Fleet Faction
Fleet Faction | |
---|---|
艦隊派 | |
Also known as | Kantaiha |
Foundation | 1920s |
Dissolved | c. 1940 |
Motives | Increasing the size of the Imperial Japanese Navy |
Active regions | Japan |
Ideology | Militarism, Nanshin-ron |
Opponents | Treaty Faction |
The Fleet Faction (
Opposition to the
During the Meiji Restoration, the Imperial government undertook a series of modernizations of the officer corps. This included European modernization and education of Japanese naval officers, with the Tracey Mission establishing a naval school for some 100 cadets in 1867.[1] After the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan acquired a significant indemnity, using it to undertake an unprecedented naval buildup.[2] Japan doubled its naval personnel and increased its naval tonnage from 30,000 prewar to 250,000 tons in 1903.[2] Japan's naval buildup elevated it to the fourth largest naval power by the completion of the Six-Six Fleet plan.[3]
Rise of the Big Gun faction
Following the Russo-Japanese War, the proponents of a larger battle line fleet were vindicated as they saw the Battle of Tsushima as a textbook Mahanian "Decisive Battle". A number of the battles in that war were fought at a greater distance than many had thought possible, showing the advantage in having guns that could fire the maximum distances. Satō Tetsutarō, who would become a future influence on Japanese naval strategy in the interwar period, established the principle of the Big Gun based on his inferences from Tsushima.[4] Tetsutaro's writing would heavily influence Kato Kanji's thinking in regards to a future maritime conflict with the United States, with his postulations on a 70% ratio in total naval strength vis-à-vis the USN influencing later naval opposition to arms control.[5]
Further following Mahanian thinking in regards to a "hypothetical enemy", the navy ministry, under
Deterioration of Japanese relations with the West
Japanese expansionism significantly worsened
Debate over the Eight-Eight Fleet
The First World War gave the Japanese navy a cause for increasing the size of its budgetary requests.
Kato Tomosaburo was appointed head of negotiations by prime minister
The navy gained internal political influence after the naval treaty, allotting it significant influence over the
The Fleet Faction's seizure of power
In the 1930s, as the Fleet Faction's influence steadily increased due to the militarist takeover of the armed forces, the "pragmatic" politicians and naval officers of the treaty faction were sidelined in favor of the expansionists.
With hawks in control of the IJN, the IJN allowed arms control agreements negotiated by members of the treaty faction to expire and began requesting increasingly higher budget appropriations from the central government in order to expand the size of the fleet.
Contributions to Japanese militarism
The contention over the Washington Naval Treaty resulted in increased military dissatisfaction with the civilian government, who had collaborated with Tomosaburo to reduce naval expenditures—pressuring Japan to accept the terms of the naval treaty.
Notes and references
Notes
- ^ Gow disputes this account on Pg 137 of Gow, 1994. Gow argues that Kanji and Tomosaburo were cooperative in regards to the 70% ratio, with Kanji seeking the strength ratio explicitly at the wishes of Tomosaburo
- ^ Gow states that Kanji was privately dissatisfied but publicly praised the treaty, in contradiction of Asada's account.
References
- ^ Perry 1966, p. 309.
- ^ a b Hurd 1903, p. 573.
- ^ Evans & Peattie 1997, p. 60.
- ^ Bose 2020, p. 57.
- ^ Bose 2020, p. 57,58.
- ^ Asada 1993, p. 83.
- ^ a b Asada 1993, p. 84.
- ^ Johnson 1972, p. 68.
- ^ Johnson 1972, p. 68–70.
- ^ Schencking 1998, p. 324.
- ^ Schencking 1998, p. 324–325.
- ^ Hirama 1991, p. 75.
- ^ Hirama 1991, p. 66.
- ^ a b c d e f Asada 1993, p. 86.
- ^ a b Johnson 1972, p. 70.
- ^ Asada 1993, p. 85.
- ^ Asada 1993, p. 86, 87.
- ^ a b c Asada 1993, p. 87.
- ^ Schencking 2005, p. 220.
- ^ a b Asada 1993, p. 88.
- ^ Asada 1993, p. 88, 89.
- ^ Gow 2004, p. 138-141.
- ^ Schencking 2005, p. 223.
- ^ a b Schencking 2005, p. 225.
- ^ a b Asada 1993, p. 93.
- ^ Asada 1993, p. 89.
- ^ Goedeken 1978, p. 70.
- ^ a b Quigley 1930, p. 1027.
- ^ a b c d Asada 1993, p. 94.
- ^ a b c d Schencking 2005, p. 226.
- ^ Johnson 1972, p. 83.
- ^ Pelz 2013.
- ^ Johnson 1972, p. 80.
Bibliography
Journals
- Schencking, Charles (1998). "Bureaucratic Politics, Military Budgets and Japan's Southern Advance: The Imperial Navy's Seizure of German Micronesia in the First World War". JSTOR 26007298.
- Hirama, Yôichi (1991). "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War ll". JSTOR 44638027.
- Trotter, Ann (1971). "Tentative Steps for an Anglo-Japanese Rapprochement in 1934". S2CID 145630455.
- Asada, Sadao (1993). "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927". JSTOR 44637473.
- Nomura, Kichisaburo (1935). "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality". JSTOR 20030656.
- Johnson, William (1972). "Naval Diplomacy and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East—1921–1935". Naval War College Review.
- Perry, John (1966). "Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power". JSTOR 2383375.
- Hurd, Archibald (1903). "The Growing Naval Power of Japan". JSTOR 25119466.
- Bose, Himadri (2020). "Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on Japanese Maritime Strategy" (PDF). Journal of Defence Studies.
- Quigley, Harold (1930). "The Far East". JSTOR 45339059.
- Goedeken, Edward (1978). "The 1927 Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference". Iowa State University.
Books
- Asada, Sadao (2013). From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States. ISBN 9781612512952.
- Adams, John (2008). If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy. ISBN 9780253000293.
- Evans, David. C; Peattie, Mark (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
- Gow, Ian (2004). Military Intervention in Pre-War Japanese Politics: Admiral Kato Kanji and the 'Washington System'. ISBN 9781135795917.
- Schencking, Charles (2005). Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. Stanford University Press.
- Pelz, Stephen (2013). The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II. Harvard University Press.