Treaty of Naples (1639)
Treaty of Naples was a political-military agreement between the
Spain and Poland until mid-1630s
Until the
The new Polish king Władysław IV, crowned in 1632, resumed the plans harbored by his father. In 1634 he sent a special envoy to Madrid.[10] Apart from usual negotiations on the Sforza heritage, the talks focused on compensation for the Polish fleet lost to the Swedes when nominally at the service of Felipe IV and ensuring Spanish posts and pension for two royal brothers.[11] The main point, however, was Spanish financial support for future Polish military effort against Sweden, since 1630 the formal belligerent in the Thirty Years' War. The Polish-Swedish 1629 Altmark truce was to expire in 1635 and the Polish monarch was considering renewal of the conflict. In 1634 Władysław sent another envoy,[12] and in 1635 another one followed.[13] Until that time Madrid adopted an ambiguous stand; the Spaniards politely listened to Polish demands, but there were no tangible results. This changed in the spring of 1635, when two envoys were agreed to travel to Warsaw.[14] However, they did not realize the urgency. French envoys, sent from Paris at approximately the same time but with opposite objectives, travelled by sea and arrived in Poland in May 1635 just in time to secure prolongation of the Altmark truce in Stuhmsdorf.[15] The Spaniards travelled by land and with many detours; they reached the king in Vilnius in August 1636.[16] It was there that they first proposed that an army be raised in Poland to join the fighting in ranks of the Catholic League.[17]
Vasas, Habsburgs and the French (1637–1639)
The year of 1637 produced what seemed like an emerging alliance between the Habsburgs and the Polish Vasas. Madrid granted pension to two royal brothers and conferred upon prince John Casimir the Toisón d’Or order. Before leaving Warsaw the Spanish envoy Vázquez de Miranda has also agreed to pay compensation for the fleet lost in Wismar and interests on Sforza's heritage,[18] though there was no tangible result when it comes to a job for the Polish prince;[19] only vague concepts about his role in command of the Mediterranean fleet or an army in Flanders were floated.[20] The major step, however, was related to the emperor. The Vienna Habsburgs and the Warsaw Vasas agreed on a so-called Family Pact. Władysław IV and the emperor Ferdinand III were cousins, as mother of the Polish king was sister to emperor Ferdinand II. However, in line with the pact they became also brothers-in-law, as Władysław IV was agreed to marry Cecilia Renata of Austria, the sister of Ferdinand III. Though the agreement sealed some heritage and succession issues and did not cover military co-operation, it seemed that following years of indecision, the king of Poland was firmly leaning towards Vienna instead of Paris.
In early 1638 prince John Casimir left Poland for Spain; it is not entirely clear whether Madrid and Warsaw had agreed on his future role on the Iberian Peninsula or whether he travelled to speed negotiations up. During his stay in Vienna the Paris press broke the news on his future appointment as
Madrid and Warsaw decide to enter military talks (1639)
While the Poles sought a peaceful way to free the prince, the Spaniards were pondering upon seizing the opportunity and as suggested back in 1636, they renewed the concept of getting the Poles engaged militarily against the French, possibly in Flanders.[29] Felipe IV sent to Warsaw another envoy;[30] it was Fernando de Monroy, nephew of the Spanish ambassador in Vienna marqués de Castañeda and already resident in the Austrian capital. He arrived in Warsaw in the spring of 1639 and found Władysław IV not only upset with the French and frustrated with futile Italian mediation, but also adopting an increasingly belligerent attitude.[31] Details of Monroy's talks in Poland are not known and it is not clear who he spoke to, yet the key of his partners was Adam Kazanowski, personal friend of the king[32] and high official at the court. When discussing raising of the army to engage along the Habsburgs he identified 3 options possible: that the Polish diet approves of the plan and the king leads the troops himself, that the diet rejects the plan and a royal brother leads the troops under the Vasa standard, and that in case John Casimir is freed from French custody, troops are raised and sent under the Habsburg colors.[33]
During or shortly after Monroy's mission the Polish king decided to explore the path proposed by Madrid and to start talks on military co-operation, potentially aimed against the French. Some time in mid-1639 Bivoni, still on the Apennine Peninsula, had his powers extended accordingly and he moved further south.
Spanish and Polish objectives
In 1637–1638 the Habsburgs recorded a string of defeats, including rupture of
The Polish objectives are far less clear. Following wars against
Treaty of Naples (1639)
Negotiations were held in Naples by Bivoni on behalf of Władysław IV and by Medina de las Torres in name of Felipe IV; other personalities were also involved, like the Polish internuncio in Naples.[51] It is known that the two started talking already in August 1639; however, Medina was fully empowered by Consejo de Estado no earlier than in November 1639.[52] It is not clear when both negotiators arrived at an agreement; one scholar claims the talks were closed by the year-end but provides no date.[53] Exact format of the compromise is not known though it was formalized on paper and signed;[54] neither the original nor a copy has been found in Spanish or Polish archives, and its contents are referred after later correspondence.[55] However, scholars refer firmly to “Tratado de Nápoles”, “traktat sojuszniczy” or “układ neapolitański”.[56]
The treaty envisioned raising an army in Poland.[57] The force was to be formed by 12,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry. They were to be accompanied by usual support and logistics units, not intended for combat, though estimates of strength of the entire army differ between 22,000[58] and almost 60,000 men.[59] They were to be commanded by Polish officers and appear officially as the army at the service of the Polish king. The troops were to be transported by land from Poland to Flanders; details were not specified. Once there, the troops would join the army commanded by Cardenal Infante and engage in combat against the French, which would technically put Poland on wartime footing against France. It was agreed the Poland would neither conclude a separatist peace with France nor return any seized territory to the French without prior agreement with the Spaniards.[60] In return, viceroy of Naples in name of Felipe IV was to pay the Polish king 500,000 Neapolitan escudos.[61]
It was also agreed – though it is not clear whether appropriate stipulations were included in the treaty itself – that on the Spanish side execution of treaty would be co-ordinated by 3 individuals. The financials were entrusted to Medina de las Torres, to be handled by infrastructure controlled by the Kingdom of Naples. The embassy in Vienna, headed by marqués de Castañeda, was supposed to negotiate the passage of Polish troops across the empire and manage relations with the Vienna court. Finally, an Italian in Spanish diplomatic service, a certain Allegretto de Allegretti, who for some time has been serving as a link between the Vienna embassy and Warsaw, was to supervise recruitment and organization of the troops in Poland. The army was supposed to be ready by late spring of 1640 and to cross the empire during the summer, to pass under the Spanish command later.[62] Though the Vienna diplomacy was informed about the developments, they were not consulted on specific issues and did not participate in the negotiations.
Implementation of the treaty (1640)
In early 1640 Medina transferred 430,000 ducats to Castañeda in Vienna for further processing[63] and in March he notified Madrid that the first installment had been paid.[64] At the time Allegretti was already in Warsaw and reported problems. King Władysław IV pointed to procedural issues which allegedly made ratification of the treaty unfeasible.[65] In the spring a Polish mission in Paris secured liberation of Jan Kazimierz following 2 years in custody; in return, the Vasas pledged not to engage militarily against the French.[66] Some scholars believe that liberation of the prince was immediate result of the Naples talks, which by the time were already no secret, though this remains disputable speculation only.[67] In line with earlier agreement the Spaniards expected that works on implementation of the Treaty of Naples go on, and Bivoni ensured them that this was indeed the case.[68] However, there was no visible progress in terms of actual recruitment.
In late spring Madrid decided to send to Poland a military who would professionally assess the state of affairs; the person chosen was Pedro Roco de Villagutiérrez, cavalry captain at the service of Cardenal Infante in Flanders. He travelled from
Given the stalemate, Bivoni and Monroy suggested payments to key Polish officials to get the deal executed;[73] apart from Kazanowski the person identified as key decision-maker was Jerzy Ossoliński,[74] an experienced statesman handling a number of diplomatic tasks.[75] Though the Spaniards initially considered paying both Kazanowski and Ossoliński,[76] they eventually decided to focus on the former; the sum intended for him (including the markup for Bivoni) was 20,000 thaler. However, this helped little. In mid-1640 Bivoni told Medina that in new circumstances, the deal had to be re-negotiated.[77] The viceroy of Naples firmly opposed re-opening of closed agreement,[78] but Madrid was in increasingly difficult position. Apart from a string of military defeats there was a rebellion in Catalonia and tension was running high in Portugal; Medina was instructed to talk. In the meantime, problems with implementation of the treaty led to two personal changes. Castañeda had to leave the Vienna embassy, charged by Medina with mishandling the issue.[79] Bivoni – who according to hints of the Warsaw officials might have exceeded his powers[80] – was also recalled; he was replaced by Maciej Tytlewski,[81] who arrived in Naples in late 1640.[82]
New treaty (1641)
Renewed negotiations between Tytlewski and Medina took place in late 1640 and early 1641; they were concluded in February. Again, there is no formal document identified in the archives and it is not at all certain that such document has ever been signed.[83] However, Spanish scholars refer formally to the agreement as “segundo Tratado de Nápoles” or – given final touches were added later in Warsaw – as “Tratado de Varsovia” and “acuerdo de Varsovia”;[84] Polish scholars refer somewhat more vaguely to “kolejne porozumienie”.[85]
The February 1641 agreement made a few important changes to the Treaty of Naples. The first was about reducing the army; troops to be raised numbered 13,000 combat-ready men. The force of 9,000 cavalry consisted of 3,000 heavy-weight
Scholars note that businesswise, the Polish king made an excellent deal. A winged hussar in regular Polish wartime service was paid annually 164 złoty; in emperor's service and under Spanish command he would cost 30 thaler monthly, equivalent to some 1,080 złoty annually.[90] Similar differences were involved in case of a cossack (24 thaler monthly) and an infantryman (12 thaler monthly). All this came on top of one-off recruitment cost, also to be covered by the Spaniards: 40 thaler for a hussar, 30 thaler for a cossack and 16 thaler for an infantryman,[91] and on top of the 230,000-thaler fee agreed as political cost of the deal, to be pocketed by the treasury of Władysław IV. Despite the higher cost and extra conditions attached, Medina seemed satisfied with the deal and he reported it to Felipe IV as a success. To avoid problems which followed the 1639 treaty – for which Medina blamed Castañeda and his envoy Allegretti – this time the viceroy of Naples sent his own representative to Warsaw to supervise the implementation. The person chosen was Vicenzo Tuttavilla, duca de Calabritto,[92] a military man who later grew to high commander in the army of the Kingdom of Naples.[93]
Failed implementation proceedings (1641–1642)
When Tuttavilla arrived in Warsaw in the spring of 1641 he found himself engaged in diplomatic struggle against a team of French envoys, who worked to prevent the Vasa rapprochement with the Habsburgs and ensure Polish neutrality in the Thirty Years' War. He could have reported partial success, as Władysław IV refused to ratify the 1640 agreement with Richelieu, which pledged not to engage Polish troops against the French. However, there was little follow-up of the Naples agreement, either in terms of approval by the diet or in terms of actual recruitment. In June 1641 Tytlewski presented Medina with a letter from the Polish king. It included numerous demands presented as conditions of implementation: payment of interests on the Sforza heritage and appropriate arrangements for Ducado di Bari and Principato di Rossano, compensation for the Wismar fleet and nomination of John Casimir to virrey de Portugal. Moreover, Władysław IV asked that 400,000-thaler-fee, originally to be paid only in case Poland gets engaged in a war against Sweden, Russia or Turkey is paid unconditionally. Despite this blow, Medina still considered the deal negotiable and was principally concerned about the financials.[94]
Kazanowski, who by the time has pocketed large sums from the Spaniards and was personally implicated in the deal, maintained that there was a high chance of success; in early autumn of 1641 he claimed having support of 48 senators with only few more needed to be won over.[95] However, he was getting less and less credible; some Spaniards claimed that they were betting on the wrong horse and that Ossoliński should have been their man.[96] In late 1641 the emperor Ferdinand III declared that no Polish army would be allowed to pass through his lands; Madrid sent Marqués de Castelo Rodrigo to Vienna to negotiate, but the envoy was only treated to suggestions that the entire deal be abandoned, with cheaper recruitment options in Denmark or Silesia.[97] The position of Medina himself, the chief negotiator of the deal, was also becoming fragile; his political ally Cardinal Infante passed away and he was left relying solely on his family relation to Olivares.[98] His personal prestige at stake, he kept claiming that all was negotiable and suggested that perhaps the Poles be used against the rebels in Catalonia, [99] or at least recruit cossacks against pro-French Catalans in Reapers' War.[100] Tuttavilla kept discussing terms of transit and in January 1642 he agreed on further details, supposed to make the passage of Poles acceptable to the emperor.[101] However, at this point Madrid declared the entire deal unworkable and Medina was notified accordingly. The Poles were told that opposition on part of the emperor cancelled the project, while money originally intended for Warsaw was transferred to Flanders.[102]
Political and historiographic evaluation
In the aftermath of failed negotiations Spanish officials remained positive that the deal had been feasible and that errors on part of their diplomacy prevented the implementation. Medina was very critical about Castañeda and claimed the Vienna ambassador mishandled his mission, namely that appointment of Allegretti allowed the Poles to believe the treaty was negotiable.[103] Marqués de la Fuente suggested the Spaniards relied on the wrong man in Warsaw.[104] Following the later unrelated conflict of 1644 between the Poles and Medina in Naples, which contributed to his dismissal from the virrey position, some in Madrid started to harbor doubts about negotiating skills of Medina himself.[105]
Spanish authors present the episode very much in terms of Poles bent on extracting as much money from the Spanish crown as possible. Accordingly, they attribute final collapse of the project to financial problems of Felipe IV, who was unable to pay for his ambitions.[106] Another factor listed as contributing to failure was position adopted by the emperor; always skeptical about transit of the Poles across his territory; in key moments he refused the right of passage and effectively buried the project.[107] Finally, it is noted that given Poland's deteriorating relations with Turkey, Warsaw turned its attention towards the South-East.[108]
Polish historians have doubts about intentions of Władysław IV and suspect that he might have engaged in negotiations with the Spaniards with ill will, using them as an instrument enabling him to exert some pressure on the French.[109] Some assume that his gamble was effective and that it produced liberation of prince John Casimir; afterwards the king lost any interest in military dealings with Felipe IV.[110] Others suggest that neither the Spaniards nor the Poles were familiar with political conditions of their partners. The Madrid court assumed that in Poland position of the king was similar to this in Spain, and they did not realize that dealing with Władysław IV was far from dealing with the Kingdom of Poland. On the other hand, the Vasa diplomacy was misled into believing that Felipe IV possessed enormous resources and it was not aware of his perennial financial problems.[111]
Potential impact of the Naples-agreed Polish army in the Thirty Years' War remains nothing but a speculation. The Polish light cavalry formation known as
See also
Footnotes
- ^ quasi-political interactions were sporadic, e.g. princess Richeza in 1152 married Alfonso VII
- ISBN 9788360097649, s. 148. How many Spaniards visited Poland is not clear
- ISBN 9788388737756, see esp. the chapter Geopolityczna przestrzeń spotkań, 1517–1598
- ^ Ernest Kowalczyk, Making diplomacy through culture: Mikołaj Sękowski, the Polish envoy to Naples and Madrid in the late sixteenth century, [in:] The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies 3 (2019), p. 53
- ^ see Skowron 2002, especially the chapter Hiszpańsko-polskie relacje dyplomatyczne w latach 1598–1623
- ^ Zbigniew Anusik, Olivares, Wazowie i Bałtyk [review], [in:] Przegląd Nauk Historycznych 4/1 (2005), p. 164
- ^ e.g. Felipe IV was ready to engage against Sweden only in case the emperor does, Anusik 2005, p. 165
- ^ Wallenstein, Vasa Dynasty and Spanish-Polish Fleet in the Baltic Sea, 1628-1632. Karel Staněk, Michal Wanner. 2018 (in Spanish).
- ^ Anusik 2005, pp. 158, 170
- ^ he envoy was Wilhelm Forbes, Skowron 2002, pp. 39-40. Władysław IV was at the time well known in Spain and enjoyed sort of excellent media publicity. El sitio de Bredá (1625) by Calderón featured "Vladislao Sigismundo Principe de Polonia y Suecia"; in the drama he is lectured by Espínola and remains firm admirer of the Spanish monarchy
- ^ Skowron 2002, pp. 38-39
- ^ the envoy was a religious, abbot of the Lubin Benedictine monastery Stanisław Mąkowski, Zbigniew Anusik, Marx i Pax [review], [in:] Przegląd Nauk Historycznych 14/2 (2015), p. 305
- ^ the envoy was a young representative of one of the most powerful oligarchic families, Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski Anusik 2015, p. 294
- ISBN 9788362261741, p. 58
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 296
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 301
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 297, Skowron 2013, p. 85. A number of soldiers recruited in Poland, most probably so-called lisowczycy, since October 1635 fought against the French in Flanders in ranks of the imperial army under the command of Matthias Gallas. This is probably when Rembrandt saw them. Their presence elicited from the French king Louis XIII a letter of protest, directed to the Polish king Władysław IV, Paweł Szadkowski, Los polacos en el ejército español en los siglos XVI y XVI, [w:] Enrique García Hernán (red.), Presencia polaca en la milicia española, Madrid 2020, ISBN 9788490914915, p. 65
- ^ Anusik 2015, pp. 301-302
- ^ Miguel Conde Pazos, El tradado de Nápoles. El encierro del príncipe Juan Casimiro y la leva de Polacos de Medina de las Torres (1638–1642), [in:] Studia Histórica 33 (2011), p. 125
- ^ Miguel Conde Pazos, La monarquía católica y los confines orientales de la Cristianidad. Relaciones entre la case de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia [PhD thesis Universidad Autónoma de Madrid], Madrid 2016, p. 395
- ^ Olivares thought it reasonable, given huge grain imports from Poland to Portugal. Margarita de Saboya was already to be replaced as virrey following so-called Revolta de Manuelinho, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 402. Other members of the council remained skeptical, Conde Pazos 2011, p. 127, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 401
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 128
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 405
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 405-406
- ISBN 9788323200048. Bivoni was earlier engaged in talks with the French in Paris regarding liberation of Jan Kazimierz, Serwański 1986, p. 248
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 129
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 129, Conde Pazos 2016, p.413
- ^ , though sources do not confirm this, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 423
- ^ Skowron 2013, p. 223
- ^ on advice of the Polish envoy to Madrid, Stanisław Mąkowski, offered in December 1639, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 414
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 415
- ^ Kazanowski was probably few years junior of the king and remained close to him during the Moscow campaign of the early 1630s
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 417
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 424
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 422
- ^ e.g. Conde de Monterrey thought Poland was too far to be of any use, while Duque de Villhermosa considered the alliance workable, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 414
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 417
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 129
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 418
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 421
- ^ a Scottish officer named Ludovick Lindsay served during the Polish campaign against Russia in 1633; in 1635–1637 he served in Flanders with some 3,000 Scottish troops, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 397. In early 1638 Lindsay was in Madrid and proposed to raise further 6,000 men in Silesia, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 420
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 419
- ^ especially that following the peace with Moscow of 1635 and prolonged armistice with Sweden of the same year, they were not engaged in wartime activities, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 396
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 130
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 414
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 130
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 130
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 135
- ^ Skowron 2013, pp. 239-240
- ^ His other objectives might have been related to the Sforza heritage, Anusik 2015, p. 303, Skowron 2013, pp. 239-240
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 424
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 417
- ^ "durante el año 1639 Francisco de Bivoni y Medina de las Torres diseñaron el tratado definitivo", Conde Pazos 2011, p. 130
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 303
- ISBN 9788496813519, p. 1018
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 303
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 130, Conde Pazos 2016, p. 424
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 304
- ^ Skowron 2013, p. 260
- ^ Skowron 2011, p. 1018
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, pp. 130-131
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 131
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 426
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 430
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 303
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 133
- ^ Skowron 2013, p. 247
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 134
- ^ when in July 1640 Villagutiérrez arrived in Warsaw he was unimpressed by the city, which seemed a shabby provincial town compared to the cities of Flanders, Conde Pazos 2011, p. 134
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p.434
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 135
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 134
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 430
- ^ at the time Ossoliński held the function of podskarbi nadworny koronny, Anusik 2015, p. 307
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 416
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 431
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 440
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 440-441
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 436
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 426
- ^ Maciej Tytlewski was abbot of the Lubin monastery between 1630 and 1640 and already had earlier diplomatic experience at the Spanish court, Edmund Callier, Klasztor OO. Benedyktynów w Lubiniu Wielkopolskim, Poznań 1888, pp. 18-39. For reasons which are not clear in the Spanish sources he appears as "Alberto", see Conde Pazos 2011, p. 136. It might be mis-spelling of Adalbert, Latin translation of his religious name Wojciech; in some Polish sources he appears as “Wojciech Tytlewski”, see Komunikaty Towarzystwa imienia Romana Dmowskiego 1980, p. 248
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 136
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 304
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 440
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 304
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 435, Skowron 2013, p. 260
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 443
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 442
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 440
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 304
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 135
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 443
- ^ Tuttavilla, Vicenzo entry, [in:] Treccani service [retrieved Jan 21, 2021]
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 444-445
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 445
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 439
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 447
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 446
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 445-446
- ^ https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/media/downloadable/files/links/t/h/the_polish_presence_in_the_spanish_military.pdf
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 136
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 448, Conde Pazos 2011, p. 137
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, pp. 427, 429
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 439
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 138
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 304
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 410
- ^ Conde Pazos 2011, p. 139
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 135, Skowron 2013, pp. 239-240
- ^ Skowron 2013, p. 247
- ^ Anusik 2015, p. 306
- ISBN 9780141937809, p. 177
- ^ allegedly they burnt down 63 villages, plunderered at will, and took as prisoners women, children and the elderly. The locals thought they were being invaded by some Asian tribes, Szadkowski 2020, pp. 66-67
- ^ Conde Pazos 2016, p. 397
- ^ who proved themselves capable of routing much larger Swedish troops. During the battle of Kircholm (1605) some 3,500 Polish troops, most of them winged hussars, first defeated and then slaughtered the Swedish army of some 11,000 men; Polish casualties were 300, Swedish casualties were 5,000, Early Modern Wars 1500-1775, London 2013, ISBN 9781782741213, p. 122
Further reading
- Miguel Conde Pazos, La monarquía católica y los confines orientales de la Cristianidad. Relaciones entre la case de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia [PhD thesis Universidad Autónoma de Madrid], Madrid 2016
- Miguel Conde Pazos, El tradado de Nápoles. El encierro del príncipe Juan Casimiro y la leva de Polacos de Medina de las Torres (1638–1642), [in:] Studia Histórica 33 (2011), pp. 123–139
- Miguel Conde Pazos, Relaciones entre los Habsburgo y los Vasa de Polonia. La embajada a Varsovia del conde de Solre y Alonso Vázquez y la firma del Tratado Familiar (1635–1660), [in:] Porfirio Sanz Camañes (ed.), Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648–1700), Madrid 2012, ISBN 9788497391306, pp. 283–310
- Ryszard Skowron, Los aliados de las esperanzas fallidas. La Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia (1598–1648), [in:] José Martínez Millán, Rubén González Cuerva (eds.), La dinastía de los Austria. Las relaciones entre la Monarquía Católica y el Imperio, Madrid 2011, ISBN 9788496813519, pp. 997–1022
- Ryszard Skowron, Las levas de polacos para los ejercitos espanoles en la epoca de la Guerra de los Treinta anos, [in:] Enrique García Hernán, Ryszard Skowron (eds.), From Ireland to Poland : Northern Europe, Spain and the Early Modern World, Valencia 2005, ISBN 9788472743175
- Ryszard Skowron, Mars i Pax. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632–1648, Kraków 2013, ISBN 9788362261741
- Ryszard Skowron, Olivares, Wazowie i Bałtyk. Polska w polityce zagranicznej Hiszpanii w latach 1621–1632, Kraków 2002, ISBN 9788388737756
- Ryszard Skowron, Polska w hiszpańskich planach wojny w Niderlandach. Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej: z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV-XVIII wieku, [in:] M. Nagielski (ed.), Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją w XVII wieku, Warszawa 2007, ISBN 9788361033356, pp. 45–46
- Ryszard Skowron, Preliminaria wojskowe z okresu polsko-hiszpańskich rokowań sojuszniczych w Neapolu (1639–1641), [in:] Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 42 (2005), pp. 221–240