The prisoner's stages of understanding correlate with the levels on the so-called divided line , which is divided into the visible and intelligible worlds, with the divider being the Sun. In the cave, he is in the visible realm, receiving no sunlight and outside he is in the intelligible realm.
Mind-Body Dualism which impinges on the nature of reality as we perceive it, and concerns the relationship which exists between mental processes, and bodily states. Descartes mused whether his perception of a body was the result of a dream, or an illusion created by an evil demon. He reasons that: "The mind is a substance distinct from the body, a substance whose essence is thought."
[9] From this stance, Descartes goes on to argue:
"I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create." [9] .
Descartes concludes that the mind, a thinking thing, can and does exist apart from its extended body. This relationship of the mind to the body, is arguably one of the the central issues in the philosophy of mind .[10] Descartes also discussed the existence of the external world, arguing that sensory perceptions are involuntary, and are not consciously directed, and as such are evidence of an world external to the mind, since God has given him the "propensity" to believe that such ideas are caused by material things.[9]
Later critics responded to Descartes's 'proof' for the external world with the brain in a vat thought experiment, suggesting in that Descartes' brain might be connected up to a machine which simulates all of these perceptions. However, the vat and the machine exist in an external world, so one form of exteranl world is simply replaced by another.
Later Thinkers
David Hume
Hume (1711-1776) argued for two kinds of reasoning: probable and demonstrative (Hume's fork ), and applied these to the skeptical argument that reality is but an illusion. He concludes that neither of these two forms of reasoning can lead us to belief in the continued existence of an external world. Demonstration by itself cannot establish the uniformity of nature (as laid out by scientific laws and principles), and reason alone cannot establish that the future will resemble the past (e.g. that the sun will rise tomorrow), Probable reasoning, which aims to take us from the observed to the unobserved, cannot do this either, as it also depends on the uniformity of nature, and cannot be proved without circularity by any appeal to uniformity. Hume concludes that there is no solution to the skeptical argument except, to ignore it.[11]
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant
he notes:
"Everything intuited or perceived in space and time, and therefore all objects of a possible experience , are nothing but phenomenal appearances, that is, mere representations [and] have no independent, self-subsistent existence apart from our thoughts". [12]
An important theme in Kant's work is that there are fundamental features of reality that escape our direct knowledge because of the natural limits of our senses and faculties.[12]
Hegel, Husserl & Heidegger
These three philospohers form the core of Phenomenological thought.
Hegel ( 1770-1831) proposed a conception of knowledge, mind and reality in which the mind itself creates external forms and objects that stand outside of it or opposed to it. The mind recognizes itself in these external forms, so that they become simultaneously 'mind' and 'other-than-mind'.
[13]
Husserl (1859-1938) observed that the 'natural standpoint' of our perception of the world and and its objects is characterized by a belief that the objects exist and possess properties. Husserl proposed a way of looking at objects by examining how we "constitute" them as (seemingly) real objects, rather than simply figments of our imagination. In this Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be "external", with mere indicators about its nature, its essence arising from the relationship between the object and the perceiver.
[14]
Heidegger (1889-1976) in
Being and Time questions of the meaning of Being, and distinguishes it from any specific thing "'Being' is not something like a being".
[15] According to Heidegger, this sense of being precedes any notions of which beings exist, as it is a primary construct.
Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptions or sensory stimuli (e.g. redness, hardness, softness, sweetness, etc.) situated in time and in space. In particular, phenomenalism reduces talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense-data. For a brief period, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) held the view that all that we could be aware of was this sense data; everything else, including physical objects which generated the sense data, could only known by description, and not known directly.[16]
Contemporary Philosophy
Constructivism
Radical Constructivism
, which claims that knowledge is the result of a self-organizing cognitive process of the human brain. The process of constructing knowledge regulates itself, whereby knowledge is constructed rather than compiled from empirical data. It is therefore impossible in principle to know the extent to which knowledge reflects an external reality.
“The function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organisation of the experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality" [17]
Social constructivism is a sociological theory of knowledge which rose to prominence in 1966 with the publication of The Social Construction of Reality [18] . Social constructivism (or constructionism) attempts to uncover how individuals and groups participate and negotiate their perceived reality, and shared understanding; in this way reality is socially constructed. Paul Ernest (1991) summarises the main foundations of social constructivism as follows:
"Knowledge is not passively received but actively built up by the cognizing subject. The personal theories which result from the organization of the experiential world must fit the constraints imposed by physical and social reality. This is achieved by a cycle of theory - prediction - test - failure - accommodation - new theory. This gives rise to socially agreed theories of the world." [19]
Computationalism
Turing Machine
consisting of an infinite tape and a tape reader.
computable. Computationalism rests on two theses: (i)
Computational Sufficiency , that an appropriate computational structure suffices for the possession of mind, and (ii)
Computational Explanation , that computation provides a framework for the explanation of cognitive processes.
[20] .
Computationalism asserts the validity of
philosophical zombies
[22] .
Transhumanism
Converging Technologies , (2002) explores the potential for technological improvments to human performance.
Thw first known use of the term "
.
Nick Bostrom , in A History of Transhumanist Thought (2005) [23] locates transhumanism's roots in Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment . Transhumanism can be defined as:
The improvemnt of the human condition through applied reason, and technology to eliminate aging and greatly enhance human capacities.
The study of the technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the ethical issues involved in their use.[24]
The Simulation Argument Digital Philosophy
.
The Simulation Argument and its Counter Arguments
Suggestions: here can be explored all of the stuff which currently is littered throughout the exisitng
), and discuss moral & ethical objections
Proposed New Structure:
Statement of Bostrom's Simulation Argument
Refutations Concerned with the Substance and Structure of the Argument
Logical Fallacy Objections
Discussion on whether Bostrom's argument has a valid logical structure.
Flaws in the Assumptions
Discussions about his calculations of computing power, and his assumptions about motivation.
Mis-Representations or Mis-Interpretations
Other Objections
Contextualising the Argument
Here will be aired all of the views, comments, objections, issues, refutations and counter-refutations that have been made subsequnt to the publication of the argument.
The Scientific Context
This will look at
Scientific Issues
Suggestions: much is already in the original article about Quantum mechanics, relativity. Here can be discussed stuff about digital physics, computationalism etc. It might also include stuff on current simulations such as biological and cosmological simulations, as well as celluar automata, and whether ot not such things are capable of supporting intelligence.
Cosmological & Biological Simulations
What is currently being done; what is possible
Quantum Mechanics and Digital Physics
Evolution versus Creationism
Computational Issues
Moores Law Predictions
Artifical Intelligence
cellular automata; artifical life; artifical consciousness
Simulation Verification & Validation Issues
(debugging); glitches in the software.
The Limits to Computability
Suggestions: This should discuss the curent state of AI, computational requirement needed to run simulated reality, Moores Law, and predictions of how close we are to doing it. In addition it would need to
The Philosophical Context
Issues of Mind and Consciousness
Computationalism: discuss the relationship between consciouness and Turing computability
Mind Transfer Theories
Ethical and Moral Implications
Religious & Theological Debates
The Limits to Knowledge
The Social and Psychological Context
Motivational Issues
Legal Issues
suggestions: Peter Jenkins' article (Journal of Futures Studies 11(1)) would make a good starting point.
The Simulism Debate
Empirical Arguments
Scientific Arguments
Ethical Arguments
Logical & Philosophical Arguments
Religious and Theological Arguments
Simulated Reality in Fiction
Suggestions: Lots of stuff in the original, but what is needed is a quick summary of the different types. I have a feeling this should go to a separate article.
Bibliography
^ The term in the usage in which it appears here seems to have been coined by Ivo Jansch in September 2006. His Simulism Wiki is an exploration of Simulism, which invites contributions, essays, comments and discussions.
^ This is a clarification by Nick Bostrom on The Simulation Argument Website ; see FAQ 3
^ a b c d Davis J. Chalmers The Matrix as Metaphysics Dept of Philosophy, U. o Arizona; paper written for the philosophy section of The Matrix website. Cite error: The named reference "M@M" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page ).
^ Parminedes' Way of Truth : The First Enquiry in Being
^ Aristotle |Physics VI:9, 239b5}}
^ Tasks and Super-Tasks
J.F.Thomson, (1954), Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Oct., 1954), pp. 1-13
doi:10.2307/3326643
^ Translation on The "Nirvana Sutra" , a website devoted to the "Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra" - the sutra specialising in the Buddha's "Buddha-dhatu" ("Buddha Nature") / "Tathagatagarbha" ("Buddha-Matrix") and "True Self" teachings; quotaion is from the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra, translated into English by Kosho Yamamoto, edited and revised by Page,T. (2000), Nirvana Publications, London.
^ Descartes, René, 1596-1650, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences
^ a b c d Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. 2, 1-62. Cite error: The named reference "Des" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page ).
^ Kim, J. (1995). in Honderich, Ted: Problems in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
^ (Hume, D. 1777, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, XII, Part 2, p.128)
^ a b Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988, Cite error: The named reference "Kant" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page ).
.
^ Woodruff Smith, D. (2007). Husserl. Routledge
^ Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)
.
^ Glasersfeld, E. von, 1989, Constructivism in Education, in Husen & Postlethwaite (eds), The International Encyclopaedia of Education Supplementary Volume, Oxford, Pergamon Press :p182)
)
^ Ernest, Paul; The Philosophy of Mathematics Education; London: RoutledgeFalmer, (1991)
^ A Computational Foundation for Study of Cognition , Chalmers, D.J. University of Arizona
^ Minds, Brains, and Programs John R. Searle, 1980, from The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3.
^ Fetzer, J. (1996) ``Minds Are Not Computers: (Most) Thought Processes Are Not Computational," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Nashville, April 5.
^ a b Bostrom, Nick (2005). "A history of transhumanist thought" (PDF) . Cite error: The named reference "Bostrom 2005" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page ).
)
^ Bostrom, N. , 2003, Are You Living in a Simulation? , Philosophical Quarterly (2003), Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255.
Simulism