Phoumi Nosavan

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Phoumi Nosavan
Major General
Battles/warsFirst Indochina War
Laotian Civil War

Major General Phoumi Nosavan (Lao: ພູມີ ຫນໍ່ສວັນ; 27 January 1920 – 3 November 1985)[1][2] was a military strongman who was prominent in the history of the Kingdom of Laos; at times, he dominated its political life to the point of being a virtual dictator.

Early life

He was born in

Chief of Staff of the brand-new Royal Lao Army. While in that position, he was largely responsible for appointing senior officers into command positions in the Military Regions of Laos. Following that, in 1957 he was the first Lao officer to be schooled in France at the École de Guerre (War College). While in France, he became acquainted with Central Intelligence Agency operative John F. "Jack" Hasey. Phoumi returned to Laos to become a founding member of the Committee for the Defence of National Interests on 17 June 1958. On 25 December 1959, he took control of the capital of Vientiane
and of the nation in a bloodless coup.

Drawing military power from his status as a general officer, and political power from appointment as

Bangkok, Thailand
in November 1985.

Colonial Service

Phoumi Nosavan was a prominent Lao military and political figure of the

Kingdom of Thailand. As part of the Lao Issara command, he briefly ran their military operations in southern Laos in coordination with the Viet Minh.[1]

In early 1949, he returned to Thailand before repatriating himself to Laos. In 1950, he joined the nascent

Chief of Staff of the newly constituted Royal Lao Army in the newly independent Kingdom of Laos.[1]

Service After Independence

Under Colonel Phoumi, there was a massive appointment of military officers subordinate to him into command positions in the Royal Lao Army. One of the criteria for these appointments was seniority in the military. However, the urban elite families had great interest in procuring these command positions; they brought influence to bear to secure appointments for their family members or adherents.[7] As the families were regionally based, officers from the elite both saw government service as a tool for political advancement, and as another way to command the allegiance of the Lao peasantry in their region.[8]

Phoumi then attended the

aide de camp.[10] While there, Phoumi became acquainted with Central Intelligence Agency operative John F. "Jack" Hasey.[11] Phoumi returned from France to command the newly created Military Region 5; to that, he added the political post of Deputy Minister for Internal Security.[9] When the May 1958 national election results favored the communist candidates, the rightwing Committee for the Defence of National Interests was formed with American support on 17 June 1958 to counterbalance the leftists. Phoumi was a charter member of the CDNI.[12]

Promoted to colonel, Phoumi joined

Houaphanh Province. While Phoui made that announcement, Phoumi told the Associated Press (AP) that if the United Nations turned down the Lao request, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) would request help from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). As the Laotian crisis began to gather skeptical coverage in the international press, Phoumi flew to Bangkok for a four-day visit. Once there, he solicited aid from his uncle, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit declined help unless Phoumi had American backing.[13] The United Nations subcommittee visited Laos from 15 to 20 September; however, it received no persuasive proof of an invasion.[14] In any case, neither the United Nations nor SEATO aid arrived. In mid-November, Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld visited Laos. He advised the Royal Lao Government that its policy should be one of strict neutrality if it expected United Nations support.[15]

Phoumi Runs The Nation

1960 Laotian Coups

On 16 December 1959, Phoui fired the CDNI ministers from his cabinet, including Phoumi. On 25 December, General Phoumi took charge of the government in a bloodless coup, using Captain Kong Le and his Bataillon Parachutistes 2 (Parachute Battalion 2) to occupy Vientiane's infrastructure. The takeover had the approval of King Sisavang Vatthana; moreover, Phoumi was the only one chosen by his monarch for the new government. Phoumi believed he could impose an authoritarian "directed democracy" upon an ignorant populace for their own welfare.[16][17]

When the 1960 election results again favored leftists and communists, Phoumi founded the Paxa Sangkhom (People's Society) political party on 12 May 1960, as a means of furthering his political ends.[18][19][20] It was about this time he became friends with Thao Ma, head of the Royal Lao Air Force.[16]

On 10 August 1960, Kong Le would oust Phoumi in his own coup. In return, Phoumi would return to power with the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency (including John Hasey) on 16 December in the Battle of Vientiane during his counter-coup. He was aided in this by Generals Kouprasith Abhay and Siho Lamphouthacoul. Phoumi reclaimed the Ministry of Defense after his counter-coup reclaimed the country,[11][18][19] as well as becoming the deputy prime minister on 4 January 1961.[21] He appointed his close friend Thao Ma to command the Royal Lao Air Force; he would act only on Phoumi's commands.[22]

As Kong Le established his

Hmong hill tribe.[25]

Phoumi himself remained in Vientiane to maintain his control over the nation, and to organize the Royal Lao Army battalions into regiments during March 1961; the

Royal Thai Government was approached by the Americans as a source of reinforcements.[26]

The

1954 Geneva Conference was renewed and engineered a truce on 11 May 1961, while the details of a new Lao government could be settled.[27] On 19 June 1961, the three feuding princes met in Zürich, with Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk mediating. On the 22nd, Prince Souphanouvong, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince Boun Oum agreed in principle upon provisional rule by an interim Lao government until elections could be held. However, Phoumi stalled upon details of the coalition government, insisting upon knowing the composition of the new cabinet. He intended to stonewall until he could foster a new government headed by King Sisavang Vatthana instead. His visit to Washington, DC after a Zürich meeting left him believing that the U.S. would back him, no matter what circumstances.[28] After his return to Laos, despite a ceasefire, troops under his command probed between Royal Lao Army and communist/Pathet Lao lines, retreating whenever they came up against the enemy. The communists fought them off, but did not retaliate.[29]

Much to the despair of the American advisers attached to his forces, Phoumi preferred to promote officers known for their incompetence while demoting his competent officers as Phoumi feared able and intelligent officers might be able to overthrow him while inept and stupid officers never would.[30] General William H. Craig of the U.S. Army wrote after visiting Laos in August-September 1961 that: "He is the only driving force in Laos but to make him function successfully, we must get tough with him".[31] Craig wanted Phoumi to change his promotion policy to start promoting able officers at the expense of his inept officers.[32]

In late December, Phoumi accused the United States of a "defeatist policy", and of treating the Royal Lao Government "like a small child". There were months of wrangling concerning his role in the proposed coalition cabinet. On 25 March 1962, Phoumi, W. Averell Harriman, and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat met in Nong Khai, Thailand. Sarit, who was kin to Phoumi, tried to convince him to join a coalition that split control of the military and police three ways among the Royalists, Neutralists, and Pathet Lao. When Phoumi would not accept, he was subjected to a heated tirade by Harriman. However, as the latter was under orders to not cut U.S. aid to Laos, he had no leverage. Phoumi remained obdurate.[33] He would not accept that the Defense and Interior ministries should be occupied by neutralists instead of rightists.[29]

Battle of Luang Namtha

Elsewhere in early 1962, skirmishing between communists and the Royal Lao Army began on the Chinese border in far northwestern Laos in Luang Namtha. Phoumi directed his troops into the ensuing Battle of Luang Namtha in the beliefs that possession of the border town could be settled by military means, and that his American backers would be forced to back his actions. For their part, the Americans favored a diplomatic or political solution to the border incursion. They suspended U.S. foreign military aid to Laos, including the payroll for the Royal Lao Army, to sway him to their point of view.[34][35][36] Phoumi turned to a secretive source of income by deputizing General Ouane Rattikone to deal opium to generate needed military funding.[37]

In any case, the battle ended with the Royal Lao Army being trounced by half its number of communists. The Royal Lao Army's 150-kilometer (93 mi) retreat took it from the Lao/Chinese border to the

paratroops.[38] The Royal Lao Government was forced by this defeat into the Second Coalition Government.[36] Phoumi was forced to surrender his political posts as the Defense and Interior ministries, and was reduced to sharing the deputy prime minister post with the communist Prince Souphanouvong, with either having the right to veto cabinet decisions. After the Luang Namtha defeat, U.S. President John F. Kennedy wanted Phoumi out of politics, and strictly limited to a military role. Kennedy directed Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown to make it known to Vientiane's politico-military elite that Phoumi no longer had the confidence of the U.S. for his political actions.[39][40]

Neutrality And More Coups

Neutrality

The International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed in July 1962; by its October deadline for foreign troop departure, it became apparent that at least 5,000 Vietnamese communists still remained in Laos.[41]

In early 1963, during the lull that followed the establishment of national neutrality, Phoumi headquartered himself in Savannakhet. He ignored the International Agreement's proviso that he disband his less able units. Instead, he beefed up the Royal Lao Army to almost 50,000 strong. He also quietly courted the Forces Armee Neutraliste, airlifting supplies to them and urging them to ally with the Royalists. Despite the American acceptance of the Forces Armee Neutraliste as allies,

T-6 Harvards on a one-to-one basis so the International Agreement was not breached. Whereas the T-6s had used only rockets and .30 caliber ammunition for strafing ground targets, the T-28s were cleared to carry and drop bombs. Additional transport craft were also supplied to the Royal Lao Air Force.[44]

By November 1963, the positions of the Forces Armee Neutraliste on the Plain of Jars needed reinforcement. In response, Royal Lao Army garrison troops were moved from

Democratic Republic of Vietnam would outrun supplies while inviting Vietnamese retaliation. When Phoumi did launch the assault, the ensuing Battle of Lak Sao would indeed end with the Royal Lao Army and its Neutralist allies dispersed in disarray by counterattacks. The communists took back Lak Sao and also occupied the entire Nakay Plateau by 1 February 1964.[45]

More Coups

On 18 April 1964, General Siho Lamphouthicoul, who had aided Phoumi's return to power in December 1960, sent his

Leonard Unger's orders to Siho and his co-conspirator Kouprasith Abhay. Despite Phoumi's non-participation, in the aftermath of the coup, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma dismissed Phoumi as Defense Minister, depriving him of troops to command. However, Phoumi's brother still headed the Lao custom service, and diverted most customs fees for personal use. Siho and Kouprasith Abhay then demanded some share of Phoumi's illicit operations—opium, gold and liquor smuggling operations, as well as his prostitution and gambling concerns.[46][47][48]

Despite his demotion, Phoumi had somehow retained control of a training battalion in Vientiane. On 4 August 1964, he used them to seize Vientiane. General Kouprasith promptly turned out his local troops to suppress the insurrection while Siho sat out the coup. The training battalion was disbanded, depriving Phoumi of his last troops under his command.[49]

Exile And Death

On 27 January 1965, Phoumi managed to convince one of his adherents to order a transfer of troops from Military Region 2 to Vientiane to ward off a purported attack by MR 5 troops. His coup, and a simultaneous one by

Chief of Staff. General Kouprasith Abhay held Vientiane and the surrounding Military Region 5. Junior officers were sent to head up units stationed on Phoumi's home ground of Savannakhet. Phoumi's birthday coup had failed because he had no troops to command.[50][51]

Phoumi convinced a loyal subordinate to return to Vientiane and retrieve a cache of gold. Phoumi then settled into a comfortable retirement in

Phoumi spent the 1970s in Bangkok exile. He was sentenced by a Lao court in absentia to 20 years prison. In 1981, he allowed the Thai-backed United Front for the Liberation of the Lao People to use his name. He remained in exile, dying in Bangkok in 1985.[1]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e f g Stuart-Fox, pp. 258–259.
  2. ^ Archives, L. A. Times (1985-11-07). "Phoumi Nosavan, Former Laotian Military Leader". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2023-11-28.
  3. ^ (in Chinese) 周恩来论华侨的国籍问题 Archived 2011-05-29 at the Wayback Machine
  4. ^ Stuart-Fox, pp. 180, 258.
  5. ^ Stuart-Fox, p. 178-179.
  6. ^ Castle, p. 149 note 136.
  7. ^ Conboy & Morrison, p. 14.
  8. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 11–13.
  9. ^ a b Conboy & Morrison, p. 25.
  10. ^ Conboy & Morrison, p. 27 note 45.
  11. ^ a b Ahern, p. 14.
  12. ^ Fall, pp. 93–94.
  13. ^ Fall, pp. 135–141.
  14. ^ Fall, pp. 145–146.
  15. ^ Fall, p. 178.
  16. ^ a b Conboy & Morrison, p. 156.
  17. ^ Ahern, pp. 8–9.
  18. ^ a b Conboy & Morrison, pp. 21, 25–26, 31–43.
  19. ^ a b Stuart-Fox, pp. 251, 258.
  20. ^ Ahern, p. 10.
  21. ^ Castle, p. 27.
  22. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 55–56.
  23. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 42–43.
  24. ^ Anthony & Sexton, p. 42.
  25. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 44–45.
  26. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 42–44, 47, 52.
  27. ^ Castle, pp. 41–42.
  28. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 61–62.
  29. ^ a b Anthony & Sexton, p. 64.
  30. ^ Kaplan, Landa and Drea p. 251-252
  31. ^ Kaplan, Landa and Drea p. 251-252
  32. ^ Kaplan, Landa and Drea p. 252
  33. ^ Ahern, pp. 118–123.
  34. ^ a b Anthony & Sexton, pp. 64–65.
  35. ^ a b Conboy & Morrison, pp. 67–73.
  36. ^ a b c Stuart-Fox, p. 24.
  37. ^ Ahern, pp. 537, 543.
  38. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 85, 166–167.
  39. ^ Stuart-Fox, pp. 292–293.
  40. ^ Anthony & Sexton, p. 69.
  41. ^ Warner, pp. 83–84.
  42. ^ Anthony & Sexton, p. 81.
  43. ^ Anthony & Sexton, p. 84.
  44. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 87–89.
  45. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 100–102.
  46. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 107, 113 note 6.
  47. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp. 98–99.
  48. ^ Warner, p. 151.
  49. ^ Conboy & Morrison, p. 123.
  50. ^ Conboy & Morrison, pp. 123–125.
  51. ^ Anthony & Sexton, p. 150.
  52. ^ Conboy & Morrison, p. 137 note 4.
  53. ^ Anthony & Sexton, pp.199–200.

References