Battles of Nakhang
Battles of Nakhang | ||||||||||
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Part of Laotian Civil War; Vietnam War | ||||||||||
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Belligerents | ||||||||||
Kingdom of Laos Supported by United States Thailand | North Vietnam |
Forces Armee Neutralistes | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | ||||||||||
Vang Pao (WIA) | Unknown | 3 unknown officers | ||||||||
Units involved | ||||||||||
Thai advisers |
5th Battalion, 168th Regiment 174th Regiment of the 316th Division | Battalion Infantry 5 | ||||||||
Strength | ||||||||||
5,120 Additional air support Thai advisers |
Total unknown First battle: Peaked at 600 to 1,000 Third battle: 600 to 800 | Unknown | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | ||||||||||
Total unknown First battle: Slight Second battle: At least 10 Third battle: 9 killed, 24 wounded Fourth battle: Very heavy, 50 percent killed of two battalions, over 50 percent killed of three battalions. Thai advisers killed, one captured. |
Total unknown, but heavy. One North Vietnamese captured First battle: Heavy, at least 70 killed with upper estimate of 1,000 Second battle: Heavy Third battle: Estimated 250 killed Fourth battle: 26 killed | Three officers executed, battalion members killed or defect to North Vietnam |
The Battles of Nakhang (16 February 1966–28 February 1969) were fought between Royalist forces and
The
On 6 January 1967, the PAVN renewed their offensive for the Third Battle of Nakhang. Despite their taking advantage of an overcast they thought would prevent aerial support, they were defeated within two days by U.S. Air Force airstrikes. It was not until 28 February 1969 that the Vietnamese succeeded in capturing Lima Site 36 for good, with their surprise assault of the Fourth Battle of Nakhang.
Background
When the United States decided to underwrite the Royal Lao Government and the Royal Lao Armed Forces in 1953, it entered into what burgeoned into the Laotian Civil War.[1]
Its northerly location and its airfield made Nakhang, Laos a major base for the
As early as 1964,
As a result of increasing Royalist activity, there were a series of skirmishes between the sides for possession of the outlying positions surrounding Nakhang throughout 1964 and 1965. In July 1965, Nakhang was the launching point for a successful offensive against Communist forces in the vicinity.[4] By late November, Vang Pao had five weak Royal Lao Army (RLA) battalions to defend the entire north of Military Region 2. He reinforced them by posting three picket lines of Auto Defense Choc (ADC) skirmishers to screen any PAVN approaches. The five battalions plus the ADC militia troops numbered 5,120 strong. Another 5,500 Auto-Defense Ordinaire home guards were alerted in villages throughout the region.[5]
First battle of Nakhang
On 15 January 1966, the PAVN high command dispatched 5th Battalion, 168th Regiment from
Later on 17 February, a
By order of the
A determined attack hit Nakhang at 0430 hours 18 February. Dawn found the Communists infiltrated within 25 meters of Royal Lao Army defenders. Eagle FAC had returned and directed four sorties of close air support south and southwest of the airstrip. Horinek tried to have himself flown in, but was diverted by cratering of the runway. He helicoptered in to the RLA command post north of the city. From there, he led a sweep along the north end of the runway, personally capturing the only PAVN prisoner of the battle.[10]
General
With the Royalist forces in dire straits,
Captain Ramon D. Horinek received the Air Force Cross for his exploits during the first Battle of Nakhang.[13]
Interim operations
Royalists casualties were few, as the guerrillas had withdrawn timely. The
Captain Horinek had counted 70 Communists killed by air in one single rice paddy at Nakhang. When questioned, a local villager described a Communist column burdened with wounded and dead taking six hours to straggle by him. Another villager estimated 1,000 Communist dead. The American conclusion was that though the PAVN had captured Nakhang, they had suffered so severely they had lost the battle. They did not occupy the site until 21 February.[14]
Having been unwelcomed at Moung Hiem, and noting that Neutralist soldiers were beginning to desert as the PAVN approached, the guerrillas withdrew back towards Nakhang to evade the oncoming enemy. On 11 March, the PAVN overran the encampment full of cooperative Neutralists, executing its three officers. BI 5 dissolved as some soldiers were killed and other volunteered to join the Communists. The Communist drive also struck some nearby smaller Lima Sites. However, the onset of monsoon rain thwarted any PAVN opportunity to attack the Neutralists holding the crucial forward fighter base at
Second battle of Nakhang
Vang Pao returned to duty a month after being wounded. He promptly planned to retake Nakhang, using his guerrilla forces without aid from the RLA regulars. The guerrillas moved into the assault mode in early May 1966. The Royalists walked into a vacated Moung Hiem to find unburied skeletons of Neutralist soldiers. A Royalist column left there to occupy Moung Son. A second column attacked Nakhang and met heavy resistance. For the next two days, Butterfly FAC Charles Larimore Jones directed tactical air strikes on the Communists in Nakhang. Meanwhile, Hmong guerrillas from Moung Hiem were being ferried to a hill southeast of Nakhang. One of the Air America helicopters was shot down in flames on 19 May, killing the pilot and nine partisans. On the 23rd, Jones circled above the battle as the Communists were slowly forced from Nakhang. Most of the retreating Communists were caught in an open field; a flight of U.S. jets inflicted widespread casualties. The Royalist guerrillas recaptured Nakhang on 25 May 1966.[17][18]
Taking advantage of the
Third battle of Nakhang
In December 1966, PAVN troops in Xam Neua accumulated into a force capable of attacking Nakhang, Lima Site 85, or Lima Site 52. When they chose to assault Nakhang, they changed from their usual night attack tactics. Choosing to infiltrate by night and attack at dawn, 600 to 800 PAVN troops nearly succeeded in a surprise raid on 6 January 1967. However, a brush with a Royalist outpost at 0600 hours brought on the battle. With an overcast of 500 meters or lower, and mountain peaks poking into the clouds as a flight hazard, it appeared that Vang Pao's Auto Defense Choc (ADC) guerrillas would have to fight without air support. Communist troops closed within 100 meters of the Royalists; they broke into the Royalists' final defense line on the north perimeter at 0630 hours. One American Central Intelligence Agency adviser was killed; the other found himself trapped in the headquarters radio shack with only a shotgun and a radio for defense. He called for air support at 0650 hours.[20]
Disregarding the weather, two tactical air flights were diverted to support Nakhang. The
Dragonfly Lead, Major Robert E. Turner, spiraled down through the overcast and recovered at 1,700 meters, amongst peaks taller than that. Having been told by the trapped adviser that he could strike anything outside the headquarters compound or its ridgeline, Turner began a series of time-consuming firing passes at the Communists. Unlike the F-105, the Skyraider was slow enough to aim at the Communists. Conserving ammunition and beginning at the northern slope where the attackers were closest to the adviser, Turner fired single rockets or short bursts of 20mm cannon fire to drive the Communists down onto the runway. As he was being damaged by heavy ground fire he flew through, he sometimes had to pull up into the overcast to go over hills and trees to avoid crashing.[22]
After expending his ordnance, he circled up to his wingman, whom he led down into combat. Captain John D. Haney made nine firing passes while Turner distracted Communist gunners with more phony gunnery runs. By the time Haney ran out of munitions, his plane had also taken heavy battle damage from the extensive ground fire. Turner's later bogus attacks meant he had made about 25 passes at his enemy. Empty 20mm cartridge casings from the aircraft clattered on the roof over the adviser's head after some firing passes. Some of the ordnance was delivered within 50 meters of the ADC militia. The aerial attacks sparked the Hmong into a counterattack. Between them, Dragonfly flight had tied up their enemies for a crucial hour and five minutes.[23][24]
Towards the end of Dragonfly's attacks, Butterfly 44 arrived on scene. The FAC took charge of the tactical air power coming on scene and directed it as the overcast cleared. Beginning with an incoming flight of Skyraiders, Butterfly 44 directed tactical air strikes on the Communists all day. Forty Vietnamese bodies littered the Royalist defenses; it was believed the PAVN suffered at least 100 dead. The attackers dispersed back into the wilderness.[25]
That night was spent with the
During post-battle cleanup, bodies of 43 PAVN soldiers were cleared from the site. Later reports by friendly espionage agent estimated total PAVN dead at 250. Royalist losses were the American adviser killed, as well as eight Hmong soldiers. There were 24 Royalist soldiers wounded; nine were medically evacuated.[27]
Dragonfly Lead Major Robert Earl Turner earned an Air Force Cross for his valor under the overcast of 6 January 1967.[28] His wingman Captain John D. Haney earned a Silver Star.[29] Venom Lead Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Ogden Conley was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for his courageous bluff on 6 January 1967.[30] Another pilot on the scene, Major John Smith Hamilton, won a DFC for his actions on 6 and 7 January 1967.[31]
Fourth battle of Nakhang
During the last week of 1968, the U.S. Air Force flew
Customarily, the PAVN allowed fleeing Royalist troops an avenue for retreat. However, when the Royalists broke out on 2 March, the PAVN unmercifully raked their departure. Of the five Royalist battalions involved, only two were fortunate enough to take about 50 percent casualties. The other three fared worse, with one battalion reduced to 30 effectives. Thai advisers with the Royalist garrison were killed except for one taken prisoner. At a cost of 26 dead, the PAVN overran Nakhang and its
Notes
- ^ Castle, pp. 15–27.
- ^ Porter (1966), p. 1.
- ^ Ahern, p. 235.
- ^ a b Conboy, Morrison, pp. 127–131.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 131.
- ^ Porter (1966), pp. 1–2, 5.
- ^ a b c Conboy, Morrison, p. 152.
- ^ Porter (1966), pp. 2–3.
- ^ Porter (1966), p. 4.
- ^ Porter (1966), pp. 5–6.
- ^ Porter (1966), p. 6.
- ^ Porter (1966), pp. 7–10.
- ^ Military Times Hall of Valor [1] Retrieved 27 March 2016.
- ^ a b Porter (1966), p. 10.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 152–153.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 153.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, pp. 154–155.
- ^ Porter (1967), p. 1.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 155.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 2–4.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 3–4.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 5–6.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 4–7.
- ^ Conboy, Morrison, p. 168.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 7–8.
- ^ Porter (1967), pp. 9–10.
- ^ Porter (1967), p. 12.
- ^ Military Times Hall of Valor [2] Retrieved 29 March 2016.
- ^ Military Times Hall of Valor [3] Retrieved 29 March 2016.
- ^ Military Times Hall of Valor [4] Retrieved 29 March 2016.
- ^ Military Times Hall of Valor [5] Retrieved 29 March 2016.
- ^ a b Conboy, Morrison, p. 209.
- ^ Ahern, p. 312.
References
- Ahern, Thomas L. Jr. (2006), Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Classified control no. C05303949.
- Castle, Timothy N. (1993). At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955–1975. ISBN 0-231-07977-X.
- Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1995). Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. Paladin Press. ISBN 978-1-58160-535-8.
- Porter, Melvin F. (1966). PROJECT CHECO REPORT THE DEFENSE OF LIMA SITE 36 25 MAY 1966. [6] HQ PACAF Tactical Evaluation Center. DOPEC-66-03504.
- Porter, Melvin F. (1967). PROJECT CHECO REPORT SECOND DEFENSE OF LIMA SITE 36 28 April 1967. HQ PACAF Directorate, Tactical Evaluation. Reprinted (1997) by Dailey Book Service. ASIN: B0006QY5VS.