Supreme emergency
In just war theory, a supreme emergency is a situation where a state faces an existential threat from an agressor, which scholars like Michael Walzer and John Rawls argue justifies otherwise unjust action.
Background
While supreme emergency is a relatively new concept,
In his 1940 speech,
Definition and criteria
For a threat to be considered a supreme emergency, Walzer suggests two conditions must be met: the threat must be imminent, and it must be of a more severe nature than ordinary military defeat. Conventional military threats, like military occupation, indemnities or the loss of territorial integrity are, Walzer argues, not severe enough to constitute a supreme emergency exemption, but the exile or murder of a large portion of the population could be.[3]: 251–254
Interpretations
As a justification
Walzer's supreme emergency defines the exemption as a justification; Walzer argues that actions like targeting civilians are not violations of just war theory when a supreme emergency is in effect and one is not morally liable for the otherwise morally wrong action of attacking civilians. The supreme emergency is a justification, Walzer argues, because a supreme emergency becomes apparent only after many options have been exhausted, and a "moral urgency" exists when an entire nation is immanently threatened. In such situations, Walzer argues that a statesman would have "moral dirty hands" because he would be obliged to urgently decide between otherwise morally wrong alternatives.[3] John Rawls similarly argues for supreme emergency as a justification, arguing that the threat of genocide undermines well-ordered society, which is the basis of Rawls' universal human rights. As such, Rawls only sees supreme emergency as justification when used by societies which are in compliance with universal human rights; Britain's attacks on civilians early in World War II were justified, but, had the roles been reversed, Germany would not have been justified in similar attacks.[5]
As an excuse
While Walzer and others have characterized supreme emergencies as a justification, others have argued instead that supreme emergencies are an excuse, mitigating, but not rectifying the wrongness of the action. Brian Orend, for example, has argued that supreme emergencies cannot be used to justify because it allows the state to perform actions which would never be permissible at an interpersonal level, because Walzer's arguments depend on a
No supreme emergency exemption
Michael Schwartz and Debra Comer argue that religious institutions, such as the Church of England, would not accept violations of jus in bello rules for a supreme emergency. This is because there is distinction between acquired rights, which stem from circumstance, and inherent rights, which are inviolable properties of personhood. Schwartz and Comer argue that Walzer incorrectly treated all rights as acquired, allowing rights that biblical ethicists consider inherent to change with circumstance.[7]
References
- hdl:10023/17848.
- ^ Robinson, Paul F., ed. (November 2016). Just War in Comparative Perspective (1 ed.). Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
- ^ ISBN 9780465052714.
- ^ ISBN 9781554810956.
- S2CID 145009709.
- S2CID 144579097.
- .