Tây Sơn military tactics and organization
The
Background
In early 1771 large numbers of the - mainly rural - population in the
The Tây Sơn brothers considered themselves champions of the people and received widespread popular support from the peasantry, from indigenous highland tribes, ethnic Chinese sea traders and troops of the Ly Tai and Dinh families. Leader Nguyễn Huệ announced that the idea was to end feudal oppression, remove corrupt officials and redistribute land, reunite the country and restore the legitimate Lê emperor to power. Patriotism, a just cause, rules and policies implemented to enforce fair, egalitarian treatment and food distribution for all, provided a solid moral basis and stood in stark contrast to the oppressive exploitation of the feudal regime of the landlords.
Organization
In 1788 the army strength had risen to a total of around 100,000 troops,[1] 100 to 300 War Elephants and about 350 cannons.
Unit Type[2] | Number of Troops[2] |
---|---|
Đội (navy force call other name: Thuyền) | 60–100 |
Cơ | 300–500 |
Đạo | 1,500–2,500 |
Doanh | ~15.000 |
The size and strength of the different unit types, called Đội, Cơ, Đạo and Doanh varies, depended on a number of factors, such as the function, the terrain and the tactical location that the unit occupied. Typically, a Đội contained between 60 and 100 men, a Cơ between 300 and 500 soldiers, and a Đạo between 1.500 and 2.500. The structure of the armies of the Lê dynasty, the Trịnh and the Nguyễn is not significantly different.[3]
The Doanh and the Đạo were mixed land units that included elements of infantry, artillery, cavalry and elephantry (as part of a modern combat unit).
There were 673 ships and vessels that had been accounted for, run by 53.250 marine soldiers under the command of admiral Vũ Văn Dũng.[4][5] Large vessels served to carry troops, food and equipment, as the light and flexible boats were used for actual combat.
Types of Tay Son warships | |||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Type-1 battleship[6] | 5 to 9 battleships, 600 to 700 men, equipped with 50 to 60 24-pounder cannons
The largest Tây Sơn ship, the "Định Quốc" was a Type-1 - defined as a mobile fort in the Hoàng Lê nhất thống chí booklet | ||||||||||||||||||||
Type-2 battleship | 40 battleships, 200 men, equipped with 16 12-pounder cannons
a versatile and swift ship, used as attack craft and for rapid troop transports | ||||||||||||||||||||
Type-3 battleship | 93 battleboats, 200 men, equipped with a single large artillery piece, that fired a 16,3 kg shot | ||||||||||||||||||||
Type-4 battleship | - 300 gunboats, 50 men, equipped with 1 small cannon. | ||||||||||||||||||||
Type-5 battleship | 100 sailing boats, 70 men
Any other type of small boats. |
The Type-4 battleship and Type-5 battleship were small but easy to handle and very useful for riverine combat. Equipped with oars, its crews were trained in river navigation and long distance troop transportation.
In 1788,
Laurent André Barisy, a French naval officer in Nguyễn lords service, reported on the forces of the Tây Sơn fleet led by Vũ Văn Dũng as follows:
"This force consists of 673 vessels, that include large warships armed with cannon and crew comparable to the largest Western-style warships of
Jeaptiste Chaigneau, in
In a letter to Letondal on April 11, 1801, concerning the naval Battle of Thị Nại, Barizy states that the Tây Sơn navy had 4,800 transport boats in the Thị Nại harbor.
List of Tây Sơn commanders
Naval commanders: |
Military policies and strategies
During the
On June 25, 1786, La Bartette states in a letter to Blandin; "They destroyed the finest churches, also all their temples where they captured all the monks and took them to battle."
Aware of the fact that discipline is the basis for military strength,
Bertette and Dousssain, who had been evangelizing in Thuận Hóa for a long time, wrote in a letter dated June 11, 1788, Nguyễn Huệ sometimes dispatched between two and three hundred thousand troops.[7]
The Tây Sơn armies avoided clashing with larger armies and only engaged in combat when victory was certain. Only after the
Tây Sơn tactics
Caution, concealment and reconnaissance
During the Tây Sơn army advance in preparation of the clash with the Siamese army,
Choose a favorable terrain
For the
Night combat
One of the most unconventional Tây Sơn tactics was to conduct combat operations during the middle of the night and disengage before dawn. The Tây Sơn troops would spend the day hidden in secret shelters and only struck again, when the situation was advantageous for successful combat.[9]
Feint
During their first campaign in Northern Vietnam, the Tây Sơn navy was besieged by
On December 20, 1788, Tây Sơn reinforcements under the command of Nguyễn Huệ (who was by then Quang Trung emperor) advanced to the Tam Điệp mountains. His generals Ngô Văn Sở, Ngô Thời Nhiệm and Phan Văn Lân, they are apology their mistake, cause suddenly withdrawal when the Qing army attacked Thăng Long. Quang Trung smiled:
"Withdrawal to evade the enemy in their time overflowing power, encourages general morale, and builds arrogance in the enemy force, luring the enemy into our trap. That way is good. You all (Quang Trung's generals) have made no mistake. They have come here (Đại Việt) to buy death, and I am going to give it to them." ("Lui quân để tránh thế giặc, trong khuyến khích tướng sĩ, ngoài làm cho giặc phấn khích, kiêu ngạo, dụ địch vào chỗ hiểm yếu của ta như thế là phải. Các khanh không có tội chi cả. Chúng nó sang đây là mua lấy cái chết đó thôi, ta đã định mẹo cả rồi".)[10]
To make more arrogant in the Qing army, Quang Trung make an order to Trần Danh Bình lead a group eight people, they carried gifts and letters to Sun Shiyi conjured him stop his troops, and listen to understand clearly reasons: "why Tây Sơn had to subvert Lê dynasty". And they also returned to Sun Shiyi 40 Chinese mans. All man was captured by Đắc Thiện Tống pirates commander, after that time, Tây Sơn troops captured him. But Sun Shiyi was beheaded both Trần Danh Bình, and Đắc Thiện Tống. Kept in all messengers to prison. During this time, Quang Trung secret to preparing attack, deciding a plan to kick Qing enemy inside Đại Việt get out their territory. On the morning of December 30, before begin attack, Quang Trung said:
"We came to enemy place, they do not know when they sleeping but we awake, we hit the enemy not in case that mean we massacre the enemy in empty hand, we definitely win..." ("Ta đến mà địch không biết là địch ngủ ta thức, ta đánh mà địch không đề phòng là ta chém kẻ tay không. Ta nhất định thắng...")
That secret factors, the Qing army did not clear the strength of the Tây Sơn, and more disdain, so when Qing army under attack they can not repulse Tây Sơn army.
Ambushes and combined forces
Preparations for the Battle of Rach Gam-Xoai Mut very well illustrate to how deep Nguyễn Huệ's tactical plannings went. In advance he sent field observers to study and fully understand the laws and tidal phases of river, the characteristics of channels, creeks, estuaries and the terrain on both river banks. He deployed selected forces in the area in advance. In accord with the order of deployment for the elite naval forces, he arranged the most effective concentration of artillery and mobile troops on both sides, ready to attack the front and the rear of Siamese forces, that entered the combat zone. The Tây Sơn also had been trained to carry out combined maneuvers of the navy forces in the rivers, creeks and branches and the infantry, operating on the river banks and the surrounding ground.[11]
Rapid movement
The French Clergyman Le Breton wrote in a letter on August 2, 1788: "As it happened Nguyen Hue returned to Phu Xuan in early July. He had rushed his troops so fast that many of his soldiers died of fatigue and heat. Even the elephants and horses, they died too."
According to Nguyễn Huệ's own account he once led an infantry and cavalry contingent in a 10 days march from
Surprise attack
Not only did attack speed,[13] Quang Trung's twin tactic was to attack suddenly, to strike at unbelievable times, preventing their defenses from leading to defeat.[9]
In the offensive in 1786, while the commander of Trịnh army was out of alert, the Tây Sơn troops began their journey on 28 April lunar month, that 25 May 1786.
On December 20, 1789, Tây Sơn troops came to Ninh Bình. After reviewing the situation, Quang Trung told his soldiers that in just 10 days, Qing army would be cleaned up. Qing army and Lê Chiêu Thống are in preparation for the Tết holiday, which is not well protected, plus Sun Shiyi's arrogance makes them really surprised. Soon, within six days of the Lunar New Year, the Tây Sơn troops destroyed the Qing army. At 5th Lunar New Year in 1789, Tây Sơn troops entered Thang Long. Sun Shiyi warriors run away, on the road running successively defeated by Tây Sơn soldiers. Finally, Sun Shiyi and Lê Chiêu Thống run away to China.
Take advantage of nominal
The Tây Sơn used psychological warfare to gain the support of the masses and the youth to join the army. First of all, in the new stage of setting up the Tây Sơn uprising against Trương Phúc Loan to support Nguyễn lords. So that, they was have belief of lord and many people.
In the later stage, using the name "Phù Lê diệt Trịnh", Nguyễn Huệ talk Nguyễn Hữu Chỉnh moved to the North.
List wars and battles
- First Tây Sơn-Nguyễn lords war
- Tây Sơn attacks Cambodia
- Battle of Rạch Gầm-Xoài Mút
- Tây Sơn-Trịnh lords war
- Battle of Ngọc Hồi-Đống Đa
- Tây Sơn invade Laos
- Second Tây Sơn-Nguyễn lords
Notes
References
References
- ^ a b "Hoàng Đế Quang Trung ra bắc". Nghiên Cứu Lịch Sử (in Vietnamese). 7 January 2014. Archived from the original on 2018-11-19. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ a b "Đôi nét về tổ chức quân đội Tây Sơn". báo Bình Định (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2019-07-03. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ "TÌM HIỂU THIÊN TÀI QUÂN SỰ CỦA NGUYỄN HUỆ (PHẦN 1)". votrandaiviet (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2018-08-21. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ "Bí mật sức mạnh thủy quân Tây Sơn của 'Hoàng đế biển cả' Quang Trung (P.1)". Đại Kỷ Nguyên (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2018-08-21. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ "Sức mạnh không thể tin nổi của thủy quân Tây Sơn". ssoha (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2019-07-08. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ "Hoàng Sa, Trường Sa thời Tây Sơn (1786 - 1802)". Tạp chí Quốc phòng toàn dân (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2018-08-21. Retrieved 20 September 2018.
- ^ Viện Lịch sử Việt Nam (en: Vietnam Institute of History) (1992), pp. 155-156.
- ^ Nguyễn Lương Bích, Phạm Ngọc Phụng (1976), pp. 265-266.
- ^ a b "Tài dụng binh của vua Quang Trung". Khúc quân hành (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2018-09-27. Retrieved 27 September 2018.
- ^ a b "Quang Trung - Nguyễn Huệ với chiến thuật nghi binh, dụ địch". Báo Bình Định (in Vietnamese). Archived from the original on 2019-08-03. Retrieved 23 September 2018.
- ^ Tạp chí quốc phòng toàn dân, ngày đăng 20 tháng 1 năm 2015, Nghệ thuật kết hợp tác chiến thủy, bộ trong trận Rạch Gầm - Xoài Mút (năm 1785), tapchiqptd.vn
- ^ "Tài dùng binh của Nguyễn Huệ (tt): Hành quân thần tốc (tt) và chiến tranh cách mạng". Dòng tên Việt Nam. Retrieved 10 Oct 2018.
- ^ Trần Trọng Kim, p. 373.
- ^ Nguyễn Lương Bích, Phạm Ngọc Phụng, p. 113.
- ^ a b Khâm định Việt sử Thông giám cương mục, book 46.
- ^ Nguyễn Lương Bích, Phạm Ngọc Phụng, p. 148.
Book
Vietnamese language:
- Khâm định Việt sử Thông giám cương mục.
- Nguyễn Lương Bích, Phạm Ngọc Phụng (1976), Tìm hiểu thiên tài quân sự của Nguyễn Huệ, Quân đội Nhân dân Publishing House.
- Nguyễn Việt – Vũ Minh Giang – Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng (1983), Quân thủy trong lịch sử chống ngoại xâm, Quân đội Nhân dân Publishing House.
- Trần Trọng Kim (1920), Việt Nam sử lược, Tân Việt Publishing House, ed.1968.
- Vietnam Institute of History, Quang Trung Nguyễn Huệ với chiến thắng Ngọc Hồi-Đống Đa, Quân đội Nhân dân Publishing House, 1992.