Animal consciousness
Animal consciousness, or animal awareness, is the
The topic of animal consciousness is beset with a number of difficulties. It poses the
Philosophers who consider subjective experience the essence of consciousness also generally believe, as a correlate, that the existence and nature of animal consciousness can never rigorously be known. The American philosopher
Animal consciousness has been actively researched for over one hundred years.[11] In 1927, the American functional psychologist Harvey Carr argued that any valid measure or understanding of awareness in animals depends on "an accurate and complete knowledge of its essential conditions in man".[12] A more recent review concluded in 1985 that "the best approach is to use experiment (especially psychophysics) and observation to trace the dawning and ontogeny of self-consciousness, perception, communication, intention, beliefs, and reflection in normal human fetuses, infants, and children".[11] In 2012, a group of neuroscientists signed the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, which "unequivocally" asserted that "humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neural substrates."[13]
Philosophical background
The
The rejection of the mind–body dichotomy is found in French Structuralism, and is a position that generally characterized post-war French philosophy.[16] The absence of an empirically identifiable meeting point between the non-physical mind and its physical extension has proven problematic to dualism and many modern philosophers of mind maintain that the mind is not something separate from the body.[17] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, particularly in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology, and the neurosciences.[18][19][20][21]
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is the theory in philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are caused by physical processes in the brain or that both are effects of a common cause, as opposed to mental phenomena driving the physical mechanics of the brain. The impression that thoughts, feelings, or sensations cause physical effects, is therefore to be understood as illusory to some extent. For example, it is not the feeling of fear that produces an increase in heart beat, both are symptomatic of a common physiological origin, possibly in response to a legitimate external threat.[22]
The history of epiphenomenalism goes back to the post-Cartesian attempt to solve the riddle of
Thomas Henry Huxley defends in an essay titled On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History an epiphenomenalist theory of consciousness according to which consciousness is a causally inert effect of neural activity—"as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".[25] To this William James objects in his essay Are We Automata? by stating an evolutionary argument for mind-brain interaction implying that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness has not only been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this if it had been efficacious.[26][27] Karl Popper develops in the book The Self and Its Brain a similar evolutionary argument.[28]
Animal ethics
Defining consciousness
About forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness can be identified and categorized based on functions and experiences. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed-upon, theory-independent definition of consciousness appear remote.[35]
Consciousness is an elusive concept that presents many difficulties when attempts are made to define it.[36][37] Its study has progressively become an interdisciplinary challenge for numerous researchers, including ethologists, neurologists, cognitive neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists.[38][39]
In 1976 Richard Dawkins wrote, "The evolution of the capacity to simulate seems to have culminated in subjective consciousness. Why this should have happened is, to me, the most profound mystery facing modern biology".[40] In 2004, eight neuroscientists felt it was still too soon for a definition. They wrote an apology in "Human Brain Function":[41]
- "We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."
Related terms, also often used in vague or ambiguous ways, are:
- cognitivereaction to a condition or event.
- Self-awareness: the capacity for introspection and the ability to reconcile oneself as an individual separate from the environment and other individuals.
- Self-consciousness: an acute sense of self-awareness. It is a preoccupation with oneself, as opposed to the philosophical state of self-awareness, which is the awareness that one exists as an individual being; although some writers use both terms interchangeably or synonymously.[45]
- Sentience: the ability to be aware (feel, perceive, or be conscious) of one's surroundings or to have subjective experiences. Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.
- intelligenceor alternatively may be considered an additional faculty, apart from intelligence, with its own properties.
- subjective, conscious experience.
Sentience (the ability to feel, perceive, or to experience subjectivity) is not the same as self-awareness (being aware of oneself as an individual). The mirror test is sometimes considered to be an operational test for self-awareness, and the handful of animals that have passed it are often considered to be self-aware.[46][47] It remains debatable whether recognition of one's mirror image can be properly construed to imply full self-awareness,[48] particularly given that robots are being constructed which appear to pass the test.[49][50]
Much has been learned in neuroscience about correlations between brain activity and subjective, conscious experiences, and many suggest that neuroscience will ultimately explain consciousness; "...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...".[51] However, this view has been criticized because consciousness has yet to be shown to be a process,[52] and the so-called "hard problem" of relating consciousness directly to brain activity remains elusive.[53]
Scientific approaches
Since
Eugene Linden, author of The Parrot's Lament suggests there are many examples of animal behavior and intelligence that surpass what people would suppose to be the boundary of animal consciousness. Linden contends that in many of these documented examples, a variety of animal species exhibit behavior that can only be attributed to emotion, and to a level of consciousness that we would normally ascribe only to our own species.[60]
Philosopher Daniel Dennett counters that:
Consciousness requires a certain kind of informational organization that does not seem to be 'hard-wired' in humans, but is instilled by human culture. Moreover, consciousness is not a black-or-white, all-or-nothing type of phenomenon, as is often assumed. The differences between humans and other species are so great that speculations about animal consciousness seem ungrounded. Many authors simply assume that an animal like a bat has a point of view, but there seems to be little interest in exploring the details involved.[61]
Consciousness in mammals (including humans) is an aspect of the mind generally thought to comprise qualities such as
In humans, there are three common methods of studying consciousness: verbal reporting, behavioural demonstrations, and neural correlation with conscious activity, though these can only be generalized to non-human taxa with varying degrees of difficulty.[63] In a new study conducted in rhesus monkeys, Ben-Haim and his team used a process dissociation approach that predicted opposite behavioral outcomes for the two modes of perception. They found that monkeys displayed exactly the same opposite behavioral outcomes as humans when they were aware or unaware of the stimuli presented.[64]
Mirror test
External videos | |
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Self-recognition in apes – National Geographic |
The sense in which animals (or human infants) can be said to have consciousness or a self-concept has been hotly debated; it is often referred to as the debate over animal minds. The best known research technique in this area is the mirror test devised by Gordon G. Gallup, in which the skin of an animal (or human infant) is marked, while they are asleep or sedated, with a mark that cannot be seen directly but is visible in a mirror. The animal is then allowed to see their reflection in a mirror; if the animal spontaneously directs grooming behaviour towards the mark, that is taken as an indication that they are aware of themself.[66][67] Over the past 30 years, many studies have found evidence that animals recognise themselves in mirrors. Self-awareness by this criterion has been reported for:
- Land mammals: elephants.[65]
- Cetaceans: killer whales and possibly false killer whales.[73]
- Birds: pigeons (can pass the mirror test after training in the prerequisite behaviors).[75]
Until recently, it was thought that self-recognition was absent in animals without a
According to a 2019 study,
The mirror test has attracted controversy among some researchers because it is entirely focused on vision, the primary sense in humans, while other species rely more heavily on other senses such as the
Language
External videos | |
---|---|
Whale song – Oceania Project | |
This is Einstein! – Knoxville Zoo |
Another approach to determine whether a non-human animal is conscious derives from passive speech research with a macaw (see
Zipf's law might be able to be used to indicate if a given dataset of animal communication indicate an intelligent natural language. Some researchers have used this algorithm to study bottlenose dolphin language.[85]
Pain or suffering
This section contains too many or overly lengthy quotations. (February 2020) |
Further arguments revolve around the ability of animals to feel
Carl Sagan, the American cosmologist, points to reasons why humans have had a tendency to deny animals can suffer:
Humans – who enslave, castrate, experiment on, and fillet other animals – have had an understandable penchant for pretending animals do not feel pain. A sharp distinction between humans and 'animals' is essential if we are to bend them to our will, make them work for us, wear them, eat them – without any disquieting tinges of guilt or regret. It is unseemly of us, who often behave so unfeelingly toward other animals, to contend that only humans can suffer. The behavior of other animals renders such pretensions specious. They are just too much like us.[87]
John Webster, a professor of animal husbandry at Bristol, argues:
People have assumed that intelligence is linked to the ability to suffer and that because animals have smaller brains they suffer less than humans. That is a pathetic piece of logic, sentient animals have the capacity to experience pleasure and are motivated to seek it, you only have to watch how cows and lambs both seek and enjoy pleasure when they lie with their heads raised to the sun on a perfect English summer's day. Just like humans.[88]
However, there is no agreement where the line should be drawn between organisms that can feel pain and those that cannot.
Montaigne is ecumenical in this respect, claiming consciousness for spiders and ants, and even writing of our duties to trees and plants. Singer and Clarke agree in denying consciousness to sponges. Singer locates the distinction somewhere between the shrimp and the oyster. He, with rather considerable convenience for one who is thundering hard accusations at others, slides by the case of insects and spiders and bacteria, they pace Montaigne, apparently and rather conveniently do not feel pain. The intrepid Midgley, on the other hand, seems willing to speculate about the subjective experience of tapeworms ...Nagel ... appears to draw the line at flounders and wasps, though more recently he speaks of the inner life of cockroaches.[89]
There are also some who reject the argument entirely, arguing that although suffering animals feel anguish, a suffering plant also struggles to stay alive (albeit in a less visible way). In fact, no living organism 'wants' to die for another organism's sustenance. In an article written for The New York Times, Carol Kaesuk Yoon argues that:
When a plant is wounded, its body immediately kicks into protection mode. It releases a bouquet of volatile chemicals, which in some cases have been shown to induce neighboring plants to pre-emptively step up their own chemical defenses and in other cases to lure in predators of the beasts that may be causing the damage to the plants. Inside the plant, repair systems are engaged and defenses are mounted, the molecular details of which scientists are still working out, but which involve signaling molecules coursing through the body to rally the cellular troops, even the enlisting of the genome itself, which begins churning out defense-related proteins ... If you think about it, though, why would we expect any organism to lie down and die for our dinner? Organisms have evolved to do everything in their power to avoid being extinguished. How long would any lineage be likely to last if its members effectively didn't care if you killed them?[90]
Cognitive bias and emotion
Cognitive bias in animals is a pattern of deviation in judgment, whereby inferences about other animals and situations may be drawn in an illogical fashion.[91] Individuals create their own "subjective social reality" from their perception of the input.[92] It refers to the question "Is the glass half empty or half full?", used as an indicator of optimism or pessimism. Cognitive biases have been shown in a wide range of species including rats, dogs, rhesus macaques, sheep, chicks, starlings and honeybees.[93][94][95]
The neuroscientist
Neuroscience
Neural correlates
The
Visual sense and representation was reviewed in 1998 by Francis Crick and Christof Koch. They concluded sensory neuroscience can be used as a bottom-up approach to studying consciousness, and suggested experiments to test various hypotheses in this research stream.[104]
A feature that distinguishes humans from most animals is that we are not born with an extensive repertoire of behavioral programs that would enable us to survive on our own ("physiological prematurity"). To compensate for this, we have an unmatched ability to learn, i.e., to consciously acquire such programs by imitation or exploration. Once consciously acquired and sufficiently exercised, these programs can become automated to the extent that their execution happens beyond the realms of our awareness. Take, as an example, the incredible fine motor skills exerted in playing a Beethoven piano sonata or the sensorimotor coordination required to ride a motorcycle along a curvy mountain road. Such complex behaviors are possible only because a sufficient number of the subprograms involved can be executed with minimal or even suspended conscious control. In fact, the conscious system may actually interfere somewhat with these automated programs.[105]
The growing ability of neuroscientists to manipulate neurons using methods from molecular biology in combination with optical tools depends on the simultaneous development of appropriate behavioural assays and model organisms amenable to large-scale genomic analysis and manipulation.[106] A combination of such fine-grained neuronal analysis in animals with ever more sensitive psychophysical and brain imaging techniques in humans, complemented by the development of a robust theoretical predictive framework, will hopefully lead to a rational understanding of consciousness.
Neocortex and equivalents
The
Researchers have argued that consciousness in mammals arises in the neocortex, and therefore by extension used to argue that consciousness cannot arise in animals which lack a neocortex. For example, Rose argued in 2002 that the "fishes have nervous systems that mediate effective escape and avoidance responses to noxious stimuli, but, these responses must occur without a concurrent, human-like awareness of pain, suffering or distress, which depend on separately evolved neocortex."
Attention
Most experiments show that one
Extended consciousness
Metacognition
Mirror neurons
Evolutionary psychology
Consciousness is likely an evolved
In his paper "Evolution of consciousness,"
The concept of consciousness can refer to voluntary action, awareness, or wakefulness. However, even voluntary behaviour involves unconscious mechanisms. Many cognitive processes take place in the cognitive unconscious, unavailable to conscious awareness. Some behaviours are conscious when learned but then become unconscious, seemingly automatic. Learning, especially implicitly learning a skill, can take place outside of consciousness. For example, plenty of people know how to turn right when they ride a bike, but very few can accurately explain how they actually do so.[142]
Neural Darwinism
Neural Darwinism is a large scale theory of brain function initially proposed in 1978 by the American biologist Gerald Edelman.[143] Edelman distinguishes between what he calls primary and secondary consciousness:
- sensations, perceptions, and mental images. For example, primary consciousness includes a person's experience of the blueness of the ocean, a bird's song, and the feeling of pain. Thus, primary consciousness refers to being mentally aware of things in the world in the present without any sense of past and future; it is composed of mental images bound to a time around the measurable present.[144]
- Secondary consciousness: is an individual's accessibility to their history and plans. The concept is also loosely and commonly associated with having awareness of one's own consciousness. The ability allows its possessors to go beyond the limits of the remembered present of primary consciousness.[58]
Primary consciousness can be defined as simple awareness that includes
Edelman's theory focuses on two nervous system organizations: the brainstem and limbic systems on one side and the thalamus and cerebral cortex on the other side. The brain stem and limbic system take care of essential body functioning and survival, while the thalamocortical system receives signals from sensory receptors and sends out signals to voluntary muscles such as those of the arms and legs. The theory asserts that the connection of these two systems during evolution helped animals learn adaptive behaviors.[144]
Other scientists have argued against Edelman's theory, instead suggesting that primary consciousness might have emerged with the basic vegetative systems of the brain. That is, the evolutionary origin might have come from sensations and primal emotions arising from
While animals with
Ursula Voss of the
For the advocates of the idea of a secondary consciousness,
Declarations on animal consciousness
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
The absence of a
neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.[152]
In 2012, a group of neuroscientists attending a conference on "Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals" at the University of Cambridge in the UK, signed the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (see box on the right).[1][153]
In the accompanying text they "unequivocally" asserted:[1]
- "The field of Consciousness research is rapidly evolving. Abundant new techniques and strategies for human and non-human animal research have been developed. Consequently, more data is becoming readily available, and this calls for a periodic reevaluation of previously held preconceptions in this field. Studies of non-human animals have shown that brain circuits correlated with conscious experience and perception can be selectively facilitated and disrupted to assess whether they are in fact necessary for those experiences. Moreover, in humans, new non-invasive techniques are readily available to survey the correlates of consciousness."[1]
- "The field of Consciousness research is rapidly evolving. Abundant new techniques and strategies for human and non-human animal research have been developed. Consequently, more data is becoming readily available, and this calls for a periodic reevaluation of previously held preconceptions in this field. Studies of non-human animals have shown that
- "The electrophysiological states of attentiveness, sleep and decision making appear to have arisen in evolution as early as the invertebrate radiation, being evident in insects and cephalopod mollusks (e.g., octopus)."[1]
- "The
- "Birds appear to offer, in their behavior, neurophysiology, and neuroanatomy a striking case of sleep patterns similar to those of mammals, including REM sleep and, as was demonstrated in zebra finches, neurophysiological patterns previously thought to require a mammalian neocortex. Magpies in particular have been shown to exhibit striking similarities to humans, great apes, dolphins, and elephants in studies of mirror self-recognition."[1]
- "Birds appear to offer, in their behavior, neurophysiology, and neuroanatomy a striking case of
- "In humans, the effect of certain hallucinogens appears to be associated with a disruption in cortical feedforward and feedback processing. Pharmacological interventions in non-human animals with compounds known to affect conscious behavior in humans can lead to similar perturbations in behavior in non-human animals. In humans, there is evidence to suggest that awareness is correlated with cortical activity, which does not exclude possible contributions by subcortical or early cortical processing, as in visual awareness. Evidence that human and non-human animal emotional feelings arise from homologous subcortical brain networks provide compelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal affective qualia."[1]
New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness
In 2024, a conference on "The Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness" at New York University[154] produced The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness.[155] This brief declaration, signed by a number of academics, asserts that, as well as "strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds", there is additional empirical evidence which "indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects)."[155][156] The declaration further asserts that "when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore that possibility in decisions affecting that animal".[155]
Examples
A common image is the scala naturae, the ladder of nature on which animals of different species occupy successively higher rungs, with humans typically at the top.[157] A more useful approach has been to recognize that different animals may have different kinds of cognitive processes, which are better understood in terms of the ways in which they are cognitively adapted to their different ecological niches, than by positing any kind of hierarchy.[158][159]
Mammals
Dogs
Dogs were previously listed as non-self-aware animals. Traditionally, self-consciousness was evaluated via the mirror test. But dogs, and many other animals, are not (as) visually oriented.[160][161] A 2015 study claims that the "sniff test of self-recognition" (STSR) provides significant evidence of self-awareness in dogs, and could play a crucial role in showing that this capacity is not a specific feature of only great apes, humans and a few other animals, but it depends on the way in which researchers try to verify it. According to the biologist Roberto Cazzolla Gatti (who published the study), "the innovative approach to test the self-awareness with a smell test highlights the need to shift the paradigm of the anthropocentric idea of consciousness to a species-specific perspective".[84][162] This study has been confirmed by another study.[163]
Birds
Grey parrots
Research with captive
In 2011, research led by Dalila Bovet of
Corvids
It was thought that self-recognition was restricted to mammals with large brains and highly evolved social cognition, but absent from animals without a
A 2020 study found that carrion crows show a neuronal response that correlates with their perception of a stimulus, which they argue to be an empirical marker of (avian) sensory consciousness – the conscious perception of sensory input – in the crows which do not have a cerebral cortex. The study thereby substantiates the theory that conscious perception does not require a cerebral cortex and that the basic foundations for it – and possibly for human-type consciousness – may have evolved before the last common ancestor >320 Mya or independently in birds.[168][169] A related study showed that the birds' pallium's neuroarchitecture is reminiscent of the mammalian cortex.[170]
Invertebrates
Octopuses are highly intelligent, possibly more so than any other order of invertebrates. The level of their intelligence and learning capability are debated,[171][172][173][174] but maze and problem-solving studies show they have both short- and long-term memory. Octopus have a highly complex nervous system, only part of which is localized in their brain. Two-thirds of an octopus's neurons are found in the nerve cords of their arms. Octopus arms show a variety of complex reflex actions that persist even when they have no input from the brain.[175] Unlike vertebrates, the complex motor skills of octopuses are not organized in their brain using an internal somatotopic map of their body, instead using a non-somatotopic system unique to large-brained invertebrates.[176] Some octopuses, such as the mimic octopus, move their arms in ways that emulate the shape and movements of other sea creatures.
In laboratory studies, octopuses can easily be trained to distinguish between different shapes and patterns. They reportedly use
Shamanistic and religious views
Researchers
Some contributors to relevant research on animal consciousness include:
- Marc Bekoff
- Peter Carruthers
- Antonio Damasio
- Marian Stamp Dawkins
- Frans de Waal
- Shaun Gallagher
- Gordon G. Gallup
- Donald Griffin
- Nicholas Humphrey
- Christof Koch
- Thomas Nagel
- Irene Pepperberg
- Bernard Rollin
- Jeffrey M. Schwartz
- Jakob von Uexküll
See also
- Animal cognition
- Animal communication
- Animal rights
- Animal rights by country or territory
- Artificial consciousness
- Awareness
- Biosemiotics
- Brain in a vat
- Cognitive ethology
- Consciousness
- Descartes' Error
- Emotion in animals
- Epiphenomenalism
- Explanatory gap
- Ethics of uncertain sentience
- Externalism
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Human–animal communication
- Internalism and externalism
- Meat paradox
- Mind–body problem
- Neural correlates of consciousness
- Philosophy of mind
- Plant perception (paranormal)
- Problem of other minds
- Self-awareness in animals
- Sentience
- Sentient beings (Buddhism)
- Spindle neuron
- Veganism
- Zoosemiotics
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Further reading
- Bayn T, Cleeremans A and Wilken P (2009) The Oxford companion to consciousness pp. 43f, Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-856951-0.
- ISBN 978-1-60868-220-1.
- Bekoff, Marc; ISBN 978-1-57731-502-5.
- Bekoff, Marc (2003). "Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections" (PDF). Zygon. 38 (2): 229–245. ]
- Brown, Jason W (2010) Neuropsychological Foundations of Conscious Experience pp. 200–210, Les Editions Chromatika. ISBN 978-2-930517-07-0.
- Cartmill, M (2000). "Animal consciousness: some philosophical, methodological, and evolutionary problems". American Zoologist. 40 (6): 835–846. S2CID 198153826.
- ISBN 978-0-19-958782-7.
- Dawkins, Marian Stamp (1998) Through our eyes only? The search for animal consciousness Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-850320-0.
- Dol, Marcel (1997) Animal consciousness and animal ethics: perspectives from the Netherlands Uitgeverij Van Gorcum. ISBN 978-90-232-3215-5.
- Griffin, Donald Redfield (1976) The Question of Animal Awareness Rockefeller Univ. Press.
- Griffin, Donald Redfield (2001) Animal minds: beyond cognition to consciousness University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30865-4.
- Huxley, TH (1874). "On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history" (PDF). Nature. 10 (253): 362–366. S2CID 4113131.
- Kunkel HO (2000) Human issues in animal agriculture pp. 213–214. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-0-89096-927-4.
- Lurz, Robert "Animal Minds" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Phillips, Clive (2009) The Welfare of Animals: The Silent Majority Springer. ISBN 978-1-4020-9218-3.
- Reznikova, Zh. I. (2007) Animal Intelligence: From Individual to Social Cognition. Cambridge University Press
- ISBN 978-0-89281-986-7. Review
- Schönfeld, Martin (2006). "Animal Consciousness: Paradigm Change in the Life Sciences". Perspectives on Science. 14 (3): 354–381. S2CID 145128785.
- Shettleworth, S. J. (1998) (2010,2nd ed) Cognition, evolution and behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, J. D., Beran, M. J., Couchman, J. J., Coutinho, M. V. C., & Boomer, J. B. (2009). Animal metacognition: Problems and prospects,[1] Comparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews, 4, 40–53.
- Steiner, Gary (2008) Animals and the moral community: mental life, moral status, and kinship pp. 11–12, Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-14234-2.
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- Van Riel, Gerd (2009) Ancient perspectives on Aristotle's De anima Leuven University Press. ISBN 978-90-5867-772-3.
- Walker, Stephen (1983) Animal thought p. 98, Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7100-9037-9.
- Invertebrates
- Smith, FA (1991). "A Question of Pain in Invertebrates". ILAR Journal. 33 (1–2): 25–31. doi:10.1093/ilar.33.1-2.25. Archived from the originalon 4 March 2016. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
- Sømme, Lauritz S. (2005) "Sentience and pain in invertebrates"[permanent dead link] Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety.
- Consciousness in a Cockroach Discover, 10 January 2007.
- Do insects Feel pain?
External links
- Animal consciousness at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Bekoff, Marc 2012 Animals are conscious and should be treated as such New Scientist, 24 September 2012.
- Koch, Christof (2012) Consciousness Is Everywhere Huffington Post, 15 August 2012.
- Octopuses Gain Consciousness (According to Scientists' Declaration) Scientific American, 21 August 2012.
- The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states 4 September 2012.
- Animals are as with it as humans, scientists say Discovery, 24 August 2012.
- Video of the Cambridge declaration Archived 26 September 2014 at the Wayback Machine
- How do octopuses think? ABC interview with Peter Godfrey-Smith.
- Do animals demonstrate consciousness? HowStuffWorks. Accessed 30 January 2012.
- I, cockroach Archived 14 July 2014 at the Aeon, 19 November 2013.
- One of Us Essay by John Jeremiah Sullivan in Lapham's Quarterly, 25 March 2014.
- Elephants mourn. Dogs love. Why do we deny the feelings of other species? The Guardian. 11 October 2017.