up one must smash them to death!"[7] On 31 March 1978 Đỗ Mười signed a decree, on the behalf of Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đông, on forbidding private property in Vietnam.[8] On his command, more than 60,000 youth groups were sent across Vietnam to close down private businesses.[9]
In November 1977, Đỗ Mười was succeeded as Minister of Construction by Đồng Sĩ Nguyên.[10] Đỗ Mười was elected to the Politburo in the aftermath of the 5th Party Congress.[10] In the Politburo he served as a protege of Lê Duẩn, the General Secretary and the dominant leader of Vietnam.[10] By 1984 Đỗ Mười was subscribing to the view that the Vietnamese economic system needed to be reformed; his original plan was to reform the price and wage system and to abolish subsidies for state enterprises.[11] However, he did not support the view that radical reforms were needed and he still firmly believed in the superiority of the planned economy over the market economy.[11] In 1985 Đỗ Mười was assigned with the task of reviewing the accomplishments of various General Departments.[12]
Lê Duẩn died on 10 July 1986 and was briefly succeeded by Trường Chinh.[13] Chinh proved to be a temporary replacement and at the 6th Party Congress, held in December 1986, he was deposed and replaced by Nguyễn Văn Linh.[13] Linh initiated the reform programme Đổi Mới (meaning "renovation") to establish a socialist-oriented market economy.[14] When Premier Phạm Hùng died on 10 March 1988, the Central Committee nominated Đỗ Mười for the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the official title of head of government) to the National Assembly of Vietnam, certain delegates of the National Assembly responded by nominating Võ Văn Kiệt for the post instead.[15] The reason was that Đỗ Mười was ideologically conservative and was skeptical of the Đổi Mới policies, while Kiệt, in contrast, was reform-minded.[15] Đỗ Mười won the election, but Kiệt managed to win 36 percent of the votes – a high percentage for an opponent in Vietnam.[15]
Premiership
As Premier Đỗ Mười supported implementation of the reform program.[11] In April 1987 farmers in southern Vietnam began protesting against collectivised agriculture, with some even occupying government offices.[16] The response of the authorities varied; Đỗ Mười claimed that low productivity in agriculture was an organisational problem and not systemic.[16] He claimed that productivity was influenced by resource availability, but since that varied regionally, the solution would be decentralisation.[16] The farms would rely on detailed local planning, regular inspections and good management and organisation.[16] This solution would, he believed, solve the wasteful expenditure on agriculture and inappropriate allocation and land utilization.[16]
Đỗ Mười was appointed Chairman of the Socio-economic Drafting Subcommittee of the Council of Ministers in 1989 or 1990.[17] The committee was tasked to draft a socio-economic strategy for the Vietnamese economy until the year 2000.[17] Its members also discussed the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1991–1995).[17]
At the 10th Plenum of the 6th Central Committee (held September 1990), Đỗ Mười's report to the plenum stressed the substantial drop of Soviet and Eastern Bloc assistance levels to Vietnam, the concurrent increase in imports, the level of national debt and "natural calamities" in agriculture.[18] Đỗ Mười laid emphasis on political stability, repair of the financial system, controlling inflation and "wasteful spending" and "excessive capital construction plans."[18] In his plans for 1991, Đỗ Mười sought to:[19]
- develop export markets and draw increased foreign investments to Vietnam and to obtain foreign technology;[19]
- eliminate state subsidies in production, business and capital construction;[19]
- rationalise state policies by privatising inefficient state-run enterprises;[19]
- encourage family-based economic units; and[19]
- undertake regional development, creating employment and reducing unemployment.[19]
General Secretary
First term (1991–1996)
Domestic policy
At the 7th National Congress, Nguyễn Văn Linh stepped down as General Secretary because of poor health.[20] Đỗ Mười was appointed the party's General Secretary at the 1st plenum of the 7th Congress.[20] Đỗ Mười became the de facto leader of the conservatives; party officials, ideologues and supporters of state-owned domination of the economy supported his tenure.[20] In the meantime, Võ Văn Kiệt, the premier, became the head of the reformist faction, while Lê Đức Anh as president, represented the military faction.[20]
The split in executive power led to the writing of the 1992 Constitution.[21] The constitution reduced the General Secretary's powers and while the constitution referred to him as the party's leader, he had no executive or legislative powers.[21] However, Article 4 enshrines the role of the Communist Party as "the leading force in the State and society", giving the general secretary authority on the overall direction of policy.[21] The 1992 Constitution led to the disappearance of party strongmen such as Lê Duẩn.[22] In the words of Đỗ Mười; "In the leadership over the building of the state apparatus and appointment of state officials, the party sets forth views, principles and guiding orientations related to the organization of the state apparatus; it considers and makes suggestions about the points raised by the state, which is [then] left to make decisions."[22]
At the 7th Congress, the majority of Politburo seats were filled by conservatives.[23] Together with the emerging military/security group in the Politburo and the Central Committee, the new party leadership was more focused on security and stability than its predecessor.[23] In 1994, four new members were appointed to the Politburo, all of whom opposed radical reform.[24] Despite conservative maneuvering, the economic reforms proved highly successful and economic growth between the 7th and 8th Party Congresses averaged 8 percent.[24] This growth rate was not sustainable in the long run without more reforms. However, the conservatives believed this would lead to instability and possibly even threaten the Party's hold on power.[25] The reformers supported change, believing that faster growth would better enhance security.[25] However, with the Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s, growth plummeted to 2 percent.[25]
Factional infighting emerged between the 7th and 8th Party Congress, crippling the country's leadership.
The conservatives launched a campaign led by Đào Duy Tùng, the editor-in-chief of Communist Review (Vietnamese: Tạp chí Cộng Sản).[27] Thanks to his support within the party, he attained unprecedented control over personnel appointments and the drafting of the Political Report to the 8th Congress, however, at the 10th Central Committee meeting of the 7th Congress, he was accused of "anti-democratic behaviour" and abuse of power and was not reelected to the Politburo, gaining only 10 percent of the vote.[28] The fall of Đào Duy Tùng, Đỗ Mười's planned successor, led to a compromise: the general secretary, prime minister and president were reelected at the 8th Congress without a majority because of the conservative – reformist power struggle.[28] However, significant turnover within the party leadership occurred and for the first time in years, the central party figures lost ground to the provincial party branches and bureaucrats – only 8.9 percent of the new Central Committee members came from the central party apparatus, while 67 percent of the new members had either an immediate provincial or government background.[28]
Foreign policy
At the 3rd plenum of the 7th Central Committee (held 14–18 July 1992) Đỗ Mười reaffirmed the importance of the party's foreign policy. He further emphasized "foreign policy plays a more and more important role .... We have realized that in the present era, no country – regardless of its high degree of development – can close its doors to the world. For a country with a very poor starting point like Vietnam, it is very important for it to strive to gain outside sources of strength."[29] While seeking relations with Western and capitalist countries, Đỗ Mười affirmed the importance of good relations with the "socialist countries, the communist and international workers movement, the movement for national independence, the Non-Aligned Movement and all other peaceful and progressive forces worldwide."[29] He expressed the Party's concern that such an open foreign policy would weaken national security, but stated "Over the past several years, hostile forces have relentlessly carried out acts of sabotage against our country. However, their dark schemes and maneuvers have all been foiled by our people."[29] Meaning, that while Vietnam would seek to strengthen its international presence, these contacts would not be allowed to change the character of Vietnamese socialism.[30]
Following the failed
On 27 June, following Đỗ Mười's election as General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, used the occasion to congratulate Đỗ Mười and stated that he hoped that relations between China and Vietnam would be normalized, on a state-to-state and a party-to-party basis.[33] In a series of July meetings, relations between the two countries further improved and Lê Đức Anh was invited to China by CPC.[33] Normalization arrived in November when Đỗ Mười and Võ Văn Kiệt visited China and held discussions with Jiang and Premier Li Peng that later led to an 11-point communique.[34] Relations would further improve in 1992, when several CPV and CPC cadres met.[34]
With the "
While relations between Vietnam and
In February 1992, China passed a law claiming the whole of the South China Sea.[40] When the matter was discussed at the Vietnam National Assembly, a stormy, private debate took place.[40] While some called for economic sanctions or even military intervention, on the advice of the Central Committee's Commission for External Relations, it adopted a declaration as the best response to the issue.[40] Nguyễn Văn Linh visited China to discuss the law, but during the visit Chinese officials signed an agreement with Crestone Energy Corporation for exploratory drilling on Vietnam's continental shelf.[40] At the 3rd plenum of the 7th Central Committee, criticism of China was harsh and Đỗ Mười accused China of expansionism.[40] In 1995 Đỗ Mười led a delegation to China.[41] He met with Jiang, Li and others.[42]
Second term (1996–1997)
Domestic policy
Before the 8th National Congress, the stalemate between the conservatives and reformers continued.
Foreign policy
Đỗ Mười attended the
Resignation
At the 4th plenum of the 8th Central Committee on 26 December 1997, Do Muoi decided to retire his posts as General Secretary and
Leadership
Under Đỗ Mười, at least three Central Committee plenums were held each year.[49] He introduced order, routine and predictability into the party's political system.[49] Each plenum centered on key issues and discussions took place in an intensive environment.[49] Under Đỗ Mười, the Central Committee plenae focused on national issues rather than on the party as had been the case under Nguyễn Văn Linh.[50] According to Louis Stern, "Muoi introduced into the plenary session a process of small group work in preparing specific policy assessments that drew on the recommendations of participating technical specialists, unidentified 'scientific groups,' 'intellectuals at home and abroad' (possibly a reference to overseas Vietnamese investors, businessmen and economists), veterans, as well as the conventional assortment of party cadres, members and party committee representatives".[50] These groups were given the power of preparing and receiving reports intended for the Central Committee beforehand and to prepare proposals or comments on specific documents generated by a plenum.[50]
Throughout his rule, Đỗ Mười tried to lead Central Committee plenum debates toward consensus.[50] He avoided backing controversial issues to avoid splits within the Central Committee.[50] When a consensus failed to materialize, as was the case with the 8th plenum of the 7th Central Committee when it failed to devise a suitable wording on the direction of ideological work, the task of revising and amending the Central Committee's resolution was transferred to the 7th Politburo.[50]
In contrast to Nguyễn Văn Linh, Đỗ Mười sought common ground with the Central Committee rather than campaigning for his own views.[51] In his speeches and in his debate participation, Đỗ Mười was less controversial and when speaking, he supported traditional party principles.[51] According to Louis Stern, "Unlike Nguyen Van Linh, Muoi did not seek to plot out unique alternatives to nagging problems, propose unconventional approaches to issues, or forge a new consensus on critical matters. Much less forceful than his predecessor in urging support for his views, Muoi was, if anything, on the conservative side of the equation on several matters", such as securing state domination over the economy and retaining strong party control over the country.[51]
Political views
Đỗ Mười believed in the "evolutionary progression of the political renovation" which began at the 6th National Congress.[52] Reform in the economic sphere was of utmost importance, while political reform was secondary.[52] However, he believed that the implementation of economic reforms often revealed weaknesses in the political system.[52] Đỗ Mười did not want to transform the political system, but to improve it.[52] Changes made to laws and governing practices should, according to him, be grounded in the ideology of Marxism–Leninism and Hồ Chí Minh Thought.[52] He opposed what he called "demagogic arguments" that called for an end to the party's "monopolistic leadership and returning all power to the people under the pretext of renewing democracy."[53] At the same time, he supported democratization of the party's decision-making process, but firmly believed in the principles of democratic centralism.[54]
Đỗ Mười supported the idea of selling preferential shares in state-owned enterprises to employees, profit sharing schemes, "and the sales of percentages of state enterprises to 'outside organizations and individuals' to create conditions for workers to become the real owners of enterprises."[54] He often stressed the importance of industrialization as not just the means of production, but as a comprehensive socio-economic change.[54] He often emphasized the need to "catch up with world progress" by emphasizing economic strategies that played on Vietnam's strengths.[54] He claimed that the industrialization program would be run by the market mechanism, but that the state-owned sector would in turn guide and control the market process.[54]
While Đỗ Mười never opposed freedom of the press, criticism, debate and diversity, he attacked those against the socialist cause.[55] At the 4th Congress of the Writers Union, Đỗ Mười stated certain literature aimed "to smear the party and state leadership and erode the people's confidence in the party and state."[55] At a press conference in 1992 he stated that "information must be guided" and the press had to "remain the shock force on the ideological and cultural front."[56] He further criticized the media for taking advantage of greater press freedom by criticizing the party and socialism.[56] By 1993, Đỗ Mười claimed that the press had been "commercialized" by the economic reforms.[56]
Death and legacy
To many outsiders, Đỗ Mười was a bland leader, but within the party his stature is such that he is still referred to as the "Godfather of Vietnamese politics" by party officials.
Awards and honors
- Vietnam:
- Gold Star Order (1997)[64]
- Japan:
- Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (2018, posthumously)[65]
References
- ^ Profile of Đỗ Mười
- ^ Viet Tuan (2 October 2018). "Revolutionary, reform architect, Party leader Do Muoi dies aged 101". VnExpress International.
- ^ Mydans, Seth (2 October 2018). "Do Muoi, Vietnam's Leader in Economic Transition, Dies at 101". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 January 2019.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Tucker 2011, p. 305.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Leifer 1995, p. 60.
- ^ Staff writer. "Ban Chap Hanh Trung Ưong, Bo Chinh Tri, Ban Bi Thu" [Central Committee, Politburo, Secretariat]. Communist Party of Vietnam. dangcongsan.vi. Archived from the original on 30 January 2013. Retrieved 26 June 2012.
- ^ a b c d e f g Võ 1990, p. 89.
- ^ Van & Cooper 1983, p. 36.
- ^ Gale Research Inc 1998, p. 53.
- ^ a b c Thai 2002, p. 84.
- ^ a b c Stern 1993, p. 42.
- ^ Stern 1993, p. 21.
- ^ a b Corfield 2008, pp. 111–112.
- ^ Staff_writers 2002, p. 2.
- ^ a b c Europa Publications 2002, p. 1421.
- ^ a b c d e Stern 1993, p. 46.
- ^ a b c Stern 1993, p. 110.
- ^ a b Stern 1993, p. 121.
- ^ a b c d e f Stern 1993, pp. 121–122.
- ^ a b c d Abrami 2007, p. 15.
- ^ a b c Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 31.
- ^ a b Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 32.
- ^ a b Guo 2006, p. 75.
- ^ a b Largo 2002, p. 4.
- ^ a b c Largo 2002, p. 5.
- ^ a b c d e Largo 2002, p. 7.
- ^ a b Corfield 2008, p. 119.
- ^ a b c Largo 2002, p. 8.
- ^ a b c Frost 1993, p. 22.
- ^ Frost 1993, p. 23.
- ^ Frost 1993, p. 28.
- ^ Frost 1993, pp. 28–29.
- ^ a b Frost 1993, p. 35.
- ^ a b Frost 1993, p. 36.
- ^ a b Frost 1993, p. 37.
- ^ a b Frost 1993, p. 38.
- ^ Thayer & Amer 1999, p. 58.
- ^ a b Johnson 1993, p. 80.
- ^ Johnson 1993, p. 81.
- ^ a b c d e Thayer & Amer 1999, p. 151.
- ^ Vang 2008, p. 585.
- ^ Vang 2008, p. 278.
- ^ a b c d Abuza 1998, p. 1111.
- ^ Abuza 1998, p. 1110.
- ^ a b c Abuza 1998, p. 1112.
- ^ a b Elliott 2012, p. 183.
- ^ Abuza 2001, p. 19.
- ^ Elliott 2012, p. 184.
- ^ a b c Stern 1995, p. 919.
- ^ a b c d e f Stern 1995, p. 920.
- ^ a b c Stern 1995, pp. 920–921.
- ^ a b c d e Stern 1995, p. 915.
- ^ Stern 1995, p. 916.
- ^ a b c d e Stern 1995, p. 918.
- ^ a b Stern 1993, p. 71.
- ^ a b c Abuza 2001, p. 145.
- ^ a b c d e Quinn-Judge 2006, p. 288.
- ^ "Ngày bình dị ở tư gia nguyên Tổng bí thư Đỗ Mười" (in Vietnamese). Giadinh.net. 2 February 2017.
- ^ "Chủ tịch Quốc hội Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân thăm nguyên Tổng Bí thư Đỗ Mười". qdnd.vn.
- ^ VTV, BAO DIEN TU (28 April 2018). "Nguyên Tổng Bí thư Đỗ Mười nhận Huy hiệu 80 năm tuổi Đảng".
- ^ "Nguyên Tổng Bí thư Đỗ Mười qua đời". Radio Free Asia.
- ^ "Nguyên Tổng bí thư Đỗ Mười qua đời" (in Vietnamese). BBC. October 2018. Retrieved 2 October 2018.
- ^ "Former Party General Secretary Đỗ Mười passes away". Vietnam News. Retrieved 2 October 2018.
- ^ "Tổ chức trọng thể lễ trao tặng các đồng chí Đỗ Mười, Lê Đức Anh, Võ Văn Kiệt huân chương sao vàng". Đại tướng Lê Đức Anh (in Vietnamese). 30 December 1997. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
- ^ "外国人叙勲受章者名簿 平成30年". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (in Japanese). 2018. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
Bibliography
Articles and journals
- Abuza, Zachary (December 1998). "Leadership Transition in Vietnam since the Eighth Party Congress: The Unfinished Congress". JSTOR 2645824.
- Abuza, Zachary (April 2002). "The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese politics" (PDF). doi:10.1355/cs24-1h. Archived from the original(PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 14 December 2012.
- Abrami, Regina (25–26 May 2007). "Vietnam through Chinese Eyes: Comparing Vertical and Horizontal Accountability in Single-Party Regimes" (PDF). Harvard Business School.[permanent dead link]
- Abrami, Regina; Malesky, Edmund; Zheng, Yu (2008). "Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China" (PDF). Harvard Business School. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 June 2012. Retrieved 14 December 2012.
- Goodman, Allan E. (January 1995). "Vietnam in 1994: With Peace at Hand". JSTOR 2645135.
- Johnson, Stephen T. (January 1993). "Laos in 1992: Succession and Consolidation". JSTOR 2645289.
- JSTOR 2644958.
- Quinn-Judge, Sophie (September 2006). "Vietnam's Bumpy Road to Reform" (PDF). .
- Sidel, Mark (January 1998). "Vietnam in 1997: A Year of Challenges". JSTOR 2645471.
- Stern, Lewis (October 1995). "Party Plenums and Leadership Style in Vietnam". JSTOR 2645566.
- Womack, Brantly (January 1996). "Vietnam in 1995: Successes in Peace". JSTOR 2645557.
- Womack, Brantly (January 1997). "Vietnam in 1996: Reform Immobilism". JSTOR 2645777.
Books
- Abuza, Zachary (2001). Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 9781555879617.
- Corfield, Justin (2008). The History of Vietnam. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313341946.
- Elliott, David W.P. (2012). Changing Worlds: Vietnam's Transition from Cold War to Globalization. ISBN 978-0195383348.
- Europa Publications (2002). Far East and Australasia. Routledge. ISBN 9781857431339.
- Frost, Frank (1993). Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change. Pacific Strategic Papers. Vol. 6. ISBN 978-9813016651.
- Gale Research Inc (1998). Encyclopedia of World Biography: Diderot-Forbes. Vol. 5. Gale Research. ISBN 9780787622213.
- Guo, Sujian (2006). The Political Economy of Asian Transition from Communism. Ashgate Publishing Company. ISBN 978-0754647355.
- Largo, V., ed. (2002). Vietnam: Current Issues and Historical Background. Nova Publishers. ISBN 978-1590333686.
- Leifer, Michael (1995). Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0415042192.
- Staff writers (2002). Vietnam: Current Issues and Historical Background. Nova Publishers. ISBN 978-1590333686.
- Stern, Lewis (1993). Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party: Nguyen Van Linh and the Programme for Organizational Reform, 1987–91. ISBN 978-9813016552.
- Thai, Quang Trung (2002). Collective Leadership and Factionalism: an Essay on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy. ISBN 9789971988012.
- Thayer, Carlyle Alan; Amer, Ramses (1999). Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition. ISBN 9789812300256.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2011). The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781851099610.
- Van, Canh Nguyen; Cooper, Earle (1983). Vietnam under Communism, 1975–1982. Hoover Press. ISBN 9780817978518.
- Vang, Pobzeb (2008). Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies. AuthorHouse. ISBN 9781434369710.
- Võ, Nhân Trí (1990). Vietnam's Economic Policy since 1975. ISBN 9789813035546.