1989 Bolivian general election

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1989 Bolivian general election
← 1985 7 May 1989 1993 →
Registered2,137,285
Turnout73.64%
Presidential election
 
Nominee Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Hugo Banzer Jaime Paz Zamora
Party MNR ADN MIR
Running mate Wálter Guevara Luis Ossio Gustavo Fernández Saavedra
Popular vote 363,113 357,298 309,033
Percentage 25.65% 25.24% 21.83%
 
Nominee Carlos Palenque Antonio Araníbar Quiroga
Party CONDEPA MIR-BL
Running mate
Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui
 Wálter Delgadillo Terceros
Popular vote 173,459 113,509
Percentage 12.25% 8.02%
Results by department (left) and province (right)
President before election

Víctor Paz Estenssoro
MNR

Elected President

Jaime Paz Zamora
MIR

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General elections were held in Bolivia on 7 May 1989.[1] As no candidate for the presidency received over 50% of the vote, the National Congress was required to elect a president on 6 August. Although the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement had received the most votes, its candidate for President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was defeated by Jaime Paz Zamora of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) in the congressional vote, despite the MIR only finishing third in the public vote.[2]

Campaign

In the initial months of 1989, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) tried in vain to postpone the election date, arguing that the deadline for

identity cards), constituted a violation of universal suffrage, the MNR pushed through legislation that added birth certificates and military service cards as valid registration documents. Nationalist Democratic Action
(ADN) refused to go along with its ally and eventually charged the MNR with conducting fraudulent registrations. By mid-February this issue had triggered the rupture of the pacto.

The end of the pacto revealed an old reality about Bolivian politics. To achieve power, broad electoral alliances must be established; yet, electoral alliances have never translated into stable or effective ruling coalitions. On the contrary, electoral alliances have exacerbated the tensions built into a complex system. Thus, once in power, whoever controls the executive must search for mechanisms or coalitions such as the pacto to be able to govern. This search was the single most important challenge facing Bolivian politicians into the 1980s.

As expected, every political party was forced to scramble for new allies. The ADN joined forces with the now minuscule Christian Democrats by naming Luis Ossio as Banzer's running mate in an effort to attract other political elements. Banzer led every major poll, and the ADN repeatedly called for Congress to respect the first majority to emerge from the May 7 election.

The situation was more complex in the MNR where, after a bitter internal struggle, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, a pragmatic former Minister of Planning and Coordination and prominent entrepreneur, captured the party's nomination. The MNR's strategy was to develop Sánchez de Lozada's image as a veteran movimientista (movement leader) to capture populist support. At the same time, party strategists intended to attract support from outside the party by building on the candidate's

Walter Guevara Arze
as the vice presidential candidate was perceived as further evidence of the party's success in influencing the candidate.

Following a similar electoral logic, the MIR sought to broaden its base of support by establishing ties with several parties, including Carlos Serrate Reich's 9 April Revolutionary Vanguard, the Revolutionary Front of the Left, and a number of dissidents from the MNRI. Paz Zamora, the MIR's candidate, led in some polls, and most analysts agreed that he would pose a significant threat to the MNR and ADN.

The left attempted a comeback following the disastrous experience of the

organized labor
, especially the COB. Given the historical divisions within the Bolivian left, however, the IU was not perceived to be a serious contender. If it could maintain unity beyond the 1989 elections, observers believed that its impact might be greater than anticipated.

The main newcomer to national

electoral politics, although no stranger to La Paz politics, was Carlos Palenque. Popularly known as el compadre (the comrade), Palenque was a former folksinger turned radio and television owner and talk show host. His "popular" style of broadcasting had always enjoyed widespread appeal in the working-class and marginal neighborhoods surrounding La Paz. For at least a decade, Palenque had been regarded as a possible candidate for mayor
of La Paz; during the 1987 municipal elections, his name was under consideration by the MNR.

Palenque's move into national politics was prompted by the closing down of his

Conscience of the Fatherland
(Conciencia de la Patria—Condepa), which grouped together a bizarre strain of disaffected leftists, populists, and nationalists who had defected from several other parties.

Ten parties and fronts contested the election, which was held as scheduled on May 7, 1989. The results, a virtual three-way tie among the MNR, ADN, and MIR, were not surprising. As expected, Congress once again was given the task of electing the next president from the top three contenders. But the slight majority (a mere 5,815 votes) obtained by the MNR's candidate, Sánchez de Lozada, was surprising to observers, as was the unexpected victory by Palenque in

Bolivian Congress
, for example, a woman dressed in native garb would serve as a deputy for La Paz Department.

Claims of fraud from every contender, especially in the recounting of the votes, clouded the legitimacy of the process. At one stage, fearing an agreement between the ADN and MIR, the MNR called for the

executive branch
.

The composition of Congress exacerbated the tensions between the parties in contention. Because seventy-nine seats are needed to elect a president, compromise was indispensable. In mid-1989, however, it was unclear whether the political system in Bolivia had matured enough to allow for compromise.

Results

Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaq Katari
Víctor Hugo Cárdenas22,9831.620–200
Katarist United Liberation FrontJenaro Flores Santos16,4161.160New0New
Bolivian Socialist Falange–10,6080.750–300
Movement of the National LeftLuis Sandoval Morón9,6870.680New0New
Total1,415,869100.001300270
Valid votes1,415,86989.97
Invalid/blank votes157,92110.03
Total votes1,573,790100.00
Registered voters/turnout2,137,28573.64
Source: Nohlen

By department

Department ADN MNR MIR CONDEPA Others
Beni 38.00% 35.76% 15.24% 1.32% 9.68%
Chuquisaca 23.00% 21.86% 25.45% 0.90% 28.78%
Cochabamba 25.45% 26.16% 25.45% 2.49% 20.45%
La Paz 20.91% 18.80% 17.46% 30.08% 12.75%
Oruro 25.46% 25.42% 29.39% 2.92% 16.81%
Pando 38.62% 37.10% 15.19% 0.81% 8.28%
Potosi 23.11% 24.43% 26.22% 1.72% 24.52%
Santa Cruz 33.44% 35.02% 22.43% 0.97% 8.13%
Tarija 23.85% 41.12% 23.97% 0.81% 10.26%
Source: Constituency-Level Election Archive

Congressional ballot

MIR's Paz Zamora was supported by Nationalist Democratic Action and Conscience of Fatherland, whilst the MNR's Sánchez was not supported by any other party. The United Left abstained from the vote.[3] For the support of the ADN, the MIR chose to elect Hugo Banzer's running mate Luis Ossio (PDC) as vice president rather than Gustavo Fernández Saavedra, Paz Zamora's running mate.

CandidatePartyVotes%
Jaime Paz ZamoraRevolutionary Left Movement9765.99
Gonzalo Sánchez de LozadaRevolutionary Nationalist Movement5034.01
Total147100.00
Total votes147–
Registered voters/turnout15793.63
Source: Morales

See also

  • Bolivian National Congress, 1989–1993

Notes

References

  1. ISBN 978-0-19-928358-3
  2. ^ Nohlen, p158
  3. ^ Walter Q Morales (2003) A brief history of Bolivia New York: Facts On File, p205

Bibliography

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