Vandal War (461–468)
Vandal War (461–468) | |
---|---|
Part of Mediterranean | |
Result | Vandal victory |
Foederati
Leo I
Anthemius,
Marcellinus
Basiliscus
Heraclius of Edessa
100,000 men
Cedrenus:
1,113 ships
Modern estimate:
50,000 men
The Vandal War (461–468) was a long-term conflict between the two halves of the
Main figures
Prelude
After the earlier Vandal War of 439–442, North Africa largely fell into the hands of the Vandals. Formally as foederati of the Romans, but de facto they ruled this part of the empire to their own discretion. Since then, the Vandals had control of part of the Mediterranean fleet and focused on piracy, at first on a small scale but becoming more and more significant over time. The Western Roman Empire lacked sufficient resources to effectively counter this.
Sack of Rome
In 455, the Vandal king
Destruction of the Roman fleet
In 460, the Roman army under the then emperor
Ricimer's coup
In August 461, Majorian returned to Italy, where he was imprisoned by
Start
Vandal occupation of the Western Isles
An
Ricimer, now the strongman in the west, was indeed lord and master in Italy, but in addition to the hostile attacks in the Mediterranean region, he had to deal with open military opposition from the generals Aegidius, Nepotianus and Marcellinus. In Marcellinus, who stayed south of Italy in
Peace negotiations
After Marcellin's departure, Sicily was again ravaged by Vandal attacks, but Ricimer's negotiations had no effect. A peace mission under the umbrella of the Eastern Roman Emperor Leo in
Vandal claim to the emperor
Geiserics' concession had a clear political purpose. The Vandal monarch now emerged as the champion of the Theodosian house against Ricimer and his upstart emperor. Placidia was married to
Ricimers' campaign against Aegidius
In 463 a confusing spectacle occurred, when Ricimer, in the name of the western emperor Libius Serverus, employed Goths to attack part of the Roman army in Gaul. When the battle was fought at Orleans, Aegidius was victorious. His rebellion was not curtailed until the autumn of 465, when he was murdered. At the time, Aegidius was engaged in negotiations with the Vandal king Geiseric, attempting to build an alternative balance of western forces to challenge Ricimer's dominance.[15]
Battle for Sicily and Interregnum
In 464 or 465 Marcellinus again campaigned against the Vandals. By order of Emperor Leo I, he returned to Sicily to defend the island against the Vandals[16] which posed a direct threat to the personal power and prestige of Ricimer, who called on Leo to persuade Marcellinus not to undertake hostilities against him.
Emperor Libius Severus, who was no more than a puppet of Ricimer, died on 15 August 465. His cause of death is unknown: both murder and natural causes are possible. The elevation of Olybrius, which would have been a restitution of the Theodosian dynasty, may have seemed a hopeful solution to some of the difficulties of the situation, but the fact that he was Geiseriks' candidate and relative was a reason not to accept him. A year and eight months after the death of Libius Severus, no successor was appointed.
Continuation of the war
Invasion of the Peloponnesus
In 467, the sea attacks by the Vandals became increasingly extensive. Geiseric's warships now also appeared off the coast of the Peloponnesus and Egypt. It was feared that there would be an attack on Alexandria that would have consequences for the grain supply of the Eastern Roman capital. This threat explains why the Eastern Roman Emperor Leo I decided to no longer stand idly by. He abandoned the diplomatic path and took steps to achieve closer cooperation with the Western Roman government in Italy. [17]
Now that not only Italy and Sicily were threatened but the trade of the entire Mediterranean, the forces of the East had to be united with those of Italy and Dalmatia against the African enemy. Leo agreed with Ricimir that Anthemius, general in the eastern army, would become the new emperor of the west. Ricimer's support was secured by an arrangement for him to marry Anthemius' daughter.
In the spring of 467, Anthemius, accompanied by Marcellinus, arrived with an army to Italy.[18] After his accession to the throne on 12 April 467, a large-scale campaign against the Vandals was prepared, to be undertaken by an Eastern Roman fleet with land troops under the overall command of Emperor Leo's brother-in-law, Basiliscus. Anthemius appointed Marcellinus, also to counterbalance Ricimer, as second imperial general and commander-in-chief of the Western Roman troops involved in the campaign.
Plan of Attack
The attack plan that the Romans had in mind was based on the idea of having the eastern and western armies act together and attack the Vandals simultaneously on three fronts. The eastern army had to be divided into two for this. A sizable fleet was assembled, reputedly consisting of 1,113 ships, to carry an army of 100,000 men. Marcellinus, was ordered to conquer Sardinia and then sail to the coast of North Africa to link up with the eastern fleet under Basiliscus.[17][19] Basiliscus would then sail directly to Carthage with the joint fleet. Heraclius, another general, would gather eastern forces in Egypt, disembark at Tripolitania, and then attack by land at Carthage. Procopius estimated the cost of the expedition at 130,000 pounds of gold; Ioannes Laurentius Lydus estimated the cost at 65,000 pounds of gold and 750,000 pounds of silver.[20]
The attack of the Romans
Marcellinus recaptured Sardinia with little difficulty, and Heraclius met little resistance from the Vandals in Tripolitania, and both moved to make contact with Basiliscus's forces.[21] According to Procopius, Basiliscus' fleet dispersed the Vandal fleet near Sicily, but Basiliscus did not take advantage of this advantage and rested his troops at Cape Bon, a strategic location sixty kilometers away from Carthage.[22][23] According to historians Michael Kulikowski, Friell and Williams, Geiseric appealed for peace and proposed a five-day armistice to give themselves time to prepare in the meantime.[24][25] Heather notes that the Romans favored avoiding a naval battle,[26] and that this may have been the reason Basiliscus hesitated to take on the Vandals to attack.[27]
The Defense of the Vandals
In the days allotted to him, Geiserik assembled a new fleet with a number of fireships and, aided by good winds, attacked the Roman fleet. The Roman fleet was defeated by the combination of the fireships, bad winds and surprise, with half of it destroyed. Basiliscus fled with the rest of the fleet to Sicily, to consolidate with Marcellin's forces; their morale and supplies might have secured a victory, but Marcellinus was murdered,[28] possibly by order of Ricimer.[29] Heraclius, who had not yet reached Carthage, returned to the Eastern Roman Empire by retracing the path he had taken, and Basiliscus returned to Constantinople with half his fleet.[24][22]
Aftermath and consequences
The poor result that the Romans achieved with the large-scale operation at the end of the Vandal war must have had a major morale effect. The Roman Empire had brought all its strength to bear and had failed in its mission to destroy the Vandal Empire. According to Heather the battle considered to have ended the Western Roman Empire's chances of survival. Without access to the resources of the former
Nevertheless, it took two years for Geiserik to regain enough confidence to resume his attacks on Italy.[31] In 472, Ricimer's western regime came to terms with Geiseric, making his son's brother-in-law, Olybrius, emperor. Geiseric did not make peace with the Eastern Roman Empire until 476.[32] He concluded a treaty with the new emperor Zeno entitled Eternal Peace. This treaty was fairly faithfully observed on both sides under his successors. A revolution in Carthage in 531 finally gave the Roman Empire, which then only existed in the East, the desired opportunity for intervention, leading to the Vandal War (533–534).[31]
References
Citations
- ^ Lee 2008, p. 48.
- ^ Heather 2008, p. 25.
- ^ Johannes Malalas, Chronographia 14:26
- ^ Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, (The Modern Library, 1932), ch. XXXVI., p. 1258.
- ^ Priscus, fr. 36.1; Hydatius, Chron., p. 32
- ^ The treaty has not been preserved: it can be deduced from the fragment of Priscus (fr. 36.2) that it was not favorable to the Romans, even though another fragment (fr. 38) makes it clear that the Vandals were not recognized for their power over Sicily; it is possible that this treaty was based on the one signed in 442 (Ch. Courtois, Les Vandales et l'Afrique, Paris 1955, p.199).
- ^ John of Antioch, fragment 203; Marcellinus, sa 461; Fasti vindobonenses priores, No 588
- ^ Flynn 1983, p. 111.
- ^ Priscus, fr. 14, De leg. ghent.
- ^ Hodgkin, Thomas (1892). "Book II, Chapter VI"
- ^ Priscus of Panium, fragments 29
- ^ Hydatius, chronicles 208; Anderson 2012, pg. 25
- ^ Hydatius, chronicles 216; Priscus, fr. 10 (in De leg. Rom.).
- ^ Kulikowski 2019, p. 220
- ^ Hydatius, Chronicles 220, 224
- ^ John M. O'Flyn (1983), pg. 116
- ^ a b Ostrogorsky 1956, p. 61.
- ^ Hydatius, Chronicles 234
- ^ Jones, Martindale & Morris 1980, p. 213.
- ^ Bury 1958, p. 337.
- ^ Bury 1923, p. 336.
- ^ a b Bury 1923, pp. 336–337.
- ^ Heather 2007, p. 402.
- ^ a b Kulikowski 2019, p. 224.
- ^ Friell & Williams 2005, pp. 261–262.
- ^ Heather 2007, pp. 401–402.
- ^ Heather 2007, p. 310.
- ^ Procopius, Vand. 1, 6, 25
- ^ O'Flynn 1983, p. 117.
- ^ Heather 2006, p. 406.
- ^ a b Burn 1923, p. 124.
- ^ Cassiodorus, Chron., sub 491; Dracontius, Satisfactio, vv. 213-214.
Bibliography
- Peter Heather (2008), The Fall of the Western Empire 425-76, pag. 5 t/m 32, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- ISBN 978-0-67466-013-7.
- A.D. Lee (2008), The Eastern Empire: Theodosius to Anastasius pag 33-22, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Anderson, W.B. (2012) [1936]. Sidonius: Poems and Letters, Vol. I: Poems, Letters, Book I-II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-99327-3.
- Penny MacGeorge (2002), Late Roman Warlords, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-925244-0.
- John Michael O'Flynn (1983), Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire, University of Alberta, ISBN 0-88864-031-5.