Battle of Branyiszkó
Battle of Branyiszkó | |||||||
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Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 | |||||||
Battle of Branyiszkó | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Hungarian Revolutionary Army | Austrian Empire | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Richard Guyon | Franz Deym von Stritež | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
4,002 men 21 cannons |
1,891 men 6 cannons[1] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
150 men | 395 men[1] |
The Battle of Branyiszkó was a battle in the
Background
On 2 January 1849, the
After the aforementioned diversion, the task of the Upper Danube Corps was to retreat through the mining towns (
The Upper Danubian Army Corps had about 12,000 soldiers, reorganized at Vác and divided into four divisions, set out towards the besieged town of Lipótvár.[5] On 11 January, the left wing of the Upper Danube Corps was at
Görgei was in danger. Major General Christian Götz's troops could occupy the mining towns from the north and Csorich's troops from the south, and attack Görgei with a combined force. He, therefore, ordered his divisions to march. Aulich had to march to Körmöcbánya, Colonel János Piller to
Aulich's division at Körmöcbánya was threatened with annihilation by Csorich's troops from the south and Götz's from the north.[7] But Görgei found a way to unite his troops. Between Körmöcbánya and Besztercebánya, under the Szkalka Mountain, there was a collapsed old mine tunnel.[7] Görgei and Aulich dug out and shored up the tunnel, and the division could march through it to Besztercebánya. Guyon's and Piller's divisions arrived here by crossing the flooded Garam.[7] Görgei, after reorganizing the troops, withdrew his corps in two columns from Besztercebánya.[7] Görgei led the northern column, which started in the
Prelude
Görgei, suffering from a hot fever due to the fatigue of leading his troops by three weeks of continuous retreat in the mountain passes during the harsh winter, spent three days in bed at
According to the Hungarian writer Kálmán Mikszáth: A characteristic habit of Artur Görgei had an even stronger psychological basis when he wanted to make a bold military action, usually he did not entrust it to his officers or subordinates, who were freshly laurelled [carried out successful military actions], but to the defeated, to those who had previously experienced some failure, thinking that in them the desire to repair the suffered damage with something great was most alive, and Görgei was not disappointed. [11]
At the same time, Kmety had to
During that time at Branyiszkó, Guyon was preparing for the battle. The natural features of the Branyiszkó pass made it an excellent defense place.[10] Its thirteen hairpin bends, its narrow paths, and the steep terrain all favored the defenders, who tried to fortify the pass, which already served as a natural fortress, with barricades.[10]
Under the command of General Deym, 2 infantry battalions, 1 cavalry company,[8] a total of 1891 men, 265 horses, and six guns defended the Branyiszkó stronghold.[12] Deym, with 1 1/2 battalions and 4 guns, occupied the pass itself,[8] the narrow serpentine road being barricaded in 22 places,[12] but in order to avoid being surrounded, he also tried to occupy the side roads, forest paths and gorges near the pass,[10] hence the ridges on either side of the pass were occupied by a 1/2 battalion. The cavalry company and 2 guns were deployed in reserve to the rear.[8] The bulk of the Austrian troops had taken positions on the height of the mountain, sheltered from the thicket of the forest, while their advance guard occupied the lower elevations, where a barn close by offered them a favorable defensive position; their guns, which were placed somewhat higher up the middle of the mountain, dominated the whole road.[13] Despite this, the Austrian defensive stance was not impeccable, with the unfortunate result that Deym's occupation of the byways left him with not enough troops to defend the pass in the best way.[10] Deym's troops, however, were battle-hardened, and accustomed to success, while Guyon had many untried troops, including a battalion of mostly Highland Slovaks that had been recruited barely two weeks ago.[10]
Guyon already had data on the situation of the enemy forces stationed in
The Guyon division set out from Szepesváralja early in the morning of 5 February for Branyiszkó, so that by 9 a.m. it had reached
That Monday was bone-chilling cold, with the thermometer dipping below minus 22.5 degrees Celsius.
Guyon divided his troops into three groups: in the middle, the 33rd "ködmön wearing" (Hungarian sheepskin waistcoat) Honvéd Battalion from Szeged, led by Major Pethő, followed by the 13th (
Opposing forces
Hungarian troops:
Guyon division:
- Szodtfriedt brigade:
- 2nd Besztercebánya (later 124th) honvéd battalion = 710 soldiers;
- 13th honvéd battalion = 960 soldiers;
- 33rd honvéd battalion = 1,040 soldiers;
- 2 companies of the 1st sapper battalion = 196 soldiers;
- Újházy jägers = 76 soldiers;
- Pozsonyand Komárom = 98 soldiers, 63 horses, 7 cannons;
Brigade total: 3,040 soldiers, 63 horses, 7 cannons.
- Üchritz brigade:
- Nógrád (later 62nd) honvéd battalion = 680 soldiers;
- 1 company of the 12th (Nádor) hussar regiment = 83 soldiers, 83 horses;
- 5th cavalry battery = 84 soldiers, 64 horses, 6 cannons;
- 6th cavalry battery = 115 soldiers, 97 horses, 8 cannons;
Brigade total: 962 soldiers, 244 horses, 14 cannons.
Division total: 4,002 soldiers, 307 horses, 21 cannons.[1]
Austrian troops:
- Deym brigade
- Landwehr battalion of the 24th (Parma) infantry regiment = 985 soldiers;
- 3rd battalion of the 30th (Nugent) infantry regiment = 661 soldiers;
- 1 company of the 1st (Kaiser Ferdinand) chevau-léger regiment = 125 soldiers, 125 horses;
- Artillery = 120 soldiers, 140 horses, 6 cannons;
Brigade total: 1,891 soldiers, 265 horses, 6 cannons.[1]
Battle
Guyon led the column attacking from the front, and, as he did not speak Hungarian well, he addressed the following speech to them, interspersing Hungarian and German words: Vorwärts dupla lénung, rückwärts kartács schiessen.[10] Which in English means something like: “If you go forward, you get double pay, if you retreat, I'll receive you with grapeshots”'.[10] However the attack led by the 33rd Honvéd Battalion was soon repulsed, because the Hungarian cannons, positioned near Korotnok, could not be effectively support the infantry, being on a much lower ground than the attacking soldiers.[8] When the Honvéds retreated, they found themselves confronted by Guyon's cannons, who fulfilled his vow and fired into them,[10] leaving one officer and 10 soldiers dead or wounded.[12] Guyon's center was then contented with a stationary artillery duel until the columns sent against the enemy's right and left and partly in its rear, appeared on the mountaintops surrounding the pass.[8] Then, at about 3 p.m., the 33rd Honvéd Battalion renewed its attack, but this did not go smoothly either.[8]
He was also assisted by the Piarist friar Imre Poleszni (Erdősi), who encouraged the Slovak nationality soldiers of the Zólyom County rookie battalion.[10] And when the attack stalled, Father Erdősi threw the one meter-long cross he was carrying into the snow in front of him, and shouted to the soldiers in Slovak: "Come on, my sons! Would you leave the Lord to these heathens?"[12] That was enough to make the soldiers turn around, climb the barricades, and force the imperials to retreat.[10]
With the self-sacrificing resistance of the 2 companies from the reserve, the Austrians retreated towards the top of the Branyiszkó pass, fighting heroically from one barricade to the other, defending every inch of ground.[8]
A company of the 12th Nádor Hussar Regiment, recruited from the Jászkun region also took part in the attack.[12]
The hussars, storming on the steep mountain road, were met by a hail of grapeshot and were forced to retreat.
Lieutenant Colonel Emil Üchtritz described this battle trick in his memoirs as follows: I ordered three Hussar trumpeters to dismount, and the 2nd Besztercebánya battalion under the command of Major Mikovényi [Károly] to advance with 300 men on the left flank, along the front line into the forest, while blowing the jäger march, so that later the astonished enemy officers asked me where I had taken so many Tyrolean jägers who were advancing so terribly fast on the left flank and causing their own men to retreat in panic. Well, you help yourself as best you can (...).[12]
Jäger officer Rezső Tirts describes their flank attack against the final Austrian position on the plateau as follows: But now all at once there was a loud crack of rifles from the Devil's Hole. It was the flank attack of the Újházy jägers, to which six hussar trumpeters blew the jäger march. One after another, their well-aimed shots dropped the artillerymen on the hill. At this moment the Piller Brigade also arrived with swift steps on the battlefield from Szepesváralja and rushed up the hill to the sound of all the drums. All this had an inspiring effect on the Honvéds, and a crushing effect on the Austrians, whose ranks began to waver. Then the Honvéds rushed out of the woods with their bayonets [pointed at the enemy], crying 'Forward! Forward!' from a thousand and a thousand throats, so that it could be heard all the way to Korotnok. The Austrians were in a panic, their ranks broke up, cannons, horses, men, all the Austrian troops went on a wild and disorderly run down the other slope, and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, on the top of the Branyiszkó Pass, on the little hill near the Chvala Bohu [Praise God in Slovakian] tavern, the Hungarian flag, raised by the Újházy jägers, proclaimed one of the most beautiful Hungarian victories.[11] Several Austrian chevau-légers trapped in the tavern were taken prisoner by a hussar with the nickname Csősz Bácsi (Uncle Field-guard), after he went in and asked the tavern keeper for a drink.[12] Another factor in the Austrian rout was that Major General Deym did not want to press the pass's defense any further,[14] because his troops were flanked by the encircling Hungarian units.[15]
Aftermath
Deym retreated through Siroka towards Eperjes, where, after 13 hours of uninterrupted marching, his troops arrived at half past 1 in the morning and joined the Schulzig column, which Schlik had meanwhile sent there in support.[8] The pursuing Guyon retired with his division at 2 o'clock after midnight at Siroka.[8] Guyon was then also called "the English lion" or "the hero of Branyiszkó", and was promoted to the rank of Major General and awarded the 2nd class of the Hungarian Military Medal.[12] The 33rd Battalion also got a share of the glory: it received a flag ribbon from Görgei, bearing the inscription "Branyiszko / 5 February 1849", embroidered, according to tradition, by the general's wife.[12]
During the battle, thirty kilometers away, Görgei, stationed in Lőcse, arranged a ball for his soldiers and officers. Kálmán Mikszáth commemorated the event as follows: Perhaps at the very moment the courier [with the news about the victory at Brnayiszkó] was leaving, the ball given by the handsome officers to the beautiful flaxen-haired ladies of Lőcse began. Görgei gladly gave permission for such entertainments, because they not only entertained the officers (the poor boys deserved it) but also underlined the attachment of the Honvéds to the local population. However, Görgei did not promise to attend the ball. He was speechless that whole day, perhaps nervous if the brilliant Hungarian leader had any nerves. Finally, at midnight, he appeared and went to the orchestra, which stopped playing the Cotillion and started to play the military alarm. The dancers bowed to their ladies, suddenly girded on their swords, and stood among the assembling troops in the street after a few minutes.[...] The officers shouted: forward to Branyiszkó! Half an hour before Görgei received Guyon's victory report, to the great sorrow of the poor girls of Lőcse... After all, the world would not have collapsed if that foolish courier had brought it in the morning! But war is such a cruel thing.[16]
On the morning of 6 February, Lieutenant General Schulzig, having united the column which had retreated from Branyiszkó with his own, withdrew towards Kassa between 7 and 8 o'clock that same morning. On the way, the lieutenant-general met Schlick at Szentpéter, who, on hearing of Görgei's advance, hurried with his whole corps towards Kassa, and ordered Schulzig's army back first to Lemes and then to the even better position at Budamér.[8] Now the Upper Danube Corps went from the defense to the offensive. On 6 February, Görgei was already in Eperjes, and on the 10th he reached Kassa, which Schlik had evacuated the day before.[15] From there, he issued orders for the next day, 7 February, according to which the Aulich division, already on its way from the Poprád valley, was to advance to Hedri, crossing the Branyiszkó pass; Piller's division was ordered to join Guyon at Eperjes, and Kmety's division remained at Korompa in the Hernád valley and did not advance even when the three Austrian companies of the Otočac border guards from Kluknó retreated on news of the loss of Branyiszkó.[8]
The battle of Branyiszkó had high stakes for both sides. If the Upper Danube army succeeded in breaking through, it could have trapped and destroyed Schlik's corps in cooperation with the Upper Tisza Corps led by General György Klapka, approaching from the south.[15] If the breakthrough did not succeed, Görgeit was in danger of being cornered by the two pursuing Imperial-Royal brigades and Schlik's corps.[15] (Although, even then, it could have slipped away from them on the Hernád valley towards Kassa.)[15]
The Upper Danube Corps essentially won the Highland campaign, as it deterred the enemy from attacking the Tisza line for weeks, prevented the enemy from taking possession of northern Hungary, and with its unexpected appearance forced Schlik to retreat from the northeastern counties of Hungary.[15] On the other hand, what seemed to be a possible great success, the encirclement of Schlik's corps was not achieved, and thanks to the actions of the newly appointed Hungarian commander-in-chief, Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński, Schlik's corps slipped through the Hungarian troops' grasp with relatively small losses.[15]
References
- ^ a b c d e Hermann 2013, pp. 62.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Hermann 2013, pp. 57.
- ^ Hermann 2013, pp. 57–58.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Hermann 2013, pp. 58.
- ^ Bóna 1999, pp. 304.
- ^ Hermann 2013, pp. 58–59.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Hermann 2013, pp. 59.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Bánlaky József: A Branyiszkó megvétele (1849. február 5-én). A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001
- ^ Hermann 2013, pp. 59–60.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Hermann 2013, pp. 60.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Süli Attila: Egy elterelő hadművelet története - Branyiszkó, 1849 február 5 Ars Militaria. 2020 május 22
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Babucs Zoltán: Branyiszkó bevétele Magyarságkutató Intézet, 2021. február 05
- ^ a b Alleker Lajos: Erdősi Imre, a branyiszkói hőspap emlékezete Nyitra, 1894, pp. 10
- ^ Hermann 2013, pp. 60–61.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hermann 2013, pp. 61.
- ^ Veres István: Bálozás a magyar szabadságharc alatt Vasárnap.com. 2021. február 23
Sources
- Alleker, Lajos (1894), Erdősi Imre, a branyiszkói hőspap emlékezete ("The Memory of Imre Erdősi, the Hero-Priest of Branyiszkó") (PDF) (in Hungarian), Nyitra
- Bánlaky, József (2001). A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme (The Military History of the Hungarian Nation) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Arcanum Adatbázis.
- Babucs, Zoltán (2021), "Branyiszkó bevétele ("The Capture of Branyiszkó")", Magyarságkutató Intézet, 5 February 2021 (in Hungarian)
- Bánlaky, József (2001). A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme (The Military History of the Hungarian Nation) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Arcanum Adatbázis.
- Bóna, Gábor, ed. (1999). The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence. A Military History. War and Society in East Central Europe. Vol. XXXV. Translated by Arató, Nóra. Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc. ISBN 0-88033-433-9.
- Gelich, Richárd (1883). Magyarország függetlenségi harcza 1848-49-ben ("The War of Independence of Hungary in 1848-49, vol. 1) (in Hungarian). Pest: Aigner Lajos.
- Hermann, Róbert (2004), Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc nagy csatái ("Great Battles of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 – 1849") (in Hungarian), Zrínyi, ISBN 963-327-367-6
- Hermann, Róbert (2013). Nagy csaták. 15. A magyar önvédelmi háború ("Great Battles. 15. The Hungarian War od Self Defense") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Duna Könyvklub. p. 88. ISBN 978-615-5013-99-7.
- Rüstow, Friedrich Wilhelm (1866). Az 1848-1849-diki magyar hadjárat története, II. kötet ("The History of the Hungarian Campaign from 1848-1849, vol. 2.) (in Hungarian). Pest: Emich Gusztáv.
- Süli, Attila (2020), "Egy elterelő hadművelet története - Branyiszkó, 1849 február 5 ("The Story of a Diversion Tactic - Branyiszkó, 5 February 1849")", Ars Militaria, 22 May 2020 (in Hungarian)
- Veres, István (2021), "Bálozás a magyar szabadságharc alatt ("Balls During the Hungarian War of Independence")", Vasárnap.com, 23 February 2021 (in Hungarian)