Minimal deterrence

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In

first strike unacceptably high.[1] To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike.[2] In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting a counterforce strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a countervalue second strike
.

While the

Minimum Credible Deterrence.[4]

The "

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Pakistan refuses to adopt a no first use policy, while India and China have adopted no first use policies. Pakistan's foreign minister Shamshad Ahmad
had warned that if Pakistan is ever invaded or attacked, it will use "any weapon in its arsenal" to defend itself.

Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race. Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary's first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage.[5] Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons. For example, the United States’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence.[6] In response to this, China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States’ advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile defense.[7]

One disadvantage of minimal deterrence is that it requires an accurate understanding of the level of damage an adversary finds unacceptable, especially if that understanding changes over time so that a previously credible deterrent is no longer credible.[8] A minimal deterrence strategy must also account for the nuclear firepower that would be "lost" or "neutralized" during an adversary's counterforce strike.[9] Additionally, a minimal deterrence capability may embolden a state when it confronts a superior nuclear power, as has been observed in the relationship between China and the United States.[10] Finally, while pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations allows states to make reductions without becoming vulnerable, further reductions may be undesirable once minimal deterrence is reached because they will increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal.[11]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 21
  2. ^ Lieber and Press 2006, 37
  3. ^ Ross 2002, 56
  4. ^ Feickert and Kronstadt 2003, 9
  5. ^ Freedman 2003, 178
  6. ^ Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 8
  7. ^ Blair 2009, 23
  8. ^ Stout 2010
  9. ^ Freedman 2003, 195
  10. ^ McVadon 2005, 6
  11. ^ Nalebuff 1988, 424

References

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