Battle of the Gebora
Battle of the Gebora | |||||||
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Part of the Peninsular War | |||||||
View of Badajoz, across the Guadiana river from the foothills of the San Cristóbal heights, by Eugène-Ferdinand Buttura | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
French Empire |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Strength | |||||||
7,000[1] | 12,000[1] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
400 killed, wounded or captured |
1,000 killed or wounded 4,000 captured |
Castile 1811–13
The Battle of the Gebora took place during the
In a bid to help extricate Marshal
When Mendizábal ignored Wellington's instructions and failed to entrench his army, Soult took advantage of the vulnerable Spanish position and sent a small force to attack the Spaniards. On the morning of 19 February, French forces under Marshal
Background
Despite his partial victory over Marshal Masséna in Portugal at the
Soult divided his army into two contingents and advanced into Extremadura via the two main passes leading from Andalusia into the
That second column, commanded by Soult and including
Prelude
Soult could not
Soult was now in a difficult position: although he had a large (4,000-strong) contingent of cavalry, deploying two battalions to escort the prisoners taken at Olivenza back to French-held Seville left him only 5,500 infantry with which to continue his campaign. Moreover, although his siege-train had begun to arrive, the continued absence of Gazan's infantry division left him with a weakened army. Despite these problems, Soult decided to besiege Badajoz in hopes that Wellington would send reinforcements to the Spanish fortress and thereby reduce the Allied forces facing Masséna at the Lines of Torres Vedras.
Meanwhile, Mendizábal had retreated to the Portuguese border after sending two battalions to reinforce the garrison at Badajoz.
Before his sudden death, La Romana had met with Wellington and agreed on a plan for the campaign—the army was to entrench on the heights of San Cristóbal, with its right flank protected by the fort of San Cristóbal, its front covered by the Gebora and Guadiana rivers, the left guarded by the fortress at Campo Maior, and Elvas protecting the rear.[19] Although aware of this plan when he took command, Mendizábal chose to ignore the instructions upon arriving on the north bank of the Guadiana on 5 February.[20] Instead, he stationed the bulk of his infantry in Badajoz, leaving only a small contingent of infantry and his cavalry below San Cristóbal.[21] On 7 February Mendizábal launched a strong sally against the besieging French lines: the Portuguese cavalry, supported by a small group of infantrymen, feinted towards the French left wing while a strong force of 5,000 men attacked the right. The Spaniards under de España drove through the first French parallel to engage one of Gen. Jean-Baptiste Girard's brigades and were only driven back when Mortier sent several battalions to his aid. De España pulled back to Badajoz, having lost 650 men and causing 400 French casualties.[22]
On 9 February Mendizábal withdrew most of his men from Badajoz, leaving behind a 7,000-strong garrison. The field army's 9,000 infantry settled on the heights of San Cristóbal while the 3,000 horse encamped behind them on the plains of the Caya. The Spanish commander again ignored Wellington's plan, failing to dig entrenchments on the heights, nor did he send out a cavalry screen to protect his front and monitor the French movements.[23] Soult, however, largely ignored the Spanish army for the next few days, concentrating instead on building up his siege lines and battering Badajoz.[24] Heavy rains also flooded both the Guadiana and Gebora rivers, rendering them impassable, so that between 11–18 February the French were only able to shell the southern end of the Spanish line, pushing the Spaniards further away from Badajoz and the protection of the San Cristóbal fort.[25]
Battle
By the afternoon of 18 February, the rains had abated and lower water levels made the Gebora River fordable again.[25] That evening Soult sent nine infantry battalions, three cavalry squadrons and two artillery batteries, under Mortier's command, to the north bank across a flying bridge over the Guadiana River. Joined by six cavalry regiments under Latour-Maubourg, the French now had 4,500 infantrymen, 2,500 cavalry and 12 cannon ready to attack the Spanish lines at dawn on 19 February.[26] Due to heavy fog that morning, Mendizábal was unaware of the approaching French until his picket, only a mile from his front, was driven back by Mortier's infantry fording the Gebora.[27] At the same time the 2nd Hussars, sent by Latour-Maubourg to turn the Spanish left flank, had managed to climb the heights to the north, also undetected, and fell upon one of de España's unsuspecting regiments.[28]
Mortier demonstrated his tactical prowess in the deployment of his small force: he sent all his cavalry to the north to attack the Spanish left; three battalions were sent south between the fort at San Cristóbal and the Spanish right wing; and his remaining six infantry battalions assaulted the Spanish front.[29] As the fog rose, the French light cavalry under Briche gained the heights and fell upon the Spanish left flank, while Latour-Maubourg took three dragoon regiments to attack the combined Spanish and Portuguese cavalry on the plains of the Caya.[30] Despite outnumbering the French, the Allied horse ignored orders and immediately fled towards Elvas and Campo Maior. They escaped unscathed, largely because Latour-Maubourg ignored them and instead launched his cavalry against the Spanish infantry line.[31]
The engagement of the Spanish right flank was not as immediately decisive. Because the fog had lifted, the Spaniards could see the numerical weakness of the opposing force and formed up with little sign of falling.[31] The musketry duel between the two sides had scarcely begun, however, when the French cavalry appeared; the light horse approached along the top of the heights while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons advanced from the rear. In response, Mendizábal formed his troops into two huge divisional squares supported by artillery which, although initially successful in impeding the French cavalry, eventually became an easy target for the French infantry and artillery.[32] As one Spanish infantryman recounted, "Their artillery played upon it in a most horrible fashion until it became first an oval and then an unformed mass that the cavalry were able to penetrate and take prisoner."[20] Briche's light cavalry thus broke through the two Spanish squares without great difficulty, and the battle was effectively over. A few of the Spanish regiments dispersed; many surrendered; and others joined together to fight their way to Badajoz or the Portuguese border.[33]
Consequences
The battle was a serious setback for the Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese allies; Wellington had earlier warned the Spanish generals that the Army of Extremadura was "the last body of troops which their country possesses",[34] and later wrote that "[t]he defeat of Mendizábal is the greatest misfortune, which was not previously expected, that has yet occurred to us."[35] The army had been essentially destroyed; although 2,500 infantry had escaped into Badajoz—and a slightly smaller number to Portugal—about 1,000 Spaniards had been killed or wounded, 4,000 were taken prisoner and 17 cannon had been lost.[36] The French, for their part, suffered only minor casualties. Soult initially reported his losses as 30 killed and 140 wounded, but those figures were eventually revised to around 400 casualties, mainly from the cavalry.[36]
Soult was now free to continue his investment of Badajoz; although the town's garrison was now some 8,000 strong due to the influx of soldiers from Mendizábal's destroyed army, it eventually fell to the French on 11 March.
See also
Notes
- ^ a b Gates 1986, p. 248.
- ^ Weller 1962, pp. 141–142.
- ^ Weller 1962, pp. 145–146.
- ^ a b c Gates 1986, p. 245.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 28–29.
- ^ Glover 1974, p. 142.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 31–32.
- ^ a b c Oman 1911, p. 32.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 33; Napier 1831, p. 91.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 35.
- ^ Napier 1831, p. 92; Oman 1911, p. 35.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 38.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 41.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 40.
- ^ Napier 1831, p. 92; Oman 1911, pp. 43–44.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 44–46; Esdaile 2002, p. 337 footnote; Gates 1986, p. 248.
- ^ Napier 1831, p. 93; Oman 1911, p. 47, from Wellington's dispatches.
- ^ a b Esdaile 2002, p. 337.
- ^ Napier 1831, p. 94; Oman 1911, p. 47.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 48; Napier 1831, p. 96.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 49.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 50.
- ^ a b Napier 1831, p. 97; Oman 1911, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Gates 1986, p. 248; Oman 1911, p. 51; Napier 1831, p. 97.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 51.
- ^ Napier 1831, pp. 97–98; Oman 1911, pp. 51–52.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 52; Napier 1831, p. 98.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 52–53.
- ^ a b Oman 1911, p. 53.
- ^ Gates 1986, p. 248; Oman 1911, p. 53; Esdaile 2002, p. 337.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 54.
- ^ Oman 1911, p. 47 and Wellington to La Romana (Wellington 1838, p. 163).
- ^ Wellington to Henry Wellesley (Wellington 1838, p. 286).
- ^ a b Gates 1986, p. 248; Oman 1911, pp. 54–55.
- ^ Oman 1911, pp. 55 and 57–61.
- ^ Gates 1986, pp. 252–253.
- ^ Gates 1986, p. 254.
- ^ Esdaile 2002, pp. 342–343.
- ^ Esdaile 2002, p. 348.
- ^ Weller 1962, pp. 187–189.
- ^ Weller 1962, pp. 198–205.
References
- Esdaile, Charles (2002), The Peninsular War, ISBN 978-0-14-027370-0
- Gates, David (1986), The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War, Pimlico (published 2002), ISBN 978-0-7126-9730-9
- Glover, Michael (1974), The Peninsular War 1807–1814: A Concise Military History, Penguin Classic Military History (published 2001), ISBN 978-0-14-139041-3
- Napier, Sir William (1831), History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. III, Frederic Warne and Co, retrieved 9 October 2007
- ISBN 978-1-85367-618-5
- Weller, Jac (1962), Wellington in the Peninsula, Nicholas Vane
- Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of (1838), The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington: During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, from 1799 to 1818, vol. VII, John Murray, retrieved 1 November 2007
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Further reading
- Oman, Sir Charles William Chadwick (1902d). A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved 27 May 2021.
External links
- Media related to Battle of the Gebora at Wikimedia Commons
Preceded by Battle of Bussaco |
Napoleonic Wars Battle of the Gebora |
Succeeded by Battle of Barrosa |