Finnish III Corps (Continuation War)
III Corps | |
---|---|
III Armeijakunta | |
Active | 1941–1944 |
Disbanded | Re-designated 1st Division on 5 December 1944 |
Country | Finland |
Branch | Army |
Type | Corps |
Engagements | |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | Hjalmar Siilasvuo |
The III Corps (
Mobilization and pre-war plans
While the exact details of the Finno-
The Finnish mobilization began on 10 June 1941 under the pretext of "additional exercises" (
In Northern Finland, 1941–1944
Before the start of the hostilities, the 6th Division was transferred from the III Corps to the German XXXVI Corps.
It soon become apparent that III Corps was the only corps-level unit of the Army of Norway making significant progress, and the corps was reinforced with parts of
By 2 August, Group F had reached the Soviet defensive lines north of Ukhta,[17][18] but failed to take the town due to strong resistance by the Soviet 54th Division. Renewed attempts in September fared no better.[19] Group J had taken up positions 8 miles (13 km) east of Kestenga after being pushed back by the Soviet 88th Division which had recently arrived in the area.[19] General Siilasvuo reported to Generaloberst Nikolaus von Falkenhorst that III Corps was unable to reach Loukhi, with both sides settling for stationary warfare in the sector.[20] On 14 August, Group J was renamed Division J and Group F as 3rd Division.[21] On the same date, Hitler ordered the attack on Ukhta to be halted, and for Division J, including SS-Division Nord, to go on the defensive.[19] Concurrently with these changes, SS Division Nord was de-subordinated from Division J and was given its own sector alongside Division J's as part of the III Corps's northern group.[21]
By 6 October the situation at the front had improved to a point where von Falkenhorst and Siilasvuo discussed continuing the III Corps's advance towards Loukhi. Due to Hitler's August order, the plan was phrased as III Corp improving its positions.[22][23] To this end, on 16 October, von Falkenhorst approved a plan to capture "a crossing of a railway and a highway 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of Kestenga",[23] indicating the real purpose of the operation was to cut the Murmansk railroad. The Finnish high command was informed about the operation on 25 October, but nobody informed the German high command, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW).[23] The operation began on 30 October, with III Corps encircling a Soviet regiment in the first two days. On 9 October, the Army of Norway reported to OKW that two regiments of the Soviet 88th Rifle Division had been virtually destroyed,[24] but Finnish intelligence indicated that Soviets were reinforcing the area with the 186th Rifle Division from Murmansk.[25]
On 5 November, Siilasvuo was informed by the Finnish high command that the attack should be halted for political reasons, and that no additional Finnish reinforcements would be forthcoming despite Siilasvuo's wishes. The
In early 1942, the German forces in northern Finland and Norway were reorganized with the creation of the
Karelian Isthmus, 1944
In March 1942, Finnish defenses had been reorganized under three large formations named
On 9 June 1944, the Soviet Vyborg–Petrozavodsk offensive started with a preparatory attack against the sector of the IV Corps. The main thrust of the offensive, on the Karelian Isthmus, hit the IV Corps sector on 10 June and quickly breached the Finnish main defensive line.[32] By 11 June, IV Corps had been pushed sufficiently far back that the flank of III Corps was endangered.[33] Even after IV Corps had reached the secondary VT-line on 12 June, III Corps was still holding to its part of the original main defensive line. On 13 June, to protect the flank of the corps, the 18th Division was released from the reserve and subordinated to III Corps. Concurrently, preparations were started for a future retreat to the VT-line.[34] By 14 June, the situation of the 15th Division was becoming increasingly untenable, and III Corps was given permission to retreat to the VT-line. The retreat began on the night of 14–15 June, and the bulk of III Corps had reached the secondary defensive line by the end of June 15, with the exception of some forces on the left-most flank on the shore of Lake Ladoga.[35]
The situation on the western Karelian Isthmus continued to deteriorate, and on 16 June Mannerheim ordered the 18th Division to be moved to the Vyborg region to act as his reserve as soon as possible. Given the rapid Soviet advance to the west, the III Corps continued to be in danger of being cut off.[36] In the following days, the corps conducted a series of delaying actions, eventually taking defensive positions along Vuoksi, on the VKT-line.[36][37] By 20 June, III Corps had created a defensive line consisting of two divisions and a brigade.[38] The front stabilized along the Vuoksi for the rest of the war, and Soviet forces failed to break the VKT-line on the III Corps sector despite several attempts.[39]
After the Continuation War
A ceasefire was agreed in September 1944 between the Soviet Union and Finland, which led to the Moscow Armistice. One of the terms of the armistice required Finland to ensure the removal of any German forces remaining in Finland. In practice, this meant that unless the German 20th Mountain Army Corps voluntarily retreated from Finland by mid-September, Finnish forces would have to evict them by force.[40] Initially, Germans fell back towards Norway in unofficial cooperation with the Finnish forces. However, following the failure of Operation Tanne Ost, where the German's attempted capture Gogland from Finnish defenders on 14–15 September, as well as a general cessation of any voluntary movement towards Norway, Finno-German cooperation completely broke down.[41][42]
During the resulting Lapland War, III Corps was moved to northern Finland where it took overall command of all the Finnish forces participating in the fighting against the Germans. The resulting formation consisted of the 3rd, 6th, 11th, 15th divisions, the Armored Division and two brigades. Over the next months, the III Corps slowly pushed the Germans out of Lapland.[43][3]
As the Finnish Army completed its demobilization by early December, as mandated by the Moscow Armistice, the forces under III Corps were reduced from a peak strength of 75,000 to approximately 12,000 men. On 5 December the corps was re-designated 1st Division, which remained under Siilasvuo's command. As the veterans of the Continuation War were demobilized and replaced by fresh conscripts, this latter part of the Lapland War became known in Finland as the "Children's Crusade". The final stages of the war saw the Germans only occupy a minor area of land in the Karesuvanto region, and the Finnish forces in the area were eventually reduced to a task force consisting of 700 men.[44][45][46] The final German forces left Finland on 27 April 1945, signaling the end to the Lapland War.[47]
See also
Notes
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 131.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 789.
- ^ a b Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 1136.
- ^ Trotter 2013, stating "Despite exhaustive efforts by Finnish historians, it has so far proven impossible to pinpoint the exact date on which Finland was taken into confidence about Operation Barbarossa".
- ^ a b Sotatieteen laitos 1988, p. 172.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1988, pp. 173–174.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1988, pp. 175–177.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1988, p. 175.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1988, pp. 177–179.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1988, p. 183.
- ^ a b Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 19.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 14–15.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 21.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 53.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 53–54.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 68.
- ^ Ziemke 1959, p. 169.
- ^ a b c Ziemke 1959, p. 179.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 22.
- ^ a b Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 54.
- ^ Ziemke 1959, p. 180.
- ^ a b c Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 100.
- ^ Ziemke 1959, p. 181.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 101.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 101–102.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 191–192.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 194.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 343.
- ^ a b Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 179.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 289–291.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 292–295.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 313.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, p. 318.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 343–347.
- ^ a b Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 370–374.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 380–385.
- ^ Sotatieteen laitos 1993, pp. 406.
- ^ Nenye et al. 2016, pp. 245–249.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 1124.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 1129.
- ^ Ziemke 1959, p. 296.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 1131.
- ^ Hietanen 1992, pp. 196–201.
- ^ Nenye et al. 2016, pp. 312–316.
- ^ Uola 2006.
- ^ Leskinen & Juutilainen 2005, p. 1148.
References
- Hietanen, Silvo (1992). "Aseista mottimetsään – armeijan kotiuttaminen syksyllä 1944" [From Arms to Forestry Work – Demobilization of the Army in the Fall of 1944]. In Hietanen, Silvo (ed.). Kansakunta sodassa: 3. Kuilun yli [Nation at War: 3. Over the Chasm] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus and ISBN 951-861-384-2.
- Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (2005). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen [The Small Giant of the Continuation War] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
- Nenye, Vesa; Munter, Peter; Wirtanen, Toni; Birks, Chris (2016). Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941–45. Oxford, UK: New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-47-281528-6.
- Sotatieteen laitos, ed. (1988). Jatkosodan historia 1 [History of the Continuation War, part 1]. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XXV (in Finnish). Vol. 1. Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. ISBN 951-0-15327-3.
- Sotatieteen laitos, ed. (1993). Jatkosodan historia 4 [History of the Continuation War, part 4]. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XXV (in Finnish). Vol. 4. Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. ISBN 951-0-15330-3.
- ISBN 978-1565126923.
- Uola, Mikko (2006). "Siilasvuo, Hjalmar (1892–1947)". Kansallisbiografia. Studia Biographica (in Finnish). Vol. 4. The Finnish Literature Society. ISSN 1799-4349. Retrieved 11 November 2021.
- Ziemke, Earl F. (1959). The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 (PDF). United States Government Printing. ISBN 0-16-001996-6. Retrieved 21 October 2021.