Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks | |
---|---|
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell |
Dissent | Marshall |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by White, Marshall |
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; New York Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210 |
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), was a case decided by the
Background
After the city evicted plaintiff/appellee Shirley Brooks from her home in Mount Vernon, N.Y. in 1973, her possessions were stored in a warehouse owned by American defendant/appellant corporation Flagg Bros., Inc. After several disputes between the parties regarding the price that Brooks was to pay for the moving and storage of her belongings, Flagg Bros. presented Brooks with notice that she needed to pay the amount owed within 10 days "or [her furniture would] be sold."[1]
When letters from Brooks to the defendant did not produce any results, Brooks brought suit under
Opinion of the Court
Rehnquist's majority opinion
However, Rehnquist wrote, Brooks carried an additional burden because she was accusing Flagg Bros. of depriving her of property under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in part, that "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." (emphasis added) Thus, according to the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Flagg Bros. taking of Brooks' property could only rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation if Flagg Bros. was a state actor, that is, performing a duty traditionally and exclusively performed by the state, and therefore attributable to the state.
Pointing out that Brooks had failed to name any governmental entity as a defendant, Rehnquist went on to argue that "very few" functions have been exclusively carried out by state governments.[2] In American history, the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors was not, in Rehnquist's view, a function performed exclusively by the state, as the parties typically retained other avenues of remedy.
To Brooks' contention that the state had directly authorized the re-sale of her possessions under the UCC, Rehnquist responded that the UCC merely embodied the state's decision not to involve itself in the debtor-lendor dispute. If the state had failed to pass any law related to the re-sale, there could be no contention that the state had acted in any way. Codification of the state's intent to not involve its courts in the re-sale of repossessed goods still equated to a refusal to act.
Marshall's dissent
Stevens' dissent
Stevens noted the role of the state in defining and controlling the debtor-creditor relationship, seeing the state power in this case as the power to allow for a binding remedy against the wishes of one of the parties to the dispute.
See also
- State actor
Notes
External links
- Text of Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)