Rational choice institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is a theoretical approach to the study of institutions arguing that actors use
RCI explains the creation of institutions as an attempt to reduce
Erik Voeten writes that the strength of RCI approaches to institutions is that they allow "us to think about what institutions should look like if they were designed to optimally improve cooperation. This provides a normative benchmark."[8] He argues that alternative perspectives cannot compete with RCI in terms of "its range of testable and generalizable implications."[8]
Definition of institutions
RCI scholars tend to define institutions as "rules of the game". These rules structure the incentives of actors, and thus alters their behavior. One prominent RCI definition of institutions is provided by Jack Knight who defines institutions as:
sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways. These rules (1) provide information about how people are expected to act in particular situations, (2) can be recognized by those who are members of the relevant group as the rules to which others conform in these situations, and (3) structure the strategic choices of actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes.[9]
According to Erik Voeten, rational choice scholarship on international institutions can be divided between (1) rational functionalism and (2) Distributive rationalism.[8] The former sees organizations as functional optimal solutions to collective problems, whereas the latter sees organizations as an outcome of actors' individual and collective goals.[8] Since individual and collective goals may conflict, the latter version of RCI accepts that suboptimal institutions are likely.[10]
Explanations for suboptimal institutions
Principal-agent model
A key concept of Rational Choice Institutionalism is the
Domestic politics
RCI scholars may also argue that international institutional dysfunction may stem from domestic politics, as governments use these institutions both to solve problems between states but also to achieve domestic political outcomes.[8][10]
Limitations
Rational Choice Institutionalism is frequently contrasted with Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. Historical Institutionalism emphasizes how small events and accidents may create paths from which it is hard to turn back from. Examining the actors involved in creating an institution and the contexts that they were operating in may provide better explanations for why particular institutions were created. Critical junctures – which can be small events and accidents – may lead to institutional change or set institutions on paths from which it is hard to turn back from. This is in contrast to Rational Choice Institutionalism where the creation of institutions, as well as institutional change, reflects optimal and efficient outcomes for actors. Historical institutionalists would rebut that by noting that many institutions are inefficient, and that these inefficiencies can be better explained through path dependency.
Both sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism would argue against the suggestion that we can assume that actors have exogenous preferences (the notion that we can assume the preferences of actors). They would argue actors do not have stable and consistent preferences, and that scholars cannot assume that they hold a given set of preferences. As a consequence, these other approaches argue that it is unreasonable to assume that a Pareto-optimal equilibrium solution exists to collective action problems.
William H. Riker, a political scientist prominent for his application of game theory and mathematics in political science, argued that a key problem with RCI scholarship was the so-called "inherability problem", which referred to an inability to distinguish whether outcomes resulted from institutions or from the preferences of actors, which made it impossible to predict optimal outcomes.[14][15]
Terry Moe argues that RCI neglects to consider the ways in which political institutions differ from other institutions, and that RCI neglects the role of power in shaping outcomes.[16][17] In other words, Moe argues that RCI accounts of political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation, mutual gains and solutions to collective action problems are unrealistic.[16][17] Historical institutionalists make a similar critique as they argue that politics is shaped by policy feedbacks and path dependencies which mean that past policies cement or increase power asymmetries, which shapes the kinds of outcomes that are possible in the future.[18]
In the context of Latin American politics, Kurt Weyland has argued that Rational Choice Institutionalism is overly focused on politics as it is conducted in legislative institutions and elections, as well as the formal rules and formal institutions of politics. He also argues that it insufficiently accounts for political change and crises, and overly focuses on microfoundations.[19]
In an influential article (and later book), George Washington University political scientists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue rationalist accounts of institutions (such as those emphasizing principal-agent problems) cannot fully account for institutional pathologies.[11][20] They provide a sociological institutionalist account of institutional dysfunction whereby institutions have powers derived from their rational-legal authority, and that these powers and autonomy may give rise to suboptimal outcomes.[11][20]
Alexander Wendt has argued that rationalist accounts of institutional design often lack falsifiability: it is not clear how one would demonstrate that an institution was not rationally designed.[21]
Alexander Wendt and Paul Pierson have also argued if actors are guided by a logic of appropriateness, rather than a logic of consequence, then the institutions that they design are not truly optimal.[22][23] Both of them question that the actors that create institutions are capable of designing functional institutions (institutions that achieve the founders' goals).[22][23]
James March and Herbert Simon criticize rational approaches to institutions, arguing that it is problematic to assume that actors have ordered preferences, actors understand the alternative choices available to them, and that actors pursue optimal alternatives (rather than satisficing alternatives). They argue that actors rely on routinized responses to problems that emerge, as opposed to evaluating and deliberating on the optimal response. This can be seen during episodes of uncertainty when actors respond in routinized ways, rather than craft original solutions to the newly emergent problems.[24]
Hendrik Spruyt argues that the "pure rational choice variant of methodological individualism" (such as functionalist RCI approaches) is flawed because "we cannot simply deduce institutional outcomes from preferences or impute preferences from observed outcomes."[25]
See also
References
- ISBN 978-0-472-10588-5.
- ^ Calvert, Randall (1995). "Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions". Explaining Social Institutions.
- ^ Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44, 936-957
- S2CID 245805749.
- ^ Williamson, Oliver (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press
- ^ Shepsle, K. (2005). Rational choice institutionalism. Harvard University Press.
- ^ Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms. Political Studies, 44, 936-957
- ^ ISSN 1094-2939.
- OCLC 1127523562.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link - ^ S2CID 41593236.
- ^ JSTOR 2601307.
- ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-19. Retrieved 2011-01-07.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) - ^ Kiewiet, D.R. and McCubbins, M.D. (1991) The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- S2CID 145664129.
- ISSN 0007-1234.
- ^ S2CID 39072417.
- ^ ISSN 8756-6222.
- S2CID 154860619.
- S2CID 144218661.
- ^ JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt7z7mx.
- ISBN 9780521533584
- ^ ISBN 978-0-521-53358-4, retrieved 2020-10-09
- ^ ISSN 0952-1895.
- ISBN 978-0-631-18631-1.
- S2CID 155957216.
Further reading
- Weingast, Barry (1998) 'Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives in A new handbook of political science, Robert E. Goodin, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2008. "Rational Choice Institutionalism." in The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions.
- Koremenos B, Lipson C, Snidal D. 2001a. The rational design of international institutions. Int. Organ. 55:761–99
- Moe, T. (2005). Power and Political Institutions. Perspectives on Politics, 3(2), 215-233.
- Moe, Terry. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 213-254. 1990.
- D. Green, I. Shapiro. 1996. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. Yale University Press
- Thomas A. Koelble. 1995. "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology." Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2: pp. 231-243.