Polaris Sales Agreement
Polaris Sales Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America | |
---|---|
Signed | 6 April 1963 |
Location | Washington, D.C. |
Effective | 6 April 1963 |
Signatories | Dean Rusk (US) David Ormsby-Gore (UK) |
The Polaris Sales Agreement was a treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom which began the
The United Kingdom had been planning to buy the air-launched Skybolt missile to extend the operational life of the British V bombers, but the United States decided to cancel the Skybolt program in 1962 as it no longer needed the missile. The crisis created by the cancellation prompted an emergency meeting between the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Macmillan, which resulted in the Nassau Agreement, under which the United States agreed to provide Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom instead.
The Polaris Sales Agreement provided for the implementation of the Nassau Agreement. The United States would supply the United Kingdom with Polaris missiles, launch tubes, and the fire control system. The United Kingdom would manufacture the warheads and submarines. In return, the US was given certain assurances by the United Kingdom regarding the use of the missile, but not a veto on the use of British nuclear weapons. The British Resolution-class Polaris ballistic missile submarines were built on time and under budget, and came to be seen as a credible deterrent.[1]
Along with the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement, the Polaris Sales Agreement became a pillar of the nuclear Special Relationship between Britain and the United States. The agreement was amended in 1982 to provide for the sale of the Trident missile system.
Background
During the early part of the
Britain's
An institutional challenge to Skybolt came from the
The subsequent American decision to cancel Skybolt created a political crisis in the UK, and an emergency meeting between Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy was called in Nassau, Bahamas.[22] Macmillan rejected the US offers of paying half the cost of developing Skybolt, and of supplying the AGM-28 Hound Dog missile instead.[23] This brought options down to Polaris, but the Americans would only supply it on condition that it be used as part of a proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). Kennedy ultimately relented, and agreed to supply Britain with Polaris missiles, while "the Prime Minister made it clear that except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these British forces will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western Alliance in all circumstances."[24] A joint statement to this effect, the Nassau Agreement, was issued on 21 December 1962.[24]
Negotiations
With the Nassau Agreement in hand, it remained to work out the details.
The number of missiles required was based on substituting for Skybolt. To achieve the same capability, the BNDSG calculated that this would require eight Polaris submarines, each of which would have 16 missiles, for a total of 128 missiles, with 128 one-megaton warheads.
A mission led by Sir
The principal finding of the Zuckerman mission was that the Americans had developed a new version of the Polaris missile, the A3. With a range extended of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km), it had a new weapons bay housing three re-entry vehicles (REBs or Re-Entry Bodies in US Navy parlance) and a new 200-kilotonne-of-TNT (840 TJ)
The choice of the A3 created a problem for the
The Zuckerman mission found the SPO helpful and forthcoming, but there was one major shock. The British were expected to contribute to the research and development costs of the A3, backdated to 1 January 1963. These were expected to top $700 million by 1968.
An American mission now visited the United Kingdom. This was led by
One remaining obstacle in the path of the programme was how it would be integrated with the MLF. The British response to the MLF concept "ranged from unenthusiastic to hostile throughout the military establishment and in the two principal political parties".[42] Apart from anything else, it was estimated to cost as much as £100 million over ten years. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office argued that Britain must support the MLF.[42] The Nassau Agreement had invigorated the MLF effort in the United States. Kennedy appointed Livingston T. Merchant to negotiate the MLF with the European governments, which he did in February and March 1963.[43] While reaffirming support for those parts of the Nassau Agreement concerning the MLF, the British were successful in getting them omitted from the Polaris Sales Agreement.[44]
The British team completed drafting the agreement in March 1963, and copies were circulated for discussion.
Outcome
The two liaison officers were appointed in April; Captain Peter la Niece became the Royal Navy project officer in Washington, D.C., while Captain Phil Rollings became the US Navy project officer in London. The Joint Steering Task Group held its first meeting in Washington on 26 June 1963.[49] The shipbuilding programme would prove to be a remarkable achievement, with the four Resolution-class submarines built on time and within the budget.[50] The first boat, HMS Resolution was launched in September 1966, and commenced its first deterrent patrol in June 1968.[51] The annual running costs of the Polaris boats came to around two per cent of the defence budget, and they came to be seen as a credible deterrent that enhanced Britain's international status.[50] Along with the more celebrated 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement, the Polaris Sales Agreement became a pillar of the nuclear Special Relationship between Britain and the United States.[52][53]
Trident
The Polaris Sales Agreement provided an established framework for negotiations over missiles and re-entry systems.[52] The legal agreement took the form of amending the Polaris Sales Agreement through an exchange of notes between the two governments so that "Polaris" in the original now also covered the purchase of Trident. There were also some amendments to the classified annexes of the Polaris Sales Agreement to delete the exclusion of penetrating aids.[54] Under the Polaris Sales Agreement, the United Kingdom paid a five per cent levy on the cost of equipment supplied in recognition of US research and development costs already incurred. For Trident, a payment of $116 million was substituted.[55] The United Kingdom procured the Trident system from America and fitted them to their own submarines, which had only 16 missile tubes like Polaris rather than the 24 in the American Ohio class. The first Vanguard-class submarine, HMS Vanguard, entered operational service in December 1994, by which time the Cold War had ended.[56]
Notes
- S2CID 144941756.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 108–111.
- ^ Hewlett & Anderson 1962, p. 277.
- ^ Goldberg 1964, p. 410.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 106–108.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974a, pp. 181–184.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, pp. 23–24, 48, 57.
- ^ Cathcart 1995, p. 253.
- ^ Gowing & Arnold 1974b, pp. 493–495.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 37.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 42–46.
- ^ Wynn 1994, pp. 186–191.
- ^ Wynn 1994, pp. 197–199.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Young 2002, pp. 67–68.
- ^ Young 2002, p. 61.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 178–182.
- ^ Young 2002, p. 72.
- ^ Moore 2010, pp. 64–68.
- ^ a b Harrison 1982, p. 27.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 372–373.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 375–376.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, p. 177.
- ^ a b Jones 2017, pp. 406–407.
- ^ Moore 2001, p. 170.
- ^ Moore 2010, p. 188.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 291–292.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 295–297.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 347.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 409.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 410.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 410–411.
- ^ a b Jones 2017, pp. 413–415.
- ^ Moore 2010, p. 231.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 416–417.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 417–418.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b Jones 2017, p. 422.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 418–419.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 434–441.
- ^ a b Moore 2010, p. 184.
- ^ Kaplan, Landa & Drea 2006, pp. 405–407.
- ^ Jones 2017, pp. 428–434.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 443.
- ^ Moore 2010, p. 232.
- ^ Moore 2001, p. 169.
- ^ Jones 2017, p. 444.
- ^ Priest 2005, p. 358.
- ^ a b Stoddart 2012, p. 34.
- ^ Ludlam 2008, p. 257.
- ^ a b Stoddart 2008, p. 89.
- ^ Hare 2008, p. 190.
- ^ Stoddart 2014, pp. 154–155.
- ^ "Exchange of Notes concerning the Acquisition by the UK of the Trident II Weapon System under the Polaris Sales Agreement" (PDF). Treaty Series No. 8. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. March 1983. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ Stoddart 2014, pp. 245–246.
References
- Cathcart, Brian (1995). Test of Greatness: Britain's Struggle for the Atom Bomb. London: John Murray. OCLC 31241690.
- Goldberg, Alfred (July 1964). "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent". International Affairs. 40 (3): 409–429. JSTOR 2610825.
- OCLC 3195209.
- Gowing, Margaret; OCLC 611555258.
- Gowing, Margaret; Arnold, Lorna (1974b). Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Volume 2, Policy and Execution. London: Palgrave Macmillan. OCLC 946341039.
- Hare, Tim (2008). "The MDA:A Practitioner's View". In Mackby, Jenifer; Cornish, Paul (eds.). US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. pp. 189–199. OCLC 845346116.
- Harrison, Kevin (1982). "From Independence to Dependence: Blue Streak, Skybolt, Nassau and Polaris". The RUSI Journal. 127 (4): 25–31. ISSN 0307-1847.
- OCLC 637004643. Retrieved 26 March 2013.
- Jones, Jeffrey (2017). Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival Of Polaris, 1945–1964. The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-67493-6.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S.; Landa, Ronald D.; Drea, Edward J. (2006). The McNamara Ascendancy 1961–1965 (PDF). History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, volume 5. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense. Retrieved 7 November 2017.
- Ludlam, Steve (2008). "The Role of Nuclear Submarine Propulsion". In Mackby, Jenifer; Cornish, Paul (eds.). US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. pp. 247–258. OCLC 845346116.
- Moore, Richard (2001). The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons. Naval History and Policy. London: Frank Cass. OCLC 59549380.
- Moore, Richard (2010). Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64. Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. OCLC 705646392.
- Navias, Martin S. (1991). British Weapons and Strategic Planning, 1955–1958. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OCLC 22506593.
- Priest, Andrew (September 2005). "In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962–1968". Contemporary British History. 19 (3): 353–376. S2CID 144941756.
- Stoddart, Kristan (2008). "The Special Nuclear Relationship and the 1980 Trident Decision". In Mackby, Jenifer; Cornish, Paul (eds.). US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press. pp. 89–100. OCLC 845346116.
- Stoddart, Kristan (2012). Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. OCLC 951512907.
- Stoddart, Kristan (2014). Facing Down the Soviet Union: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1976–83. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. OCLC 900698250.
- Wynn, Humphrey (1994). RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces, Their Origins, Roles and Deployment, 1946–1969. A documentary history. London: The Stationery Office. ISBN 0-11-772833-0.
- Young, Ken (2002). "The Royal Navy's Polaris Lobby: 1955–62". Journal of Strategic Studies. 25 (3): 56–86. S2CID 154124838.
External links
- "Polaris Sales Agreement" (PDF). Treaty Series No. 59. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. August 1963. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- "Exchange of Notes concerning the Acquisition by the UK of the Trident II Weapon System under the Polaris Sales Agreement" (PDF). Treaty Series No. 8. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. March 1983. Retrieved 6 November 2017.