Opération Turquoise
| Opération Turquoise | |
|---|---|
 Map showing the advance of the RPF during the genocide and the location of Zone Turquoise. | |
| Date | 23 June 1994 – 21 August 1994 |
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| Part of a series on the |
| Rwandan genocide |
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Opération Turquoise was a
The charges raised against the French army during Operation Turquoise are of "complicity of genocide and/or complicity of crimes against humanity." The victims allege that French soldiers did nothing to stop the genocide and let Interahamwe militias escape to Zaire after the massacres.[3][4] The former Rwandan ambassador to France and co-founder of the RPF Jacques Bihozagara testified, "Operation Turquoise was aimed only at protecting genocide perpetrators, because the genocide continued even within the Turquoise zone." France has always denied any role in the killing.[4]
Background
On 6 April 1994 Rwandan President
The French had provided the Hutu-dominated Habyarimana government with extensive military, and diplomatic support, including a military intervention to save the government during an offensive by the rebel Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990. Immediately after the genocide began, the RPF began another offensive to overthrow the genocidal government and steadily gained ground. By late June, the RPF controlled much of the country and was nearing a complete victory. RPF units carried out retributive attacks within areas they controlled, but they were not of the scale and organization as those carried out in the genocide.
Implementation
On 19 June, the French government made an announcement of their intentions to organize, establish, and maintain a "safe zone" in the south-west of Rwanda. At the brink of defeat and retreat, the news of an intervention from their allies was broadcast across the country by the genocidaires, with a consequent increase in their confidence, and the continuation of their hunt for genocide survivors.[5] The French said the objectives of Opération Turquoise were:
to maintain a presence pending the arrival of the expanded
On 20 June, France sent a draft resolution to the UNSC for authorization of Operation Turquoise under a two-month Chapter VII mandate. After two days of consultations and the personal approval of the
There was an evacuation of the population westward, enforced by the Hutu regime, now set to flee from the Tutsi rebels, after it had been made clear the French were there to provide only a "safe zone", rather than assistance in the conflict. Unfortunately, there were roadblocks and checkpoints along the way, and the Tutsis left alive, and even Hutus without ID cards, were killed.[8] The outflow of refugees exacerbated the already great numbers of refugees in the region, known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis spilling out of Rwanda, and neighbouring Hutu-Tutsi Burundi, predominantly into Zaire. Approximately, 2.1 million people lived in Zaire in refugee camps. These camps contained the Rwandan state military (FAR) which led to the invasion of Zaire by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, known as the First Congo War.
The area of French influence, known as Zone Turquoise, within the
The force left as the mandate of the operation expired on 21 August. The RPF immediately occupied the region, causing another refugee outflow.
Controversy
Opération Turquoise is controversial for two reasons: accusations that it was a failed attempt to prop up the genocidal Hutu regime and that its mandate undermined the UNAMIR.
The RPF, well aware that French assistance to the government had helped blunt their 1990 offensive, opposed the deployment of a French-led force. By early June, the RPF had managed to sweep through the eastern half of the country and move south and west, while besieging Kigali in the center. The advance resulted in a massive refugee outflow, though the Hutu government was also implicated in encouraging the flight (see Great Lakes refugee crisis.) Regardless, the Zone Turquoise was created in the steadily shrinking areas out of RPF control. The RPF was one of many organisations that noted that the French initiative to safeguard the populace was occurring six weeks after it had become apparent mass killings were occurring in Rwanda. On 22 July, French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur addressed the Security Council, stating that France had a "moral duty" to act without delay and that "without swift action, the survival of an entire country was at stake and the stability of a region seriously compromised."[9]
In May 2006, the Paris
UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire had also opposed the deployment, having sent extensive communication back to U.N. Headquarters that the placement of two U.N.-authorised commands with different mandates and command structures into the same country was problematic. Dallaire was also a strong proponent of strengthening UNAMIR and transitioning it to a Chapter VII mandate, rather than introducing a new organisation. Concern over conflicting mandates led to five countries on the UNSC to abstain in the vote approving the force. The UN-sponsored "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" found it "unfortunate that the resources committed by France and other countries to Operation Turquoise could not instead have been put at the disposal of UNAMIR II." On 21 June, Dallaire replaced 42 UNAMIR peacekeepers from Francophone Congo, Senegal and Togo with UN staff from Kenya after the negative reaction of the RPF to Opération Turquoise. Over the two months of the mandate, there were confrontations, and risk of confrontations, between RPF and French-led units around the zone, during which UNAMIR was asked to convey messages between the two. The UN independent inquiry drily noted that this was "a role which must be considered awkward to say the least."[6]
Notes on the text
- ^ a b Frederick H. Fleitz Jr. (2002), Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s, London: Praeger
- ^ a b Caplan, Gerard, Pambazuka News 142: Rwanda Ten Years After the Genocide: Some Reminders of the International Response to the Crisis Archived 2006-12-18 at the Wayback Machine, Pambazuka News, 5 February 2004
- ^ a b "Validation des plaintes visant l'armée française au Rwanda." Press Release. Reuters.Online posting. Libération France 29 May 2006.
- ^ a b c "France accused on Rwanda killings", BBC News, 24 October 2006
- ^ Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p. 426.
- ^ a b The United Nations Organisation, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UK: UWE, archived from the original on 2006-04-16
- ^ "Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention That Never Happened | The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance". Sites.tufts.edu. 1998-02-15.
- ^ Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p. 439.
- ^ a b Rwanda: ‘Genocidal slaughter’ claims as many as 1 million — UN authorises ‘Operation Turquoise’ to protect displaced persons, UN Chronicle, Vol 4 (1994)
- ^ Meredith, Martin (2005), "27", The State of Africa, London: The Free Press
- ^ cf [1], fichier auditio1.rtf, p.94
- ^ Power, A Problem from Hell, p. 380
- ^ Tribunal aux Armées de Paris — TAP (in French), FR: Défense
References
- Dallaire, R. (2004), Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, London: Arrow Books, ISBN 978-0-09-947893-5
- de Guillebon, Hugues (April 2023). "Une saison en enfer: Opération Turquoise, 22 juin-22 août 1994, première partie" [A Season in Hell: Operation Turquoise, 22 June–22 August 1994, part 1]. Le Fana de l'Aviation (in French) (641): 50–61. ISSN 0757-4169.
- de Guillebon, Hugues (May 2023). "Une saison en enfer: Opération Turquoise, 22 juin-22 août 1994, deuxième partie" [A Season in Hell: Operation Turquoise, 22 June–22 August 1994, part 2]. Le Fana de l'Aviation (in French) (642): 46–57. ISSN 0757-4169.
- Power, S. (2004), A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (1st ed.), New York: Harper Perennial, ISBN 0-06-054164-4
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