Close air support
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In military tactics, close air support (CAS) is defined as aerial warfare actions—often air-to-ground actions such as strafes or airstrikes—by military aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces. A form of fire support, CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of all forces involved. CAS may be conducted using aerial bombs, glide bombs, missiles, rockets, autocannons, machine guns, and even directed-energy weapons such as lasers.[1]
The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires or movement is the determining factor. CAS may need to be conducted during shaping operations with special forces if the mission requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of those forces. A closely related subset of air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, denotes interdiction against units with near-term effects on friendly units, but which does not require integration with friendly troop movements. CAS requires excellent coordination with ground forces, typically handled by specialists such as artillery observers, joint terminal attack controllers, and forward air controllers.
World War I was the first conflict to make extensive use of CAS, albeit using relatively primitive methods in contrast to later warfare, though it was made evident that proper coordination between aerial and ground forces via radio made attacks more effective. Several conflicts during the interwar period—including the Polish–Soviet War, the Spanish Civil War, the Iraqi Revolt, and the Chaco War—made notable use of CAS. World War II marked the universal acceptance of the integration of air power into combined arms warfare, with all of the war's major combatants having developed effective air-ground coordination techniques by the conflict's end. New techniques, such as the use of forward air control to guide CAS aircraft and identifying invasion stripes, also emerged at this time, being heavily shaped by the Italian Campaign and the invasion of Normandy. CAS continued to advance during the conflicts of the Cold War, especially the Korean War and the Vietnam War; major milestones included the introduction of attack helicopters, gunships, and dedicated CAS attack jets.
History
World War I
The use of aircraft in the close air support of ground forces dates back to
The most successful attacks of 1917–1918 had included planning for co-ordination between aerial and ground units, although it was relatively difficult at this early date to co-ordinate these attacks due to the primitive nature of air-to-ground radio communication. Though most air-power proponents sought independence from ground commanders and hence pushed the importance of interdiction and strategic bombing, they nonetheless recognized the need for close air support.[3][page needed]
From the commencement of hostilities in 1914, aviators engaged in sporadic and spontaneous attacks on
At the
Aircraft support was first integrated into a battle plan on a large scale at the 1917 Battle of Cambrai, where a significantly larger number of tanks were deployed than previously. By that time, effective anti-aircraft tactics were being used by the enemy infantry and pilot casualties were high, although air support was later judged as having been of a critical importance in places where the infantry had got pinned down.[4]
At this time, British doctrine came to recognize two forms of air support; trench strafing (the modern-day doctrine of CAS), and ground strafing (the modern-day doctrine of air interdiction) – attacking tactical ground targets away from the land battle. As well as strafing with machine-guns, planes engaged in such operations were commonly modified with bomb racks; the plane would fly in very low to the ground and release the bombs just above the trenches.[citation needed]
The Germans were also quick to adopt this new form of warfare and were able to deploy aircraft in a similar capacity at Cambrai. While the British used single-seater planes, the Germans preferred the use of heavier two-seaters with an additional machine gunner in the aft
During the
No 1 Squadron made six heavy raids during the day, dropped three tons of bombs and fired nearly 24,000 machine gun rounds.[2]
Inter-war period
The close air support doctrine was further developed in the interwar period. Most theorists advocated the adaptation of fighters or light bombers into the role. During this period, airpower advocates crystallized their views on the role of air-power in warfare. Aviators and ground officers developed largely opposing views on the importance of CAS, views that would frame institutional battles for CAS in the 20th century.[citation needed]
The inter-war period saw the use of CAS in a number of conflicts, including the
The British used air power to great effect in various colonial hotspots in the
During the Spanish Civil War German volunteer aviators of the Condor Legion on the Nationalist side, despite little official support from their government, developed close air support tactics that proved highly influential for subsequent Luftwaffe doctrine.[citation needed]
The observers and participants of these wars would base their CAS strategies on their experience of the conflict. Aviators, who wanted institutional independence from the Army, pushed for a view of air-power centered around interdiction, which would relieve them of the necessity of integrating with ground forces and allow them to operate as an independent military arm. They saw close air support as both the most difficult and most inefficient use of aerial assets.[citation needed]
Close air support was the most difficult mission, requiring identifying and distinguishing between friendly and hostile units. At the same time, targets engaged in combat are dispersed and concealed, reducing the effectiveness of air attacks. They also argued that the CAS mission merely duplicated the abilities of artillery, whereas interdiction provided a unique capability.[citation needed] Ground officers contended there was rarely sufficient artillery available, and the flexibility of aircraft would be ideal for massing firepower at critical points, while producing a greater psychological effect on friendly and hostile forces alike. Moreover, unlike massive, indiscriminate artillery strikes, small aerial bombs would not render ground untrafficable, slowing attacking friendly forces.[3][page needed]
Although the prevailing view in official circles was largely indifferent to CAS during the interwar period, its importance was expounded upon by military theorists, such as
actual 'offensive' support must come from an even more mobile artillery moving alongside. For this purpose the close co-operation of low-flying aircraft ... is essential[8]
World War II
Luftwaffe
As a continental power intent on offensive operations, Germany could not ignore the need for aerial support of ground operations. Though the
These preparations did not prove fruitful in the
Despite these accomplishments, German CAS was not perfect and suffered from the same misunderstanding and interservice rivalry that plagued other nations' air arms, and friendly fire was not uncommon. For example, on the eve of the Meuse offensive, Guderian's superior cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, his order was issued too late to be implemented, and the Luftwaffe commander followed the schedule he had previously worked out with Guderian.[citation needed] As late as November 1941, the Luftwaffe refused to provide Erwin Rommel with an air liaison officer for the Afrika Korps, because it "would be against the best use of the air force as a whole."[3][page needed]
German CAS was also extensively used on the Eastern Front during the period 1941–1943. Their decline was caused by the growing strength of the Red Air Force and the redeployment of assets to defend against American and British strategic bombardment. Luftwaffe's loss of air superiority, combined with a declining supply of aircraft and fuel, crippled their ability to provide effective CAS on the western front after 1943.[citation needed]
RAF and USAAF
The
Although the RAF was working on its CAS doctrine in London, officers in North Africa improvised their own coordination techniques. In October 1941,
The use of
By the time the
At the start of the War, the
The situation improved during the
In 1944, USAAF commander Lt. Gen.
The USAAF saw the greatest innovations in 1944 under General
The American Navy and Marine Corps used CAS in conjunction with or as a substitute for the lack of available artillery or naval gunfire in the
Red Air Force
The
Korean War
From Navy experiments with the
Though the Marine Corps continued its tradition of intimate air–ground cooperation in the
It is unsurprising, then, that
The
Vietnam and the CAS role debate
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US Army began to identify a dedicated CAS need for itself. The Howze Board, which studied the question, published a landmark report describing the need for a helicopter-based CAS requirement.[29] However, the Army did not follow the Howze Board recommendation initially. Nevertheless, it did eventually adopt the use of helicopter gunships and attack helicopters in the CAS role.[30]
Though the Army gained more control over its own CAS due to the development of the helicopter gunship and attack helicopter, the Air Force continued to provide fixed-wing CAS for Army units. Over the course of the war, the adaptation of The Tactical Air Control System proved crucial to the improvement of Air Force CAS.[31] Jets replaced propeller-driven aircraft with minimal issues. The assumption of responsibility for the air request net by the Air Force improved communication equipment and procedures, which had long been a problem. Additionally, a major step in satisfying the Army's demands for more control over their CAS was the successful implementation of close air support control agencies at the corps level under Air Force control.[31] Other notable adaptations were the usage of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs), a role previously dominated by FACs on the ground, and the use of B-52s for CAS.[31]
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation was much more prepared for the application of CAS in the Vietnam War, due to CAS being its central mission.[32] In fact, as late as 1998, Marines were still claiming in their training manuals that "Close air support (CAS) is a Marine Corps innovation."[33] One of the main debates taking place within the Marine Corps during the war was whether to adopt the helicopter gunship as a part of CAS doctrine and what its adoption would mean for fixed-wing CAS in the Marine Corps.[34] The issue would eventually be put to rest, however, as the helicopter gunship proved crucial in the combat environment of Vietnam.
Though helicopters were initially armed merely as defensive measures to support the landing and extraction of troops, their value in this role led to the modification of early helicopters as dedicated gunship platforms. Though not as fast as fixed-wing aircraft and consequently more vulnerable to anti-aircraft weaponry, helicopters could use terrain for cover, and more importantly, had much greater battlefield persistence owing to their low speeds. The latter made them a natural complement to ground forces in the CAS role. In addition, newly developed anti-tank guided missiles, demonstrated to great effectiveness in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, provided aircraft with an effective ranged anti-tank weapon. These considerations motivated armies to promote the helicopter from a support role to a combat arm. Though the U.S. Army controlled rotary-wing assets, coordination continued to pose a problem. During wargames, field commanders tended to hold back attack helicopters out of fear of air defenses, committing them too late to effectively support ground units. The earlier debate over control over CAS assets was reiterated between ground commanders and aviators. Nevertheless, the US Army incrementally gained increased control over its CAS role.[35]
In the mid-1970s, after Vietnam, the USAF decided to train an
NATO and AirLand Battle
Since their 1977 introduction into modern military practice for close air support purposes, General
Aircraft
Various aircraft can fill close air support roles.
During the Second World War, a mixture of dive bombers and fighters were used for CAS missions. Dive bombing permitted greater accuracy than level bombing runs, while the rapid altitude change made it more difficult for anti aircraft gunners to track. The Junkers Ju 87 Stuka is a well known example of a dive bomber built for precision bombing but which was successfully used for CAS. It was fitted with wind-blown sirens on its landing gear to enhance its psychological effect.[36] Some variants of the Stuka were equipped with a pair of 37 mm (1.5 in) Bordkanone BK 3,7 cannons mounted in under-wing gun pods, each loaded with two six-round magazines of armour-piercing tungsten carbide-cored ammunition, for anti-tank operations.[37]
Other than the
Of the Allied powers that fought in the Second World War, the Soviet Union used specifically designed ground attack aircraft more than the UK and US. Such aircraft included the Ilyushin Il-2, the single most produced military aircraft at any point in world history.[26] The Soviet military also frequently deployed the Polikarpov Po-2 biplane as a ground attack aircraft.[42]
The Royal Navy Hawker Sea Fury fighters and the U.S. Vought F4U Corsair and Douglas A-1 Skyraider were operated in a ground attack capacity during the Korean War.[43][44][45] Outside of the conflict, there were numerous other occasions that the Sea Fury was used as a ground attack platform. Cuban Sea Furies, operated by the Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria ("Revolutionary Air Force"; FAR), were used to oppose the US-orchestrated Bay of Pigs Invasion to attack incoming transport ships and disembarking ground forces alike.[46][47] The A-1 Skyraider also saw later use, especially throughout the Vietnam War.[48]
In the
Usually close support is thought to be only carried out by
The use of information technology to direct and coordinate precision air support has increased the importance of
Doctrine
- MCWP 3-23.1: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (PDF). U.S. Marine Corps. 30 July 1998.
- JP 3-09.3: Close Air Support (PDF). Joint Chiefs of Staff. 25 November 2014.
See also
- Artillery observer
- Attack aircraft
- Counter-insurgency aircraft, a specific type of CAS aircraft
- Flying Leathernecks
- Forward air control
- Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance
- Pace-Finletter MOU 1952
- Tactical bombing, a general term for the type of bombing that includes CAS and air interdiction
References
Citations
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- ^ a b c d Hallion (1990), Airpower Journal, p. 8.
- ^ a b c d e House (2001), Combined Arms Warfare.
- ^ ISBN 9780817356576. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
- ^ Omar, Mohamed (2001). The Scramble in the Horn of Africa. p. 402.
This letter is sent by all the Dervishes, the Amir, and all the Dolbahanta to the Ruler of Berbera ... We are a Government, we have a Sultan, an Amir, and Chiefs, and subjects ... (reply) In his last letter the Mullah pretends to speak in the name of the Dervishes, their Amir (himself), and the Dolbahanta tribes. This letter shows his object is to establish himself as the Ruler of the Dolbahanta
- ^ Boyle, Andrew. Trenchard Man of Vision p. 371.
- ^ Corum & Johnson, Small Wars, pp. 23-40.
- ISBN 978-0801476310. Retrieved 7 February 2013.
- ^ ISBN 978-2-36567-083-8.
- ^ Delve 1994, p. 100.
- ^ Strike from Above: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911–1945. pp. 181–182.
- ^ "Joint Air Operations Interim Joint warfare Publication 3–30" (PDF). MoD. pp. 4–5. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-06-08.
CAS in defined as air action against targets that are in proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of these forces
- ^ Matthew G. St. Clair, Major, USMC (February 2007). "The Twelfth US Air Force Tactical and Operational Innovations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943–1944" (PDF). Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 4, 2011.
The use of forward air controllers (FAC) was another innovative technique employed during Operation Avalanche. FACs were first employed in the Mediterranean by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa but not by the AAF until operations in Salerno. This type of C2 was referred to as 'Rover Joe' by the United States and 'Rover David' or 'Rover Paddy' by the British.
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- ^ Post, Carl A. (2006). "Forward air control: a Royal Australian Air Force innovation". Air Power History.
- ^ "RAF & Army Co-operation" (PDF). Short History of the Royal Air Force. RAF. p. 147. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-08-06.
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- Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system, leading to differentiation of British 'Rover David', US 'Rover Joe' and British 'Rover Frank' controls, the last applying air strikes against fleeting German artillery targets.
- ^ Janus, Allan (6 June 2014). "The Stripes of D-Day". National Air and Space Museum. Retrieved 20 November 2016.
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- ^ Coox 1985, p. 663.
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- ^ Blair (1987), Forgotten War, p. 577.
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- ^ ISBN 0-16-051552-1.
- ^ Callahan, Lieutenant Colonel Shawn (2009). Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe Sanh. Quantico, VA: History Division, United States Marine Corps. pp. 25–27.
- ^ RHODES, J. E. (30 July 1998). "CLOSE AIR SUPPORT" (PDF). MCWP 3-23.1. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. U.S. Marine Corps.
- ^ Krueger, Colonel S.P. (May 1966). "Attack or Defend". Marine Corps Gazette. 50: 47.
- ^ "Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War – Chapter 5" (PDF). Carl.army.mil. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 October 2011. Retrieved 16 April 2012.
- ^ Griehl 2001, p. 63
- ^ Griehl 2001, p. 286
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- ^ Michael Sirak with Marc Schanz, "Spooky Gun Swap Canceled". Air Force Magazine, October 2008, Volume 91, Number 10, p. 24.
- ^ "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)" (PDF). U.S. Department of Defense. 3 September 2003. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 September 2007.
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External links
- Can Our Jets Support the Guys on the Ground? – Popular Science
- The Forward Air Controller Association
- The ROMAD Locator The home of the current ground FAC
- Operation Anaconda: An Airpower Perspective Archived 2019-07-14 at the Wayback Machine – Close air support during Operation Anaconda, United States Airforce, 2005.