Gary Varner
Gary Varner | |
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Texas A&M | |
Main interests | Environmental ethics, animal ethics, utilitarianism, R. M. Hare |
Notable ideas | Biocentric individualism, Harean approaches to animal ethics |
Gary Edward Varner (March 10, 1957 – June 28, 2023) was an American philosopher specializing in
Varner started a research project in 2001 that looked at animals in Hare's two-level utilitarianism. The project's initial monograph, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition, was released by Oxford in 2012. In the book, Varner moved away from his biocentrism, instead endorsing a developed version of Hare's ethics. Varner draws a distinction between persons, near-persons and merely sentient beings; although all are morally considerable, the lives of persons are of the most significance, and the lives of merely sentient beings are of the least. The practical consequences of this view, though initial comments were offered in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition, was to be explored in Sustaining Animals, with which Varner at one time had a contract with Oxford. His third book was Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics, co-authored with Jonathan Newman and Stefan Linquist, and published with Cambridge University Press. It was published in 2017.
Life and career
Varner completed a
Varner joined
Varner's second monograph, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in the Two-Level Utilitarianism of R. M. Hare, was published in 2012 by Oxford University Press.[6] Varner had been working on questions about R. M. Hare and animals since 2001, when he taught a graduate class exploring the subject; given that Peter Singer was a student of Hare, Varner was interested in exploring whether Hare's philosophy endorsed Singer's conclusions about animal liberation.[7] A project entitled Harey Animals: Situating Animals in the Two-Level Utilitarianism of R. M. Hare was submitted to Oxford University Press, but this was subsequently split into two books; Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition was the first, while the second, Sustaining Animals: Envisioning Humane, Sustainable Communities, was under contract with the publisher.[2][7] While Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition addresses theoretical issues in Hare's philosophy, Sustaining Animals was to be more practically focussed, exploring the applicability of the Harean philosophy developed in Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition to real-world issues concerning human-animal relationships.[7]
In 2017, Varner's Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics, co-authored with the
Thought
Biocentric individualism
Varner's In Nature's Interests? offers a resolution of the debate between individualistic approaches to animal rights and holistic accounts of environmental ethics. Varner defends an interest-based biocentric individualism according to which all living beings—including plants[11]—have morally significant interests that ground prima facie (though overridable) duties.[12] The approach follows in the tradition of the work of Kenneth Goodpaster and Paul W. Taylor, though Varner's approach differs from Taylor's in its focus on interests rather than duties, with Varner showing clear utilitarian commitments.[11]
Varner begins by critiquing holistic approaches to environmental ethics, using
- Nothing at or below the level of a fish possesses desires.
- Nevertheless, all living things possess biological needs, and these needs are plausibly construed as interests.
- The welfare of an organism O is, at least in part, to be understood in terms of the interests, rather than the desires, of O.
- Therefore, all living things have a welfare.
- Therefore, all living things are morally considerable.[14]
Rowlands argues that the problem with the book's central approach is that it assumes that all interests have a clear relation to welfare and thus moral considerability; an assumption which, he argues, is partially undermined by the introduction of biological interests.[15] Jon Jensen, who reviewed the book for Ethics and the Environment, raised a similar worry, arguing that Varner did not sufficiently justify his claim that biological interests are inherently morally significant.[16]
A distinctive aspect of Varner's theory as presented in In Nature's Interests? is the hierarchy of interests that he proposes; biological interests are the least important, with desire-based interests of greater significance and "ground projects"—possessed only by humans, these are "a nexus of [an individual's] most important desires"—of the most weight.[17] Thus, Varner defends a kind of "axiological anthropocentrism"; this can be distinguished from "valuational anthropocentrism", according to which only humans have inherent value.[18]
The book also has a practical dimension, presenting debates between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics as of little practical consequence, and suggesting that animal rights goals can be consistent with holistic environmentalist goals.[13] Jensen argues that Varner's own discussion of the reconciliation of environmentalism and animal advocacy is too narrow, but that, nonetheless, Varner's own biocentric individualism offers potential in this area, even despite the limited engagement in the book with practical animal-related issues.[19]
Two-level utilitarianism
Hare's philosophy of
In Part I, Varner offers considerable endorsement of Harean philosophy. Varner interprets Hare as understanding that utilitarianism derives from prescriptivism, and affirms Hare's argument on this point. He goes on to discuss the utility of Intuitive-Level System (ILS) rules;
In Part II, Varner adopts a
In Part III, Varner explores the
Varner then considers a range of proposals for sustainable, humane agriculture, including replacing cattle with buffalo and engineering blind chickens.
Selected bibliography
- Varner, Gary (1990). "Biological functions and biological interests". .
- Varner, Gary (1991). "No holism without pluralism". .
- Varner, Gary (1994). "The prospects for consensus and convergence in the animal rights debate". doi:10.2307/3562383.
- Varner, Gary (1994). "In defense of the vegan ideal: Rhetoric and bias in the nutrition literature". .
- Varner, Gary (1995). "Can animal rights activists be environmentalists?" In: Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism, edited by Donald Marietta and Lester Embree, 169–201. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780847680559.
- Varner, Gary (1998). In Nature's Interests? Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195108651.
- Varner, Gary (1999). "How facts matter: On the language condition and the scope of pain in the animal kingdom". Pain Forum. 8: 84–6. .
- Allen, Colin, Gary Varner, and Jason Zinser (2000). "Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent". .
- Varner, Gary (2002). "Biocentric individualism". In: Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, what Really Works, edited by ISBN 9780195139099.
- Varner, Gary (2012). Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in the Two-Level Utilitarianism of R. M. Hare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199758784.
- Newman, Jonathan, Gary Varner, and Stefan Linquist (2017). Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
References
- ^ a b c Varner, Gary (2016). CV. Texas A&M University. Accessed November 13, 2016.
- ^ a b c Varner, Gary. "Biographical narrative". Texas A&M University. Archived from the original on 11 December 2014.
- ^ "Gary Varner Archived 2016-11-14 at the Wayback Machine". Texas A&M University. Accessed November 13, 2016.
- ^ Varner 1998, p. vii.
- ^ Varner 1998.
- ^ a b Varner 2012.
- ^ a b c d Varner 2012, pp. xi–xii.
- ^ For reviews, see Elliott-Graves 2018; Gregg 2018; Faith 2019; Lawson 2019.
- ^ "Author Meets Critics on the Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics". Biology & Philosophy. 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
- ^ Weinberg, Justin (10 July 2023). "Gary Varner (1957-2023)". Daily Nous. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
- ^ a b Jensen 2000, p. 235.
- ^ Rowlands 2000, p. 598.
- ^ a b Jensen 2000, p. 236.
- ^ Rowlands 2000, p. 599.
- ^ Rowlands 2000, pp. 599–601.
- ^ Jensen 2000, p. 237.
- ^ Jensen 2000, pp. 237–8.
- ^ Jensen 2000, p. 238.
- ^ Jensen 2000, pp. 238–9.
- ^ Attfield and Humphreys 2012, p. 493.
- ^ Kadlac 2015, p. 247.
- ^ Attfield and Humphreys 2012, p. 494.
- ^ Varner 2012, chap. 3.
- ^ Kadlac 2015, p. 248.
- ^ Attfield and Humphreys 2012, pp. 494–5.
- ^ a b Attfield and Humphreys 2012, p. 495.
- ^ Andrews 2014, p. 491.
- ^ a b c Kadlac 2015, p. 249.
- ^ a b c d e Attfield and Humphreys 2012, p. 496.
- ^ Andrews 2014, p. 690.
- ^ Moss 2015, p. 227.
- ^ a b Moss 2015, p. 228.
- ^ Kadlac 2015, pp. 249–50.
- ^ Andrews 2014, p. 659.
- ^ Attfield and Humphreys 2012, pp. 496–7.
Cited texts
- .
- .
- Elliott-Graves, Alkistis (2018). " Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Accessed 10 July 2023.
- Faith, Daniel P. (2019). "Defending Biodiversity".
- Gregg, Emily A. (2018). "Defending Biodiversity". doi:10.1086/698052
- Jensen, Jon (2000). "Book review: In Nature's Interests? Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics". Ethics and the Environment. 4 (2): 235–9.
- Kadlac, Adam (2015). "Book Review: Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism, written by Gary E. Varner". .
- Lawson, Ian (2019). "Defending Biodiversity: Environmental Science and Ethics".
- Moss, Justin (2015). "Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level Utilitarianism". Ethics, Policy & Environment. 18 (2): 226–32.
- doi:10.2307/2693630.
- Varner, Gary (1998). In Nature's Interests? Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195108651.
- Varner, Gary (2012). Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199758784.
External links
- Personal website (captured June 29, 2019 by the Wayback Machine)