Supervaluationism
In
According to supervaluationism, a proposition can have a definite truth value even when its components do not. The proposition "
Supervaluations were first formalized by Bas van Fraassen.[3]
Example abstraction
Let v be a classical valuation defined on every atomic sentence of the language L and let At(x) be the number of distinct atomic sentences in a formula x. There are then at most 2At(x) classical valuations defined on every sentence x. A supervaluation V is a function from sentences to truth values such that x is supertrue (i.e. V(x)=True) if and only if v(x)=True for every v. Likewise for superfalse.
V(x) is undefined when there are exactly two valuations v and v* such that v(x)=True and v*(x)=False. For example, let Lp be the formal translation of "Pegasus likes licorice". There are then exactly two classical valuations v and v* on Lp, namely v(Lp)=True and v*(Lp)=False. So Lp is neither supertrue nor superfalse.
See also
- Kripke semantics
- Sorites paradox
- Subvaluationism
References
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- ^ "Supervaluation: Definition from Answers.com". Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 2005. Retrieved 2012-03-04.
- ^ Free Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
External links