Battle of Hollandia
Battle of Hollandia | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the New Guinea Campaign | |||||||
Landing craft approaching Tanahmerah Bay | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
United States Australia (naval/air) | Japan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Douglas MacArthur Robert Eichelberger Daniel Barbey |
Fusatarō Teshima Masazumi Inada | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
41st Infantry Division | 2nd Army | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
~ 30,000 | 11,000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
152 killed 1,057 wounded |
3,300 killed 300 captured |
The Battle of Hollandia (code-named Operation Reckless) was an engagement between Allies of World War II and Japanese forces during World War II. The majority of the Allied force was provided by the United States, with the bulk of two United States Army infantry divisions being committed on the ground. Air and naval support consisted largely of U.S. assets, although Australia also provided air support during preliminary operations and a naval bombardment force.
The battle took place between 22 April and 6 June 1944 and formed part of the New Guinea campaign. The operation consisted of two landings, one at Tanahmerah Bay and the other at Humboldt Bay, near Hollandia. The landings were undertaken simultaneously with the amphibious invasion of Aitape ("Operation Persecution") to the east. The battle was an unqualified success for the Allied forces, resulting in a withdrawal by the Japanese to a new strategic defense line in the west of New Guinea and the abandonment of all positions in the east of the island.
Background
Geography and strategic situation
Hollandia was situated on the east side of a headland separating Humboldt Bay to the east and Tanahmerah Bay, 25 miles (40 km) to the west. The town itself was on the shore of Humboldt Bay, with a first-class anchorage. The headland was formed by the Cyclops Mountains, a mountain ridge rising steeply to 7,000 feet (2,100 m) and was backed by Lake Sentani, extending 15 miles (24 km) east to west. Between the mountain ridge and the lake was a narrow plain where the Japanese had built a number of airfields; three had been constructed by April 1944 and a fourth was under construction.[3] Of these, only one was considered to be complete.[4]
In early 1944, after the
Plans
Allied intelligence successes led to the decision to land at Hollandia. Intelligence gained from breaking the codes protecting Imperial Japanese Army radio messages led the Allies to learn that the Hollandia area was only lightly defended, with Japanese forces being concentrated in the Madang-Wewak region. In response, on 8 March General Douglas MacArthur sought approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring forward the previously planned landings at Hollandia to 15 April. Approval was granted four days later. MacArthur's plan was bold, as it involved making a large amphibious landing deep behind the front lines in New Guinea.[6] The Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed the United States Pacific Fleet to assign aircraft carriers to provide air support for the landings.[7] The attack was designated Operation Reckless in recognition of the risks involved in carrying it out.[7]
MacArthur met with the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral
The Japanese high command intended to hold Hollandia. The area was selected by the
As an attack on Hollandia was not expected, no plans were prepared to defend the area prior to the Allied landing.[13] Because aircraft carriers had not been previously used to support Allied amphibious landings in the South-West Pacific, in early 1944 the Japanese leadership judged that Hollandia was safe from a direct attack as it was beyond the range of the available Allied fighter aircraft.[14] The 18th Army did not plan for the defense of Hollandia, and the Army Air Force and Naval units stationed there had little opportunity to develop plans due to the rapid turnover of their leadership.[15]
Opposing forces
The port and airfields were the base for units of the Japanese
Allied planners estimated Japanese forces around Hollandia at around 14,000 troops in total.[17] It proved difficult to accurately estimate the size and composition of the Japanese defenses, as attempts to infiltrate reconnaissance parties in the area failed. As a result, code breaking was the main source of intelligence. During the early stages of the planning process MacArthur's headquarters believed that two Japanese infantry regiments may have been in the Hollandia area, but this was later discounted. It was later thought that 3000 troops from the 6th Sea Detachment were in the area, and reinforcements were being rapidly transferred there.[20]
The main landings at Hollandia would be made at two locations. The
The ground forces would be supported by two naval bombardment forces.
Landings
Preparations
Initial operations commenced in the second week of March 1944 with air raids by aircraft of the U.S.
The Allies conducted a deception operation to ensure that the Japanese continued to believe that they would land at Hansa Bay rather than Hollandia. This involved air attacks and naval bombardments on the Wewak area, and faked landings of reconnaissance patrols. This deception effort proved successful.[38]
In response to a request from the head of the US Navy, Admiral
Assault
The 41st Division was to stage from Cape Cretin, while the 24th would depart from
At Tanahmerah Bay, after a naval bombardment from the three Australian cruisers commencing around 06:00, the two RCTs from the 24th Division disembarked from the four U.S. and Australian transports –
On landing, the U.S. troops came under sporadic small arms and machine gun fire, but this was quickly suppressed. The terrain, however, proved more problematic. Red 2 beach was found to be highly unsuitable and the promised roads were non-existent. Backed by a swamp just 30 yards from the shoreline, and with just one exit trail unsuitable for vehicles, it quickly became congested. Red 1 was found to be better, allowing
As a result of the terrain difficulties, Tanahmerah Bay was quickly written off as a landing site; while the infantry already ashore pressed on to the Sentani plain the remainder of the 24th Division was diverted to Humboldt Bay, which had by this time been secured. After four days under these conditions the two units had reached the western airfield and on 26 April it was secured.[48][49]
Meanwhile, at Humboldt Bay Rear Admiral
Three transports were assigned to the operation,
Seven LSTs and the Australian transport Westralia were unloaded over the shore at White 1, landing 4,200 tonnes of combat supplies and over 300 vehicles on the first day. The beach quickly became congested, as it had also been the center of a Japanese supply dump prior to the assault, and engineers had to work to clear the area with bulldozers and construct a roadway to the beach's only exit. A fire caused by Allied bombing continued to burn in the Japanese supply dump for several days and later attracted the attention of a Japanese bomber, which attacked the beach area late on 23 April, resulting in more fires and killing 24 and wounding 100 more. This attack also destroyed 60 percent of all rations and ammunition that had been landed, and resulted in shortages amongst the infantry advancing towards the airfields. On 24 April, the beach became more congested with the arrival of scheduled reinforcements and further equipment, as well as two transports and seven LSTs carrying troops, including the corps commander and his headquarters, which had been diverted from Tanahmerah Bay. To ease the congestion on White 1, 11 LSTs were landed off White 2, while engineers from the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade worked to clear the beach, shifting stores and equipment into Jautefa Bay.[53]
Meanwhile, the infantry continued their advance inland. By the end of the day on 23 April the 186th Infantry were about halfway to Lake Sentani, while those from the 162nd had secured Hollandia and were securing the high ground around their objective, winkling out isolated pockets of resistance with aerial support.[54] There was little resistance initially, but further inland there was some opposition as elements of the 186th Infantry reached the lake by 24 April. Engineers operating amphtracks pushed forward from Jautefa Bay to the lake to carry the infantry around the Japanese positions at the lake, completing their flanking maneuver on 25 April. By 26 April, U.S. troops secured the two eastern airfields, and later that day linked up with forces advancing from the 24th Division advancing from Tanahmerah Bay. The fires around White 1 continued until 27 April when the engineers were released to return to the beach. The stores situation in the forward area grew more urgent as the supply line up the single road broke down. Aerial resupply brought some relief, and on 30 April a group of 12 LCTs, towed by several LSTs, arrived at Humboldt Bay. The situation was not fully resolved until 3 May when transport aircraft began landing on an airstrip that was hastily built by an engineer aviation battalion at Tami.[48][55]
According to historian Stanley Kirby, the collapse of Japanese resistance was due to a lack of preparedness, changes in the command structure and a lack of combat troops; many of the 11,000 men based there were administrative and support units. None of the senior officers present had been in post more than a few weeks and the senior air officer had been relieved following the destruction of his air forces at the beginning of April. Neither Kitazono nor Endo had been able to prepare a comprehensive defensive plan, and in any event had neither the men nor the resources to carry it out.[56] On the other hand, the Allied operation had been over-insured; concerns over the strength of the Japanese garrison had left the Allies with a four to one advantage in the event.[56] Historian Edward J. Drea attributed the success of the operation largely to MacArthur's bold decision to exploit intelligence gained through code breaking, and judged it was "MacArthur's finest hour in World War II and ULTRA's single greatest contribution to the general's Pacific strategy".[57] Stephen R. Taaffe reached a similar conclusion.[58]
Aftermath
Japanese casualties amounted to 3,300 killed and 600 wounded in combat;[59] a further 1,146 were killed or died in the area up to 27 September 1944.[60] A total of 7,200 Japanese troops assembled at Genjem and then attempted to withdraw overland to Sarmi; only around 1,000 reached their destination. Allied casualties amounted to 157 killed and 1,057 wounded.[61] U.S. forces undertook mopping up operations in the area until 6 June.[59]
Operation Reckless was an unqualified success, as were the landings around Aitape under the guise of Operation Persecution. The loss of Hollandia made the Japanese strategic defense line at Wakde, to the west, and all Japanese positions to the east untenable. Japanese forces to the west were reconfigured to form a defense line through Biak and Manokwari,[62] while the Japanese 18th Army, still in defensive positions around Wewak, to the east, were faced with a long retreat west through the jungle having been ordered to bypass Hollandia and Aitape and reinforce the 2nd Army in western New Guinea. This plan was eventually reversed in favor of a counterattack on U.S. forces around Aitape.[63][64]
Meanwhile, the Allies quickly made the Sentani airfields operational and were able to mount bombing raids on Japanese positions as far west as Biak, making them useless for air operations. The landings at Hollandia and Aitape were followed just four weeks later by landings at Wakde, Sarmi and Toem, to the west.[65][18] In mid-July, the Japanese launched their counterattack with around 20,000 troops, resulting in heavy fighting further inland during the Battle of Driniumor River.[64][66] Both Humboldt and Tanahmerah were developed with naval base, ammunition, repair and fuel facilities.[43] The facilities in the area were designated Base G. Several higher headquarters were moved to the area, including those of the Sixth Army, Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, and Seventh Fleet. Base G played an important role as a staging area for subsequent operations in New Guinea and the Philippines.[67]
See also
Notes
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 17–18.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 16–18.
- ^ a b c Keogh 1965, p. 372.
- ^ Kirby 1962, p. 419.
- ^ Drea 1992, pp. 104–105.
- ^ a b Taaffe 1998, p. 78.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, pp. 82–83.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 95.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 97–98.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 98.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, p. 80.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, p. 95.
- ^ Drea 1992, pp. 109–110.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 98–99.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 67, 88.
- ^ a b Smith 1953, p. 84.
- ^ a b Morison 1960, p. 88.
- ^ Drea 1992, p. 110.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, p. 81.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 29–32.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 46, 63.
- ^ McCartney 1948, pp. 89–92.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 63, 84.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 45, 48.
- ^ Young 1959, pp. 526–527.
- ^ McCartney 1948, pp. 39–40, 383.
- ^ Kirby 1962, p. 420.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 47.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 29–30.
- ^ Clodfelter 2017, p. 508.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 35.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 38.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 49–50.
- ^ Futrell 1950, p. 598.
- ^ Drea 1992, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Drea 1992, p. 112.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Gill 1968, pp. 397, 401.
- ^ Roskill 1960, p. 355.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 29, 41.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 68.
- ^ a b Bisno, Adam. "Securing New Guinea: The U.S. Navy in Operations Reckless and Persecution: 21–22 April 1944". Naval History and Heritage Command. Retrieved 2 July 2020.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 52.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 51.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 74–75, 403.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 76–78.
- ^ a b Kirby 1962, p. 421.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 74.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 79–82.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 404.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 83.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 84–85.
- ^ Morison 1960, p. 84.
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 86–87.
- ^ a b Kirby 1962, p. 422.
- ^ Drea 1992, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Taaffe 1998, pp. 102–103.
- ^ a b Morison 1960, p. 87.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 102 (note 52).
- ^ Morison 1960, pp. 87–89.
- ^ Keogh 1965, p. 379.
- ^ Smith 1953, pp. 131–132, 145.
- ^ a b Morison 1960, p. 72.
- ^ Kirby 1962, p. 423.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 152.
- ^ Smith 1953, p. 83.
Sources
- Clodfelter, Micheal (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-147662-585-0.
- Drea, Edward J. (1992). MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the war against Japan, 1942–1945. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 978-0-7006-0504-0.
- Futrell, Frank (1950). "Hollandia". In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea (eds.). The Army Air Forces in World War II: Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. U.S. Office of Air Force History. pp. 575–646. OCLC 909927818.
- OCLC 65475.
- Keogh, Eustace (1965). South West Pacific 1941–45. Melbourne, Victoria: Grayflower Publications. OCLC 7185705.
- OCLC 632441219.
- McCartney, William F. (1948). The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press. ISBN 1-4325-8817-6.
- OCLC 174795561.
- OCLC 58588186.
- Smith, Robert Ross (1953). The Approach to the Philippines. The United States Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 570739529.
- Taaffe, Stephen R. (1998). MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0870-6.
- Young, Gordon Russell (1959). Army Almanac: A Book of Facts Concerning the Army of the United States. Washington, D.C.: ISBN 978-0-7581-3548-3.
External links
- Rickard, John. "Battle of Hollandia". History of War. Retrieved 1 July 2020.