Tampico Affair
Tampico Affair | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United States | Mexico | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Henry T. Mayo | Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
9 sailors | ~10 infantry |
History of Mexico |
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Timeline |
Mexico portal |
The Tampico Affair began as a minor incident involving
Background
In the midst of the Mexican Revolution, General Victoriano Huerta became President of Mexico following a coup to oust the democratically-elected president,
By the spring of 1914, relations between the US and Mexico were strained.
During his State of the Union address on 2 Dec. 1913, Wilson stated, "There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority." In early 1914, Wilson lifted the arms embargo, which allowed the Constitutionalists to buy arms. With these moves, Wilson was moving closer to intervention.[5]
Mayo's
On 6 April, Constitutionalist rebel forces, under the command of Col. Emiliano J. Nafarrete, occupied La Barra, Doña Cecilia, and Arbol Grande. General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, Tamaulipas governor and commander of the Federal Army garrison, and nephew of the late Mexican military hero and Secretary of the Army and Navy Ignacio Zaragoza, sent his gunboat Veracruz to shell the rebel forces behind the oil tanks. Mayo sent a letter to both parties stating he would remain neutral, but to protect American lives and property, he would "take all necessary steps." Mayo then evacuated several Americans, but refused to land troops to protect the American-owned refinery. After additional rebel attacks on 7 and 8 April at the Iturbide Bridge, the foreign population sought refuge on the US Navy ships, the German cruiser SMS Dresden, and British cruiser HMS Hermione. Clarence Miller, US consul in Tampico, sent an urgent request for help in evacuating the American population within the city. Then, on the evening of 8 April, a marine courier for the US consulate was detained but soon released.[3]: 14–18
Running short on gasoline for an auxiliary engine, Dolphin's Capt. Ralph Earle visited the US consulate on 9 April, where he arranged a purchase from a German civilian, Max Tyron. Capt. Earle was to arrange delivery from Tyron's dock. However, the dock was located in close proximity to the Iturbide Bridge.[3]: 20
Conflict
Capt. Earle ordered Ensign Charles C. Copp to take a whaleboat, and crew, to pick up coal from Tyron's dock. Though flying the US colors fore and aft, the US Navy sailors were unarmed and unable to speak Spanish. While loading the fuel, the sailors were surrounded by an armed squad of Zaragoza's soldiers. Two sailors, Coxswain G.H. Siefert and Seaman J.P. Harrington, were still on board the American whaleboat, but they too were taken at gunpoint. All were taken to Col. Ramón H. Hinojosa's headquarters. He released the Americans to continue reloading their gasoline, but they were not allowed to leave until permission was received from Zaragoza.[3]: 21–23 [6][7]
Max Tyron informed Capt. Earle and Admiral Mayo aboard the Dolphin, and Mayo ordered Earle to seek his men's release under strong protest. Earle, accompanied by Clarence Miller, met with Zaragoza who apologized, explaining his men were "evidently ignorant of the first laws of war." Within an hour of their arrest, the whaleboat had returned to Dolphin. Ensign Copp was faulted by Mayo for allowing his men to be taken from a US vessel. Mayo viewed the incident as an insult to US sovereignty, requiring reparation. Mayo had Commander William A. Moffett deliver a note to Zaragoza stating, "taking men from a boat flying the American flag is a hostile act, not to be excused." Mayo further demanded a "formal disavowal", that the responsible officer "receive severe punishment," and "that you hoist the American flag in a prominent position on shore and salute it with 21 guns, which salute will be duly returned by this ship."[3]: 23–25
Morelos Zaragoza referred the matter to the Mexican Ministry of War in Mexico City. When Wilson heard of the matter from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, Wilson responded, "Mayo could not have done otherwise," and further, "...unless the guilty persons are promptly punished consequences of gravest sort might ensue..."[3]: 32
On 12 April, Huerta stated, via Ruiz to O'Shaughnessy, that since Zaragoza had apologized and arrested Hinojosa, the US had "ample satisfaction." The Mexican government would not apologize further, nor salute the US flag. Huerta called these "humiliating terms...carrying courtesy to that point would be equivalent to accepting the sovereignty of a foreign state to the derogation of national dignity and decorum, which the president is disposed to have respected in any case." O'Shaughnessy told Ruiz that Wilson might need to "uphold our national dignity, even with armed force, if necessary."[3]: 44–45
On 13 April, Wilson told reporters, "The salute will be fired." On 14 April, Wilson ordered the Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Charles Johnston Badger, to Mexican waters. Huerta stated, "Is it a calamity? No. It is the best thing that could happen to us." On 15 April, Wilson stated regarding the Mexico situation, there had been "many cases...of the flouting of the rights of US citizens or the dignity of the government of the United States, and no attempt at either reparation or correction." On 16 April, Washington was notified that Huerta had agreed to a simultaneous salute, signifying "satisfaction with which the two countries see the happy end of a conflict which has at no time been really serious." Yet Wilson decided the US fleet would stay to prevent any ..."manifestations of ill-will and contempt for the United States which Huerta has exhibited in the past," and misunderstood Huerta's meaning of simultaneous. When simultaneous was finally understood, Wilson opposed the idea, and fleet orders remained the same. Huerta maintained he had done "everything he was obliged to do." On 18 April, Wilson stated he would see Congress, "with a view of taking such actions as may be necessary to enforce the respect due to the nation's flag," if Mexico did not fire the salute by the next day.[3]: 48–51, 53, 60–62, 65
Aftermath
President Wilson sought Congressional approval for the use of armed forces on 20 April. In particular, Wilson advocated "taking Vera Cruz," to get rid of Huerta and his illegitimate authority. Wilson received Congressional approval that evening, and ordered landings at Veracruz, so as to seize the Custom house, and intercept an expected arms shipment for Huerta's forces.[5][9][10][3]: 69–77
In the ensuing
In January 1917, Germany sent the so-called Zimmermann Telegram, which implied that a Mexican alliance with Germany against the US would result in Mexico regaining territory taken from it by the US in prior wars and that Germany's forthcoming unrestricted submarine warfare campaign would guarantee defeat of the British and French. The British interception of Zimmermann's telegram and the German unrestricted submarine warfare against US merchant ships soon afterward, were effectively both final justifications that President Wilson needed to request a declaration of war against Germany, in April 1917.[20]
Anti-American sentiment in Mexico from the Tampico incident was the chief reason that the Mexican government remained neutral in World War I.[21] Mexico refused to participate with the US military excursion in Europe and granted full guarantees to German companies for keeping their operations open, specifically in Mexico City.[22]
President Wilson considered another military invasion of Veracruz and Tampico in 1917–1918,[23][24] to take control of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the shortest overland route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the Tampico oil fields.[24][25] The relatively-new Mexican president, Venustiano Carranza, threatened to destroy the oil fields in case the Marines landed there.[26][27]
See also
References
- ^ C.V, DEMOS, Desarrollo de Medios, S. A. de (2 January 2015). "La Jornada: Victoriano Huerta: de dictador a fantasma para turistas y propiedad del estado de Texas". www.jornada.com.mx.
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- ^ ISBN 9780393003901.
- ^ "Wilsonian Missionary Diplomacy – Intervention in Mexico". Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ ISBN 9780307277909.
- ^ a b Logbook of USS Dolphin
- ISBN 978-0875866635.
- ^ a b "Nelson O'Shaughnessy - People - Department History – Office of the Historian". history.state.gov. Retrieved 2020-12-02.
- ^ "The Washington Times, April 18, 1914". p. 10. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ "More Battleships Ordered to Mexico". The New York Sun. 23 April 1914. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ Alan McPherson (2013) Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America, p. 393, ABC-CLIO, U.S.
- ^ Susan Vollmer (2007) Legends, Leaders, Legacies, p. 79, Biography & Autobiography, U.S.
- ^ Shepherd, William G. (24 April 1914). "Blind with Anger Huerta Allowed Mobs to Riot in Mexico". The Day Book. Chicago. Image 4. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ "New Appeal from Ensenada". The New York Sun. 25 April 1914. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ "Army and Navy Orders". The Washington Times. 24 April 1914. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ John Whiteclay Chambers & Fred Anderson (1999) The Oxford Companion to American Military History, p. 432, Oxford University Press, England.
- ^ Michael Small (2009) The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914, p. 35, University of Ottawa, Canada.
- ^ "Rescue Party Off for West Coast Monday". The Bisbee Daily Review (Arizona). 28 April 1914. Archived from the original on 10 December 2014. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
- ^ "71 US Warships Operating in Mexico". El Paso Herald. 4 May 1914. Retrieved 27 November 2014.
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- ^ Lee Stacy (2002) Mexico and the United States, Volume 3, p. 869, Marshall Cavendish, US
- ^ Jürgen Buchenau (2004) Tools of Progress: A German Merchant Family in Mexico City, 1865–present, p. 82, UNM Press, US
- ^ Ernest Gruening (1968) Mexico and Its Heritage, p. 596, Greenwood Press, US
- ^ a b Drew Philip Halevy (2000) Threats of Intervention: U.S.–Mexican Relations, 1917–1923, p. 41, iUniverse, US
- ^ Lorenzo Meyer (1977) Mexico and the United States in the oil controversy, 1917–1942, p. 45, University of Texas Press, US
- ^ Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, Armando Razo (2003) The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929, p. 201, Cambridge University Press, UK.
- ^ Lorenzo Meyer (1977) Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942, p. 44, University of Texas Press, US