Battle of Oroscopa

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Battle of Oroscopa
Part of the prelude of the Third Punic War
Date151 BC
Location
Unknown location in northern Tunisia
Result

Numidian victory

Belligerents
Carthage
Numidian rebels
Numidia
Commanders and leaders
Hasdrubal
Suba  Executed
Asasis  Executed
Masinissa
Gulussa
Strength
31,400 Unknown
Casualties and losses
Unknown, but very heavy Unknown, but light

The Battle of Oroscopa was fought between a Carthaginian army of more than 30,000 men commanded by the general Hasdrubal and a Numidian force of unknown size under its king, Masinissa. It took place in late 151 BC near the ancient town of Oroscopa in what is now north western Tunisia. The battle resulted in a heavy Carthaginian defeat.

When the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage ended in 201 BC, one of the terms of the peace treaty prohibited Carthage from waging war without the permission of the Roman Senate. Masinissa, an ally of Rome, exploited this to repeatedly raid and seize Carthaginian territory with impunity. In 151 BC, Carthage assembled an army of 25,400 men under Hasdrubal, disregarding the treaty. This force was joined by 6,000 Numidian cavalry led by two disgruntled Numidian leaders and attempted to deter Masinissa's aggression against the Carthaginian-held town of Oroscopa. Amid considerable fighting Masinissa lured the Carthaginians into an area of rough terrain with limited water sources, where foraging for food was difficult, and surrounded them. The Carthaginians considered their opponents to be unregimented tribesmen and expected them to disperse, but Masinissa had forged a well-disciplined army with an efficient logistics system and it was able to starve the Carthaginians into surrender.

In contravention of the terms of the surrender, the Carthaginians were then attacked and many, perhaps most, were killed. Hasdrubal and most of his officers survived and returned to Carthage. There, Hasdrubal was condemned to death in an attempt to placate Rome, but anti-Carthaginian factions in Rome used the illicit military action as a pretext to prepare a punitive expedition. This sparked the Third Punic War, which ended in the complete destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and the death or enslavement of its population.

Background

In the mid-2nd century BC Rome was the dominant power in the Mediterranean region,[1] and Carthage was a large city-state in the north east of what is now modern Tunisia.[2][3] The Romans referred to the Carthaginians by the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), which is a reference to Carthage's Phoenician origin. "Punic" derives from this usage.[4] Carthage and Rome had fought the 23-year-long First Punic War from 264 to 241 BC and the 17-year-long Second Punic War between 218 and 201 BC. Both wars ended with Roman victories, the Second when the Roman general Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal, the premier Carthaginian general of the war, at the Battle of Zama, 160 kilometres (100 mi) south west of Carthage.[5] Africanus imposed a peace treaty on the Carthaginians which stripped them of their overseas territories, and some of their African ones. An indemnity of 10,000 silver talents[note 1] was to be paid over 50 years.[6] Hostages were taken and Carthage was prohibited from waging war outside Africa, and in Africa only with the Roman Senate's express permission. Many senior Carthaginians wanted to reject the treaty, but Hannibal spoke strongly in its favour and it was accepted in spring 201 BC.[8][9] Henceforth it was clear that Carthage was politically subordinate to Rome.[10]

Prelude

A map of the western Mediterranean with the territories of Numidia, Carthage and Rome shown
Map of approximate extent of Numidian, Carthaginian and Roman territory in 150 BC

At the end of the Second Punic War Masinissa, an ally of Rome, emerged as by far the most powerful ruler among the Numidians, the indigenous population which controlled much of what is now Algeria and Tunisia.[11] Over the following 50 years he repeatedly took advantage of Carthage's inability to militarily protect its possessions by raiding or seizing territory which Carthage had long held. The Carthaginians repeatedly petitioned Rome for redress, claiming that Masinissa was in breach of the treaty. Rome always backed Masinissa and refused to act or to give permission for Carthage to take military action to defend its territory.[12] Masinissa's seizures of Carthaginian land and settlements became increasingly flagrant,[13] extending to major towns and important ports.[14]

Battle

In 151 BC the Numidians once again raided into territory which had been Carthaginian for centuries. They blockaded the town of Oroscopa[note 2] and devastated the farmland around it.[14] This was a provocation too far for the Carthaginians;[16] they raised an army of 25,000 infantry and 400 cavalry commanded by the previously unrecorded Carthaginian general Hasdrubal and, regardless of the treaty, counter-attacked the Numidians. They were reinforced by two disgruntled Numidian leaders, Suba and Asasis, with 6,000 additional cavalry.[13][14][17]

The Carthaginians advanced on Oroscopa, won several small-scale skirmishes and, as Hasdrubal saw it, drove the Numidians away. Dissatisfied with this, Hasdrubal had the Carthaginian army follow the Numidians, hoping to provoke them into a decisive battle. The Numidians deliberately lured the Carthaginians on, into an area of rough going where water sources were limited and foraging for food was difficult. Eventually there was a

set-piece battle; it is unclear whether Masinissa chose to give battle or was compelled to by Hasdrubal's manoeuvres. The fight went on for a whole day, but with no result. It is possible that the fighting largely consisted of cavalry charging and counter-charging while hurling javelins at each other, and that little hand-to-hand combat took place. The battle was supposedly watched by the adopted grandson of Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, who was in Numidia to obtain war elephants for the Roman army from his adoptive grandfather's ally.[14]

Hasdrubal withdrew his army to a hilltop, fortified his camp and entered into negotiations with Masinissa, using Aemilianus as an intermediary. As the Carthaginians were unwilling to hand over Suba and Asasis to Masinissa for punishment, the negotiations failed. Meanwhile, the Numidians had constructed their own fortifications in a wide circle around the base of the hill on which the Carthaginians were encamped. This prevented the Carthaginians from foraging for food, or even from moving off as an army without a hard fight. Hasdrubal was unwilling to commit his army to the latter, especially as he believed that the Numidian army was a loose barbarian confederation whose supply lines would be more stretched than his own. He was convinced that with neither combat nor loot they would soon start to return home. So the Carthaginians consumed the supplies of food they had with them, then slaughtered and ate their pack animals. With these gone they killed and ate their cavalry mounts. With no firewood to burn to make this diet more palatable, the Carthaginians burnt the wooden components of their shields and other equipment.[18]

During his long reign Masinissa had created a well-disciplined army with more efficient logistics than when the Carthaginians had last fought him, 50 years before. This force surprised the Carthaginians with its ability to maintain itself in the field for a sustained period.[19] Eventually disease struck the Carthaginian camp and Hasdrubal was forced to surrender.[13] Humiliating terms were imposed, including the payment of a huge indemnity.[19] While the Carthaginian soldiers were surrendering they were attacked by Numidian cavalry led by Masinissa's son, Gulussa. Whether this was with the connivance of Masinissa is unclear.[13][19] The modern historian William Harris suggests that Gulussa was encouraged by the Romans in this attack.[17] The casualties suffered by the Carthaginians are also unclear: Harris states that "very few returned home",[17] Nigel Bagnall writes of "few survivors"[13] and Adrian Goldsworthy that "many [were] cut down".[19] All sources agree that Hasdrubal and most of his officers survived, and returned to Carthage.[13][19] There Hasdrubal was condemned to death, in an attempt to placate Rome.[20] The Numidians took over the Campi Magni (Great Plains) region and the town of Thusca (modern Sers) in what is now north western Tunisia.[21] The fighting, surrender and massacre were probably over by late 151 BC.[17]

Aftermath

Carthage had paid off its indemnity to Rome, imposed fifty years before at the end of the First Punic War, in 151 BC and was prospering economically,

People's Assembly of Rome declared war on Carthage.[16][28]

A large Roman army landed at Utica. The Carthaginians hoped to appease the Romans, but despite the Carthaginians surrendering all of their weapons, the Romans pressed on to

Roman province of Africa with Utica as its capital.[36][37]

Notes, citations and sources

Notes

  1. ^ Several different "talents" are known from antiquity. The ones referred to in this article are all Euboic (or Euboeic) talents.[6] At the time of the Second Punic War 10,000 talents was approximately 269,000 kg (265 long tons) of silver.[7]
  2. ^ The location of Oroscopa, other than that it was in what is now northern Tunisia, is not clear.[14] Possibly it was near modern Vaga.[15]

Citations

  1. ^ Holland 2004, p. 10.
  2. ^ Miles 2011, pp. 324–325.
  3. ^ UNESCO 2020.
  4. ^ Sidwell & Jones 1998, p. 16.
  5. ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 289, 295–298.
  6. ^ a b Lazenby 1998, p. 228.
  7. ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 158.
  8. ^ Miles 2011, p. 317.
  9. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 308–309.
  10. ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 303, 305–306.
  11. ^ Kunze 2015, p. 398.
  12. ^ Kunze 2015, pp. 398, 407.
  13. ^ a b c d e f Bagnall 1999, p. 307.
  14. ^ a b c d e Goldsworthy 2006, p. 336.
  15. ^ Harris 2006, p. 150 n. 245.
  16. ^ a b Kunze 2015, p. 407.
  17. ^ a b c d Harris 2006, p. 151.
  18. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 336–337.
  19. ^ a b c d e f Goldsworthy 2006, p. 337.
  20. ^ a b Bagnall 1999, p. 308.
  21. ^ Le Bohec 2015, p. 435.
  22. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 332.
  23. ^ Kunze 2015, pp. 405, 408.
  24. ^ Kunze 2015, p. 408.
  25. ^ a b Kunze 2015, p. 399.
  26. ^ Harris 2006, pp. 151, 153.
  27. ^ Le Bohec 2015, p. 437.
  28. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 337–338.
  29. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 338–339.
  30. ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 314–315.
  31. ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 315–316.
  32. ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 346, 348–351.
  33. ^ Miles 2011, pp. 3–4.
  34. ^ Le Bohec 2015, p. 441.
  35. ^ Scullard 2002, p. 316.
  36. ^ Le Bohec 2015, p. 443.
  37. ^ Scullard 2002, pp. 310, 316.

Sources