Amphibious Assault Ship Project

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The Amphibious Assault Ship Project was a proposed procurement project by the

National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy
has led to no movement on the idea.

This idea came about as part of the development of the

Joint Support Ship Project of the Royal Canadian Navy and the need to improve the strategic sealift and amphibious assault capability of the Canadian Forces.[1] Many of the capabilities required for strategic sealift were to be included in the Joint Support Ship Project, however, a dedicated amphibious assault ship was favoured by some, such as then Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier.[2]

By late 2008, the project appeared to have been placed on hold, if not cancelled.

STX France would consolidate the hulls for arctic operations.[4][5] The Royal Canadian Navy also trained with the French Navy on a Thales-built amphibious assault ship.[6]
However, the project was abandoned due to budget constraints.

Background

In 2005 Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier and Director of Maritime Requirements, Captain (N) Peter Ellis told the Standing Committee on National Defence in the House of Commons that the Canadian Forces required strategic sealift capacity for operations in the 21st century.[7] The Minister of National Defence at that time, David Pratt, was directly involved in several major procurement projects totaling $7.0 billion including the Joint Support Ship Project and what became the Amphibious Assault Ship Project, declaring that in the next decade the Canadian Forces must expect to engage in the sort of operations it has experienced over the past decade.[8]

Concept

According to the

Direction générale de l'Armement (DGA), as well as the French newspaper La Tribune, the Royal Canadian Navy had shown "strong interest" in purchasing two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France.[9][10][5]
A Mistral-class ship can carry a significantly large military force with equipment and vehicles in "fighting order", enabling the Canadian Forces to face armed opposition ashore.

As conceived, the Amphibious Assault Ship Project envisioned a ship that could carry personnel and equipment that could rapidly disembark in waves using

CH-47 Chinook. The ship would be able to disembark personnel and equipment, and support to them in the face of armed opposition. The warship
could also be used in support of humanitarian operations since it would have a large hospital on board designed for treating combat casualties. The ship will be able to carry a battalion-size able to conduct noncombatant evacuation operation around the world.

The

landing ship dock.[12]

Aircraft

As with any amphibious assault ship, a possible Canadian amphibious assault ship would be expected to carry a number of

F-35 Lightning II.[12]

Mistral-class concept rejection

In 2014 the Department of Defence looked at the possibility of acquiring two already complete Mistral-class amphibious assault ships from France. These vessels had been originally ordered by Russia in 2010 but the delivery was halted following the illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea by Russia. As a result France began looking for other potential buyers including Canada and Egypt. After an examination process and several training cruises on the vessels, in 2015 the Deputy Defence Minister John Forster advised Defence Minister

National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. Due to the negative impact it would have on the construction on other vessels needed to replace Canada's aging surface combat fleet, the Department of National Defence withdrew interest in purchasing the vessels. The two Mistral vessels would end up being sold to the Egyptian Navy in 2015 becoming ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser.[13]

See also

References

  1. ^ Canadian ultimate land operation ashore Archived February 12, 2012, at the Wayback Machine
  2. ^ Sharon Hobson (Winter 2006). "Plain Talk" (PDF). Canadian Naval Review. 1 (4). Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (Dalhousie University): 28–29. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-06.
  3. The Ottawa Citizen. Archived from the original
    on 2009-07-05.
  4. ^ Shadwick, Martin. "The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)". Canadian Military Journal. Government of Canada. Retrieved 1 August 2015.
  5. ^ a b Cabirol, Michel (31 May 2012). "DCNS propose la frégate Fremm et le Mistral au Canada". La Tribune (in French). Retrieved 1 August 2015.
  6. ^ "The RCN welcomes French Ship Mistral and La Fayette in Halifax". Royal Canadian Navy. Government of Canada. 16 June 2014. Retrieved 1 August 2015.
  7. ^ "Plain Talk "BIG HONKING SHIP"" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on July 6, 2011.
  8. ^ Eggenberger, John; Fisher, Ralph; Gimblett, Richard; MacKenzie, Lew. "A Canadian Rapid Reaction Force That Counts". Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  9. ^ "Le Canada s'intéresse aux Mistral de DCNS" (in French). Reuters. 7 January 2011. Archived from the original on 8 January 2011. Retrieved 8 January 2011.
  10. ^ a b Mader, Les (14 July 2008). "Reviving the Princes – Some Thoughts on a Canadian Standing Contingency Task Force". National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  11. ^ Boettger, E.F. (30 October 2007). "Canada's Stature and Influence in Coalitions: A Question of Salience, Relevance and Interoperability" (PDF). Canadian Forces College. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  12. ^ a b Shadwick, Martin (14 July 2008). "Carriers, Sealift And Replenishment". National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  13. ^ Everson, Kristen (8 February 2016). "Top general and defence bureaucrat were at odds over whether to buy French warships". CBC News. Retrieved 19 November 2018.


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