Second siege of Badajoz (1811)
Second siege of Badajoz (1811) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Peninsular War | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
French Empire | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Armand Philippon |
| ||||||
Strength | |||||||
7,600 | 34,700 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
Unknown | 964 killed, wounded or captured |
Castile 1811–13
The second siege of Badajoz (22 April – 12 May and 18 May – 10 June, 1811) saw an
While Wellington faced Marshal André Masséna's Army of Portugal in the north, his lieutenant Beresford attempted to capture French-held Badajoz in the south. Beresford invested the city in April but Philippon's garrison successfully fended off his attacks. The siege was briefly lifted while the Battle of Albuera was fought on 16 May. Though both sides suffered horrific casualties, Beresford emerged the victor and Soult retreated to the east. Wellington brought reinforcements from the north and resumed the siege, but progress was slow in the face of spirited French resistance. Meanwhile, Masséna's replacement Marmont brought large forces south to join Soult. The British commander lifted the siege after being menaced by the numerically superior French army led by Soult and Marmont.
Background
Hoping to assist Marshal
At about this time Soult received intelligence that Spanish General
A
Too late, Latour-Maubourg finally woke up and sent two cavalry regiments and four infantry battalions on a
First phase
Before investing Badajoz, Beresford thought it worthwhile to drive Latour-Maubourg's force out of
In any case, Beresford could not have besieged the fortress at once because no siege train had been assembled. Apparently, this was an oversight by Arthur Wellesley, Viscount Wellington who failed to issue the necessary orders. The main problem was that the British army in the Iberian Peninsula had never been provided by the home government with a proper siege train. Therefore, Major Alexander Dickson began forming a siege park from the Portuguese cannons available at Elvas.[14] In the words of historian Charles Oman, "The walls of Elvas were a perfect museum of ancient artillery..." Some of the cannons that Dickson used had dates of 1620, 1636, 1646, and 1652 on their breeches. Even the pieces from the early 1700s were of an obsolete pattern. Most of the gunners were Portuguese, many only half trained. These were later supplemented by the personnel from British artillery batteries stationed at Lisbon in the companies of Captains Baynes, Bredin, Glubb, and Raynsford.[16]
On 20 April, Wellington arrived on a flying visit from the northern front. By this time, his opponent Masséna had abandoned his campaign in Portugal and retreated into Spain. Two days later, Wellington accompanied
The siege began on 22 April 1811. Philippon's 4,000 defenders included the 1st Battalions of the 12th Light, 34th Line, and 88th Line Infantry Regiments and the 3rd Battalions of the 40th and 100th Line Infantry Regiments. To oppose the French, Beresford had 10,500 British and 10,200 Portuguese troops available.[19] In case Soult tried to relieve Badajoz, Wellington arranged for as many as 15,000 Spanish troops to be ready to help.[17] On 5 May Dickson reported that the siege train was finally ready. The next day, Beresford invested Badajoz south of the Guadiana with Alten's brigade, Major General William Lumley's British brigade, and Brigadier General Luiz Fonseca's Portuguese brigade. On the 7th Lieutenant Colonel James Kemmis's brigade and the 17th Portuguese Regiment took post on the north side opposite San Cristobal. Four more brigades were stationed in support between Badajoz and La Albuera. Meanwhile, Colborne conducted a successful campaign in the Sierra Morena with 2,000 men, causing Latour-Maubourg to fall back even farther.[20]
Dickson assigned five 24-pound cannons and two howitzers to attack San Cristobal while 14 24-pound cannons and two 8-inch howitzers were deployed south of the river. On 8 April 1811, trenches were started on all three fronts at a distance of 400 yards (366 m) from the fortress. Opposite the Picurina fort, good progress was made, and a 10-gun battery was installed by the 11th. However, it was found almost impossible to dig trenches in front of San Cristobal because there was bedrock under a thin layer of topsoil. What little work could be done during the night had to be abandoned under deadly French fire during the day. Since trenches were out of the question, wooden gabions filled with soil had to be erected. On this front, Philippon launched a sortie on the evening of the 10th. The attack was repulsed, but the Allies pursued their enemies too far and came under murderous fire from San Cristobal. The French lost 200 men in the sortie; the British and Portuguese lost 438. On 11 April, a five-gun battery opened fire on the fort, but during the day four of its guns were put out of action by accurate French fire. By this time, six of the nine available engineers were casualties. A second battery was brought into action the next morning, but it was soon silenced. Shortly afterward, news arrived that Soult was rapidly approaching with an army of relief. Beresford ordered his troops to La Albuera to resist Soult's advance and sent the siege guns back to Elvas. The gabions were set on fire to deny the materials to the French.[21] British losses in the failed siege numbered 533, nearly all in Kemmis's brigade, plus 200 Portuguese.[22]
Albuera
On 16 May 1811, Beresford defeated Soult in the
On 14 May 1811, the
Second phase
On 27 May Beresford was officially replaced in command on the southern front. Four days later, General Rowland Hill arrived to take over the covering force, the 2nd and 4th Divisions plus Alten's brigade and Lumley's cavalry, approximately 10,000 men. Wellington personally took charge of the siege corps, which consisted of the 3rd and 7th Divisions and Hamilton's division. These troops numbered 14,000 including 700 gunners.[30] Philippon's garrison consisted of 3,600 men.[29] Again, Wellington's engineers, of whom there were only 25 available, urged him to attack the San Cristobal fort. In addition, a major effort was planned against the Castle on the south side of the Guadiana.[31]
On 25 May, Major General William Houston's 7th Division invested the north side. Two days later, Picton's 3rd Division joined Hamilton's Portuguese south of the river. For the second leaguer, Dickson collected a siege train of 46 artillery pieces, 30 24-pound cannons, four 16-pound cannons, four 10-inch howitzers, and eight 8-inch howitzers. As in the earlier siege, all were ancient relics from the ramparts of Elvas. To serve the guns, 110 British from Raynesford's battery and 500 Portuguese were available.[32]
Picton's 3rd Division was made up of the British brigades of Colonel
During the night of the 30th, the first parallel was successfully started at a distance of 800 yards (732 m) from the Castle. Across the river, gabions were set up opposite San Cristobal and earth was brought up to fill them, but they were obliterated by French artillery fire in the morning. By the morning of 3 June, 16 24-pound cannons and four howitzers were emplaced against the Castle. Earlier, a battery was set up against San Cristobal but it proved to be ineffective because it was 1,200 yards (1,097 m) distant. By using wool packs, eight-gun and five-gun batteries were finally established 450 yards (411 m) from San Cristobal with a four-gun support battery right behind.[26] The guns began battering Badajoz on 3 June and silenced the guns of San Cristobal. That day, the French knocked out one gun, but four more were out of action because of defects in the siege guns. The ancient pieces tended to droop at the muzzle if fired too quickly, often blew out their vents, or shook their old carriages to pieces. On the 4th, the French put a second gun out of action near the Castle, but two more were disabled by muzzle drooping and three howitzers had their carriages damaged by their own firing. On the north side, two cannons and two howitzers went out of commission because of similar problems. The bombardment continued through 5 and 6 June. The Castle proved very resistant to shot but the San Cristobal fort showed considerable damage.[34]
At midnight on 6 June 1811, 180 volunteers from Houston's division assaulted San Cristobal. The 25-man forlorn hope managed to reach to ditch with only minor casualties only to discover that the ditch had been cleared of debris and the breach had been blocked up by carts and
After this failure, Wellington ordered three more days of bombardment. By 9 June only 27 of the original 46 siege guns remained in action. On the 7th, six iron ship guns arrived from Lisbon and proved efficient. However, the defenses of the Castle were still formidable. To keep the French from clearing the ditch of debris, the Allied guns fired
On 9 June 1811 at 9:00 PM, Houston launched his second assault on San Cristobal. The storming party consisted of 400 soldiers from Sontag's brigade and the 17th Portuguese Line. It was supported by 100 sharpshooters who were ordered to shoot at any Frenchman who appeared at the breaches. The French opened a heavy fire as soon as the attackers appeared. The major commanding the column and the ranking engineer lieutenant were both killed at once. The attackers put up their 16 ladders but most of the men were shot down. The few who managed to reach the top were bayonetted by courageous groups of Frenchmen who charged down the breach. After fifty minutes, most of the ladders were smashed and the Allied survivors fled back to their trenches. The attackers lost 54 killed, 81 wounded, and four captured.[38]
On 10 June, a truce was agreed so that the Allies could recover their many wounded. During this lull, the defenders of San Cristobal repaired their defenses. Even so, Philippon's situation was critical. The Allied guns had breached the Castle and the French commander was compelled to put his garrison on half-rations. Philippon drew up a desperate plan to break out when his provisions failed. However, on the 10th Wellington decided to abandon the siege. He received intelligence that Marshal
Relief
Shortly after being defeated by Wellington at the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro on 3 to 5 May 1811, Masséna was replaced by Marmont. The new commander abolished the existing corps and created six independent divisions in their place. Likewise, General of Division Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d'Erlon's IX Corps was broken up and its battalions ordered to join Soult's army.[40] With surprising speed, Marmont marched for the south also. When he discovered his opponent on the move, Spencer transferred his corps to the south and joined Wellington at Elvas on 17 June. Marmont, d'Erlon, and Soult combined forces at Mérida on 18 June and lunged to the west. The 60,000-man French army relieved Badajoz then confronted Wellington's 50,000 troops along the Guadiana near Elvas. The French commanders declined to attack the formidable British position. Soon after, Soult was called away to deal with threats against Andalusia. After resupplying Philippon's garrison, Marmont and d'Erlon withdrew.[41]
Aftermath
The stalemate in the west proceeded with the Blockade of Almeida.
Notes
- ^ a b Gates 2002, p. 247.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 353.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 248.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 354.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 355.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 249.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 357.
- ^ Gates 2002, pp. 253–254.
- ^ Glover 2001, p. 342.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 265–269.
- ^ a b Oman 1996, pp. 269–270.
- ^ Broughton 2001.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 272.
- ^ a b Oman 1996, pp. 273–274.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 275–277.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 276.
- ^ a b Oman 1996, pp. 279–281.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 282.
- ^ Smith 1998, p. 361.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 284.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 285–287.
- ^ a b c d Smith 1998, pp. 362–364.
- ^ Glover 2001, p. 158.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 395.
- ^ a b Oman 1996, p. 397.
- ^ a b Oman 1996, p. 421.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 407–408.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 411–412.
- ^ a b c Smith 1998, p. 364.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 415–416.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 417.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 419–420.
- ^ Glover 2001, pp. 377–379.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 422–423.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 424–425.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 426.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 427–429.
- ^ Oman 1996, p. 428.
- ^ Oman 1996, pp. 430–431.
- ^ Gates 2002, p. 270.
- ^ Gates 2002, pp. 275–276.
References
- Broughton, Tony (2001). "French Infantry Regiments and the Colonels Who Led Them 1789–1815: Part IX 81e to 90e Regiments". The Napoleon Series. Retrieved 8 December 2013.
- Gates, David (2002). The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0-7126-9730-6.
- Glover, Michael (2001). The Peninsular War 1807–1814. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-141-39041-7.
- Oman, Charles (1996). A History of the Peninsular War Volume IV. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole. ISBN 1-85367-224-6.
- Smith, Digby (1998). The Napoleonic Wars Data Book. London: Greenhill. ISBN 1-85367-276-9.
Further reading
- Oman, Sir Charles William Chadwick (1902d). A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved 27 May 2021.
External links
- Media related to Second siege of Badajoz (1811) at Wikimedia Commons