Mentalism (psychology)
In
Neither mentalism nor behaviorism are mutually exclusive fields; elements of one can be seen in the other, perhaps more so in modern times compared to the advent of psychology over a century ago.[1]: 11–12, 184 [3]
Classical mentalism
Psychologist
The rise of behaviorism
Concurrently thriving alongside mentalism since the inception of psychology was the functional perspective of behaviorism. However, it was not until 1913, when psychologist
The new mentalism
Critical to the successful revival of the mind or consciousness as a primary focus of study in psychology (and in related fields such as cognitive neuroscience) were technological and methodological advances, which eventually allowed for brain mapping, among other new techniques.[7] These advances provided an experimental way to begin to study perception and consciousness.[7]
However, the cognitive revolution did not kill behaviorism as a research program; in fact, research on operant conditioning actually grew at a rapid pace during the cognitive revolution.[1] In 1994, scholar Terry L. Smith surveyed the history of radical behaviorism and concluded that "even though radical behaviorism may have been a failure, the operant program of research has been a success. Furthermore, operant psychology and cognitive psychology complement one another, each having its own domain within which it contributes something valuable to, but beyond the reach of, the other."[1]: xii
See also
- Cartesianism
- Cognitivism (psychology)
- Dualism (philosophy of mind)
- Property dualism
References
- ^ OCLC 30158598.
- PMID 22478131.
The stimulus-response (S-R) psychology of Watson (1913) is ultimately about behavior and is definitely mechanistic. The behavior-analytic approach of Skinner (1938, 1953) is not ultimately about behavior, and it is definitely not mechanistic. As operant psychologists, we are not concerned with identifying stimuli and responses that bear some fixed relationship to one another and that can be used as building blocks to explain complex behavior patterns. As operant psychologists, we are concerned, first and foremost, with the functions of behavior or, in lay terms, with purpose (Lee, 1988; Morris, 1993; Skinner, 1974), even though we do not analyze and use the term purpose as a lay person would. [...] Functionalism would have been a better term for what we are about but, unfortunately, that term has already been used to describe a school of psychology quite different from ours.
- ^ doi:10.1037/h0082031.
- ^ .
- .
- OCLC 45188938.
- ^ OCLC 849719164.
In that sense, the behaviorists were right: as a method, introspection provides a shaky ground for a science of psychology, because no amount of introspection will tell us how the mind works. However, as a measure, introspection still constitutes the perfect, indeed the only, platform on which to build a science of consciousness, because it supplies a crucial half of the equation—namely, how subjects feel about some experience (however wrong they are about the ground truth). To attain a scientific understanding of consciousness, we cognitive neuroscientists "just" have to determine the other half of the equation: Which objective neurobiological events systematically underlie a person's subjective experience?
Further reading
- Burgos, José E.; PMID 31976433.
- Burgos, José E. (2016). "Antidualism and antimentalism in radical behaviorism" (PDF). Behavior & Philosophy. 43: 1–37. See also the six responses to Burgos in volume 44 of Behavior & Philosophy.
- Lo Dico, Giuseppe (2016). Philosophical and empirical approaches to psychology: mentalism vs. antimentalism. Lanham, MD: OCLC 922913669.
- S2CID 143651727.
- Charles, Eric P. (September 2011). "Seeing minds in behavior: descriptive mentalism". S2CID 144248697.
- Carlson, Richard A. (June 2002). "Mentalism, information, and consciousness". .
- Hocutt, Max (1996). "Behaviorism as opposition to Cartesianism". In OCLC 41663265.
- Preston, Beth (August 1994). "Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative?". S2CID 44132696.
- Moore, Jay (1989). "Why methodological behaviorism is mentalistic". Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology. 9 (2): 20–27. doi:10.1037/h0091470.
- OCLC 14414028.
- Schnaitter, Roger (1986). "A coordination of differences: behaviorism, mentalism and the foundation of psychology". In Knapp, Terry J.; Robertson, Lynn C. (eds.). Approaches to cognition: contrasts and controversies. Hillsdale, NJ: OCLC 12556673.
- OCLC 9255523.