Critical anthropomorphism

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Critical anthropomorphism (from

study of animal behavior. It uses scientific knowledge of the species, its perceptual world, and ecological and evolutionary history to generate hypotheses through the lens of the sentience of the observer.[1][2] The term is of particular relevance to mentalistic behavioral mechanisms, and its application involves using "natural history, our perceptions, intuitions, feelings, careful behavioral descriptions, identifying with the animal, optimization models, previous studies, and so forth in order to generate ideas that may prove useful in gaining understanding and the ability to predict outcomes of planned (experimental) and unplanned interventions".[3]

Background

cognitive maps, for example, stands as an early example of critical anthropomorphism.[4]

Implementation

The critically anthropomorphic approach has been applied to a range of species and behavioral and cognitive capacities. Burghardt and Rivas describe case histories of how critical anthropomorphism informed the design and interpretation of animal behavior research.

anacondas and other snakes.[7]

Historically, an idea like critical anthropomorphism would be at odds with behaviorism, but some contemporary investigators of animal conditioning and learning take exception. For example, Timberlake and Delmater (1991)[8] argued that behaviorists should relax their mechanistic constraints and consider the sensory and perceptual worlds of nonhuman species:

Instead of projecting oneself as a particular type of human into the circumstances of the organism, one attempts to assume both the circumstances and the characteristics of the organism...Experimenters not only need to put themselves in the subject's shoes, they need to wear them – walk, watch, hear, touch, and act like the subject. The humility required to assume this role coupled with the power of the experimental approach should increase the efficiency with which the understanding, prediction, and control of behavior can advance.[9]

Caveats

The idea of an inner world resembles subjective states, contrasting it with behaviorism, particularly

Conwy Lloyd Morgan, acknowledge that studying the behavior of other organisms requires a degree of introspection on the part of the observer. Morgan argued that studying the behavior of other organisms was a doubly inductive process; this process begins with observation and description of the animal, which is followed by the subjective induction of that behavior based on the observer's own understanding of his or her own conscious experience. Morgan argued that the observer's introspectionis essential to understanding the behavior of others, and he held firm on the importance of remaining critical and objective when doing so.[4][10] Clive Wynne, a vocal critic of anthropomorphism, considers the alternatives espoused by scientists, such as critical anthropomorphism or biocentric anthropomorphism,[11] to be nonscientific. Wynne discusses the history of anthropomorphism through George Henry Lewes, George Romanes, and Charles Darwin
to elaborate on pitfalls, limitations, and the arguably nonscientific status of anthropomorphism. Wynne argues that modern versions of behaviorism are no more accurate than their historical predecessors.

Burghardt[12][13] counters Wynne's arguments by pointing out that: 1) critical anthropomorphism is not by itself intended to be a description and explanation of behavior, but rather as a heuristic for generating testable hypotheses, 2) critical anthropomorphism can—and has—been used to avoid ill-conceived studies of animal behavior, 3) denying our status as animals and that we might share similar experiences of the world with nonhuman species is itself erroneous, and 4) mentalistic explanations of behavior are not, as Wynne suggests, equal to supernatural ones.

See also

References

  1. ISBN 9780805802528
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  2. ISBN 9780791431252
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  3. ^ Burghardt 1991, p. 72.
  4. ^
    PMID 3898938
    .
  5. ^ Uexkull, J. von (1985) [1909]. Umwelt and innenwelt der tiere. [translated by CJ Mellor and D. Gove, and reprinted in G.M. Burghardt (ed.) Foundations of Comparative Ethology. New York: Nostrand Reinhold. pp. 222–245.
  6. ISBN 9780262523226
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  7. S2CID 5374924
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  8. PMID 22478079
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  9. ^ Timberlake & Delamater 1991, p. 39.
  10. OCLC 40451963
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  11. doi:10.1641/0006-3568(2000)050[0861:AEEPN]2.0.CO;2
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  12. doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.20009
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  13. PMID 15229581
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