User:Ta eis heauton/wwk

Coordinates: 60°30′26″N 29°00′45″E / 60.507342°N 29.012389°E / 60.507342; 29.012389
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Battle of Taipale
Part of the Winter War

Trenches of Base Five in Terenttilä, Taipale during the Winter War 1939-1940. Depicted "second lieutenant Jalas and Mantila". SA-Kuva.
Date6 December 1939 (1939-12-06) – 13 March 1950 (1950-03-13)
Location
Karelian Isthmus
Result Soviet victory
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Units involved

Finland 10th Division

Finland 8th Division[d]

6th Separate Batallion


Support elements of:
Finland 10th Field Artillery Regiment
Finland 4th Heavy Artillery Battery[5]
Finland Lagoda Coastal Artillery[4]

December 1939
Soviet UnionSoviet 7th army

  • 9 infantry divisions
  • 1 armoured corps
  • 3 armoured brigades

From February 1940

  • Soviet Union 86th Division
  • Soviet Union 97th Division

From March 1940

  • Soviet Union 53rd Division
Supporting Units
Casualties and losses
2,250 dead and wounded Over 10,000 dead[f]

This is an incomplete draft I am working on

The Battles of the Mannerheim Line or the Battles at the Karelian Isthmus were intensive battles fought during the

war of attrition.[8]

The attacking Soviet forces were unable to break through the Finnish lines in the first major offensive during December 1939, suffering heavy losses as the world stood astonished watching the battles painted in the Western press as David against Goliath. At the start of the war Soviet Union did not, however, have an overwhelming superiority of troops at the Karelian Isthmus, though it did have a vast material advantage from the beginning of the campaign. The Soviet main command had been very optimistic about the war, anticipating an easy victory.[23] The plan had been to overtake Finland in 12 days with just the armies of the Leningrad Military District area spread along the 1400km long border,[24] employing the fast movement shown by Nazi Germany in invasion of Poland a few months ago in September 1939.

After the embarrassment of the first month

Stalin was furious.[9]
There was a relative pause in major Soviet operations during January 1940 as Stavka, the Soviet high command revamped their strategy, focusing on a campaign at the Karelian Isthmus. The command was restructured and re-inforcements brought in, effectively doubling Soviet strength at the Isthmus front. There were also changes in tactics after the harsh lessons of the first month of the war.

The second major offensive in February 1940 targeted Summa region in the western Isthmus with an overwhelming concentrated local superiority. The Soviet forces pushed through the main defenses of Mannerheim Line 11th of February, forcing the Finnish troops to fall back to their second line of defense. On 27th February Finnish forces retreated to the third and last line of defense near Vyborg, then third largest city of Finland. The Soviet forces continued pushing north-west on both sides of city, managing to extend the front in the west by breaking away from the bottleneck of the Isthmus with an attack over the ice of Vyborg Bay.

As the fighting rolled through the suburbs of Vyborg the Finnish military command answered a situation query from the political command how the exhausted Finnish troops were on the brink of a collapse and unlikely to be able to hold for much longer. Negotiations for peace had already been going on, and in the exposed situation the delegation lead by Finnish prime minister

Moscow peace treaty
signed 12th of March the hostilities at the Karelian Isthmus ceased 13th of March 1940.

Background

Following the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Soviet Union had on 5th October 1939 sent a diplomatic message to Finland demanding negotiations on territory.

mobilisation under the guise of "additional refresher training", deploying troops at the border.[11][12] On 26 November 1939, an incident was reported near the Soviet village of Mainila, close to the border with Finland.[13] A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. The shots were a false flag operation looking for casus belli to start military operations.[13][14][15][16][12]

Preparations

Soviet

Position of Taipale at eastern end of Mannerheim Line

Soviet Union had already started intensive mobilisation near the Finnish border in 1938–39. Soviet operational plans made in September 1939 had called for an invasion to start in November.[17][18] The final battle plans were put together in haste during the first two weeks of November.[19] The Soviet main command had been very optimistic about the war, anticipating an easy victory.[20] The plan was to overtake Finland in 12 days with just the troops of the Leningrad Military District area,[21] employing the fast movement shown by Nazi Germany on their invasion of Poland just a few months ago.

Isthmus or whole border? The debate. "The Ministry of Defense, headed by Stalin’s longtime crony Marshal Kli- ment Voroshilov, and the staff of the Leningrad Military District, under the command of General Kirill Meretskov, began planning the invasion in Septem- ber 1939. They envisioned the forces of the Leningrad Military District, which had been augmented by twenty divisions comprised primarily of conscripts and reservists, quickly overrunning the Finns and crushing whatever resistance might be offered."[21]

General

Käkisalmi in the east, then continue towards Southern Finland[22] to capture the Finnish capital of Helsinki before reaching the western Finnish port town of Hanko.[23] The march from the border to the Mannerheim Line was to take three days, the defenses were to be overrun in x days, after which the troops were to reach Vyborg in xx days. The plan called for the 7th Army to advance 20 km a day, almost the peace time marching speed of the infantry divisions.[24]

Although the Soviets did not have vast number of troops compared to Finns at the beginning of the conflict[25], they did have overwhelming material superiority. The Soviet Army was modern and mobilised, considered the pride of the nation, with practically infinite resources compared to their opponent. Up to that point the army had never lost, having just won a brief border war against Japan in Khalkhin Gol[26] in 1938.

The stength of the 7rth Army.

The proportional material superiority.

The 7th Army had 9 infantry divisions had thousands of tanks and armored cars and absolute air power.[27]

Battle formations Ohtonen s. 10-12 Stalin laughing at S

Massing Troops at the border Ohtonen 13-14

To Viipuri in 4 days, Helsinki in 2 weeks

Main goal Ohtonen pp 19

"This is where the 7th Army (commanded by Army Commander 2nd class V.F. Jakovlev) attacked. Its task, with support from the Baltic Fleet, was to destroy the Finnish troops in front of it, seize the de- fence lines on the Isthmus and advance to a line Hiitola station - Antrea station -Viipuri, after which it was to organize an advance to Lahti, Hyvinkää and Helsinki together with the 8th Army. The army included the 19th Army Corps in the west (its goal being Viipuri) and the 50th Army Corps in the east (its target being the Antrea station)." Manninen

Finnish

Mannerheim Line

An example of a Finnish camouflaged trench from 1944.

Finland had been preparing for a possible military confrontation with the Soviet Union since the 1920s. The possible main offensive was expected on the narrow Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad

fortifications were exaggerated by both Soviet and Finnish propaganda, calling them the Maginot Line of the north.[30]

Unlike the Maginot Line, however, Mannerheim Line was based on the principles of

field fortifications,[31] enabling fast renewal of the fortifications with materials at hand and swift movement of the troops. A lot of the defenses relied on natural structures.[30]

Mannerheim Line was at its strongest near the shores of Gulf of Finland in the west and the massive lake Lagoda in the east, where relatively stronger fortifications were guarded by powerful coastal artillery batteries.[32] During the summer leading up to the conflict the upgrading work on the defensive structures had focused at Summa in the mid-western part of the isthmus, regarded by the Finnish command as the most vulnerable position and the natural route to the assumed Soviet main target of Vyborg.

Battle plans

The Finnish battle plan was to first employ defense in depth at the border area, then stop the oncoming Soviet troops at the Mannerheim Line. The first Finns to meet the enemy at the border would be guard troops consisting of the regular army and border companies drafted of local men from the area. In case of an attack, their task was to slow down the enemy, inflicting damages while the area was evacuated and the reserve field army readied itself to meet the offensive at the Mannerheim Line.

For the defensive line the Finnish standing orders were firm. They were not to give up their positions, if necessary "fighting to the last man". If a position was lost, it was to be taken back immediately. Behind the most fortified first line of defense Finns had built two fall-back positions to create depth of defense, with the third line in some parts of the isthmus 80km behind the first positions. The building at the rear continued fervently throughout the war by the troops in reserve.

To defend the Isthmus Finns had xxx

From the outset Finns had serious shortages of material, Air. Ammunition. Tanks.

On Battle plans at Isthmus Ohtonen page 8

Tuunainen (Military Effectiviness, google books) page 92 - Elastic Defense linking to Germans

Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II prewar to March 1943 (S, Leavenworth) kuva pp 15, selitys alussa 1-4 Explaining principles of Elastic Defense

Massing the troops, October 1939

Troops to the border at Isthmus.

"The concentration of Soviet troops along the border in the Karelian Isthmus began in early October, i.e. after the Baltic nego- tiations had ended with results that satisfied the Soviet Union and when negotiations with Finland were beginning. At the same time, Finland mobilized its defences. It was at this point in time that the Finnish operation formally began, as the Leningrad Military District issued battle order number 1 to its troops at 1830 hours on 8 Octo- ber: they were to group themselves along the border in the Isthmus by the morning of 10 October. Heavy artillery and three armoured brigades were sent to the area as well as reinforcements to the east- ern border of Finland." Manninen 13

"The main task laid down in the plan "to defeat the Army and Navy of Finland" prepared by the military council of the Leningrad Military District for the General Staff on 29 October was to break Finland's defences: " Manninen 14

" In the Karelian Isthmus this meant"disbanding the protective groups, seizing the defence line across the Isthmus and crushing the enemy's main force with a decisive strike to the north-east, in cooperation with the troops proceeding in the direction of Vitele and those in the Sortavala, Viipuri and Käkisalmi sectors and seizing the area to line Hiitola - Imatra - Viipuri." After performing this task, the troops were to prepare for further action directed towards the inner parts of Finland. The plan also considered it possible that Sweden would send 2 or 3 divisions and at most 100 aircraft to assist the Finns." Manninen 4

"The plan deduced that "the endurance of Finland's army will depend on the result of the first battles." Therefore emphasis was placed on a massive first strike to be carried out with a major force. It was calculated that the operation could be accomplished in 10-15 days, i.e. in 8-10 days on the Isthmus and in 15 days in the middle parts of Finland, the rate of advance being 10-12 km per day. In the instructions given to the commands on 29 November the Leningrad Military District set even stricter goals - apparently in order to raise 14 

the spirits of the troops: to invade Viipuri in four days and arrive at Helsinki in two weeks.1°"

"on 17 November instructions were dispatched to complete the con- centrations and to prepare, together with the Baltic Fleet and the Northern Fleet, for"a determined attack, the aim of which is to de- stroy the enemy's ground and naval forces in a short period of time"" Voroshilov (Ohtonen 15)

"The high command of the Soviet armed forces organized itself into a command body, adopting the traditional name of "stavka". The members were Voroshilov, as commander-in-chief, Stalin, N.G. Kuznetsov and the Chief of General Staff, Shaposhnikov.13" M;anninen 17

Soviet Attack, November 1939

Finns work on defenses, Soviets amass troops.

Mainila.

Attack 30.11.1939.

Joukot vedettiin taakse (R) [33] Confrontation Marski + komentajat [33]

[33][34] The Finnish battle plan was to first employ

defense in depth, then stop the oncoming Soviet troops at the main defense structures. The first Finns to meet the enemy south of the river would be the batallion strength guard troops Metsapirtti Unit
, consisting of local men from the area. In case of an attack, their task was to slow down the enemy, inflicting damages while the area was evacuated of civilians and the main line of defense readied itself to meet the offensive. The Finnish troops had built forward trench positions at Umpilinna south of the river Taipale to help the task of the guard units.

"The depth of Finland's area for protective delaying action was 12 km on the eastern side, 45-50 in the middle and 60-65 km in the west. The Soviet troops made contact with Finland's main defence position in the east, by Suvanto, on 4 December, that in the middle sector on 6 December and that in the west, on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, on 10 December. The average speed of attack of the 7th Army had been 3-7 km per day, less than half of what had been planned. Traffic jams in the rear and the fact that the battles were called off at night played a role in this slow progress." Manninen 19

Finnish Defense Holds, December 1939

Guard Troop Skirmishes

Puna-armeijan hyökkäyksen alettua se sai kosketuksen suomalaisten hyvin heikkojen suojajoukkojen kanssa, jotka vetäytyivät viikon kuluessa pääasemaan. Vetäytyminen oli ylipäällikön käskyn vastainen ja aiheutti kotirintamalla paikoittain jopa paniikkia.

6-8th December, First Attempt at Breakthrough in Taipale

Position of Taipale at eastern end of Mannerheim Line

The Finnish resistance had seemed stronger in the west, so xxxx decided to focus on breakthrough in the eastern isthmus. Focus on Käkisalmi. Go through roads Taipale, Kiviniemi and railweays. Over river Taipale. xxx created Western Group for this purpose, consisting of 3 infantry divisions and 39th Armored Brigade. The breakthrough attempt was supported by heavy artillery and more than xxx tanks. Finns withdrew from the front positions, Öoester had straingthened the line on purpose, because the shape of the niemi would have left the Finnish troops exposed. Try to take it back, failed. Finnish artillery deadly. Suffering from lack of ammunition, could not carpet, had to focus on concentrated fire. Soviets crumpled before reaching the main line. The Soviet troops managed to establish a bridgehead at Koukkuniemi with huge cost, base for further attacks.

At Kiviniemi the retreating Finns had blown the railroad bridge, partially failed. Some soviets got over, repelled xxxxx. Crossing the river was a disaster. boats floated to the rapids, amphibious tanks sank.

The patience of xxx did not last long. Yakovlev arkistoon 8.12. Merentskoville alennus. Gave Finns a chance of fregrouping, 23 from the reserves.

Soviets continued bombarding and reconnoissance missions.

Focus now to the west. Also east.


" Meretskov was al- ready being told by the high command on 2 December to reinforce the attack near Taipaleenjoki from one division to two, with the aim of crossing the River Vuoksi at Taipaleenjoki and proceeding from there to the rear of the main Finnish position. The troops on this flank were combined into an operation group commanded by Corps Commander V.D. Gröndahl, with the 10th Armoured Corps in re- serve, its light tanks waiting for the resistance to break down in or- der to be able to reach out quickly far into the Finns' rear. According to Matvei Zakharov, Meretskov was exaggerating the attack on the Eastern Isthmus against the ideas of the General Staff." manninen 19-20

"The troops of Gröndahl's group began an attack on three sec- tors on 6 December. Their attempts at breakthrough were support- ed by strong artillery and approximately 150 tanks, but they failed, leaving 35 destroyed tanks in front of the Finnish positions. After advancing 1-1.5 km, the detachments of the most successful 19th Infantry Regiment seized a bridgehead position on the other side of the river at Koukunniemi and took a firm hold on it. The Red Army attempted to cross the River Vuoksi in the direction of Kiviniemi on 7 December, but failed." Manninen 20


The Soviet forces started 6th of December with artillery.[35] Finnish troops at Neosaari withdrew across the river at 11:00[35] Lopputulema [36]

8.12 Stavkalle komento Yakovlev moskovaan[37] Meretskoville alennus pääpainopiste lönteen Summaan [38] Suomalaisille tsäänssi tuoda reservejä [39] 23 rservistä, paikalla 8.12 aamulla [40]

15-18th, Summa and Taipale

The new attack simultaneously at Summa and Taipale.

Regrouping, got delayed.


"Due to the partial regrouping of the troops, the delayed opera- tion did not begin until 15-17 December, and it reached its great- est strength on 19 December. Despite unusually fierce attacks, the troops could not achieve any notable success during the first week. The attack by three Soviet divisions on the eastern Isthmus on 15-17 December was fended off, while in the direction of the main attack, along theViipuri-Leningrad railway, the Soviet troops tried to break through with the strength of three divisions in the Sumna-Lähde section, which was considered the most dangerous. Dozens of de- stroyed tanks were left on the battlefield. In five days the 20th Ar- moured Brigade alone lost 67 heavy tanks along this part of the front, most of them on 17 and 19 December. The Finnish defensive victory came to be called"the miracle of Summa" all over the world." manninen 21

Focus on Taipale, intensive artillery [31]

Full strength, 49 13882men 150 14764men 39 Arm Brig panssarivaunut, 204Erp liekinheitinvaunut + tykistö[41]

Artillery 3 hours [42][43]

Artillery ineffective, good camouflage [43]

Red army tactics poor, lack of coordination [44]

Tanks lost the men, anti-tank guns picked the apart [43][42]

advancement couple of 100 meters [42]

Several new offensives [45]

When the attacks stopped 18 tanks and countless men lost [44]

Finnish counter-attack at Summa.

"By 20 December the Soviet troops in the Isthmus had com- pletely lost the initiative, and the Finns considered the situation suit- able for an extensive counter-offensive. The aim was to beat the ene- my in front of the Mannerheim Line with a two-sided encirclement. The operation began on 23 December, but soon lost its strength. It nevertheless came very close to the headquarters of the 50th Corps, which Meretskov was visiting at the time, and in this way it had a concrete effect on the command of the Soviet offensive. It was becoming clear that troops would have to be increased if the Man- nerheim Line was to be broken." Manninen 21

25-27th December, Third Attempt at breakthrough in Suvanto

New troops at the border.

After receiving more troops, the Gröndahl group began yet an- other attack on the eastern Isthmus. It suddenly tried to cross Suvan- to into the western flank of the defenders of Taipale with a strength of approximately one division on 25-27 December. The aim was to advance toViljakkala and then to Sakkola station and Käkisalmi af- ter the breakthrough. The crossing of Suvanto was successful, but the attackers were fended off. Manninen 21

Focus on Kelja-Volossula [46]

Crossing in foir places [45]

Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated [45]

Counterattack success but costly for Finns Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated [45]

2000 Soviet dead [31]

850 in the stone

Fighting stopped [31]

Stavka furious: "Dig in, gnaw" Finns surprised, confused, poor coordinated [45]

Soviet Regrouping, January 1940

"After the operations of the troops from the Leningrad Military District had proved fruitless, the Main Military Soviet had to halt the offensive in late December 1939 so that the command could be organized in a more reliable manner and a new operation plan could be drawn up for breaking through the Mannerheim Line."[47]

"By the first week of January 1940 it was clear that Meretskov’s initial plan had failed and that he, Stalin, and the Red Army high command had mas- sively underrated their enemy and overestimated the abilities of their own forces." [48]

"Stalin extremely angry"[9].

"At the end of December 1939, after replacing and reassigning many high- ranking officers including Meretskov, and putting Marshal Semen Timoshenko in charge, Stalin called for a new approach to the war, with far-less-ambitious goals." [8]

The advances at the Isthmus battles had called casualties at what R Reese calls "First World War levels". [49]

"In January 1940, when it became clear to Stalin and Voroshilov that the forces of the Leningrad Military District would not be able to beat the Finns with their own resources, the Ministry of Defense began transferring units from other military districts. Rumors of the horrific bloodletting spread throughout the army and triggered such negative responses as one soldier’s gloomy observation: “We’re going to certain death. They’ll kill us all. If the newspapers said that for every Finn you need ten Russkies, they’d be right. They are swatting us like flies." [50]

"The Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov, put forward the same plan for breaking through the Mannerheim Line as he had presented a few months earlier, and this time Stalin ac- cepted it." [51]

"Rather than attack in all areas, he concentrated the war on the Karelian Isthmus with the goal of breaking the Mannerheim Line and seizing Viipuri, using massed artillery and tanks to support infantry attacks." [8]

"7 January 1940. On the same day, Timoshenko, who already had a knowledge of the Isthmus, was appointed commander of the troops at the front, which included the 7th Army (command- ed by K.A. Meretskov) and the 13th Army (commanded by Army Commander 2nd grade V.D. Gröndahl) as well as several air force, artillery and rear detachments. The Baltic Fleet was also operatively subordinated to the front."[51]


Troops and the battle plan

Timoshenko had already proposed that the attack should follow "the procedure".[47] He visited the front personally and made a thorough plan. The troops rehearsed with life sized replicas.[52]

"When the attack began, there were eight Army Corps head- quarters (including one of the so-called Finnish People's Army) on this front, of which the 7th Army had four and the 13th Army three, and 23 divisions (of which two were Finnish)."[52]

"Of the 13 Finnish divisions, 9 were on the Isthmus, togeth- er with a cavalry brigade. The Soviet troops on the Isthmus had a significant superiority over their adversary: more than two-fold for the infantry and almost three-fold for the artillery, while they were utterly superior in terms of tanks and aircraft. On 11 February the Red Army had 1 558 tanks on the Isthmus, whereas the Finns had only 10 usable tanks in their reserves." [53]

"The continuity of the operation of the North-Western Front was to be guaranteed by drawing up reserves in echelons in the rear. Ti- moshenko decided to organize the troops for the main attack into four echelons: eleven divisions in the front line, the third divisions in the second line of the Army Corps in the second echelon, the two reserve divisions of the Armies, armoured brigades and a mecha- nized sharpshooter-machine gun brigade in the third echelon, and the front commander's two reserve divisions and the two divisions of the "Finnish People's Army" in the fourth echelon. The infantry divisions had been organized into one echelon with all three regi- ments in line, while every regiment had positioned its battalions in three successive echelons. The width of the front of an Army Corps was ordered to be 5--6 km, while a division's front was 2--2.5 km, regiment's 700-800 m, and a company's at least 400 m. This kind of echelon was to make it possible to carry out a massive first strike and reinforce the troops from depth at the right moment. It also created good preconditions for directing the emphasis of the troops flexibly as dictated by the situation."[54]

Soviet Breakthrough, February-March 1940

Summa

Soviet-t26-destroyed-february-1940-winterwar.png

Taipale

Vuosalmi

Viipurinlahti

Viipuri

Karjalankannas talvisodan viimeisenä päivänä 13. maaliskuuta 1940.

Aftermath

Moscow Peace Treaty

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Seeds of Future Conflicts

Position of Taipale at eastern end of Mannerheim Line

The 2/6th Independent Company had won a significant victory, but now had 23 wounded and was very low on ammunition. Frazier landed on the newly captured airstrip in his Piper Cub at 12:30.[55] He rejected the airstrip as unsuitable for Dakotas, and oversaw the preparation of a new airstrip on better ground near Mission Hill.[56] This was still a difficult approach, as aircraft had to land upwind while avoiding Mission Hill. Although it was not known if the airstrip would be ready, Hutchison flew in for a test landing there the next day, 21 September, at 15:30. He collected the wounded and flew them to Nadzab, and returned an hour later with a load of rations and ammunition. He also brought with him Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, the commander of the 21st Infantry Brigade, and his headquarters, who took charge of the area. Around 18:00, six more transports arrived.[55] 60°30′26″N 29°00′45″E / 60.507342°N 29.012389°E / 60.507342; 29.012389

In Media

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Grendahl was at the beginning of the Battles of Taipale the commander of 7th Army Right Wing Group, then from late December 1939 the commander of the newly formed 13th army.[1]
  2. ^ 23rd Regiment was originally part of the Finnish 8th Division, but was first moved to the 10th division front 7th Dec 1939, then subjected to full 10th Division command.[2]
  3. ^ Metsäpirtti Group were guard troops drafted of local men living at the border area. The Group was responsible for guarding the area between the border and the river. Strength of a batallion.[3] After the Metsäpirtti skirmish the Group was moved under 10th division command.[4]
  4. ^ 8th Division took part in the Kiviniemi Battle.[2]
  5. ^ 24th Regiment took part in the battles at Kiviniemi, in the far western flank of the Taipale front.[2]
  6. ^ Soviet units did not keep detailed records of losses during the first months of the war.[6]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Raunio & Kilin 2010, pp. 38.
  2. ^ a b c Raunio & Kilin 2010, pp. 29.
  3. ^ Sorko & Strang 2010, pp. 24.
  4. ^ a b Raunio & Kilin 2010, pp. 25.
  5. ^ Irincheev 2010, pp. 20.
  6. ^ Irincheev 2010, pp. 44.
  7. ^ Manninen 2004, pp. 42.
  8. ^ a b c Reese 2008, pp. 830.
  9. ^ a b Manninen 2004, pp. 37.
  10. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 3.
  11. ^ Turtola 1999a, pp. 38–41.
  12. ^ a b Chew 1971, pp. 25.
  13. ^ a b Chew 1971, pp. 5.
  14. ^ Edwards 2006, pp. 105.
  15. ^ Turtola 1999a, pp. 44–45.
  16. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 844.
  17. ^ Ries 1988, pp. 55–56.
  18. ^ Ries 1988, pp. 141–148.
  19. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 13.
  20. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 20.
  21. ^ a b Reese 2008, pp. 827.
  22. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 17.
  23. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 828.
  24. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 14.
  25. ^ Aptekar 2017.
  26. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 15.
  27. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 23.
  28. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 15.
  29. ^ Manninen 2004, pp. 8.
  30. ^ a b Chew 1971, pp. 60.
  31. ^ a b c d Chew 1971, pp. 61.
  32. ^ Nenye et al. 2015, pp. ??.
  33. ^ a b c Chew 1971, pp. 17.
  34. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 18.
  35. ^ a b Raunio & Kilin 2010, pp. 27.
  36. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 36.
  37. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 848.
  38. ^ Nenye et al. 2015, pp. 73.
  39. ^ Nenye et al. 2015, pp. 67.
  40. ^ Raunio & Kilin 2010, pp. 32.
  41. ^ Irincheev 2012, pp. 37.
  42. ^ a b c Irincheev 2012, pp. 38.
  43. ^ a b c Nenye et al. 2015, pp. 75.
  44. ^ a b Chew 1971, pp. 62.
  45. ^ a b c d e Nenye et al. 2015, pp. 76.
  46. ^ Chew 1971, pp. 70.
  47. ^ a b Manninen 2004, pp. 38.
  48. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 832.
  49. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 831.
  50. ^ Reese 2008, pp. 843.
  51. ^ a b Manninen 2004, pp. 39.
  52. ^ a b Manninen 2004, pp. 40.
  53. ^ Manninen 2004, pp. 43–44.
  54. ^ Manninen 2004, pp. 41–42.
  55. ^ a b Dexter 1961, p. 423.
  56. ^ Bradley 2004, p. 41.

Sources

In English

  • Chew, Allen F. (1971). The White Death: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War. Michigan State University Press.
    ISBN 978-1931195225
    .

In Finnish

In Russian

Further reading

External links

Taipale Category:1939 in Finland Category:1940 in Finland Category:December 1939 events

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