Mytilenean revolt
Mytilenean Revolt | |||||||
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Part of the Peloponnesian War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Tenedos | Mytilene and other cities on Lesbos, weakly supported by Sparta and the Peloponnesian League | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Paches |
Salaethus, Alcidas, others | ||||||
The suppression of the revolt in 427 BC was followed by a famous debate at Athens in which the assembly ordered the execution of the entire male population of Mytilene, but then reversed that order a day later. |
The Mytilenean revolt was an incident in the
The attempt to reach a settlement at Athens fell through, as the Athenians were unwilling to allow their loyal ally
In the wake of the Mytileneans' surrender,
Plan and preparations
The Mytilenean government (which was
The revolt
Initial moves
The Athenians, who were still suffering from the plague at this time and were under great financial strain from the unexpectedly long and involved war, initially tried to negotiate in order to avoid taking on yet another military commitment in Lesbos.[5] When the Mytileneans refused to abandon their plans to unify Lesbos or their preparations for war, however, the Athenians resigned themselves to the necessity of a military response and dispatched a fleet to Mytilene; ten Mytilenean triremes which had been serving in the fleet were interned at Athens with their crews. The initial plan was for the fleet to arrive during a religious festival for which all the Mytileneans would be outside of the city, and during which it would be easy for the Athenians to seize the fortifications of the town. Since this plan was crafted in the open Athenian assembly, however, it was impossible to keep it secret, and the Mytileneans had ample warning of the fleet's approach.[4] On the day of the festival, they remained in the city, with doubled guards on the weaker sections of the walls; the Athenians, arriving to find the city well defended, ordered the Mytileneans to surrender their fleet and tear down their walls. The Mytileneans refused this demand, and even went so far as to send their fleet to fight the Athenians just outside the harbor. When the Athenians quickly defeated this fleet and drove it back into the harbor, however, the Mytileneans quickly agreed to negotiate, arranged an armistice on the scene, and sent representatives to Athens. In doing this, however, the Mytilenean government was aiming not at reaching an accommodation with Athens, but rather at buying time for their negotiations with Sparta and Boeotia to bear fruit.[4] As the representatives were on their way to Athens, a second group was secretly dispatched to Sparta to secure that city's support in the rebellion.
Failure of negotiations and resumption of fighting
The negotiations at Athens were brief and unsuccessful. The Mytileneans offered to remain loyal if the Athenians would withdraw their fleet from Lesbos.[6] Implicit in this proposition was that the Athenians would abandon Methymna, and that the Athenians could not do, as failing to protect a subject city from aggression would have undermined their claims to legitimacy as rulers of their empire.[7] The Athenians, accordingly, rejected the Mytilenean offer, and when the ambassadors returned to Lesbos bearing this news all the cities of Lesbos save Methymna openly declared war on Athens.[8] The Mytileneans mustered an army and marched out to attack the Athenian camp; although they came off slightly the better in the ensuing battle, they were unwilling to press their advantage and retreated back behind their fortifications before nightfall. At this point the Athenians, encouraged by the lack of initiative on their enemies' part, summoned troops from their allies and, once these arrived, built two fortified camps, one on either side of Mytilene's harbor. From these they instituted a naval blockade of the city (the Mytileneans and their allies continued to control all the land outside the Athenian fortifications).
Sparta wavers
Immediately after the Mytilenean attack on the Athenian camp, a trireme bearing ambassadors from Sparta and Boeotia slipped past the Athenians into Mytilene and persuaded the Mytileneans to send a second group of ambassadors to plead for Spartan intervention (the Spartans and Boeotians had been dispatched before the revolt, but had been prevented from entering the city for some time).[9] This second group of Mytilenean ambassadors arrived within a week of the first, in July, but neither secured any immediate assistance; the Spartans deferred the decision over Mytilene to the Peloponnesian League as a whole, which would be convening at Olympia later that summer.[10] At that meeting, the Mytilenean ambassadors gave a speech in which they gave justifications for their revolt, emphasized Athens' weakness, and stressed the importance of attacking the Athenians in the empire, from which they drew their resources.[11] After hearing this speech, the Spartans and their allies voted to accept the Lesbians into their alliance and attack Athens immediately in support of the revolt.[12]
The plans made at Olympia called for all the allied states to send their contingents to the
Fighting on Lesbos
While the Spartan force was at the isthmus making its preparations, the Mytileneans and their allies launched an attack on Methymna, expecting that the city would be betrayed to them from within.[17] In the event, however, the promised betrayal failed to materialize, and the attack was repulsed. The Mytileneans returned home, stopping along the way to help strengthen the fortifications of several of their allies near Methymna. Once the Mytileneans were gone, the Methymnians marched out against one of these cities, Antissa, and were defeated by the Antissans and their mercenaries in fighting outside that city's walls.
At this point the Athenians, realizing that their force at Lesbos was insufficient to cope with the Mytileneans, dispatched an additional 1,000 hoplites to the scene. The Athenians at Lesbos were now able to gain control of the land around Mytilene and build a wall of
Siege, relief effort, and surrender
To pay the expenses of the ongoing siege in their current state of financial crisis, the Athenians were forced to turn to two extraordinary measures. First, they imposed an eisphora, or direct tax, on their own citizens.[18] Ancient Greeks were extremely reluctant to use measures such as this, which were regarded as an imposition on personal freedom, and in fact this may have been the first time that such a tax was ever imposed at Athens.[19] At the same time, Athens announced an increase in the tribute assessments for its subjects, and twelve ships were sent out to collect the new assessments several months before the usual time; this action clearly triggered resistance, as one of the generals commanding these ships was killed while attempting to make collections in Caria.[20]
In the summer of 427 BC, the Spartans and their allies planned a concerted effort on land and sea to strain Athens' resources and relieve the siege at Mytilene. The annual invasion of Attica that year was the second largest of the
At Mytilene, however, time was rapidly running out for the Peloponnesians to come to the rescue. A Spartan representative, Salaethus, had been smuggled into the city in a trireme at the end of the winter with news of the relief scheme, and had taken command of the defenses there in anticipation of the fleet's arrival.[22] Food supplies in the city, however, were exhausted at some point early in the summer, and, since the fleet had yet to materialize, Salaethus was forced to gamble on a breakout attempt.[23] Hoplite armor was issued to all the citizens, most of whom heretofore had only served as light troops, in preparation for this attempt. Once the people were thus armed, however, they refused to obey the government and demanded that the authorities distribute any remaining food supplies, threatening to come to terms with the Athenians on their own if this was not done. Realizing that they could not prevent this, and that a peace concluded without their involvement would surely be fatal to them, the members of the government contacted the Athenian commander and surrendered, on the condition that none of the Mytileneans should be imprisoned, enslaved, or executed until representatives from the city had presented their case at Athens.
While these events were taking place, Alcidas advanced slowly and cautiously with his fleet, wasting a great deal of time in rounding the Peloponnese. Although he succeeded in giving the Athenians the slip and reaching
Debate at Athens
After he completed subduing Mytilene, Paches sent the greater part of his army back to Athens, and sent with it the Mytileneans whom he had identified as particularly culpable in the revolt and the captured Spartan general Salaethus. Salaethus was executed immediately, although he suggested that, in return for his life, he would have the Spartan force besieging Plataea withdrawn.[27] The assembly then turned its attention to the question of what to do with the prisoners at Athens and the rest of the Mytileneans back on Lesbos. What followed was one of the most famous debates in the history of the Athenian democracy, and one of only two occasions on which Thucydides records the content, and perhaps some of the actual words, of the opposing speeches in the assembly.[28] As such, the debate has been the subject of much scholarly analysis, aimed elucidating both the circumstances of the revolt and the internal politics of Athens at that time.
Thucydides' account
The debate reported by Thucydides took place over two days. On the first day, the events of which Thucydides only summarizes, the Athenians angrily condemned the entire male population of Mytilene to death, and the women and children to slavery.[29] The citizens were particularly enraged that the revolt had brought a Spartan fleet into Ionian waters, where it would never have passed in normal circumstances and where no enemy fleet had sailed in over 20 years. In accordance with the assembly's decision, a trireme was dispatched to Mytilene bearing orders for Paches to execute the Mytilenean men.
On the next day, however, as the Athenians considered the severity of the measure they had just passed, a number of citizens began to have second thoughts.
In Cleon's speech, as reported by Thucydides, the politician argues that consistent enforcement of laws, even when they seem unjust, is the only way to maintaining order, and moreover that the Mytilenean people as a whole (not merely the aristocracy) had revolted against Athens, and thus deserved to be condemned.[31] The speech is filled with acerbic criticism of the Athenian people, and of certain elements of the ideology of democracy, and it lays out an imperial ideology that openly describes Athens' rule as a tyranny and embraces it as such.[32] Part of Cleon's speech was devoted to attacking those who would speak against him, maintaining that anyone who would speak on behalf of the Mytileneans must have been bribed.[33] Certain elements of the speech evoke arguments made by Pericles in his famous funeral oration, and it is clear that Cleon, as portrayed by Thucydides, is deliberately laying claim to aspects of Pericles' mantle of leadership with his speech.[34] In content, the speech emphasizes the favored status that Mytilene had held before the revolt, asserts that the city as a whole bears responsibility for the revolt, and argues that a favored city that revolts must be treated harshly so as to deter others from following.[35]
After Cleon's speech, Thucydides presents a speech by Diodotus, a politician who appears only this once in recorded history, but who, Thucydides reports, had also spoken against Cleon's proposal the previous day.[36] He is identified as "Diodotus, son of Eucrates";[37] the Eucrates in question is presumably a fairly prominent lieutenant of Pericles mentioned on several occasions before this.[38] The early portion of Diodotus' speech is devoted to refuting the charges that Cleon had preemptively levelled against those who would speak after him, principally by arguing that the assembly would deprive itself of wise counsel if it constantly examined the motives of speakers instead of the arguments they presented.[39] Next Diodotus attacks Cleon's claim that harshness would deter future revolts, on the grounds that no state revolts in the expectation of failure, and that the more useful countermeasure, therefore, is a mild punishment that will allow for reconsideration when the revolt appears likely to fail. Throughout the speech, Diodotus refuses to stray from the grounds of expediency, reminding the Athenians that they sit not as a court of law but as political assembly, dedicated to determining what action is most advantageous for Athens. On the issue of culpability, however, he flatly denies that the demos shares in the guilt of the oligarchs, and warns the assembly against alienating its potential friends throughout the empire.[40]
After speeches on the motion concluded, the assembly voted, by a narrow margin, to overturn the previous day's decree.[41] Cleon then put forward a second motion proposing the execution, without trial, of the 1,000 Lesbians whom Paches had selected out as most responsible for the rebellion; that motion was carried without recorded discussion. A ship was immediately dispatched to Mytilene to countermand the execution order sent out the previous day. The Mytilenean representatives in Athens offered a sizable reward to the crew if the ship arrived in time to prevent the executions. Rowing day and night, sleeping in shifts, and eating at their oars, the rowers of the second trireme managed to make up the first ship's one day lead and arrive at Mytilene just as Paches was reading the original order, in time to prevent its execution.
Modern analyses
Authenticity of the speeches
As with all the speeches reported by Thucydides, the resemblance between Cleon's and Diodotus' speeches as the historian recorded them and the speeches actually given has been the subject of much debate. In the famous passage where he lays out his methodology for reporting the content of speeches, Thucydides states that "my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said."[42] Various historians have either stressed the first clause of this sentence and reached the conclusion that Thucydides put words into his speakers' mouths or emphasized the second clause and concluded that Thucydides' speeches maintain the basic sense of the speeches actually given on the various occasions he describes.[43] Still other scholars take the second approach but conclude that Thucydides strayed from this approach over his writing career; a number of schemes for dating the authorship of the various speeches has also been proposed, without any gaining a preponderance of support.
Popularity of the Athenian Empire
Diodotus' speech contains the famous claim that "in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side."
Aftermath
Although Mytilene's citizens were spared execution, a harsh punishment was still imposed on the rebellious Lesbians.
In an anecdote that some have connected with the Mytilene affair, Plutarch reports that Paches killed himself during a trial at some point after his command at Mytilene.[51] Donald Kagan has interpreted this anecdote to indicate that Paches, a moderate, was being prosecuted by Cleon or another more aggressive politician, who disapproved of his decision to break off the pursuit of Alcidas' fleet.[52]
References
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the events leading up to the revolt are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.2.
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 100-101
- ^ Legon, Megara and Mytilene, 201
- ^ a b c Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 101
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the Athenian reaction and the initial battle are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.3-4.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.4
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 101-102
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the early fighting on Lesbos are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.5-6.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.5
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 102
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.9-14
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.15
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the Peloponnesians' actions and the Athenian response are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.15-16.
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 100
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 103
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.13
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the fighting on Lesbos are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.18.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.19
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 104-5
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 104
- ^ a b Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 26.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.25
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the proposed breakout and the surrender are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.27-28.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.29
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding Alcidas' campaign in the Aegean are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.30-33.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.35
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.36
- ^ Wasserman, Post-Periclean Democracy in Athens, 27
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the first day's debate are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.36.
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding events leading up to Cleon's speech are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.36.
- ^ Cleon's speech is recounted by Thucydides at 3.37-40.
- ^ Andrews, Cleon's Hidden Appeals, 46
- ^ Andrewes, The Mytilene Debate, 72
- ^ Wasserman, Post-Periclean Democracy, 33
- ^ Kagan, The Archidamian War, 157
- ^ Diodotus' speech is recounted by Thucydides at 3.42-48.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.41
- ^ Kagan, The Archidamian War, 126
- ^ Wasserman, Post-Periclean Democracy, 36
- ^ An abstract of the content of Diodotus' speech may be found in Kagan, The Archidamian War, 160-2.
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the remainder of the debate and the aftermath are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.49-50.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.22
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the scholarly conflict over the authenticity of Thucydides' speeches are drawn from Andrewes, The Mytilene Debate, 66-67.
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.47
- ^ A summary of this scholarly debate as it pertains to Mytilene specifically may be found in Gillis, The Revolt at Mytilene, 41.
- ^ See Kagan, The Archidamian War, 152 n. 16 and Legon, Megara and Mytilene, 206.
- ^ Unless otherwise noted, all details regarding the sanctions imposed on Lesbos are drawn from Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 3.50.
- ^ See Kagan, The Archidamian War, 166 for the sum and destination of the money raised from the land dedicated to the gods.
- ^ a b Kagan, The Archidamian War, 166
- ^ Legon, Megara and Mytilene, 211
- ^ Plutarch, Nicias 6.1
- ^ Kagan, The Archidamian War, 167-8
Sources
Ancient
- Diodorus Siculus, Library
- Plutarch. . Lives. Translated by John Dryden – via Wikisource.
- Thucydides. . Translated by Richard Crawley – via Wikisource.
Modern
- Andrewes, Arthur. "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49". Phoenix, Vol. 16, No. 2. (Summer, 1962), pp. 64–85.
- Andrews, James A. "Cleon's Hidden Appeals: Thucydides 3.37-40". The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 1. (2000), pp. 45–62.
- Gillis, Daniel. "The Revolt at Mytilene". The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 38–47.
- ISBN 0-670-03211-5
- ISBN 0-8014-9714-0
- Legon, Ronald P. "Megara and Mytilene". Phoenix, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Autumn, 1968), pp. 200–225.
- Wasserman, Felix Martin. "Post-Periclean Democracy in Action: The Mytilenean Debate (Thuc. III 37-48)". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 87. (1956), pp. 27–41.