Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission | |
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Case history | |
Prior | 177 Cal.App.3d 719, 223 Cal.Rptr. 28 (App. 2d Dist. 1986); probable jurisdiction noted, 479 U.S. 913 (1986). |
Holding | |
A governmental exaction has to be substantially related to a legitimate government interest and there must be a nexus between the exaction and that interest. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, Powell, O'Connor |
Dissent | Brennan, joined by Marshall |
Dissent | Blackmun |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Blackmun |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the
In a 5–4 ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that a requirement by the CCC was a taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
The Nollans owned beachfront property in
The property in question is located along
The "psychological impediments to public access" became a popular finding in staff reports analyzing projects before the California Coastal Commission, particularly when a proposed development had only a minor physical impact to access by the public but required (for legal adequacy for the staff report and California's Environmental Quality Act and Coastal Act) rational bases for imposition of conditions to help make a proposed development consistent with the environmental laws of the state.
The Nollans' property did not present the same conditions found along beaches in Malibu, being less than 4% developed and having smaller, less-intensive development than that along the Malibu shoreline. The condition for approval of the Nollans' Coastal Development Permit was that the applicants record an offer to dedicate a strip of property (generally 25 feet (7.6 m) wide and located landward of the mean high tide)—or, more generally, from the actual edge of the water on any particular day during any given tide along the beach.
Prior procedure
The CCC subsequently appealed to the
Issue
The issue before the court was whether the imposition by the CCC of the requirement that the Nollans convey a public easement as a condition for granting a land-use permit constituted a
Reasoning
In writing for the Court's majority, Justice Antonin Scalia derided the concept of psychological impediments to public access; he wrote that if a public agency wishes to place conditions of approval on a permit, that those conditions must bear some relation to the public-policy concerns purported to be resolved through the imposition of conditions of approval. For example, if a project eliminates 120 square feet (11 m2) of public parkland, an appropriate condition would be to require replacement in-kind of the 120 square feet (11 m2) to maintain the size of public parkland. In short, there had to be a nexus between the public-policy issue and the condition of approval which sought to address it. Justice Scalia then pointed out that under the ruling, a public-access condition did not meet that nexus test by compensating for the slight loss of public view across the Nollans' property; he then stated that if loss of public views across the Nollans' property was truly the issue, then an appropriate condition of approval would have been "construction of a public viewing platform on the roof of the Nollans' house".
The public had no right of passage with the existing bungalow in place, so it would be unaffected by the larger structure replacing it. The Court specified that a “close nexus” must be shown between the regulatory condition imposed and the development impacts of concern, and that the regulatory action must “substantially advance legitimate state interests” (AADASDF p 53). Although the case appears to deal primarily with takings, the principles are applied to the exaction and impact-fee debate as well. The Court struck down California’s policy of “anything goes” for exaction requirements, and created the rational-nexus standard for states across America.[3]
Later implications
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,[4] the Court evaluated further the degree of the connection required. In that case, the City of Tigard, Oregon required any business owner seeking to substantially expand onto property adjacent to a floodplain to create a public greenway and bike path from private land in order to prevent flooding and traffic congestion. The Supreme Court ruled that the city’s requirement would be a taking if the city did not show that there was a reasonable relationship between the creation of the greenway and bike path and the impact of the development. "Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred", the Court held. “Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property".
See also
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 483
- List of United States Supreme Court cases
References
- ^ Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
- ^ Myers, David W. (December 14, 1986) "Court to Decide State's Beach Access Issue" Los Angeles Times
- ^ Nollan v. California Coastal Commission—Case Brief Retrieved 2011-08-13.
- ^ Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
External links
- Text of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) is available from: Cornell CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)