People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola
People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola | |
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Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola | |
Pedro Tonho Pedale (last) | |
FAPLA chief of the general staff and army commander | Lieutenant General António dos Santos França (1982-1989)[1][2] |
Industry | |
Foreign suppliers | Soviet Union |
Related articles | |
History | Angolan War of Independence South African Border War Angolan Civil War |
The People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (
Its major adversaries were the
After the Bicesse Accords in 1993, the FAPLA were transformed in the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Angola, FAA), by the integration of UNITA and FALA members.
History
In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its
In August 1974, a few months after a military
Independence was set for November 11, 1975.By 1976, FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change.
Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions into southern Angola, coupled with UNITA's northward expansion in the east, forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid.[6] Dependence also increased on military personnel from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and Cuba.
Unlike African states that acceded to independence by an orderly and peaceful process of institutional transfer, Angola inherited a disintegrating
Combat performance
FALPA fought UNITA and the
In January 1985, the CIA Directorate of Intelligence estimated that ".. in spite of intensive Soviet training and infusions of Soviet equipment, we believe the Angolan Army is still only a marginally capable fighting force and could not survive against any military threat--internal or external -- without Soviet backing and a Cuban military presence."[8]
The
On the other hand, it could be argued that FAPLA had substantially improved its capabilities and performance. In the first place, FAPLA had begun to develop and acquire the organisation, doctrine, and equipment of a conventional army only during the civil war of 1975-76. It was then forced to fight a counterinsurgency war in the most remote and inaccessible parts of the country over extended lines of communications, without the requisite air or ground transport or logistical infrastructure. UNITA also enjoyed the advantages of operating in thinly populated areas along porous borders with Zambia and Zaire, with extensive SADF combat and logistic support, making it impossible for FAPLA to isolate or outflank UNITA. Moreover, military experts believe that counterinsurgency troops must outnumber guerrillas by ten to one in order to win such wars, a ratio FAPLA could never approximate. The air force and navy were even further behind and had required years to acquire the assets and the expertise needed for effective operations. Although the navy was of marginal use in the war, air power was critical.
It was only after sufficient aircraft and air defence systems had been deployed in the mid-1980s that Luanda was able to launch and sustain large offensives in the south. In August 1986, FAPLA repelled UNITA after they had captured Cuito Cuanavale during Operation Alpha Centauri. Although they suffered heavy losses and perhaps relied too heavily on Soviet military doctrine, the FAPLA and the Angolan Air Force (FAPA/DAA) in the late 1980s showed increased strength, put greater pressure on UNITA, and raised the costs of South Africa's support for UNITA. Luanda's resolve and the improved capabilities and performance of its armed forces were among the essential conditions under which South Africa agreed to negotiate its withdrawal from Angola.
Howe writes that Angola's defence minister acknowledged that senior officials profited significantly from weapons purchases; a newspaper sympathetic to the MPLA, Angolense reported that senior officers made US$320 million in commissions.[10]
The Bicesse Accords of May 1991 called for the integration of the FAPLA and UNITA forces, into a 50,000-strong unified, neutral military force.. before the September 1992 election. The FAA was to contain an equal number of FAPLA and FALA personnel.[11]
The FAPLA and UNITA armies began the integration process, but it was halted, as UNITA returned to war following their loss of the 1992 Angolan general election. The army was renamed the Angolan Armed Forces (Portuguese: Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA)), losing the close nominal association with the MPLA.
Structure and military regions, 1988
In 1988, the strength of the Angolan armed forces was estimated at 100,000 active-duty and 50,000 reserve personnel, organized into a regular army and a supporting militia, air and air defense force, and navy.[1] The active-duty forces had expanded greatly since independence in the face of SADF and UNITA pressure. The regular army's 91,500 troops were organized into brigades ranging in size from 750 to 1,200 men each, deployed throughout the ten military regions. Most regions were commanded by lieutenant colonels, with majors as deputy commanders, but some regions were commanded by majors. Each region consisted of one to four provinces, with one or more infantry brigades assigned to it. The brigades were generally dispersed in battalion or smaller subunits to protect strategic terrain, urban centers, settlements, and critical infrastructure such as bridges and factories. Counterintelligence agents were assigned to all field units to thwart UNITA infiltration.
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Angolan military regions |
Five military regions were initially established in 1975. Their numbers grew to seven in 1983 and ten by December 1985.
Notes
- ^ a b Collelo 1991, p. 215.
- ^ Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary - Africa South of the Sahara, DDB 2680-104-85, ICOD 15 October 1984, Angola
- ^ Collelo 1991, p. 210.
- ^ a b Fontanellaz 2019, p. 6.
- ^ James III 2011, p. 54.
- ^ Collelo 1991, p. 44.
- ^ Collelo 1991, p. 211.
- ^ CIA Directorate of Intelligence (January 1985). "SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE | CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2022-09-25.
- ^ a b Collelo 1991, p. 231.
- ISBN 1-58826-315-0. citing 'Profits Fuel Angola's War,' GuardianWeekly, 8–14 July 1999.
- ^ Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Angola: Information on the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertaçao de Angola (FAPLA), 6 December 2001, AGO37934.E
- ^ Fontanellaz 2019, p. 8.
- ^ See also Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary - Africa South of the Sahara, DDB 2680-104-85, ICOD 15 October 1984, Angola p9-10, declassified by letter dated April 29, 2014.
- ^ Collelo 1991, p. 214, 216.
- ^ Collelo 1991, p. 214.
References
- Collelo, Thomas (1991). Angola: A country study. Vol. 550, no. 59. Washington DC: Government Printing Office. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Country Studies. Federal Research Division.
- Fontanellaz, Adrien (2019). War of Intervention in Angola: Cuban and Angolan Forces at War, 1976-1983. Africa@War No. 34. Solihill: Helion & Co.
- James III, W. Martin (2011). A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-90. Transaction Publishers. 'New material in this edition 2011,' original edition 1992.
- Polack, Peter (2013). The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War: South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War (illustrated ed.). Casemate Publishers. ISBN 978-1-61200-195-1. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
Further reading
- (in Portuguese) FAPLA: Bastion of Peace in Angola, People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola. Department of Agitation and Propaganda, 1988, 250 pages
- Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Psychology Press, 2004.
- Miguel Junior, Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola; First National Army and the War (1975-1992), Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2015; ISBN 978-1-5049-4126-6.
- Kenneth Pollack (2019). Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness. New York: Oxford University Press. (pages 84-87 and 91-102 cover Cuban operations supporting the FAPLA in Angola)
- Smith, James, "FAPLA – Angola's Marxist Armed Forces," Jane's Intelligence Review. 1 July 1990.
- Spall, John, Manhood, Morality and the Transformation of Angolan Society: MPLA Veterans and Post-war Dynamics. James Currey, 2020.
- Šubin, Gennadij V., and Andrei Tokarev, eds. Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale: Soviet Soldiers' Accounts of the Angolan War. Jacana Media, 2011.
- Stephen L. Weigert, Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961-2002. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Igor Zhdarkin, We Did Not See It Even in Afghanistan: Memoirs of a Participant of the Angolan War (1986-1988). Moscow: Memories Mockba, 2008. Translated by Tamara Reilly. 399 pp. ISBN 978-5-903116-57-7. Elaine Windrich reviewed the book at h-net.org, A Russian View of the Angolan War, November 2008.