Siege of Badajoz (1658)
38°52′44″N 6°58′01″W / 38.879°N 6.967°W
Siege of Badajoz | |||||||
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Part of the Portuguese Restoration War | |||||||
Map of the Siege of Badajoz by João Nunes Tinoco | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Portugal | Spain | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Joanne Mendes de Vasconcelos |
Luis de Haro | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
14,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 20 cannons, 2 mortars[1] |
4,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry (garrison)[2] 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry (relief army)[2] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
6,200: dead (by the plague and combat) or deserters [3] | Unknown |
The fourth siege of Badajoz took place from July to October 1658 during the Portuguese Restoration War. It was an attempt by a huge Portuguese army under the command of Joanne Mendes de Vasconcelos, governor of Alentejo, to capture the Spanish city of Badajoz, which was the headquarters of the Spanish Army of Extremadura. The fortifications of Badajoz were essentially medieval and considered vulnerable by the Portuguese, and had already been attacked by them three times during this war.[4]
So in 1658, Mendes de Vasconcelos gathered an army at
The siege lasted for four months, during which time one-third of the Portuguese troops either died (mainly from the plague) or deserted.[3] The arrival of a relief army, under King Philip IV of Spain's favorite don Luis de Haro in October, lifted the siege. Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese commander, was stripped of his rank and imprisoned for his failure.
Taking advantage of this failure,
Background
After the death of John IV of Portugal in 1656, various Spanish offensives were launched against Portuguese territory, mainly from Extremadura, but also from Galicia, where a second front was opened to force the Portuguese to divide their forces.[6] The Spanish Army of Extremadura, recently reinforced with many veterans of the war against France, was commanded by Francisco de Tuttavilla, Duke of San German, who appointed Gaspar Téllez-Girón y Sandoval, Duke of Osuna, as general of artillery and his second-in-command.[7] In 1657 they laid siege to the Portuguese town of Olivença with 8,000 soldiers and 29 cannons and occupied the town, despite a desperate attempt by the Count of San Lorenzo, military governor of Alentejo, to dislodge them by launching a surprise attack himself on the Spanish town of Badajoz. Mourão fell into Spanish hands shortly thereafter.[7] San Lorenzo was then dismissed from his command and replaced by dom Joanne Mendes de Vasconcelos, who easily managed to retake both Mourão and Olivença in the following months, since their Spanish garrisons had been considerably diminished in order to move troops to face the French armies in Catalonia.[8]
Mendes de Vasconcelos, encouraged by his successes, promised the Portuguese Queen Regent
The Spanish fortress town of Badajoz was at that time garrisoned by 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry soldiers. The military governor of the fortress was the Marquis of Lanzarote, Diego Paniagua y Zúñiga,
Siege
Preliminary maneuvers
The Portuguese army left its fortress at Elvas on 12 July and arrived outside Badajoz the following day. A company of
Despite the longstanding danger of a Portuguese attack, the situation of the Spanish force in Badajoz was dreadful.[12] The garrison suffered from a lack of ammunition and supplies, the soldiers were dressed in rags or were practically nude, and there was none among the civilian population of the town trained to wield a weapon.[12] The Duke of San German put soldiers and civilians to work on the fortifications and storing food.[12] The Portuguese sappers, meanwhile, proceeded to prepare the field for an assault upon the fortress. Mendes de Vasconcelos had decided, in a war council with many other senior officers, to attack Fort San Cristóbal, a key point in the Badajoz defenses.[14] This fort, built after 1640, covered a bridgehead over the Guadiana river, thus guarding access to the city.[15] A redoubt was quickly strengthened on the bridgehead by the Spanish sappers, who, protected by the Duke of Osuna and his cavalry, also widened the trenches which connected it with Fort San Cristóbal, the garrison of which was being strengthened every day along a strongly defended communication road.[15]
The Portuguese assault was thoroughly prepared. The plan was for six Portuguese squadrons under dom João da Silva to block the entrance to the bridge, isolating the redoubt from Fort San Crisóbal. The fort would in turn be attacked by Alfonso Futrado and Simon Correa da Silva.
The assault, however, was a costly failure. After twenty-two days of prolonged action, during which the defenders, led by the Marquis of Lanzarote, virtually wiped out Almado's regiment with
Attempted encirclement
The Portuguese general, convinced of the impossibility of taking Badajoz by assault, changed his strategy and began a
Portuguese sappers built a pontoon bridge over the Guadiana river which united two Portuguese quarters in Vado del Moro and allowed Mendes de Vasconcelos' troops to cross the river.[18] Having reinforced Santa Engracia, north of San Critsóbal, and fortified a bridge over the Gévora river, they built, unmolested, an arc of the circumvallation from Gévora to Vado del Moro.[17] Fort del Mayordomo, located near the Guadiana river, had been abandoned by its Spanish garrison shortly after being built.[17] The Portuguese used it to cover the construction of the circumvallation line to the Guadiana.[17] They also tried to occupy Cerro del Viento, a hill near Vado del Moro, but were repelled by the Spanish garrison that was there and had to build the circumvallation line behind it.[17] Given the strategic importance of Cerro del Viento, the nearby hill of Cerro de las Mayas had been earmarked for an improvised star fortification by the Italian general Ventura de Tarragona, but it had not been built, leaving the Fort of San Miguel vulnerable.[17]
Mendes de Vasconcelos instructed dom André de Albuquerque, dom Rodrigo de Castro and the Count of Misquitella to occupy the Convent of San Gabriel.
On 20 June, after an ineffective bombardment by a 6-gun battery put in place to try to breach the parapets, the Portuguese tercios and the cavalry, the latter covered by ranks of musketeers, were ordered to attack.[21] The advance was made difficult by the presence of vineyard fences in the field.[21] Moreover, 5 Portuguese battalions at the head of the attack were surprised by the Spanish cavalry of the Duke of Osuna and his general, don Juan de Pacheco, followed by the Duke of San German who, with various Spanish tercios, had sallied out of Badajoz in order to try to counter the Portuguese assault.[22] Maestre de Campo of Tercio de la Armada, whose brother the Irish officer William Dongan was the commander of the Fort of San Miguel, managed to reach the fort.[23] Albuquerque, meanwhile ordered dom Luiz de Menezes to reinforce his vanguard battalions.[23] The Portuguese cavalry was also sent into action. Teniente General Diniz de Mello de Castro was wounded and captured, but a Spanish counter-attack was repelled and the Fort of San Miguel finally surrendered.[24]
Skirmishing and bombardment
The capture of Fort San Miguel allowed the Portuguese sappers to complete the circumvallation works, which consisted of a continuous line of little forts, each able to garrison as many as about 200 soldiers, or perhaps as few as 25 musketeers.[19] The Spanish also continued strengthening their defenses. The Southwestern section of the wall was fortified at Pedraleras, and a ravelin was erected 400 meters in front of the Gate of Santa Maria.[19] No significant action took place during this period, except for an ambush near San Gabriel by André de Albuquerque, against a Spanish supply convoy sent from La Albuera,[25] and various sorties by the garrison of Badajoz to try to obstruct the Portuguese works.[26] A night attack by the Spanish Duke of Osuna against a Portuguese section cost Mendes de Vasconcelos 200 infantry and 40 horses.[27]
On 6 August, however, Osuna and San German abandoned the town, and with 1,200 cavalry soldiers, broke the lines of circumvallation near the quarter of Santa Engracia, between two Portuguese redoubts, reaching
Relief
The Duke of Medina de las Torres had suggested that Philip IV himself should lead the relief of Badajoz in the company of all the Grandees of Spain.[32] Luis de Haro, Philip IV's favourite, however, feared that Queen Mariana of Austria would be given the government of the country during the absence of the king, and, although having no military experience, offered himself to lead the relief army.[32] His force consisted of up to 12,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry, or perhaps as little as 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.[32] Haro did not reach Badajoz until mid-October, but his appearance compelled Mendes de Vasconcelos to abandon the siege.[31] The buildings in Cerro del Viento were set on fire and the bridge over the Gévora river was destroyed,[31] The Portuguese army retreated unmolested to Elvas having lost 6,200 men in all,[3] either killed in battle or dead from disease.[32]
Aftermath
When the Spanish relief army arrived, Luis de Haro entered Badajoz, where he was acclaimed by some as "Liberator of the town and Restorator of the Monarchy".[33] In Portugal, Queen Luisa de Guzmán imprisoned Mendes de Vasconcelos for his failure to capture Badajoz.[34] News of a further setback for the Portuguese arrived from the northern frontier, as a Spanish army commanded by the Governor of Galicia, Rodrigo Pimentel, Marquis of Viana, entered Portuguese territory in early September, defeating a Portuguese army led by João Rodrigues de Vasconcelos e Sousa, 2nd Count of Castelo Melhor at the Battle of Vilanova. Spanish forces proceeded over the following months to capture Lapela, Monção, Salvatierra de Miño and other Portuguese strongholds.[35] De Haro, meanwhile, decided to attack Portugal on his own and, against the advice of the Duke of San German, advanced towards the Portuguese fortress of Elvas.[33]
Elvas was reached by the Spanish army on 22 October and a siege begun.
Notes
- ^ Ericeira, p. 97
- ^ a b c d e f g Madoz, p. 259
- ^ a b c The Count of Ericeira – simultaneously a contemporaneous chronicler and a top military leader who participated on the Badajoz siege – wrote that the initial Portuguese army besieging Badajoz had 17,000 men (História de Portugal Restaurado, 1657-1662, pages 97-98 in the 1751 edition, or page 90 in the 1698 edition) and he adds that, after the siege, the returning army had 9,000 men of infantry plus 1,800 horsemen (p. 135 in the 1751 edition, or page 133 in the 1946 edition). The difference is 6,200 missing men (dead by the plague, dead in combat and deserters). Most of the dead were not killed in combat, but by disease (plague): “…the army defeated by the power of sickness…”, in Ericeira, História de Portugal Restaurado, (1657-1662), page 133 in the 1751 edition, or page 124 in the 1698 edition. Usually, sick men are not considered "losses" since it’s impossible to determine the number of those who did survive and those who didn’t.
- ^ a b White, p. 68
- ^ Facing the imminent arrival of an army led by D. Luis de Haro, the Portuguese troops opted by withdrawing to Elvas and waiting for the Spanish.The confrontation occurred in January 1659, and was a thunderous disaster to D. Luis…the military setback, which added to the disastrous situation of the Netherlands, forced Madrid to seek peace with France. in Valladares, Rafael- La Rebelión de Portugal 1640-1680, Junta de Castilla Y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1998, page 163
- ^ González López, p. 158
- ^ a b González López, p. 159
- ^ Aldama/González, p. 368–369
- ^ a b c Aldama/González, p. 369
- ^ Ericeira, p. 93
- ^ Ericeira, p. 94
- ^ a b c d Villalon, p. 120
- ^ Ericeira, p. 100
- ^ Ericeira, p. 102
- ^ a b c d Villalon, p. 121
- ^ Ericeira, p. 107
- ^ a b c d e f g Villalon, p. 122
- ^ a b c Ericeira, p. 111
- ^ a b c d Villalon, p. 123
- ^ Ericeira, p. 113
- ^ a b Ericeira, p. 114
- ^ Ericeira, p. 115–116
- ^ a b Ericeira, p. 116
- ^ Ericeira, p. 117–118
- ^ Ericeira, p. 122–123
- ^ Ericeira, p. 124
- ^ Ribeiro, p. 180
- ^ a b Ribeiro, p. 181
- ^ Ribeiro, p. 179
- ^ Ericeira, p. 127
- ^ a b c Villalon, p. 124
- ^ a b c d Aldama/González, p. 370
- ^ a b Gebhardt, p. 506
- ^ Gebhardt, p. 506–507
- ^ González López, p. 173
- ^ Halliday, p. 79
- ^ Halliday, p. 80
- ^ Halliday, p.81
- ^ Count of Ericeira (who was General of artillery in this battle of Elvas), page 227 in the 1751 edition or Page 222 in the 1946 edition
- ^ Sánchez Marcos, p. 161
References
- Aldama, Dionisio S.; García González, Manuel (1863). Historia general de España desde los tiempos primitivos hasta fines del año 1860: inclusa la gloriosa guerra de Africa (in Spanish). Vol. 10. M. Tello.
- Cruz Villalón, María (1988). "Las murallas de Badajoz en el Siglo XVII, in Norba - arte, Nº 8". Norba: Revista de Arte (in Spanish) (8): 115–142. ISSN 0213-2214.
- Ericeira (conde da), Luis de Menezes (1751). Historia de Portugal restaurado ...: 1657-1662 (in Portuguese). Lisbon, Portugal: Domingos Rodrigues.
- Gebhardt, Victor (1864). Historia general de España y de sus Indias: desde los tiempos más remotos hasta nuestros días (in Spanish). Vol. 5. Libreria española.
- González López, Emilio (1973). El águila caída: Galicia en los reinados de Felipe IV y Carlos II (in Spanish). Editorial Galaxia. ISBN 84-7154-166-1.
- Halliday, Andres (1812). The present state of Portugal, and of the Portuguese army: with an epitome of the ancient history of that kingdom. Edinburgh: G. R. Clarke.
- Madoz, Pascual (1845). Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de ultramar (in Spanish). Vol. 2. Madrid, Spain: Est. tip. de P. Madoz y L. Sagasti.
- Ribeiro de Macedo, Duarte (1767). Obras (in Portuguese). Lisbon, Portugal: A. Rodrigues Galhardo.
- Sánchez Marcos, Fernando (1983). Cataluña y el Gobierno central tras la Guerra de los Segadores, 1652-1679: el papel de don Juan de Austria en las relaciones entre Cataluña y el Gobierno central, 1652-1679 (in Spanish). Edicions Universitat Barcelona. ISBN 84-7528-069-2.
- Valladares, Rafael (1998). La Rebelión de Portugal (1640-1680) (in Spanish). Spain: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura.
- White, Lorraine (2003). Strategic geography and the Hispanic Monarchy's failure to reconquer Portugal, 1640-1668, in Studia historica. Historia moderna, Nº 25 (in Spanish). ISSN 0213-2079.