Talk:William Schaffner
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Entertaining, but hardly substantiated. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.143.221.50 (talk) 01:52, 22 March 2009 (UTC)
See: "UFO files: USAF pilot's death explained" [1] 62.183.251.50 (talk) 11:00, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
There's no mystery at all. Air Clues, the RAF flight safety magazine, published this account:
"The pilot of the accident aircraft was a USAF exchange officer who had completed 2 tours on the USAF F-102 all weather fighter. He had accumulated 121 hours on the Lightning, of which 18 were at night. He had been declared Limited Combat Ready after only 8 weeks on the squadron; this unusually short period of time was based on his previous operational status as well as his performance thus far on the Lightning. The limitation on his operational status was partially due to the requirement to complete all the stages of the visident profiles; at the time of the accident, he was qualified in 2 of the 3 phases of visident, which meant that he would be capable of carrying out shadowing and shepherding tasks only if he was in visual contact with the target.
The Squadron was participating in a Taceval at RAF Binbrook and the squadron Cdr had authorised this pilot to participate, in the belief that he would not be involved in a shadowing or shepherding mission. However, unbeknown to the station or squadron, the Taceval team had just changed the exercise scenario from normal interceptions to shadowing or shepherding on slow speed low-flying targets. The targets were Shackletons flying at 160kts at the minimum authorised height of 1,500ft.
After maintaining one hour at cockpit readiness, the pilot was scrambled. While he was taxying, the scramble was cancelled and he returned to the dispersal, ordering fuel only and no turnround servicing. This was contrary to standing instructions and the engineering officer ordered a full turnround. The turnround was delayed and, during this delay, the pilot was warned that he would be scrambled as soon as he was ready. He told the groundcrew to expedite the servicing but started his engines and taxied before the servicing was complete. He got airborne at 20:30.
The pilot climbed to FL 100 and was handed over to GCI; he was then given a shadowing task against a 160kt target at 1,500ft. At a range of 28nm, he was told to accelerate to M.95 in order to expedite the take over from another Lightning. He called that he was in contact with the lights but would have to manoeuvre to slow down; his voice was strained, as though he was being affected by 'g'. His aircraft was seen by the other Lightning pilot; it appeared to be about 2,000yds astern and 500-1,000ft above the Shackleton, in a port turn. The Shackleton crew then saw the aircraft, apparently very low. Shortly afterwards, the Lightning pilot failed to acknowledge instructions and emergency procedures were initiated. A search by the Shackleton, and a further air/sea search the following day, failed to detect any trace of the aircraft or pilot.
The wreckage was located nearly 2 months later with surprisingly little damage. The canopy was attached and closed, and there was no sign of the pilot. The aircraft appeared to have struck the sea at a low speed, planed the surface and come to rest comparitively slowly. The ejection seat handle had been pulled to the full extent allowed by the interruptor link in the main gun sear. (The interruptor link ensures that the seat does not fire unless the canopy has gone). The canopy gun sear had been withdrawn but the cartridge had not been struck with sufficient force to fire it (during servicing the firing unit had been incorrectly seated because of damaged screw heads). The canopy had been opened normally, the QRB was undone, as was the PEC, and the PSP lanyard had been released from the life jacket.
It was concluded that the difficult task, carried out in rushed circumstances, combined with a lack of training in this profile, led to the pilot failing to monitor his height while slowing down. He had inadvertantly flown into the sea but had attempted to recover the situation by selecting reheat; this was ineffective with the tail skimming the water. He attempted to eject, but this was unsuccessful due to the canopy failing to jettison. He then manually abandoned the aircraft, but was never found. He was, therefore, presumed to have drowned during or after his escape.
Wing Commander Spry says. There are a number of points which are raised by this article, the first of which is do not believe all you read in the newspapers! Among the serious points to consider are the distractions and stress caused by the false scramble and interrupted turnround, as well as the supervisory failure of allowing a LCR pilot to participate in a Taceval by night. Close supervision during exercise conditions, in a single seat environment, is almost impossible. Minimum qualifications are laid down for a reason!"
https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/211415-foxtrot-94-a.html
As a note, QRB is Quick Release Button, PEC is Personal Equipment Connector and PSP is Personal Survival Pack. The PSP included the pilot's survival dinghy. As the lanyard was detached, the pilot did not manage to take the PSP with him. The night was stormy and the sea may have carried him away before he could retrieve the PSP. Although he still had an immersion suit and Mae West on, he would drown if overwhelmed by the waves. The cockpit canopy would close by itself due to lack of hydraulic pressure.
The official report of the board of inquiry is in the National Archives, File DEFE 71/95, and has been open since 2008. Khamba Tendal (talk) 14:49, 11 May 2018 (UTC)
--- "Entertaining but hardly substantiated" - a standard response when a critique raises embarrassing questions. This "explanation", as it stands, is almost less credible than the original account! If he literally "flew into the sea" the aircraft would, of course, have been shattered. His "tail was skimming the water" - evidence please? - which meant that "reheat was ineffective". Really? Fighters routinely take off at sea level with reheat lit. So why was it "ineffective" in this case? How can you be sure he was able to open the canopy in the first place, if hydraulic pressure was lost after impact? If he was so inexperienced, how did he manage to crash-land a Lightning at sea, at night, with minimal damage, in seas which subsequently overwhelmed and drowned him? Do you know how difficult it is to belly-land on water, even in broad daylight??? He was seen approaching "2,000 yards astern" - how and by whom? Obviously not by any visual flight rules; by the Shackleton radar perhaps? I can rationalise answers to these questions for myself, but I would prefer to see how you do it, preferably by citing evidence rather than random speculation. I would be the last to suggest that Wikipedia has serious academic credibility, but it ought to be capable of doing somewhat better than a Superman comic. (Comment by alan1000) Alan1000 (talk) 14:12, 23 September 2019 (UTC)
For the record, I feel the findings of the board of inquiry and especially the account in Air Clues as related here are pretty satisfactory all things considered. I think Alan is suffering from a little pot/kettle syndrome with his demands and has an obvious bias coloring his views given the... passion of his reply. 2601:87:4400:AF2:C9C4:7C62:C0DF:9561 (talk) 16:44, 29 May 2020 (UTC)