Vitebsk–Orsha offensive

Coordinates: 55°12′N 30°12′E / 55.2°N 30.2°E / 55.2; 30.2
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Vitebsk–Orsha offensive
Part of
Belorussian SSR
55°12′N 30°12′E / 55.2°N 30.2°E / 55.2; 30.2
Result Soviet victory
Belligerents  Germany Soviet Union Soviet UnionCommanders and leaders Georg-Hans Reinhardt (Third Panzer Army)
Kurt von Tippelskirch (Fourth Army) Ivan Bagramyan (1st Baltic Front)
Ivan Chernyakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front)Strength 14 infantry divisions
2 panzer divisions
(exact number of troops unknown) UnknownCasualties and losses 41,700 killed
126 tanks and assault guns destroyed
1,840 motor vehicles
17,800 taken prisoner
[citation needed] 11,014 killed
318 tanks destroyed
113 aircraft shot down
[citation needed]

The Vitebsk–Orsha offensive (Russian: Витебско-Оршанская наступательная операция) was part of the Belorussian strategic offensive of the Red Army in summer 1944, commonly known as Operation Bagration. During the offensive, Soviet troops captured Vitebsk and Orsha. A Soviet breakthrough during the offensive helped achieve the encirclement of German troops in the subsequent Minsk offensive.

Planning

The immediate goals of the Soviet offensive were:

  • Break through the defences of 3rd Panzer Army to the north and south of Vitebsk and encircle the city, which occupied a salient in the German lines.
  • Break through the heavily fortified area around the main Moscow-Minsk highway and liberate the town of Orsha.
  • Commit motorised / cavalry exploitation forces through the gap opened once the highway had been cleared, opening the way for the
    Minsk offensive operation
    .

Soviet intelligence had revealed the depth of the German defences on the

78th Sturm Division
.

Deployments

Wehrmacht

The cities of

78th Sturm Division
(Orsha).

The above units were under the overall command of

Ernst Busch
).

Red Army

Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky was appointed to coordinate the operations of the two Fronts involved.

The offensive

Vitebsk

Army Group Centre's northern flank was defended by the

Hovhannes Bagramyan, and Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front, who were given the task of breaking through the defences to the north and south of Vitebsk
and cutting off the salient.

It was in this sector that Soviet forces had their greatest initial gains. The Soviet

LIII Corps of four divisions, was already serious, as Soviet forces were clearly intending to encircle the city, but no reserves were available to shore up the collapsing defences, and requests to withdraw German troops to the second defense lines, the 'Tiger' line, were denied by the Oberkommando des Heeres
.

By 25 June

206th Infantry Division was ordered to stay in the city and fight to the last man.[2]

Troops of the 158th Rifle Division fighting near the Vitebsk railway station during the assault on the city

Soviet plans in this sector met with overwhelming success. The 4th Luftwaffe Field Division was cut off and destroyed by the 39th Army on the evening of 25 June, and by the next day the 246th Infantry and

6th Luftwaffe Field Divisions, fighting their way along the road from Vitebsk, had also been encircled. Hitler insisted that a staff officer be parachuted into Vitebsk to remind Gollwitzer that the trapped 206th Infantry Division should not withdraw; Third Panzer Army's commander, Reinhardt, was only able to get this decision reversed by insisting on being parachuted in himself if Hitler continued to order it.[3] By the evening Soviet forces were fighting their way into the city and Gollwitzer finally ordered the garrison to withdraw too, in defiance of the Supreme High Command of the German Army
orders.

By 27 June LIII Corps had been dispersed, its 30,000 men being almost all killed or taken prisoner; a group of several thousand from the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division initially managed to break out, but was liquidated in the forests west of Vitebsk.

6th Guards Army in pursuit: VI Corps was also largely destroyed. Third Panzer Army had been effectively shattered within days, and Vitebsk
liberated: even more significantly, a huge gap had been torn in the German lines to the north of Fourth Army in the former VI Corps sector.

Orsha

The central sector of Soviet operations was against the long front of

25th Panzergrenadier Division
holding the lines to the south. As a result of the strong defenses in this sector, Soviet plans included the commitment of heavily armed engineer units to assist in a breakthrough.

Orekhovsk failed.[5]

Völckers's position was further threatened by the near-collapse of the Third Panzer Army's VI Corps, immediately to the north. At 11:20 on 25 June the VI Corps, which had been cut off from its parent formation, was reassigned to Fourth Army.

286th Security Division into the lines.[7]

The operation effectively ceased with the arrival of 5th Guards Tank Army's forward units at the Berezina on 28 June.

Consequences

In terms of its objectives within the broader structure of Operation Bagration, the offensive was a complete success:

  • The two key cities and communication / transport centres of Vitebsk and Orsha were captured.
  • Heavy damage was inflicted on German forces, with the LIII Corps of Third Panzer Army being almost eliminated and other corps suffering high levels of casualties and loss of equipment.
  • The breakthrough of exploitation forces at Orsha, in combination with a similar breakthrough in the south in the parallel
    Minsk offensive operation
    .

External links

Footnotes

  1. ^ Dunn (2000), pp. 1–2.
  2. ^ Zaloga (1996), p. 52.
  3. ^ Mitcham (2001), p. 24.
  4. ^ The Soviet record, given in Glantz, p.85, states that this group was first intercepted by the 179th Rifle Division at Lake Sarro on 26 June, and was eventually destroyed near Iakubovschina on 27 June.
  5. ^ Zaloga (1996), pp. 56–7.
  6. ^ Dunn (2000), p. 149.
  7. ^ Dunn (2000), pp. 149–50.

References

  • Dunn, Walter S. (2000). Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944. Lynne Riener.
    ISBN 9781555878801
    .
  • ISBN 9780415351164
    .
  • ISBN 9780275968564
    .
  • Niepold, Gerd (1987). Battle for White Russia: The destruction of Army Group Centre June 1944. Translated by Simpkin, Richard. London: Brassey's.
    ISBN 9780080336060
    .
  • Zaloga, Steven (1996). Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre.
    ISBN 9781855324787
    .
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