Court-martial of James, Lord Gambier
The Court-martial of James, Lord Gambier, was a notorious British naval legal case during the summer of 1809, in which Admiral
Gambier was the
On his return to Britain, Cochrane used his position as a
At the conclusion of the court-martial the members of the court unanimously found in Gambier's favour and despite Cochrane's best efforts Parliament voted thanks to Gambier. Gambier was restored to command and served in the Navy until his death in 1833. Despite popular support, Cochrane's resistance had alienated much of the naval and political establishment in Britain and not long afterwards he was implicated in the
Background
In February 1809 the French Atlantic Fleet, based at
While Gambier debated what action to take, Willaumez was censured for his failure to escape the British fleet and was replaced by
Cochrane initially refused the offer, but was later directly ordered to prepare and lead the operation, sailing to join Gambier in his ship, the frigate
Battle of the Basque Roads
Cochrane fitted out 24
Gambier then ordered the reinforcements to withdraw, leaving Cochrane again unsupported against the rest of the main French fleet which was gradually dragging itself off the shoals and into the relative safety of the Charente River. Despite a letter from Gambier suggesting he withdraw, Cochrane renewed his attack on 13 April but was unable to cause any significant damage to the French ships as they threw stores and guns overboard to facilitate their escape.[14] On the morning of 14 April Gambier directly ordered Cochrane to retire, turning command of the operation over to Captain George Wolfe. Cochrane reluctantly complied, and on 15 April sailed back to Britain with dispatches.[15]
Wolfe renewed attacks on the remaining stranded ships of the French fleet over the next week, but with little effect. The frigate
The thanks
Although Gambier's dispatch issued after the action stated that "I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane",
Cochrane was already a popular and flamboyant figure in British public life, with a long history of outspoken military and political activity. He was lauded as the hero of the action and awarded membership of the prestigious
Cochrane was incensed, and visited Lord Mulgrave to warn him in no uncertain terms that if such thanks were proposed Cochrane would, in his position as Member of Parliament, lead a faction to oppose it. He made no direct reference to Gambier's conduct, but instead criticised the notion of giving thanks for only a partial victory, rendered incomplete by the inaction of the fleet. He described the vote as "public misrepresentation".[17] Mulgrave was furious, replying that "Such a course will not only prove injurious to the Government, but highly detrimental to yourself, by raising up against you a host of enemies".[23] Cochrane was unmoved, and refused to back down when Mulgrave first threatened him with the government's displeasure and then offered him a frigate squadron and infantry regiment of his own to conduct operations against the French as he wished without oversight should he drop the complaint.[20]
Gambier demands a court-martial
Mulgrave immediately notified Gambier of Cochrane's intentions and the admiral, aware that his competence and bravery were being called directly into question, demanded a court-martial to investigate his conduct.[24] Gambier focused the court-martial on himself rather than his subordinate, as that greatly restricted Cochrane's ability to argue against him. As a witness, Cochrane could only respond to questions from the court at the court's convenience, while Gambier, as the defendant, was present throughout, free to provide lengthy written statements in his own defence, and to personally cross-examine all witnesses.[25] When Cochrane was asked in advance of the trial to provide written specifics of his accusations against Gambier he refused on the grounds that it would be insubordinate, leaving the court-martial to set the terms of the charges. These were that "Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th day of the said month of April, the enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed, did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual measures for destroying them". This narrow and specific charge was now the focus of the court.[26]
Mulgrave and Gambier then contrived to pack the court with Gambier's supporters. The court-martial was scheduled for
They also ensured that the witnesses were sympathetic to Gambier. Captain
It was also ensured that the charts of the action placed before the court were prepared by senior warrant officers Thomas Stokes and Edward Fairfax of Gambier's flagship
Court-martial of Lord Gambier
The court-martial was convened on 26 July 1809 aboard
Day one
The first witnesses were Thomas Stokes, Master of HMS Caledonia, who had drafted the maps presented to the court, and Lieutenant Richard Hoskings of Caledonia, called to attest to the flagship's log book.[35] They were followed by John Spurling, Master of HMS Imperieuse, who was closely questioned on his ability to reliably document signals in the midst of battle; he acknowledged that he had been unable to retain a complete record. The court then called Samuel Raven, Master of HMS Caesar, and John Thompson, Master's Mate of HMS Beagle, to attest to the accuracy of their logbooks.[38]
It was at this point that Lord Cochrane was called to the stand. Cochrane was closely questioned for the rest of the day and much of the following morning, the first exchanges focusing on whether it was appropriate for Cochrane to make use of written recollections of the day in his evidence and then progressing to the geography of the anchorage.[39] Cochrane insisted that the entrance was wide and deep enough for at least six ships to pass safely, but was denied permission to present his own charts to the court.[40] He repeatedly requested the opportunity to read his prepared narrative of the battle to the court, but was denied, his ability to speak limited to answering the court's questions.[41] Eventually Curtis intervened, supported by Young, to note that "I never in all my experience knew the document of a witness permitted to be received when he was present himself to be examined".[40]
Cochrane was then closely questioned on a series of signals he made at midday on 12 April. In these signals he sent a series of warnings that the French ships were beginning to refloat, followed by the signal at 13:45 "the ship is in distress, and requires to be assisted immediately", indicating that Imperieuse was under fire. He had in fact deliberately allowed Imperieuse to drift within range of the French ships in an effort to provoke a reaction from Gambier.[42] This discussion deteriorated into an extended argument about the propriety of Cochrane's use of notes, with particular interventions from Young and Stanhope.[43] At the close of the first day, Cochrane asserted that Gambier's great mistake was not that he failed to attack on the afternoon of 12 April, but that he failed to attack in the morning when the French were most vulnerable. The proceedings were then held over until the morning.[44]
Day two
Cochrane was recalled on the morning of 27 July and immediately accused Gambier of failing to support his operation. He reiterated his signals sent on the morning of the battle: "Half the fleet could destroy the enemy", and "The frigates alone can destroy the enemy". He accused Gambier of "unnecessary delay".[45] He mentioned his assumption that Gambier paused so that the crews could eat lunch, stating, "I could not in any other way account for a proceeding, that thus enabled the helpless French ships to endeavour their escape".[46] Under close questioning however, Cochrane lost his temper, refusing to directly answer questions put to him and instead giving lengthy answers that reflected poorly on Gambier's conduct.[27] Eventually the court was cleared for a 20-minute discussion following which Cochrane was severely admonished by Curtis to answer only those questions put to him.[47]
Cochrane did not fully comply with these instructions, and was further admonished for recounting conversations with other officers regarding Gambier's conduct, which the court ruled "inappropriate" hearsay.[48] Cochrane then read out a letter sent to him by Gambier on the morning of 13 April, when much of the French fleet was still exposed, which urged him to withdraw, lest he "tarnish [the victory] by attempting impossibilities".[49] In an attachment, Gambier permitted Cochrane one further attack on the French, but wrote "I do not think you will succeed; and I am anxious that you should come to me as I wish to send you to England as soon as possible".[50] As his evidence concluded, Cochrane became irate once more, challenging the court that "I have felt that if I had answered yes or no to all the questions which have been put to me, I ought to be hung".[51] There followed a series of exchanges regarding the reliability of Cochrane's charts, the threat from the fort on Île-d'Aix and the nature of signals issued on the night of 12 April before Cochrane withdrew.[52]
The court then called Rear-Admiral Robert Stopford, who had led HMS Caesar into Aix Roads on the night of 12 April. Stopford fully supported Gambier's case and took full responsibility for withdrawing the squadron sent to reinforce Cochrane on 12 April during the following morning, citing the dangers of the anchorage, on which his own ship had grounded in the night.[53] Bicknell then announced that the prosecution case was complete, but Curtis overruled him noting that the panel had further questions. The court was then adjourned for the evening.
Day three
At the start of 28 July Cochrane was briefly called again to answer questions about his charts and the discrepancies between them and those supplied to the court.[54] He was followed by Stopford, who was further questioned about the movements of the ships sent to reinforce Cochrane on 12 April. Gambier was invited to question the witness and took the opportunity to discuss the bravery of a number of volunteers from Stopford's flagship who served on the fireships, two of whom were killed.[55] Curtis then called the command of the fireship operation into question, asking whether "every fire-ship was conducted with equal ability and resolution toward the enemy".[56] Sutton then questioned Stopford on the width of the entrance to Aix roads and the threat from the batteries of Île-d'Aix, Stopford's answer contradicting that of Cochrane.[57]
The court briefly recalled John Spurling, who was questioned on the depth of the anchorage, whether Imperieuse had grounded during the operation and the strength of the batteries on Île-d'Aix.[58] He was followed by Captain George Wolfe of HMS Aigle, who had assumed command from Cochrane on 14 April. When asked whether Gambier was to blame for any failings during the battle, he replied "I have no recollection of any thing of the kind".[59] The court then called Captain John Tremayne Rodd of HMS Indefatigable, who had joined the attack on 12 April. Rodd also supported Gambier, and further noted that his ship had almost become grounded in the enemy anchorage and that he had no recollection of Cochrane urging him to disobey orders and continue the attack after being instructed to withdraw, something Cochrane had reported after the battle.[60] With that, the case was adjourned; it sat briefly on Saturday 29 July and was then adjourned until Monday, 31 July.[61]
Day five
The day was reserved for Gambier's testimony. The admiral, as the defendant, was permitted to provide a full written statement to the court, read by Moses Greetham. Cochrane petitioned the court to be allowed to remain for the testimony,[62] but Curtis dismissed him with the comment "I have never heard of such a thing in my life".[63] Gambier's testimony ran to 34 pages and started by stating his indignation at having to answer "loose and indirect accusations of an officer, so much his inferior in rank".[64] and accused Cochrane of attempting to "exalt his own reputation at the expense of mine".[65] He justified his conduct by saying "however highly courage is to be viewed in an officer, it is always incomplete in its consequences, without the equal exercise of judgement and discretion".[66]
Gambier's lengthy account of his plans for the operation, and his conduct during it, match that described in his dispatches, although in greater detail. Cochrane barely features, except where Gambier describes his proposals for a general attack on the stranded French fleet as "preposterous and impractical".[67] Gambier notes that his chief concern was that should a ship have been severely damaged in the narrow waterway it would have been impossible to retrieve it, "the consequence of which could scarcely have been less than their utter destruction".[68] and warned that "if the impression arising out of this inquiry should prove less favourable to Lord Cochrane . . . his Lordship must be sensible that, as the instigator of this Court-Martial, he will himself be the instigator of this change of sentiment".[69]
There followed brief testimony from John Dyer, an Admiralty clerk, John Spurling again and then John Wilkinson, Secretary to Lord Gambier, to attest to the accuracy of some of the documents presented to the court.[70] There was then a close examination by Gambier of Edward Fairfax, Master of the Fleet and drafter of the charts presented to the court, followed by the recalled Thomas Stokes. Both officers testified as to the accuracy of their charts and corroborated Gambier's evidence of the disposition of the anchorage and of the French fleet.[34] Gambier then called Captain John Bligh of HMS Valiant, who led the reinforcements on 12 April. Bligh described his ships as in "a perilous situation", and testified that they were in danger of being wrecked.[71] The court was then adjourned once more.
Day six
Bligh was called again on the morning of 1 August, testifying that he had overheard Cochrane stating that if Gambier had led the fleet into the anchorage on 12 April, three of four British ships might have been lost.[72] Thomas Stokes was recalled to attest to the relative positions of the French and British ships on the charts before Gambier called Captain John Beresford, captain of HMS Theseus, which entered the anchorage on the evening of 12 April but was not heavily engaged. Beresford described Cochrane's signals on the day of the battle as "very improper" and "impossible",[73] and reiterated Gambier's concern that he may have suffered heavy losses had he attacked Aix Roads with his fleet.[74]
Beresford was followed by Captain
Edward Fairfax was briefly recalled to discuss the night attack on 11 April and then Rodd was briefly recalled.[78] Gambier then recalled his secretary John Wilkinson and questioned him as to Cochrane's conduct during his brief conference with Gambier on 14 April. This evidence was halted by Curtis, who gently admonished Gambier for asking directly whether Cochrane had discussed the admiral's "conduct or misconduct" with any officers on board Caledonia. Curtis raised "doubts entertained as to the strict propriety of this; it is commenting on the conduct of officers whose conduct is not called into question, and I think it might be attended with very unpleasant consequences".[79] Gambier then offered to rest his case, but Curtis suggested that he wait until the following day before deciding whether to conclude.[80]
Day seven
On 2 August Stopford and Hockings were briefly called to clarify portions of their testimony. Gambier then reopened his case, having decided overnight to call more captains of the fleet to testify.
Captain
Captain Francis Newcombe of the brig HMS Beagle was next called, and complained about Cochrane's conduct, the latter having fired shot in the direction of his vessels during the battle as a means of encouraging him to engage the enemy more closely.[85] He did however agree with Seymour that reinforcements might have been sent in earlier although he countered by noting that they would have been under considerable fire from the fort on Île-d'Aix.[31] Hockings was briefly called again, followed by Kerr, Stopford and Wolfe. The court then briefly called Captain Pulteney Malcolm of HMS Donegal, who stated that an attack before noon would have been highly dangerous. The court was then adjourned.[86]
Day eight
The last day of evidence, 3 August, first saw Kerr recalled to correct some minor points before Malcolm retook the stand. Malcolm then testified that although an attack before noon would have been hazardous, in his opinion an attack on the main French fleet should have been made regardless of the hazards and that there was some unnecessary delay, albeit small, in Gambier's order to dispatch reinforcements.[87] He also suggested that ships of the line might have been sent in earlier had they removed the large quantities of stores they carried to reduce their draught, although acknowledged that since the fleet's transports had been used as fireships in the initial attack, this may have meant throwing the stores overboard.[88]
The court then called Captain
Verdict
On the morning of the ninth day, 4 August, Gambier made his final summation and the court ruled against an application from Cochrane to present further evidence. The court was then cleared for deliberations, reconvening at 13:00. The verdict was then read by Moses Greetham, concluding that:
Having heard the evidence produced in support of the charge, and by the Right Honourable Lord Gambier in his defence, and what his Lordship had to allege in support thereof; and having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the whole, the Court is of the opinion, that the charge . . . has not been proved against the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier; but that his Lordship's conduct on that occasion . . . was marked by ZEAL, JUDGEMENT, ABILITY and an anxious Attention to the Welfare of His Majesty's service, and doth adjudge him to be MOST HONOURABLY ACQUITTED.[91]
Following the verdict, Curtis ceremonially returned Gambier's sword which had been surrendered to the court at the start of proceedings, at which Gambier thanked him and the panel for the "obliging manner in which you have conveyed to me their sentiments".[92]
Aftermath
Gambier's exoneration was reported in much of the British press, who had followed the trial closely, particularly in The Times,
In January 1810 the vote of official thanks to Gambier went ahead in Parliament, passing with 161 votes to 39, Cochrane leading the Radical faction in opposition and succeeding in getting the minutes of the court-martial produced in Parliament.
The entire affair has been heavily criticised by British historians. William James noted in 1827 that "we cannot refrain from observing, that several of members, particularly the president (Sir Roger Curtis) and Admiral Young, evinced a strong bias in favour of the accused".[26] He further notes that much of Gambier's evidence, accepted at trial without comment, was inaccurate.[101] In 1900, William Laird Clowes agreed, noting that Gambier "was fortunate" in the verdict.[32] More recent historians have been more pronounced in their opinions, Richard Woodman noted in 2001 that Cochrane "was browbeaten and forbidden to ask questions" and called Gambier "stupid".[102] Perhaps the most unexpected opinion came from the Emperor Napoleon, who years later told an English correspondent that Cochrane "could not only have destroyed [the French ships], . . . but he might and would have taken them out, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done . . . The French admiral was a fool, but yours was just as bad".[74]
References
- ^ Mostert, p. 572
- ^ Woodman, p. 263
- ^ James, p. 98
- ^ Cordingly, p. 179
- ^ Adkins, p. 270
- ^ Clowes, p. 259
- ^ Harvey, p. 110
- ^ Woodman, p. 267
- ^ Mostert, p. 569
- ^ Adkins, p. 272
- ^ James, p. 111
- ^ Cordingly, p. 194
- ^ Cordingly, p. 200
- ^ Clowes, p. 267
- ^ James, p. 121
- ^ Clowes, p. 268
- ^ a b Cochrane, p. 245
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 131
- ^ a b "No. 16248". The London Gazette. 21 April 1809. p. 538.
- ^ a b Mostert, p. 573
- ^ Cochrane, p. 244
- ^ Cordingly, p. 209
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 134
- ^ a b Cordingly, p. 210
- ^ Harvey, p. 138
- ^ a b James, p. 125
- ^ a b Cordingly, p. 211
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 139
- ^ Cochrane, p. 249
- ^ Gurney, p. 1
- ^ a b c Cordingly, p. 213
- ^ a b Clowes, p. 269
- ^ Gurney, p. vii
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 145
- ^ a b Gurney, p. 24
- ^ Cochrane (ii), p. 13
- ^ James, p. 100
- ^ Gurney, p. 29
- ^ Gurney, p. 34
- ^ a b Gurney, p. 35
- ^ Gurney, p. 37
- ^ Harvey, p. 126
- ^ Gurney, p. 41
- ^ Gurney, p. 43
- ^ Gurney, p. 45
- ^ Harvey, p. 142
- ^ Gurney, p. 48
- ^ Gurney, p. 50
- ^ Harvey, p. 128
- ^ Gurney, p. 52
- ^ Harvey, p. 143
- ^ Cordingly, p. 212
- ^ Gurney, p. 70
- ^ Gurney, p. 75
- ^ Gurney, p. 78
- ^ Gurney, p. 79
- ^ Gurney, p. 82
- ^ Gurney, p. 83
- ^ Gurney, p. 87
- ^ Gurney, p. 91
- ^ Gurney, p. 104
- ^ Cochrane, p. 255
- ^ Gurney, p. 105
- ^ Gurney, p. 107
- ^ Gurney, p. 108
- ^ Gurney, p. 110
- ^ Gurney, p. 125
- ^ Gurney, p. 127
- ^ Gurney, p. 131
- ^ Gurney, p. 139
- ^ Gurney, p. 155
- ^ Gurney, p. 157
- ^ Gurney, p. 164
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 148
- ^ Gurney, p. 168
- ^ Gurney, p. 172
- ^ Gurney, p. 176
- ^ Gurney, p. 178
- ^ Gurney, p. 179
- ^ Gurney, p. 181
- ^ Gurney, p. 184
- ^ Gurney, p. 189
- ^ Harvey, p. 141
- ^ Gurney, p. 196
- ^ Gurney, p. 201
- ^ Gurney, p. 208
- ^ a b Harvey, p. 140
- ^ Gurney, p. 213
- ^ Gurney, p. 218
- ^ Gurney, p. 227
- ^ Gurney, p. 231
- ^ Gurney, p. 232
- ^ Cordingly, p. 214
- ^ a b c Harvey, p. 149
- ^ a b Cordingly, p. 215
- ^ Cochrane, p. 258
- ^ Cochrane, p. 259
- ^ James, p. 128
- ^ Tracy, p. 150
- ^ Tracy, p. 79
- ^ James, p. 126
- ^ Woodman, p. 273
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