32nd Infantry Division Triglavski
32nd Infantry Division Triglavski | |
---|---|
Active | 1941 |
Disbanded | 1941 |
Country | Kingdom of Yugoslavia |
Branch | Royal Yugoslav Army |
Type | Infantry |
Size | Division |
Part of | 7th Army |
Engagements | Invasion of Yugoslavia |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | Dragiša Pandurović |
The 32nd Infantry Division Triglavski was a short-lived
Part of the Yugoslav
Background
The
The army's development was hampered by the kingdom's poor economy, and this continued during the 1920s. In 1929, King
The weaknesses of the VKJ in strategy, structure, equipment, mobility and supply were exacerbated by serious ethnic disunity within Yugoslavia, resulting from two decades of Serb hegemony and the attendant lack of political legitimacy achieved by the central government.[9][10] Attempts to address the disunity came too late to ensure that the VKJ was a cohesive force. Fifth column activity was also a serious concern, not only from the Croatian nationalist Ustaše but also from the country's Slovene and ethnic German minorities.[9]
Structure
Peacetime organisation
According to regulations issued by the VKJ in 1935, the headquarters of the 32nd Infantry Division Triglavski (32nd ID) would be created at the time of
Wartime organisation
The wartime organisation of the VKJ was laid down by regulations issued in 1936–37,[12] which set the strength of an infantry division at 26,000–27,000 men.[4] A total of 11,200 horses and other pack and draught animals were required to provide mobility for each infantry division. The theoretical wartime organisation of a fully mobilised Yugoslav infantry division was:[13][14]
- headquarters
- divisional infantry headquarters, with three or four infantry regiments
- divisional artillery headquarters, with one or two artillery regiments
- a cavalry battalion with two squadrons, a bicycle squadron and a machine gun platoon
- a pioneer battalion of three companies
- an anti-tank company, equipped with twelve 37 mm (1.5 in) or 47 mm (1.9 in) anti-tank guns
- a machine gun company
- an anti-aircraft machine gun company
- a signals company
- logistics units
Each infantry regiment was to consist of three or four infantry battalions and a machine gun company,[12] and the divisional artillery regiments were animal-drawn and largely equipped with World War I-vintage pieces.[15] An artillery regiment consisted of four battalions, one of 100 mm (3.9 in) light howitzers, one of 65 mm (2.6 in) or 75 mm (3.0 in) mountain guns, and two of 75 mm (3.0 in) or 80 mm (3.1 in) field guns.[16] The 32nd ID was included on the wartime order of battle in "Defence Plan S", which was developed by the Yugoslav General Staff in 1938–1939. It was to be formed using mainly Slovene-manned units administered by the Dravska divisional district: the 39th and 40th Infantry Regiments and 32nd Artillery Regiment; and an additional infantry regiment, the 110th, attached from the VJK reserve.[13][17]
Planned deployment
The 32nd ID was a component of the
Prior to the invasion, significant fortifications known as the Rupnik Line were constructed along the Italian and German borders, within what became the 7th Army's area of operations. Along the frontier with Italy in the sector of the 32nd ID, mutually supporting bunkers were established on forward slopes of the mountain ranges behind a belt of obstacles. The main positions followed a line from Mount Blegoš south-south-east through Hlavče Njive, Žirovski Vrh, Vrh Svetih Treh Kraljev, Zaplana, Mount Slivnica, Grahovo, and Lož to Petičak.[21] These fortifications were to be manned by border guard units, and were not the responsibility of the 7th Army.[22]
Operations
Mobilisation
After unrelenting pressure from
According to a post-war
- the divisional commander Divizijski đeneral[b] Dragiša Pandurović and his staff were mobilising in Ljubljana, and arrived in their concentration area at Grosuplje, just south of Ljubljana around noon on 6 April
- the divisional infantry headquarters was moving from Celje to Ljubljana
- the 39th Infantry Regiment was marching from Celje to Lepoglava to join Detachment Ormozki of the 4th Army, and had reached Logatec
- the 40th Infantry Regiment, with about 80 percent of its troops and 50 percent of its vehicles and animals, was located at its mobilisation centre in Ljubljana
- the 110th Infantry Regiment, with about 60 percent of its troops and 50 percent of its animals, was on the move from Celje to Zagreb, where it was to join the 1st Army Group reserve, and had reached Zidani Most
- the 32nd Artillery Regiment was marching from Ljubljana to Grosuplje
- the 37th Infantry Regiment, which had been allocated to the 32nd ID from the Dravska divisional district at mobilisation, was moving from its mobilisation centres to divisional reserve positions around Ribnica, Sodražica, Bloke, Lašče and Novo Mesto
- other divisional units were mobilising in Ribnica, Ljubljana and Celje
Operations
The border between Italy, Germany and Yugoslavia was largely unsuitable for motorised operations due to its mountainous terrain.
On the morning of 6 April, Luftwaffe (German Air Force) aircraft conducted surprise attacks on Yugoslav airfields in the 7th Army area, including Ljubljana.[33] At 07:00, Messerschmitt Bf 109E fighters of Jagdgeschwader 27 strafed Ljubljana airfield, attacking hangars and some Potez 25 biplanes.[34] This was followed by attacks by the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) on Yugoslav troop concentrations of the 7th Army.[35] German and Italian air attacks interfered with the deployment of troops and command was hampered by reliance on civilian telegraph and telephone services.[36] The front along the border with Italy was relatively quiet, with some patrol clashes occurring,[37] some sporadic artillery bombardments of border fortifications, and an unsuccessful raid by the Italians directed at Mount Blegoš.[38] On 7 April, along the Italian border there were only skirmishes caused by Italian reconnaissance-in-force to a depth of 3 km (1.9 mi). By the end of the day, morale in the 7th Army had started to decline due to fifth column elements encouraging soldiers to stop resisting the enemy.[39]
In the area of responsibility of the 32nd ID, the XXXXIX Mountain Corps of
On 10 April, as the situation was becoming increasingly desperate throughout the country, Simović, who was both the Prime Minister and Chief of the General Staff, broadcast the following message:[45]
All troops must engage the enemy wherever encountered and with every means at their disposal. Don't wait for direct orders from above, but act on your own and be guided by your judgement, initiative, and conscience.
The same day, Luftwaffe reconnaissance sorties revealed that the main body of the 7th Army was withdrawing towards Zagreb, leaving behind light forces to maintain contact with the German bridgeheads.[46] That night, the 1st Mountain Division of Generalmajor[f] Hubert Lanz, the most capable formation of XXXXIX Mountain Corps, detrained, crossed the border near Bleiburg, and advanced southeast towards Celje, reaching a point about 19 km (12 mi) from the town by evening.[47] The rest of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps encountered little resistance, and by nightfall had reached the line Šoštanj–Mislinja.[48] During the night of 10/11 April, XXXXIX Mountain Corps was ordered to bridge the Savinja river at Celje, then advance towards Brežice on the Sava.[49]
The Germans captured Celje on 11 April,
On 15 April, orders were received that a ceasefire had been agreed, and that all 7th Army troops were to remain in place and not fire on German personnel.
Notes
- U.S. Army lieutenant general.[23]
- U.S. Army major general.[23]
- U.S. Army general of the army.[30]
- U.S. Army lieutenant general.[40]
- U.S. Army brigadier general.[40]
Footnotes
- ^ Figa 2004, p. 235.
- ^ Hoptner 1963, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 60.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 58.
- ^ Brayley & Chappell 2001, p. 17.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 58–59.
- ^ Hoptner 1963, p. 161.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 57.
- ^ a b Tomasevich 1975, p. 63.
- ^ Ramet 2006, p. 111.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 99–101.
- ^ a b Terzić 1982, p. 104.
- ^ a b Niehorster 2018b.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 104, 106–107.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 107, 119.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 101, 155, 226.
- ^ Niehorster 2018a.
- ^ Krzak 2006, p. 584.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 164, 259–260.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 148.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 249–250.
- ^ a b Niehorster 2018c.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 34–43.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, p. 64.
- ^ Trevor-Roper 1964, pp. 108–109.
- ^ Barefield 1993, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 101, 258–260.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 55.
- ^ a b Niehorster 2018d.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 79.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 274–275.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 201.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 286.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 294–295.
- ^ Krzak 2006, p. 585.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 294.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 312–313.
- ^ a b Niehorster 2018e.
- ^ a b c Terzić 1982, p. 348.
- ^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 215.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 338.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 349.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 53.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 57.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, p. 58.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 362.
- ^ Terzić 1982, p. 364.
- ^ a b c d Terzić 1982, p. 388.
- ^ a b U.S. Army 1986, p. 60.
- ^ Krzak 2006, p. 595.
- ^ Zajac 1993, p. 35.
- ^ Terzić 1982, pp. 444–445.
- ^ U.S. Army 1986, pp. 63–64.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 89–95.
- ^ Tomasevich 1975, pp. 73–74.
References
Books
- Brayley, Martin; Chappell, Mike (2001). British Army 1939–45 (1): North-West Europe. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-052-0.
- Figa, Jozef (2004). "Framing the Conflict: Slovenia in Search of Her Army". Civil-Military Relations, Nation Building, and National Identity: Comparative Perspectives. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-313-04645-2.
- Hoptner, J.B. (1963). Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941. New York: Columbia University Press. OCLC 404664.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-34656-8.
- Shores, Christopher F.; Cull, Brian; Malizia, Nicola (1987). Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940–41. London: Grub Street. ISBN 978-0-948817-07-6.
- Terzić, Velimir (1982). Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941: Uzroci i posledice poraza [The Collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941: Causes and Consequences of Defeat] (in Serbo-Croatian). Vol. 2. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga. OCLC 10276738.
- ISBN 978-0-8047-0857-9.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1964). Hitler's War Directives: 1939–1945. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. OCLC 852024357.
- U.S. Army (1986) [1953]. The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941). Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. OCLC 16940402. CMH Pub 104-4. Archived from the originalon 19 June 2009. Retrieved 31 December 2016.
Journals and papers
- Barefield, Michael R. (May 1993). "Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941" (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2017.
- Krzak, Andrzej (2006). "Operation 'Marita': The Attack Against Yugoslavia in 1941". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 19 (3): 543–600. S2CID 219625930.
- Zajac, Daniel L. (May 1993). "The German Invasion of Yugoslavia: Insights For Crisis Action Planning And Operational Art in A Combined Environment" (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. (PDF) from the original on 13 December 2016.
Websites
- Niehorster, Leo (2018a). "Balkan Operations Order of Battle Royal Yugoslavian Army 7th Army 6th April 1941". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 15 July 2018.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018b). "Royal Yugoslavian Army Infantry Division 6th April 1941". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 15 July 2018.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018c). "Royal Yugoslav Armed Forces Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 15 July 2018.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018d). "Royal Italian Land Forces Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 16 July 2018.
- Niehorster, Leo (2018e). "German Army and Waffen-SS Ranks". Leo Niehorster. Retrieved 16 July 2018.