4th Panzer Army
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4th Panzer Army | |
---|---|
Panzer | |
Role | Armoured warfare |
Size | Army 1 July 1943 (start of the Battle of Kursk): 223,907[1] 1 November 1943 (Battle of the Dnieper): 276,978[2] 20 December 1943 (start of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive): 358,618[3] 10 April 1944 (end of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive): 247,200[4] |
Engagements |
|
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | See Commanders |
The 4th Panzer Army (
The army was destroyed during the Battle of Stalingrad,[5][6] but later reconstituted.
Formation and preparations for Operation Barbarossa
As part of the German High Command's preparations for
The war against Russia is an important chapter in the struggle for existence of the German nation. It is the old battle of Germanic against Slav peoples, of the defence of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation, and the repulse of Jewish-Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the destruction of present-day Russia and it must therefore be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron will to exterminate the enemy mercilessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the present Russian-Bolshevik system are to be spared.
— 2 May 1941[10]
The order was transmitted to the troops on Hoepner's initiative, ahead of the official
1941: Invasion of the Soviet Union
Advance on Leningrad
The 4th Panzer Group consisted of the
- XLI Army Corps: 1st Panzer Division, 6th Panzer Division, 36th Infantry Division, 269th Infantry Division
- LVI Army Corps: 8th Panzer Division, 3rd Motorised Infantry Division,[13] 290th Infantry Division
- Operation Typhoon)
The Army Group was to advance through the
After Reinhardt's corps closed in, the two corps were ordered to encircle the Soviet formations around
On 6 July 1941, Hoepner issued an order to his troops instructing them to treat the "loyal population" fairly, adding that "individual acts of sabotage should simply be charged to communists and Jews".[18] As with all German armies on the Eastern Front, Hoepner's panzer group implemented the Commissar Order that directed Wehrmacht troops to murder Red Army political officers immediately upon capture, contravening the accepted laws of war.[19] Between 2 July and 8 July, the 4th Panzer Group shot 101 Red Army political commissars, with the bulk of the executions coming from the XLI Panzer Corps.[18] By 19 July, 172 executions of commissars had been reported.[20]
By mid-July, the 4th Panzer Group seized the
By late July, Army Group North positioned 4th Panzer Group's units south and east of
On 29 August, Leeb issued orders for the blockade of Leningrad in anticipation that the city would soon be abandoned by the Soviets. On September 5, Hitler ordered Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group and an air corps transferred to
Battle of Moscow
As part of
Once the Vyazma pocket was eliminated, other units were able to advance on 14 October. Heavy rains and onset of the rasputitsa (roadlessness) caused frequent damage to tracked vehicles and motor transport further hampering the advance.[27] By early November, the 4th Panzer Group was depleted from earlier fighting and the weather but Hoepner, along with other panzer group commanders and Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, was impatient to resume the offensive.[28]
On 17 November, the 4th Panzer Group attacked again towards Moscow alongside the V Army Corps of the 4th Army, as part of the continuation of Operation Typhoon by Army Group Centre. The panzer group and the army corps represented Kluge's best forces, most ready for a continued offensive. In two weeks' fighting, Hoepner's forces advanced 60 km (37 mi) (4 km (2.5 mi) per day).[29] Lacking strength and mobility to conduct battles of encirclement, the Group undertook frontal assaults which proved increasingly costly.[30] A lack of tanks, insufficient motor transport and a precarious supply situation, along with tenacious Red Army resistance and the air superiority achieved by Soviet fighters hampered the attack.[31]
The
As late as 2 December, Hoepner urged his troops forward stating that "the goal [the encirclement of Moscow] can still be achieved". The next day, he warned Kluge that failure to break off the attack would "bleed white" his formations and make them incapable of defence. Kluge was sympathetic since the south flank of the 4th Army had already had to retreat under Red Army pressure and was on the defensive.[36] Hoepner was ordered to pause his attack, with the goal of resuming it on 6 December.[37] On 5 December 1941, with orders to attack the next day, Hoepner called a conference of chiefs-of-staff of his corps. The reports were grim: only four divisions were deemed capable of attack, three of these with limited objectives. The attack was called off; the Red Army launched its winter counter-offensive on the same day.[38]
1942: Battle of Stalingrad
On 1 January 1942, the 4th Panzer Group was redesignated 4th Panzer Army. The 4th Panzer Army held defensive positions in the spring of 1942 and then was reinforced, re-fit and transferred to Army Group South for Case Blue, its offensive in Southern Russia. Command was transferred to general Hermann Hoth in June. As the operation progressed, Hitler divided Army Group South into two army groups. Army Group A which was composed of the German 17th Army and 1st Panzer Army and Army Group B which was composed of 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army.[citation needed] The 4th Panzer Army was on 1 Aug 1942 composed of:[39]
- XLVIII Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Troops Rudolf Veiel): 14th Panzer Division, 29th Motorized Division, (24th Panzer Division from 6th Army on 14 Aug)
- IV Army Corps (General of Infantry Viktor von Schwedler): 94th Infantry Division, 371st Infantry Division, (297th Infantry-Division from 6th Army on 14 Aug)
- Romanian VI Army Corps (Lieutenant General Corneliu Dragalina): Romanian 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 20th Infantry Division
Army Group B's objective was to anchor itself on the Volga while Army Group A drove into the oil fields of the Caucasus. The 4th Panzer Army approached Stalingrad from the south while the 6th Army approached it from the west. Their aim was to meet up at Stalingrad and encircle the Soviet 62nd and 64th armies outside the city. The 6th Army was faced by a strong counterattack by the Soviet forces and failed to meet up with the 4th Panzer Army for three crucial days, allowing the two Soviet armies to withdraw into Stalingrad.
The 4th Panzer Army guarded the outside perimeter of Stalingrad while the 6th Army was engaged in the battle to capture the city. For over two months, the 6th Army was embroiled in vicious fighting in the city; though it was able to take over 90% of the city, it was unable to destroy the last pockets of resistance. On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched
1943: Battles of Kursk and Kiev
The army was then given reinforcements including 160 new tanks. It then was able to halt the Soviet winter offensive in Southern Russia and then counterattacked in the Third Battle of Kharkov, retaking the city in March 1943. The army saw little or no action over the next three months as both sides built up their strength for the upcoming Battle of Kursk.
The army throughout the spring of 1943 was significantly reinforced and grew to a strength of 1,100 tanks and 250,000 men by July 1943. It was to form the southern spearhead in the
1944–45: The retreat
By early 1944, the 4th Panzer Army had been pushed back to the pre-war 1939 Polish border. The army defended positions in Ukraine west of Kiev until late June 1944, fighting in the southern regions of the
By August 1944, Soviet attacks forced a full retreat of the 4th Panzer Army through the area of
- LVI Panzer Corps (General Johannes Block)
- XLVIII Panzer Corps (General Maximilian von Edelsheim)
- VIII Army Corps (General Hermann Recknagel)
The defense along the Vistula took place from August 1944 until the renewed Soviet
On 1 January 1945, the 4th Panzer Army, then under
Unknown to the Wehrmacht, the Soviet command planned to saturate the entire defensive zone with artillery bombardment. The Red Army began their
The Red Army halted its offensive in February 1945. The 3rd Panzer Army was tasked to halt the Soviets in the north, while the 9th Army was guarding against the Soviets in the centre. During February 1945, the 4th Panzer Army defended along the Oder River, containing the Soviet bridgehead at Steinau on the Oder. In March and the first half of April 1945, the army concentrated on defenses along the Lusatian Neisse River between Görlitz and Guben.[40]
On April 16, 1945, the Red Army renewed its offensive by crossing the Oder River. While the 9th Army held the Soviet forces at the
Aftermath
One of the 4th Panzer Army commanders, Erich Hoepner, was executed for his role in the 20 July plot.
Following the end of the war, one of the 4th Panzer Army former commanders,
None of the other commanders ever faced charges.[citation needed]
Commanders
No. | Portrait | Commander | Took office | Left office | Time in office |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Erich Hoepner (1886–1944) | Generaloberst15 February 1941 | 7 January 1942 | 326 days | |
2 | Richard Ruoff (1883–1967) | Generaloberst8 January 1942 | 31 May 1942 | 143 days | |
3 | Hermann Hoth (1885–1971) | Generaloberst31 May 1942 | 10 November 1943 | 1 year, 163 days | |
4 | Erhard Raus (1889–1956) [45] | Generaloberst10 November 1943 | 21 April 1944 | 163 days | |
5 | Josef Harpe (1887–1968) | Generaloberst18 May 1944 | 28 June 1944 | 41 days | |
6 | 28 June 1944 | 5 August 1944 | 38 days | ||
7 | Hermann Balck (1893–1982) | General der Panzertruppe5 August 1944 | 21 September 1944 | 47 days | |
8 | Fritz-Hubert Gräser (1888–1960) | General der Panzertruppe21 September 1944 | 8 May 1945 | 229 days |
See also
References
Citations
- ^ Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 532/43 g. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stand vom 1.7.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680057.
- ^ Pz. AOK 4 Oberquartiermeister Nr. 1834/43 g. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 1.11.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680072.
- ^ Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4 an Heeresgruppen Intendant Süd, 1227/43 geh. Kdos. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 20.12.43. NARA T313, R390, F8680079.
- ^ Armeeintendant Pz. A.O.K. 4, 399/44 g. Kdos. An Heeresgruppenintendant Süd. Verpflegungsstärken nach dem Stande vom 10.4.44. NARA T313, R408, F8700017.
- ^ ISBN 978-0850523423.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-4516-5113-3.
- ^ Zabecki 2014, p. 615.
- ^ Förster 1998, pp. 496–497.
- ^ Crowe 2013, p. 90.
- ^ a b Burleigh 1997, p. 76.
- ^ a b Förster 1998, pp. 519–521.
- ^ Melvin 2010, pp. 198–199.
- ^ Manstein, Lost victories p,178 / Mungo Melvin Manstein p,205
- ^ Melvin 2010, pp. 205.
- ^ Melvin 2010, pp. 209–210.
- ^ Melvin 2010, pp. 217–218.
- ^ Glantz 2012.
- ^ a b Stein 2007, p. 301.
- ^ Stahel 2015, p. 28.
- ^ Lemay 2010, p. 252.
- ^ Jones 2008, p. 35.
- ^ Stahel 2015, p. 37.
- ^ Megargee 2006, pp. 104–106.
- ^ Megargee 2006, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Stahel 2013, pp. 74–75, 95.
- ^ Stahel 2013, p. 95.
- ^ Stahel 2013, pp. 173–174.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 78–80.
- ^ Stahel 2015, p. 228.
- ^ Stahel 2015, p. 223.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 240–244.
- ^ Stahel 2015, p. 186−189, 228.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 229–230.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 235–237, 250.
- ^ Forczyk 2006.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 295–296.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 304–305.
- ^ Stahel 2015, pp. 306–307.
- ISBN 978-0-7006-1630-5) p.272
- ^ a b Tessin 1973, p. 229
- ISBN 9783421062376.
- ^ Beevor 2002, p. 329
- ^ Hebert 2010, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Hebert 2010, pp. 216–217.
- ^ Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations p. 352
Works cited
- Beevor, Antony (2002). The Fall of Berlin 1945. New York: Viking Books.
- ISBN 9780521582117.
- ISBN 978-1-317-98681-2.
- ISBN 978-0-8117-4437-9.
- Forczyk, Robert (2006). Moscow 1941: Hitler's first defeat. Osprey. ISBN 9781846030178.
- ISBN 978-0-19-822886-8.
- ISBN 978-0-7524-6070-3.
- Hebert, Valerie (2010). ISBN 978-0-7006-1698-5.
- Jones, Michael (2008). Leningrad: State of Siege. ISBN 978-0-465-01153-7.
- Lemay, Benoit (2010). Erich Von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-935149-55-2.
- ISBN 978-0-7425-4482-6.
- ISBN 978-0-297-84561-4.
- ISBN 978-1-107-08760-6.
- ISBN 978-1-107-03512-6.
- Stein, Marcel (2007). Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janushead – A Portrait. Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1-906033-02-6.
- Tessin, Georg (1973). Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945. Vol. 2. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag.
- ISBN 978-1-59884-981-3.