Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg

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Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg
Political partyNazi Party

Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg (October 31, 1905 – October 12, 1946) was a Nazi

Stackelberg leadership model
. Stackelberg became a member of the Nazi Party in 1931 and was a Scharführer (Sergeant) in the SS.

Biography

Stackelberg was born in

Baltic German family of nobility from present-day Estonia. His mother was an Argentinian of Spanish descent. After the October Revolution the family fled to Germany, first to Ratibor and later to Cologne. He studied economics and mathematics at the University of Cologne as an undergraduate. He graduated in 1927 with a thesis on the Quasi-rent in Alfred Marshalls work (German: Die Quasirente bei Alfred Marshall). He continued his studies as a Ph.D. student in economics under Erwin von Beckerath. He graduated in 1930 with a dissertation on cost theory (German: Die Grundlagen einer reinen Kostentheorie), which was published in 1932 in Vienna. In 1934 he finished his habilitation on market structure and equilibrium (German
: Marktform und Gleichgewicht).

After his habilitation he became a lecturer at the University of Cologne. After one semester he accepted a position at the

University of Berlin where he taught until 1941. In 1941, Stackelberg became professor of economics at the University of Bonn. In 1944, Stackelberg left Germany for Spain, where he became a visiting professor at the Complutense University of Madrid. He died of lymphoma in 1946.[1] He is buried in the British Cemetery in Madrid
.

Stackelberg became a member of the Nazi Party in 1931 and became a Scharführer (Sergeant) in the SS in 1933. However, his interactions with many German aristocrats opposed to the Nazi regime (some of whom were within his immediate family), led to his increased disillusionment with that movement to the extent that towards the end of his life he no longer supported it.[2]

Research

The

Cournot game
firms act sequentially, with the leader choosing a quantity first. The follower observes the decision of the leader and chooses his quantity.

There are some further constraints upon the sustaining of a Stackelberg equilibrium. The leader must know

ex ante
that the follower observes his action. The follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg follower action and the leader must know this. Indeed, if the 'follower' could commit to a Stackelberg leader action and the 'leader' knew this, the leader's best response would be to play a Stackelberg follower action.

More generally, in a

Cournot game. The Nash equilibrium
plays an important role in solving the Stackelberg game and other games.

See also

Publications

  • Grundlagen einer reinen Kostentheorie (Foundations of Pure Cost Theory), Vienna, 1932
  • Marktform und Gleichgewicht (Market Structure and Equilibrium),2011, Translated by Bazin, Damien, Hill, Rowland, Urch, Lynn Vienna, 1934 Website for the book
  • Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre (Foundations of Theoretical Economics), Bern, 1948
  • The Theory of the Market Economy, London, 1952
  • Foundations of a Pure Cost Theory, 2014, Translated by Bazin, Damien, Hill, Rowland, Urch, Lynn Website for the book

References

  1. ^ Hans Möller (1949). "Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg und sein Beitrag für die Wirtschaftswissenschaft". Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 105 (3): 395–428.
  2. ^ Ruschmann, Dirk (1999). "Kampf um die Führung". Die Zeit. Retrieved 2007-11-15.