Kalbiyya

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Kalbiyya
الكلبية
Alawite Syrian tribal confederation
Arab
LocationNusayri mountains region, Syria
Population480,000 (est. 2011)[1]
Branches
  • Rashawneh
  • Junaydi
  • Al-Nawasireh
  • Al-Jurud
  • Al-Qarahilah
Language
Alawite

The Kalbiyya (

Bashar Al-Assad, continued after he became president in 2000. The Kalbiyya population mainly live in the Latakia Governorate
in north west Syria.

Background

The Kalbiyya are a tribe, or tribal confederation, of the Alawite community of northwestern

Twelver branch of Shia Islam.[7]

The Alawite homeland is in the

Nusayri mountains coastal region, inland of the Mediterranean ports of Latakia and Tartus.[5][8] Historically, the Alawites lived in about eighty villages in the region.[9] The Kalbiyya are one of the four tribes, or tribal confederations, into which the Alawite community is divided, the others being the Matawira, Haddadin, and Khayyatin.[3][4]

Demographics and society

Nusayri mountains, homeland of the Kalbiyya, near Qardaha

The Kalbiyya were estimated in 2011 to number approximately 480,000 out of a population of 3 million Alawites in Syria.[1] At that time the total Syrian population was around 22 million.[10] The main areas of Kalbiyya settlement are the districts of Jableh, Haffa and Latakia and the town of Qardaha,[1] all within Latakia Governorate in north west Syria.[11] They are the most geographically compact of the Alawite tribes, the others being more dispersed in non-contiguous areas across the coastal region.[12]

The Kalbiyya consists of five branches: Rashawneh, Junaydi, al-Nawasireh, al-Jurud, and al-Qarahilah.[13] Each branch of an Alawite tribe has its own hereditary chief, a structure which leads to frequent internal disputes within Alawite society.[14] The Junayd family typically provide the leadership of the Kalbiyya and was based at Tell Salhab, near Masyaf.[13] Traditionally, Alawite society is divided into three classes: religious leaders, landowners and peasants, with religious leadership, like chieftaincy, being hereditary.[14]

History

Emergence and Ottoman period

There are no known references to the Kalbiyya in medieval sources. They are not, for instance, mentioned among the tribes led by the 13th century Alawite paramount leader

Makzun al-Sinjari. It is only after the Ottoman conquest of Syria in the early 16th century that the Kalbiyya are mentioned in historical records. Stefan Winter, an historian specialising in Ottoman Syria, notes that, despite this, they may have existed as a grouping before the 16th century (but without any "special role" among the Alawites). He also speculates that their name "may originally have invoked a link" with the medieval Banu Kalb bedouin tribal confederation.[2]

There is evidence that, following the conquest, the Kalbiyya were among the tribes favoured by the Ottomans in order to use them as part of their local administrative control and tax collection structure.[15] The Kalbiyya's emergence as a recognised group may therefore be linked to this Ottoman policy.[2] Nevertheless, there were a number of Kalbiyya rebellions during the 16th century,[16] and by the beginning of the 19th century, the Kalbiyya had a reputation for lawlessness and were in constant and open conflict with the Ottoman authorities.[17]

In the 1850s,

St Paul's description of the heathen: "filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness".[19] He criticized their brigandage, feuds, lying and divorce[19] and claimed that "the state of [their] society was a perfect hell upon earth".[20] Lyde's account has been described as "colourful" but "unreliable" in certain respects.[19]

The Assad family
Bashar Al-Assad

During the French mandate

Following the end of Ottoman rule after World War I, Syria became part of the French mandate, which was subdivided into separate territories including an Alawite State.[21] By 1930, Syria as a whole had an Alawite population of 213,870, of which 50,700 were Kalbiyya.[1]

The Alawite community was divided between "separatists" who supported the maintenance of a separate Alawite state and "nationalists" or "unionists", who advocated integration into a wider Syrian or even

Hafez Al-Assad, later president of Syria.[22] It should, however, be noted that historian Stefan Winter has questioned the authenticity of these letters.[23]

Since Syrian independence

Syria became independent in 1946 but suffered from political instability in its first years and, in 1963, the Ba'athist coup overthrew the then government.[24] The coup was led by three Alawites: Salah Jadid, Muhammad Umran and Hafez Al-Assad. Assad was from the Kalbiyya tribe, Umran from the Khayyatin, and Jadid from the Haddadin.[25] Following Assad's seizure of sole power in 1970, part of his strategy was to concentrate control in the hands of members of his own Kalbiyya tribe.[25] In 1970, the Kalbiyya numbered 108,800[1] compared to a total Syrian population of 6,305,000.[26] Although Alawites in general dominated the government, as historian Jordi Tejel points out, in practice "active participation" in the Assad regime was limited to the Kalbiyya.[27] Additionally, there is evidence that the Kalbiyya areas received much greater infrastructure investment and other economic benefits compared to other Alawite areas.[28]

Assad, following his death in 2000, was succeeded as president by his son,

Bashar.[29] The latter continued to rule through the same power structures as his father, with the Kalbiyya playing a central role.[30] With the advent of the 2011 uprising and subsequent civil war, there was even greater focus on this policy. In 2012–2013, some 90% of regime army generals, according to sources close to the government, were not only Alawite but from the Kalbiyya tribe.[31]

Notable Kalbiyya

  • Ghazi Kanaan,[34] Head of Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon 1982-2002; Syrian Minister of the Interior 2004-2005.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e Goldsmith 2015, p. 7.
  2. ^ a b c Winter 2016, p. 99.
  3. ^ a b Tibi 1990, p. 138.
  4. ^ a b Commins 2004, p. 28.
  5. ^ a b Williams 2020, p. 59.
  6. ^ Rolland 2003, p. 75.
  7. ^ Menzies & Granados Palmer 2019, p. 694.
  8. ^ Field 1994, p. 101.
  9. ^ Nisan 2015, p. 117.
  10. ^ Akhmedov 2022, p. 708.
  11. ^ PCGN 2011, p. 7.
  12. ^ Goldsmith 2015, p. 25.
  13. ^ a b Batatu 1999, p. 377.
  14. ^ a b Alkan 2022, p. 27.
  15. ^ Winter 2016, p. 122.
  16. ^ Winter 2016, pp. 75, 83, 113, 115.
  17. ^ Moosa 1987, p. 276.
  18. ^ Moosa 1987, p. 277.
  19. ^ a b c Howse 2011.
  20. ^ Pipes 1992, p. 165.
  21. ^ a b c Firro 1997, pp. 91–92.
  22. ^ Seale 1990, p. 20.
  23. ^ Winter 2016, pp. 260–261.
  24. ^ Commins 2004, pp. 10–12.
  25. ^ a b Zisser 1999, p. 135.
  26. ^ Batatu 1999, p. 6.
  27. ^ Tejel 2008, p. 58.
  28. ^ Goldsmith 2015, pp. 109–110.
  29. ^ Winter 2016, p. 1.
  30. ^ Zisser 2006, p. 65.
  31. ^ Droz-Vincent 2016, p. 176.
  32. ^ Zisser 1999, p. 129.
  33. ^ Cordesman 2002, p. 337.
  34. ^ Goldsmith 2015, p. 109.
  35. ^ Seale 1990, p. 19.

Bibliography