Battles of Khalkhin Gol
Battles of Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan | |
---|---|
Part of the Khalkha River, Mongolian People's Republic 47°43′49″N 118°35′24″E / 47.73028°N 118.59000°E | |
Result |
Soviet-Mongolian victory
|
Territorial changes | Status quo ante bellum; enforcement of border claims in accordance with the Soviet and Mongolian interpretation |
Mongolia
61,860–73,961[nb 1]
498–550 tanks
385–450 armored cars[4][5]
900 aircraft (participated)
- Peak strength: 580[6]
4,000 trucks[7]
1,921 horses and camels (Mongol only)[8]
~30,000 (includes Manchu forces)[9][10][11]
73 tanks[12]
19 tankettes
400 aircraft (participated)
- Peak strength: 200[6]
1,000 trucks[13]
2,708 horses[14]
24,903 combat
752-2,276 noncombat[nb 2]
556[17]–990[2]
Equipment:
208 aircraft lost[18]
253 tanks destroyed or crippled[19]
133 armored cars destroyed
96 mortars and artillery
49 tractors and prime movers
652 trucks and other motor vehicles[15][17]
significant animal casualties[20]
17,364-17,716 combat
2,350 noncombat
2,895 (Soviet claim)[nb 3]
Equipment:
162 aircraft lost[18]
29 tanks destroyed or crippled[12]
7 tankettes destroyed
72 artillery pieces (field guns only)[22]
2,330 horses killed, injured, or sick[14]
significant motor vehicle losses[23][page needed]
Events leading to World War II |
---|
The Battles of Khalkhin Gol (
Background
After the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Japan turned its military interests to Soviet territories that bordered those areas. The first major Soviet-Japanese border incident, the Battle of Lake Khasan, occurred in 1938 in Primorye. Clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces occurred frequently along the border of Manchuria.
In 1939, Manchuria was a
The principal occupying army of Manchukuo was the Kwantung Army of Japan, consisting of some of the best Japanese units in 1939. However, the western region of Manchukuo was garrisoned by the relatively newly formed 23rd Infantry Division at Hailar under General Michitarō Komatsubara and included several Manchu army and border guard units all under the direct command of the Sixth Army. The 23rd was the newest and least experienced division in the entire Kwantung Army. In addition to this, the 23rd Division was equipped with outdated equipment. Japanese army experts rated the combat capability of the 23rd Division as "below medium", comparable to a garrison division on occupation duty in China.[25]
The Soviet forces consisted of the 57th Special Corps, deployed from the Transbaikal Military District. They were responsible for defending the border between Siberia and Manchuria. The Mongolian troops mainly consisted of cavalry brigades and light artillery units, and proved to be effective and agile, but lacked armor and manpower in sufficient numbers.
On 2 June 1939 Georgy Zhukov was told by Commissar of Defence Kliment Voroshilov that Stalin was dissatisfied with the local commander and he was to go to Mongolia, take command of the 57th Special Corps and eliminate Japanese provocations by inflicting a decisive reverse on the Imperial Japanese Army (when summoned to Moscow on 1 June he had feared he was to be arrested and interrogated by the NKVD).[26]
In 1939, the Japanese Cabinet sent instructions to the Kwantung Army to strengthen and fortify Manchukuo's borders with Mongolia and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Kwantung Army, which had long been stationed in Manchuria far from the Japanese Home Islands, had become largely autonomous and tended to act without approval from, or even against the direction of, the Japanese government.[27]
Battles
May: Skirmishes
The incident began on 11 May 1939. A Mongolian cavalry unit of some 70 to 90 men had entered the disputed area in search of grazing for their horses. On that day, Manchu cavalry attacked the Mongolians and drove them back across the river Khalkhin Gol. On 13 May, the Mongolian force returned in greater numbers and the Manchukoans failed to dislodge them.
On 14 May, Lt. Col. Yaozo Azuma led the reconnaissance regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division, supported by the 64th Infantry Regiment of the same division, under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata, into the territory and the Mongolians withdrew. Soviet and Mongolian troops returned to the disputed region, however, and Azuma's force again moved to evict them, but the Soviet-Mongolian forces surrounded Azuma's force on 28 May and destroyed it.[28] The Azuma force suffered eight officers and 97 men killed and one officer and 33 men wounded, for 63% total casualties.
The commander of the Soviet forces and of the
June: Escalation
Both sides increased their forces in the area. Soon Japan had 30,000 men in the theater. The Soviets dispatched a new
On 27 June the
Throughout June there were reports of Soviet and Mongolian activity on both sides of the river near Nomonhan and small-scale attacks on isolated Manchukoan units. At the end of the month, the commander of the 23rd Japanese Infantry Division, Lt. Gen. Michitarō Komatsubara, received permission to "expel the invaders".
July: Japanese assault
The Japanese planned a two-pronged assault. The first attack would be made by three regiments plus part of a fourth: the
- Lt. Gen. Yasuoka Masaomi, IJA, Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Corps[33]
- 3rd Tank Regiment[34]
- Type 89 I-Go medium tanks– 26
- Type 97 Chi-Hamedium tanks – 4
- Type 94 tankettes – 7
- Type 97 Te-Ketankettes – 4
- 4th Tank Regiment[35]
- Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks– 35
- Type 89 I-Gomedium tanks – 8
- Type 94 tankettes – 3
- 3rd Tank Regiment[34]
The northern task force succeeded in crossing the Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets from Baintsagan Hill, and advancing south along the west bank. However, Zhukov, perceiving the threat, launched a counterattack with 450 tanks and armored cars. The tanks consisted of primarily BTs with a handful of T-26s, while the armored cars were BA-10s and BA-3/6s, which were similar in armor (6–15 mm (0.24–0.59 in)) and armament (main: 45 mm (2 in) gun 20K mod, secondary: two 7.62 mm (0.30 in) machine guns) to the Soviet light tanks. The Soviet armored force, despite being unsupported by infantry, attacked the Japanese on three sides and nearly encircled them. The Japanese force, further handicapped by having only one pontoon bridge across the river for supplies, was forced to withdraw, recrossing the river on 5 July. Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Corps of the Yasuoka Detachment (the southern task force) attacked on the night of 2 July, moving in the darkness to avoid the Soviet artillery on the high ground of the river's west bank. A pitched battle ensued in which the Yasuoka Detachment lost over half its armor, but still could not break through the Soviet forces on the east bank and reach the Kawatama Bridge.[36] After a Soviet counterattack on 9 July threw the battered, depleted Yasuoka Detachment back, it was dissolved and Yasuoka was relieved.[37]
The two armies continued to spar with each other over the next two weeks along a four-kilometre (2.5 mi) front running along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol to its junction with the Holsten River.[38] Zhukov, whose army was 748 km (465 mi) away from its base of supply, assembled a fleet of 2,600 trucks to supply his troops, while the Japanese suffered severe supply problems due to a lack of similar motor transport.[32] On 23 July, the Japanese launched another large-scale assault, sending the 64th and 72nd Infantry Regiments against Soviet forces defending the Kawatama Bridge. Japanese artillery supported the attack with a massive barrage that consumed more than half of their ammunition stores over a period of two days.[39] The attack made some progress but failed to break through Soviet lines and reach the bridge. The Japanese disengaged from the attack on 25 July due to mounting casualties and depleted artillery stores. By this point they had suffered over 5,000 casualties between late May and 25 July, with Soviet losses being much higher but more easily replaced.[32][40] The battle drifted into a stalemate.
August: Soviet counterattack
With war apparently imminent in Europe, and to avoid fighting a two front war, Zhukov planned a major offensive on 20 August 1939 to clear the Japanese from the Khalkhin Gol region and to end the fighting.
In comparison, at the point of contact, the Kwantung Army had only the 23rd Infantry Division, which with various attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions. Its headquarters had been at Hailar, over 150 km (93 mi) from the fighting. Japanese intelligence, despite demonstrating an ability to track the build-up of Zhukov's force, failed to precipitate an appropriate response from below.[47] Thus, when the Soviets finally did launch their offensive, Komatsubara was caught off-guard.[47][48] To test the Japanese defences prior to their main assault on 20 August, the Soviets launched three aggressive probing assaults, one on 3 August and the others on 7/8 August. All three were disastrously thrown back, with around 1,000 combined dead and several tanks knocked out on the Soviet side compared to just 85 Japanese casualties.[49] The Japanese counterattacked and routed elements of the Mongolian 8th Cavalry Division, seizing a hilly sector of the battlefront.[50] Despite the fact that no more major fighting would take place until 20 August, Japanese casualties continued to mount at a rate of 40 wounded per day.[51] Kwantung Army staff officers were becoming increasingly worried over the disorganized state of the 6th Army headquarters and supply elements. The growing casualty count meant that the green 23rd Division would have to take, train and assimilate new replacements "on the job".[51] By contrast, Tokyo's oft-stated desire that it would not escalate the fighting at Khalkhin Gol proved immensely relieving to the Soviets, freed to hand-pick select units from across the military to be concentrated for a local offensive without fear of Japanese retaliation elsewhere.[52]
Zhukov decided it was time to break the stalemate.
The Soviet Union and Japan agreed to a cease-fire on 15 September; it took effect the following day at 1:10 pm.[32][57][58]
Aftermath
Japanese records report 8,440 killed, 8,766 wounded, 162 aircraft lost in combat, and 42 tanks lost (of which 29 were later repaired and redeployed). Roughly 500 to 600 Japanese and Manchus were taken prisoner during the battles. Due to a military doctrine that prohibited surrender, the Japanese listed most of these men as killed in action, for the benefit of their families.[59] Some sources put the Japanese casualties at 45,000 or more killed, with Soviet casualties of at least 17,000.[32] However, these estimates for Japanese casualties are considered inaccurate as they exceed the total strength of the Japanese forces involved in the battle (estimated at 28,000–40,000 troops, despite Soviet claims that they were facing 75,000).[60][10] According to the records of the Bureau 6A hospital, the Japanese casualties amounted to 7,696 killed, 8,647 wounded, 1,021 missing, and 2,350 sick, for a total of 19,714 personnel losses, including 2,895 Manchu casualties. The Kwantung Army headquarters and their records give a slightly different figure of 8,629 killed and 9,087 injured. The former Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry estimated a total of 35,000 to 36,000 casualties[10] The Soviets initially claimed to have inflicted 29,085 casualties on the Japanese, but later increased this to 61,000 for the official histories.[2]
In recent years, with the opening of the Soviet archives, a more accurate assessment of Soviet casualties has emerged from the work of
Mongolian casualties were 556–990, with at least 11 armored cars destroyed and 1,921 horses and camels lost.[64]
Nomonhan was the first use of
Air combat
Soviet aircraft losses
I-16 fighter | I-15 biplane fighter
|
I-153 biplane fighter | SB high-speed bomber | TB-3 heavy bomber | R-5 reconnaissance aircraft | Total: | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Combat losses | 87 | 60 | 16 | 44 | 0 | 1 | 208 |
Non-Combat losses | 22 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 42 |
Total losses | 109 | 65 | 22 | 52 | 1 | 1 | 250 |
Ref[18] |
Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-4 reconnaissance aircraft | Ki-10 biplane fighter | Ki-15 reconnaissance | Ki-21 high speed bomber | Ki-27 fighter | Ki-30 light bomber | Ki-36 utility aircraft | Fiat BR.20 medium bomber
|
Transport aircraft | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Aerial combat losses | 1 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 62 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 88 |
Write-offs due to combat damage | 14 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 34 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 74 |
Total combat losses | 15 | 1 | 13 | 6 | 96 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 162 |
Combat damage | 7 | 4 | 23 | 1 | 124 | 33 | 6 | 20 | 2 | 220 |
Ref[18] |
Aircraft losses summary and notes
Combat losses include aircraft shot down during aerial combat, written off due to combat damage or destroyed on the ground.
Non-combat losses include aircraft that were lost due to accidents, as well as write-offs of warplanes due to the end of their service life. Thus Soviet combat losses amount to 163 fighters, 44 bombers, and a reconnaissance aircraft, with further 385 fighters and 51 bombers requiring repairs due to combat damage. VVS (Soviet Air Forces) personnel losses were 88 killed in aerial combat, 11 killed by anti-aircraft artillery, 65 missing, six killed in air-strikes and four died of wounds (174 total) and 113 wounded. The Japanese combat losses were 97 fighters, 25 bombers and 41 other (mostly reconnaissance), while 128 fighters, 54 bombers and 38 other required repairs due to combat damage. The Japanese Air Force suffered 152 dead and 66 severely wounded.
Aircraft ordnance expenditures
USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons).
Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons.[66]
Summary
While this engagement is little known in the West, it played an important part in subsequent Japanese conduct in World War II. The battle earned the Kwantung Army the displeasure of officials in Tokyo, not so much due to its defeat, but because it was initiated and escalated without direct authorization from the Japanese government. This defeat combined with the Chinese resistance in the
Instead, support shifted to the
Soviet assessment
The battle was the first victory for the soon-to-be-famous Soviet general Georgy Zhukov, earning him the first of his four
Following the battle, the Soviets generally found the results unsatisfactory, despite their victory. Though the Soviet forces in the Far East in 1939 were not plagued by fundamental issues to the same extent as those in Europe during the 1941 campaigns, their generals were still unimpressed by their army's performance. As noted by Pyotr Grigorenko, the Red Army went in with a very large advantage in technology, numbers and firepower, yet still suffered huge losses, which he blamed on poor leadership.[29]
Although their victory and the subsequent negotiation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact secured the Far East for the duration of the Soviet-German War, the Red Army always remained cautious about the possibility of another, larger Japanese incursion as late as early 1944. In December 1943, when the American military mission proposed a logistics base be set up east of Lake Baikal, the Red Army authorities were according to Coox "shocked by the idea and literally turned white".[73] Due to this caution, the Red Army kept a large force in the Far East even during the bleakest days of the war in Europe. For example, on July 1, 1942, Soviet forces in the Far East consisted of 1,446,012 troops, 11,759 artillery pieces, 2,589 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 3,178 combat aircraft.[74] Despite this, the Soviet operations chief of the Far Eastern Front, General A. K. Kazakovtsev, was not confident in his army group's ability to stop an invasion if the Japanese committed to it (at least in 1941–1942), commenting: "If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler's side ... our cause is hopeless."[75]
Japanese assessment and reforms
The Japanese similarly considered the result not a failing of tactics, but one that simply highlighted a need to address the material disparity between themselves and their neighbours.
Despite all of the above, Japanese industry was not productive enough to keep up with either the United States or the Soviet Union, and Yamashita warned against going to war with them for this reason. His recommendations were not taken to heart, and Japanese militarists eventually successfully pushed for war with the United States. In spite of their recent experience and military improvements, the Japanese would generally continue to underestimate their adversaries, emphasizing the courage and determination of the individual soldier as a way to make up for their lack of numbers and smaller industrial base. To varying degrees, the basic problems that faced them at Khalkhin Gol would haunt them again when the Americans and British recovered from their defeats of late 1941 and early 1942 and turned to the conquest of the Japanese Empire.[32][78][page needed]
Also, events exposed a severe lack of procedures for emergency stanching of bleeding. The original Japanese doctrine explicitly forbade first aid to fellow soldiers without prior orders from an officer, and first-aid training was lacking. As result, a large proportion of Japanese dead was due to hemorrhaging from untreated wounds. Furthermore, up to 30% of the total casualties were due to dysentery, which the Japanese believed was delivered by Soviet biological-warfare aerial bombs. To reduce susceptibility to diseases, future Japanese divisions would commonly include specialized Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Departments.[79] Finally, the Japanese food rations were found to be unsatisfactory, both in packing and in nutritional value.[80]
Legacy
After the Second World War, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, fourteen Japanese were charged by delegates of the conquering Soviet Union, with having "initiated a war of aggression ... against the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River" and also with having waged a war "in violation of international law" against the USSR.[81] Kenji Doihara, Hiranuma Kiichirō and Seishirō Itagaki were convicted on these charges.
Commemoration
The anniversary of the battle was first celebrated in 1969, on the occasion of its 30th anniversary. After its 50th anniversary, in 1989, it dwindled in importance, going down to the level of academic debates and lectures. Only recently has the anniversary made a resurgence as an important event in Mongolian history.[82]
The Mongolian town of Choibalsan, in the Dornod Province where the battle was fought, is the location of the "G. K. Zhukov Museum", dedicated to Zhukov and the 1939 battle.[83] Ulaanbaatar also has a "G. K. Zhukov Museum" with information about the battle.[84] The latter museum was opened on 19 August 1979 in the presence of Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal and Zhukov's three daughters.[85] During the 70th, 75th and 80th anniversaries of the battle in 2009, 2014 and 2019, respectively, the President of Russia has taken part in the celebrations alongside the President of Mongolia and Soviet and Mongolian veterans, with the celebration often coinciding with a state visit.
On the 80th anniversary, in 2019, a military parade was held in Choibalsan on Independence Square, which featured tactical formations of the Russian Armed Forces' Eastern Military District and the Mongolian Armed Forces, all of whom were participants in the joint Russian-Mongolian military exercises "Selenga-2019" the previous month.[86][87][88] Parades were held in the federal subjects of Russia that surround and have a close relationship with Mongolia, such as Buryatia, Yakutia and the Altai Republic. In the Buryat capital of Ulan-Ude, a parade was held in the capital.[89][90] In addition, a concert on Sükhbaatar Square took place on 28 August, during which the Russian Alexandrov Ensemble together with the Mongolian singers gave a performance.[91]
See also
- Mukden Incident
- Tientsin incident
- Kantokuen
- Mongolia in World War II
Notes
- ^ Includes at least 57,000 Soviet[1] and 4,860 MPR personnel.[2] Combined Soviet-MPR strength was possibly as high as 74,000.[3]
- ^ 9,703 dead and missing,[15][16]
15,251 wounded,
701 to 2,225 hospitalized due to disease.
Boris Sokolov writes that according to E. I. Smirnov's "Война и военная медицина. 1939–1945 годы" ("War and military medicine. 1939–1945") the figure of 701 only accounts for sick patients who were treated in hospitals of the Transbaikal Military District and that the total number of ill during the campaign was 2,225. - ^ Japanese military record:
8,440 killed,
8,766 wounded
Soviet claim:
60,000 killed and wounded,
3,000 captured[21]
See the "Aftermath" section.
References
Citations
- ^ Kotelnikov 2010, p. 109.
- ^ a b c d e "Khalkhin Gol Battle: the Revision of Statistics". Archived from the original on 18 February 2017. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
- ^ Krivosheyev 1993, pp. 71–2.
- ^ ISBN 9781591148388.
- ^ Zaloga 2007, p. 13.
- ^ a b V. Kondratiev, "Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air" retrieved 3 Jan. 2016
- ^ a b Coox 1985, p. 580.
- ^ "The Khalkhin Gol Battle, 1939" Retrieved 3 Jan. 2016
- ^ Bellamy, Christopher D.; Lahnstein, Joseph S. (1990). "The New Soviet Defensive Policy: Khalkhin Gol 1939 as Case Study". Parameters. 20 (1): 24. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
- ^ a b c Kristian Gauthier (2016). "La bataille de Nomonhan et la seconde guerre mondiale en extrème-orient" (PDF) (in French). University of Québec at Montreal. p. 87. Retrieved 19 July 2020.
- ^ The cited source here describes Japanese forces after the assault on the Soviets as numbering 28,000 men, and includes Manchu forces. For more information, see the "Aftermath" section.
- ^ a b c Zaloga 2007, p. 14.
- ^ Coox1985, p. 563.
- ^ a b Coox 1985, p. 1168.
- ^ a b M. Kolomiets "Boi u reki Khalkhin-Gol" Frontovaya Illyustratsia (2002)
- ^ a b Sokolov, Boris (9 February 2015). "Халхин-Гол". www.slavic-europe.eu (in Russian).
- ^ a b c "Soviet Losses in the Khalkhin Gol Battle". RKKA in World War II – Russian Project. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- ^ ISBN 5-88573-009-1.
- KhT-130S, and 17 T-37s. This does not include tanks that only sustained light to moderate damage, or ones lost due to mechanical failure.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 576. During one Japanese counterattack alone on the 12/13 August the MPR 8th cavalry division lost 100 horses captured.
- ISBN 0-7006-0899-0.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 987, includes 28 120mm–150mm guns and 44 75mm guns.
- ^ There are multiple accounts of Japanese trucks being knocked out by Soviet artillery and aviation, as well as losses due to mechanical failures or environmental hazards. Coox 1985.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 3 – "Map 2". Archived from the original on 7 May 2011.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 181.
- ^ Beevor 2012, pp. 14, 18.
- ^ Baabar 1999, pp. 384–6.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 5 – "Map 3". Archived from the original on 13 November 2011.
- ^ a b "Григорий Штерн / Grigoriy Shtern". Retrieved 15 May 2022.
- ^ Baabar 1999, pp. 386–7.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 271.
- ^ a b c d e f g Neeno 2005.
- ^ a b Coox 1985, p. 1119.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 349.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 350.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 6 – "Map 4". Archived from the original on 13 November 2011.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 47 (Redeployment).
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 1 (Japanese Initiatives).
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 53 (Hills 742 and 754).
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 7.
- ^ Coox 1985, pp. 578–9.
- ^ Coox 1985, pp. 579, 641 note 23.
- ^ a b c Coox 1985, p. 590.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 9 (The Soviet Offensive).
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 10 – "Map 6". Archived from the original on 13 November 2011.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 74 – "Map 17". Archived from the original on 7 May 2011.
- ^ a b Coox 1985, p. 578.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 71 (Japanese Intelligence Failures).
- ^ Coox 1985, pp. 575–6.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 576.
- ^ a b Coox 1985, p. 577.
- ^ Coox 1985, pp. 573–4.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 663.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 86 (Outcome).
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 77 (Encirclement of the 2/28th Infantry).
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 841.
- ^ Goldman 2012, pp. 163–4.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 911.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 1176.
- ^ Drea 1981, p. 9.
- ISBN 5-203-01400-0). pp. 77–85.
- ISBN 978-5-9533-4672-6pp. 158–59, 162.
- ^ Krivosheyev 1993, p. 77.
- ^ Khalkhin Gol Battle: Brief Description and Data Retrieved 20 Jan. 2017. pp. 5–6, 13.
- ^ Nedialkov 2011, p. 144.
- ^ Nedialkov 2011, p. 141.
- ^ Beevor 2012, Chapter 17.
- ^ Beevor 2012, p. 18.
- ^ a b Goldman, Stuart (28 August 2012). "The Forgotten Soviet-Japanese War of 1939". The Diplomat.
- ^ Snyder 2010, p. 166.
- ^ "Declaration Regarding Mongolia". The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. 14 April 1941. Archived from the original on 11 March 2007. Retrieved 24 February 2021.
- ^ "World War II : Documents". The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Archived from the original on 6 March 2015. Retrieved 4 March 2015.
- ^ Coox, Alvin D. (July 1958). "The Myth of the Kwantung Army". Marine Corps Gazette. 42 (7): 43.
- ISBN 9780415408615.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 1079.
- ^ 「"ノモンハン" は日本軍の一方的敗北ではない」三代史研究会『明治・大正・昭和30 の"真実"』文春新書、2003 年、p. 122
- ^ 福井雄三『坂の上の雲に隠された歴史の真実 明治と昭和の歴史の虚像と実像』
- ^ Drea 1981.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 1167.
- ^ Coox 1985, p. 1019.
- ^ See counts 26 and 36 of the IMTFE indictment, available at "Indictment from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East". Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. pp. 7, 9.
- ^ "Who Loses in Khalkhin Gol Battle". www.baabar.mn.
- ^ "Cultological Culture". Retrieved 4 March 2015.
- ^ "Embassy of the Russian Federation in Mongolia". Archived from the original on 8 October 2011. Retrieved 1 August 2009.
- ^ "Музей маршала Советского Союза Георгия Константиновича Жукова. Улан-Батор. Монголия". www.legendtour.ru. Archived from the original on 10 July 2019. Retrieved 18 June 2019.
- ^ "В Монголии прошел парад в честь 80-летия боев на Халхин-Голе – РИА Новости, 29.08.2019". ria.ru.
- ^ "В Монголии прошел парад в честь 80-летия боев на Халхин-Голе". Яндекс.Новости.
- ^ "В Монголии прошел парад в честь 80-летия боев на Халхин-Голе". asiarussia.ru.
- ^ "Парад в честь 80-летия Победы советских и монгольских войск на реке Халхин-Гол прошел в Улан-Удэ". egov-buryatia.ru.
- ^ "Info". Regnum.ru. 16 September 2019. Retrieved 30 December 2019.
- ^ "80th anniversary of Khalkhin Gol victory celebrated in Mongolia". russkiymir.ru.
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- Kotelnikov, Vladimir R. (2010). Air War Over Khalkhin Gol, The Nomonhan Incident. SAM publications. ISBN 9781906959234.
- Krivosheyev, G. F., ed. (1993). Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts (PDF). Moscow: Military Publishing House. ISBN 5-203-01400-0.
- Kuromiya, Hiroaki (2011). "The Mystery of Nomonhan, 1939". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 24 (4): 659–77. S2CID 144644320.
- Moses, Larry W. "Soviet-Japanese Confrontation in Outer Mongolia: The Battle of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol," Journal of Asian History (1967) 1#1 pp. 64–85.
- Nedialkov, Dimitar (2011). In The Skies of Nomonhan, Japan vs Russia, May–September 1939 (2nd ed.). Crecy Publishing. ISBN 9780859791526.
- Neeno, Timothy (16 January 2005). "Nomonhan: The Second Russo-Japanese War". MilitaryHistoryOnline.com. This work uses the Coox book and Drea paper as sources.
- Sella, Amnon. "Khalkhin-Gol: The Forgotten War," Journal of Contemporary History (1983) 18#4 pp. 651–87 in JSTOR
- Snow, Philip. "Nomonhan – the unknown victory," History Today (1990) 40#7 pp. 22–28
- Snyder, Timothy (2010). "Final Solution". Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. New York City: Basic Books. ISBN 9780465002399.
- Young, Katsu H. "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union," Monumenta Nipponica (1967) Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (1967), pp. 82–102 in JSTOR
- Zaloga, Steven J. (2007). Japanese Tanks 1939–45. Osprey. ISBN 9781846030918.
External links
- Topographic Map of the Khalkhin Gol battle area
- Videos of the Nomonhan War Museum Archived 23 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- Warbird Forum – Japan vs. Russia, 1939
- "On the Road to Khalkhin Gol", Part 1 and Part 2, by Henry Sakaida
- Парад в Монголии в честь 80-летия победы на Халхин-Голе