Battle of France

During the 1930s, the French built the

In 1939, the

On 7 September, in accordance with the Franco-Polish alliance, France began the Saar Offensive with an advance from the Maginot Line 5 km (3 mi) into the Saar. France had mobilised 98 divisions (all but 28 of them reserve or fortress formations) and 2,500 tanks against a German force consisting of 43 divisions (32 of them reserves) and no tanks. The French advanced until they met the thin and undermanned Siegfried Line. On 17 September, Gamelin gave the order to withdraw French troops to their starting positions; the last of them left Germany on 17 September, the day of the Soviet invasion of Poland. Following the Saar Offensive, a period of inaction called the Phoney War (the French Drôle de guerre, joke war or the German Sitzkrieg, sitting war) set in between the belligerents. Adolf Hitler had hoped that France and Britain would acquiesce in the conquest of Poland and quickly make peace. On 6 October, in a speech to the Reichstag he made a peace offer to the Western powers.^[34][35][36]

On 9 October 1939, Hitler issued

On 10 October 1939, Britain refused Hitler's offer of peace and on 12 October, France did the same. The pre-war German codename of plans for a campaign in the Low Countries was Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb (Deployment Instruction No. 1, Case Yellow). Colonel-General

River Somme. German strength in 1940 would then be spent and only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.^[42] When Hitler raised objections to the plan and wanted an armoured breakthrough, as had happened in the invasion of Poland, Halder and Brauchitsch attempted to dissuade him, arguing that while the fast-moving mechanised tactics were effective against a "shoddy" Eastern European army, they would not work against a first-rate military like the French.^[43]

Hitler was disappointed with Halder's plan and initially reacted by deciding that the Army should attack early, ready or not, hoping that Allied unreadiness might bring about an easy victory. Hitler proposed an invasion on 25 October 1939 but accepted that the date was probably unrealistic. On 29 October, Halder presented Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb, with a secondary attack on the Netherlands.[44] On 5 November, Hitler informed Walther von Brauchitsch that he intended the invasion to begin on 12 November. Brauchitsch replied that the military had yet to recover from the Polish campaign and offered to resign; this was refused but two days later Hitler postponed the attack, giving poor weather as the reason for the delay.^[45][46] More postponements followed, as commanders persuaded Hitler to delay the attack for a few days or weeks, to remedy some defect in the preparations or to wait for better weather. Hitler also tried to alter the plan, which he found unsatisfactory; his weak understanding of how poorly prepared Germany was for war and how it would cope with losses of armoured vehicles were not fully considered. Though Poland had been quickly defeated, many armoured vehicles had been lost and were hard to replace. This led to the German effort becoming dispersed; the main attack would remain in central Belgium, secondary attacks would be undertaken on the flanks. Hitler made such a suggestion on 11 November, pressing for an early attack on unprepared targets.^[47]

Halder's plan satisfied no-one; General

Sedan, which lay in the sector of Army Group A. On 21 October, Rundstedt agreed with his chief of staff, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, that an alternative operational plan to reflect these principles was needed, by making Army Group A as strong as possible at the expense of Army Group B to the north.^[48]

Manstein plan

Main article: Manstein plan

While Manstein was formulating new plans in

Such a risky independent use of armour had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but OKH doubted such an operation could work.[50] Manstein's general operational ideas won immediate support from Guderian, who understood the terrain, having experienced the conditions with the German Army in 1914 and 1918.^[51] Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he avoided mentioning Guderian and played down the strategic part of the armoured units, to avoid unnecessary resistance.^[52] Six more memoranda followed between 31 October 1939 and 12 January 1940, each becoming more radical. All were rejected by OKH and nothing of their content reached Hitler.^[51]

On 10 January 1940, a German aircraft, carrying a staff officer with the Luftwaffe plans for an offensive through central Belgium to the North Sea, force-landed near Maasmechelen (Mechelen) in Belgium. The documents were captured but Allied intelligence doubted that they were genuine. In the full moon period in April 1940, another Allied alert was called for a possible attack on the Low Countries or Holland, an offensive through the Low Countries to outflank the Maginot Line from the north, an attack on the Maginot Line or an invasion through Switzerland. None of the contingencies anticipated the German attack through the Ardennes but after the loss of the Luftwaffe plans, the Germans assumed that the Allied appreciation of German intentions would have been reinforced. Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb, an amendment to the plan on 30 January, was only a revision of details. On 24 February, the main German effort was moved south to the Ardennes.^[53] Twenty divisions (including seven panzer and three motorised divisions) were transferred from Heeresgruppe B opposite Holland and Belgium to Heeresgruppe A facing the Ardennes. French military intelligence uncovered a transfer of German divisions from the Saar to the north of the Moselle but failed to detect the redeployment from the Dutch frontier to the Eifel–Moselle area.^[54]

On 27 January, Manstein was sacked as Chief of Staff of Army Group A and appointed commander of an army corps in

Allied strategy

Escaut plan/Plan E

See also: French war planning 1920–1940

On 3 September 1939, French military strategy had been settled, taking in analyses of geography, resources and manpower. The French Army would defend in the east (right flank) and attack on the west (left flank) by advancing into Belgium, to fight forward of the French frontier. The extent of the forward move was dependent on events, which were complicated when Belgium ended the Franco-Belgian Accord of 1920 after the German Remilitarisation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. The neutrality of the Belgian state was reluctant openly to co-operate with France but information was communicated about Belgian defences. By May 1940, there had been an exchange of the general nature of French and Belgian defence plans but little co-ordination against a German offensive to the west, through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium. The French expected Germany to breach Belgian neutrality first, providing a pretext for French intervention or that the Belgians would request support when an invasion was imminent. Most of the French mobile forces were assembled along the Belgian border, ready to forestall the Germans.^[60]

A prompt appeal for help from the Belgians might give the French time to reach the German–Belgian frontier but if not, there were three feasible defensive lines further back. A practicable line existed from

Louvain and along the Dyle river to Antwerp, which was 70–80 km (43–50 mi) shorter than the alternatives. A second possibility was a line from the French border to Condé, Tournai, along the Escaut (Scheldt) to Ghent and thence to Zeebrugge on the North Sea coast, possibly further along the Scheldt (Escaut) to Antwerp, which became the Escaut plan/Plan E. The third possibility was along field defences of the French border from Luxembourg to Dunkirk. For the first fortnight of the war, Gamelin favoured Plan E, because of the example of the fast German advances in Poland. Gamelin and the other French commanders doubted that they could move any further forward before the Germans arrived. In late September, Gamelin issued a directive to Général d'armée Gaston Billotte

, commander of the 1st Army Group,

...assuring the integrity of the national territory and defending without withdrawing the position of resistance organised along the frontier....

— Gamelin[61]

giving the 1st Army Group permission to enter Belgium, to deploy along the Escaut according to Plan E. On 24 October, Gamelin directed that an advance beyond the Escaut was only feasible if the French moved fast enough to forestall the Germans.^[62]

Dyle plan/Plan D

By late 1939, the Belgians had improved their defences along the

Alphonse Georges, commander of the North-Eastern Front, about reaching the Dyle before the Germans. The British had been lukewarm about an advance into Belgium, but Gamelin persuaded them; on 9 November, the Dyle plan was adopted. On 17 November, a session of the Supreme War Council deemed it essential to occupy the Dyle Line and Gamelin issued a directive that day detailing a line from Givet to Namur, the Gembloux Gap, Wavre, Louvain and Antwerp. For the next four months, the Dutch and Belgian armies laboured over their defences, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) expanded and the French army received more equipment and training. Gamelin also considered a move towards Breda in the Netherlands; if the Allies prevented a German occupation of Holland, the ten divisions of the Dutch army would join the Allied armies, control of the North Sea would be enhanced and the Germans would be denied bases for attacks on Britain.^[63]

By May 1940, the 1st Army Group was responsible for the defence of France from the Channel coast south to the Maginot Line. The

Lord Gort), First Army (Général d'armée Georges Maurice Jean Blanchard) and Ninth Army (Général d'armée André Corap) were ready to advance to the Dyle Line, by pivoting on the right (southern) Second Army. The Seventh Army would take over west of Antwerp, ready to move into Holland and the Belgians were expected to delay a German advance, then retire from the Albert Canal to the Dyle, from Antwerp to Louvain. On the Belgian right, the BEF was to defend about 20 km (12 mi) of the Dyle from Louvain to Wavre with nine divisions and the First Army, on the right of the BEF, was to hold 35 km (22 mi) with ten divisions from Wavre across the Gembloux Gap to Namur. The gap from the Dyle to Namur north of the Sambre, with Maastricht and Mons on either side, had few natural obstacles and was a traditional route of invasion, leading straight to Paris. The Ninth Army would take post south of Namur, along the Meuse to the left (northern) flank of the Second Army.^[64]

The Second Army was the right (eastern) flank army of the 1st Army Group, holding the line from

Pont à Bar 6 km (3.7 mi) west of Sedan to Longuyon. GQG considered that the Second and Ninth armies had the easiest task of the army group, dug in on the west bank of the Meuse on ground that was easily defended and behind the Ardennes, a considerable obstacle, the traversing of which would give plenty of warning of a German attack in the centre of the French front. After the transfer from the strategic reserve of the Seventh Army to the 1st Army Group, seven divisions remained behind the Second and Ninth armies and more could be moved from behind the Maginot Line. All but one division were either side of the junction of the two armies, GQG being more concerned about a possible German attack past the north end of the Maginot Line and then south-east through the Stenay Gap, for which the divisions behind the Second Army were well placed.^[65]

Breda variant

If the Allies could control the Scheldt Estuary, supplies could be transported to Antwerp by ship and contact established with the Dutch Army along the river. On 8 November, Gamelin directed that a German invasion of the Netherlands must not be allowed to progress around the west of Antwerp and gain the south bank of the Scheldt. The left flank of the 1st Army Group was reinforced by the Seventh Army, containing some of the best and most mobile French divisions, which moved from the general reserve by December. The role of the army was to occupy the south bank of the Scheldt and be ready to move into Holland and protect the estuary by holding the north bank along the Beveland Peninsula (now the Walcheren–Zuid-Beveland–Noord-Beveland peninsula) in the Holland Hypothesis.^[66]

On 12 March 1940, Gamelin discounted dissenting opinion at GQG and decided that the Seventh Army would advance as far as Breda, to link with the Dutch. Georges was told that the role of the Seventh Army on the left flank of the Dyle manoeuvre would be linked to it and Georges notified Billotte that if it were ordered to cross into the Netherlands, the left flank of the army group was to advance to Tilburg if possible and certainly to Breda. The Seventh Army was to take post between the Belgians and Dutch by passing the Belgians along the Albert Canal and then turning east, a distance of 175 km (109 mi), when the Germans were only 90 km (56 mi) distant from Breda. On 16 April, Gamelin also made provision for a German invasion of the Netherlands but not Belgium, by changing the deployment area to be reached by the Seventh Army; the Escaut plan would only be followed if the Germans forestalled the French move into Belgium.^[66]

Allied intelligence

In the winter of 1939–40, the Belgian consul-general in

Our River on the Luxembourg–German border. On 30 April, the French military attaché in Bern warned that the centre of the German assault would come on the Meuse at Sedan, sometime between 8 and 10 May. These reports had little effect on Gamelin, as did similar reports from neutral sources such as the Vatican and a French sighting of a 100 km-long (60 mi) line of German armoured vehicles on the Luxembourg border trailing back inside Germany.^[67][68]

Prelude

See also:

Order of battle for the Battle of France

German Army

Germany had mobilised 4,200,000 men of the Heer (German Army), 1,000,000 of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), 180,000 of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS (military arm of the Nazi Party). When consideration is made for those in Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive starting on 10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions. The German forces in the west in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 guns.^[69] In 1939–40, 45 per cent of the army was at least 40 years old and 50 per cent of all the soldiers had just a few weeks' training. The German Army was far from motorised; ten per cent of their army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared with the 300,000 of the French Army. All of the British Expeditionary Force was motorised.^[70] Most of the German logistical transport consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.^[71] Only 50 per cent of the German divisions available in 1940 were fit for operations, often being worse equipped than the German army of 1914 or their equivalents in the British and French Armies. In the spring of 1940, the German Army was semi-modern; a small number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".^[72]

Army Group A, commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt, comprised 45+1⁄2 divisions, including seven Panzer and was to execute the main movement effort through the Allied defences in the Ardennes. The manoeuvre carried out by the Germans is sometimes referred to as a "Sichelschnitt", the German translation of the phrase "sickle cut" coined by Winston Churchill after the event. It involved three armies (the 4th, 12th and 16th) and had three Panzer corps. The XV had been allocated to the 4th Army but the XLI (Reinhardt) and the XIX (Guderian) were united with the XIV Army Corps of two motorised infantry divisions on a special independent operational level in Panzergruppe Kleist (XXII Corps).^[73] Army Group B (Fedor von Bock), comprised 29+1⁄2 divisions including three armoured, was to advance through the Low Countries and lure the northern units of the Allied armies into a pocket. It was composed of the 6th and 18th Armies. Army Group C, (General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) comprising 18 divisions of the 1st and 7th Armies, was to prevent a flanking movement from the east and with launching small holding attacks against the Maginot Line and the upper Rhine.^[74]

Communications

Wireless proved essential to German success in the battle. German tanks had radio receivers that allowed them to be directed by platoon command tanks, which had voice communication with other units. Wireless allowed tactical control and far quicker improvisation than the opponent. Some commanders regarded the ability to communicate to be the primary method of combat and radio drills were considered to be more important than gunnery. Radio allowed German commanders to co-ordinate their formations, bringing them together for a mass firepower effect in attack or defence. The French numerical advantage in heavy weapons and equipment, which was often deployed in "penny-packets" (dispersed as individual support weapons) was offset. Most French tanks also lacked radio and orders between infantry units were typically passed by telephone or verbally.^[75]

The German communications system permitted a degree of communication between air and ground forces. Attached to Panzer divisions were the Fliegerleittruppen (

Tactical Air Control Party troops) in wheeled vehicles. There were too few Sd.Kfz. 251 command vehicles for all of the army but the theory allowed the army in some circumstances to call Luftwaffe units to support an attack. Fliegerkorps VIII, equipped with Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers (Stukas), was to support the dash to the Channel if Army Group A broke through the Ardennes and kept a Ju 87 and a fighter group on call. On average, they could arrive to support armoured units within 45–75 minutes of orders being issued.^[76]

Tactics

The German army conducted combined arms operations of mobile offensive formations, with well-trained artillery, infantry, engineer and tank formations, integrated into Panzer divisions. The elements were united by wireless communication, which enabled them to work together at a quick tempo and exploit opportunities faster than the Allies. Panzer divisions could conduct reconnaissance, advance to contact or defend and attack vital positions and weak spots. Captured ground would be occupied by infantry and artillery as pivot points for further attacks. Although many German tanks were outgunned by their opponents, they could lure Allied tanks onto the divisional anti-tank guns.^[77] The avoidance of tank-versus-tank engagements conserved German tanks for the next stage of the offensive, units carrying supplies for three to four days' operations. The Panzer divisions were supported by motorised and infantry divisions.^[78]

German tank battalions (Panzer-Abteilungen) were to be equipped with the

NCOs and men were expected to use their initiative and had control over supporting arms, rather than the slower, top-down methods of the Allies.^[81]

Luftwaffe

Army Group B had the support of 1,815 combat aircraft, 487 transport aircraft and 50 gliders; 3,286 combat aircraft supported Army Groups A and C. The Luftwaffe was the most experienced, well-equipped and well-trained air force in the world. The combined Allied total was 2,935 aircraft, about half the size of the Luftwaffe.

air superiority missions, medium-range interdiction, strategic bombing and close air support operations, depending on circumstances. It was not a Panzer spearhead arm, since in 1939 fewer than 15 per cent of Luftwaffe aircraft were designed for close support as this was not its main role.^[83][84]

Flak

The Germans had an advantage in anti-aircraft guns (Fliegerabwehrkanone [Flak]), with 2,600

batteries belonging to the Luftwaffe, 48 companies of light Flak integral to divisions of the army and 20 companies of light Flak allocated as army troops, a reserve in the hands of HQs above corps, about 700 88 mm (3.46 in) and 180 37 mm (1.46 in) guns manned by Luftwaffe ground units and 816 20 mm (0.79 in) guns manned by the army.^[86]

Allies

France had spent a higher percentage of its

The French Army had 117 divisions, of which 104 (including 11 in reserve) were for the defence of the north. The British contributed 13 divisions in the BEF, three of which were untrained and poorly-armed labour divisions. Twenty-two Belgian, ten Dutch and two

Despite several partial mobilisations since 1936, during the full mobilisation in September 1939, officers were unfamiliar with their duties, technical experts were simultaneously expected to hand over their vehicles, report to recruitment centres and were also exempt from service as essential workers. Reservists flooded the depots leading to shortages of beds and poor sanitary conditions. The army lacked 150,000 pairs of trousers, 350,000 blankets, 415,000 tents and 600,000 pairs of boots. Recruits often left their centres and returned home or drank excessively as they waited around for someone to take charge and integrate them. This was a disastrous process not too dissimilar from that of 1870, though the main German blow fell on Poland initially and not France.[91]

The French mechanised light and heavy armoured divisions (DLM and DCr) were new and not thoroughly trained. Reserve B Divisions were composed of reservists above 30 years old and ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-aircraft artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery and wireless, despite the efforts of Gamelin to produce mobile artillery units.^[87][92] Only 0.15 per cent of military spending between 1923 and 1939 had been on radio and other communications equipment; to maintain signals security, Gamelin used telephones and couriers to communicate with field units.^[93]

French tactical deployment and the use of mobile units at the

The French Army comprised three army groups; the 2nd and 3rd Army Groups defended the Maginot Line to the east; the 1st Army Group (General Gaston Billotte) was on the western (left) flank, ready to move into the Low Countries. Initially positioned on the left flank near the coast, the Seventh Army, reinforced by a Division Légère Mécanique (DLM, mechanised light division), was intended to move to the Netherlands via Antwerp. To the south of the Seventh Army were the motorised divisions of the BEF, which would advance to the Dyle Line on the right flank of the Belgian army, from Leuven (Louvain) to Wavre. The First Army, reinforced by two DLM and with a Division Cuirassée (DCR, Armoured Division) in reserve, would defend the Gembloux Gap between Wavre and Namur. The southernmost army involved in the move forward into Belgium was the French

The

In early June 1940, the French aviation industry was producing a considerable number of aircraft, with an estimated reserve of nearly 2,000 but a chronic lack of spare parts crippled this fleet. Only about 599 (29 per cent) were serviceable, of which 170 were bombers.[103] The Germans had six times more medium bombers than the French.^[93][102] Despite its disadvantages, the Armée de l'Air performed far better than expected, destroying 916 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat, a kill ratio of 2.35:1. Almost a third of the French victories were accomplished by French pilots flying the Curtiss Hawk 75, which accounted for 12.6 per cent of the French single-seat fighter force.^[104]

Anti-aircraft defence

In addition to 580 13 mm (0.5 in) machine guns assigned to civilian defence, the French Army had 1,152

Bofors 40 mm light anti-aircraft guns, about 300 heavy and 350 light anti-aircraft guns.^[106] The Belgians had two heavy anti-aircraft regiments and were introducing Bofors guns for divisional anti-aircraft troops. The Dutch had 84 75 mm (2.95 in), 39 elderly 60 mm (2.36 in), seven 100 mm (3.9 in), 232 20 mm (0.79 in) 40 mm (1.57 in) anti-aircraft guns and several hundred First World War-vintage Spandau M.25 machine guns on anti-aircraft mountings.^[86]

Battle

Northern front

See also: German invasion of Luxembourg

At 21:00 on 9 May, the code word Danzig was relayed to all German army divisions, beginning Fall Gelb. Security was so tight that many officers, due to the constant delays, were away from their units when the order was sent.

Fort Eben-Emael which helped the advance of Army Group B.^[108] The French command reacted immediately, sending the 1st Army Group north in accordance with Plan D. This move committed their best forces, diminishing their fighting power by the partial disorganisation it caused and their mobility by depleting their fuel stocks. By the time the French Seventh Army crossed the Dutch border, they found the Dutch already in full retreat and withdrew into Belgium to protect Antwerp.^[109]

Invasion of the Netherlands

Main article:

Battle of the Netherlands

The Luftwaffe effort over the Netherlands comprised 247 medium bombers, 147 fighters, 424

prisoners of war and evacuated to Britain.^[113]

The French Seventh Army failed to block the German armoured reinforcements from the

government in exile in Britain.^[114] Dutch casualties amounted to 2,157 army, 75 air force, and 125 Navy personnel; 2,559 civilians were also killed.^[115]

Invasion of Belgium

Main article:

Battle of Belgium

The Germans quickly established air superiority over Belgium. Having completed thorough photographic reconnaissance, they destroyed 83 of the 179 aircraft of the Aeronautique Militaire within the first 24 hours of the invasion. The Belgians flew 77 operational missions but this contributed little to the air campaign. The Luftwaffe was assured air superiority over the Low Countries.^[116] Because Army Group B's composition had been so weakened compared to the earlier plans, the feint offensive by the 6th Army was in danger of stalling immediately, since the Belgian defences on the Albert Canal position were very strong. The main approach route was blocked by Fort Eben-Emael, a large fortress then generally considered the most modern in Europe, which controlled the junction of the Meuse and the Albert Canal.^[117]

Delay might endanger the outcome of the entire campaign, because it was essential that the main body of Allied troops be engaged before Army Group A established bridgeheads. To overcome this difficulty, the Germans resorted to unconventional means in the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael. In the early hours of 10 May,

KW-line five days earlier than planned. Similar operations against the bridges in the Netherlands, at Maastricht, failed. All were blown up by the Dutch and only one railway bridge was taken, which held up the German armour on Dutch territory for a short time.^[118][119]

The BEF and the French First Army were not yet entrenched and the news of the defeat on the Belgian border was unwelcome. The Allies had been convinced Belgian resistance would have given them several weeks to prepare a defensive line at the Gembloux Gap. The XVI Panzerkorps (General

The

The advance of Army Group A was to be delayed by Belgian motorised infantry and French mechanised cavalry divisions (DLC, Divisions Légères de Cavalerie) advancing into the Ardennes. The main resistance came from the Belgian 1st Chasseurs Ardennais, the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced by engineers and the French 5e Division Légère de Cavalerie (5th DLC).^[125] The Belgian troops blocked roads, held up the 1st Panzer Division at Bodange for about eight hours and then retired northwards too quickly for the French, who had not arrived. The Belgian barriers proved ineffective when not defended; German engineers were not disturbed as they dismantled the obstacles. The French had insufficient anti-tank capacity to block the surprisingly large number of German tanks they encountered and quickly gave way, withdrawing behind the Meuse.^[126]

The German advance was hampered by the number of vehicles trying to force their way along the poor road network. Panzergruppe Kleist had more than 41,140 vehicles, which had only four march routes through the Ardennes.^[126] French reconnaissance aircrews had reported German armoured convoys by the night of 10/11 May but this was assumed to be secondary to the main attack in Belgium. On the next night, a reconnaissance pilot reported that he had seen long vehicle columns moving without lights; another pilot sent to check reported the same and that many of the vehicles were tanks. Later that day, photographic reconnaissance and pilot reports were of tanks and bridging equipment. On 13 May, Panzergruppe Kleist caused a traffic jam about 250 km (160 mi) long from the Meuse to the Rhine on one route. While the German columns were sitting targets, the French bomber force attacked the Germans in northern Belgium during the Battle of Maastricht and had failed with heavy losses. In two days, the bomber force had been reduced from 135 to 72.^[127]

On 11 May, Gamelin ordered reserve divisions to begin reinforcing the Meuse sector. Because of the danger the Luftwaffe posed, movement over the rail network was limited to night-time, slowing the reinforcement. The French felt no sense of urgency, as they believed the build-up of German divisions would be correspondingly slow; the French Army did not conduct river crossings unless assured of heavy artillery support. While they were aware that the German tank and infantry formations were strong, they were confident in their strong fortifications and artillery superiority. The capabilities of the French units in the area were dubious; in particular, their artillery was designed for fighting infantry and they were short of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns.^[128] The German advance forces reached the Meuse line late in the afternoon of 12 May. To allow each of the three armies of Army Group A to cross, three bridgeheads were to be established, at Sedan in the south, Monthermé to the north-west and Dinant further north.^[129] The first German units to arrive hardly had local numerical superiority; the German artillery had an average of 12 rounds per gun per day, while French artillery had 30 rounds per gun per day.^[130][131]

At

The Luftwaffe executed the heaviest air bombardment the world had yet witnessed and the most intense by the Germans during the war.^[133] Two Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wings) attacked, flying 300 sorties against French positions.^[134] A total of 3,940 sorties were flown by nine Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Groups).^[135] Some of the forward pillboxes were undamaged and the garrisons repulsed the crossing attempts of the 2nd Panzer Division and 10th Panzer Division. The morale of the troops of the 55th Infantry Division further back was broken by the air attacks and French gunners fled. The German infantry, at a cost of a few hundred casualties, penetrated up to 8 km (5.0 mi) into the French defensive zone by midnight. Even by then, most of the infantry had not crossed. Much of this success was due to the actions of just six German platoons, mainly assault engineers.^[136]

The disorder that had begun at Sedan spread further. At 19:00 on 13 May, troops of the 295th Regiment of the 55th Infantry Division were holding the last prepared defensive line at the

Guderian had indicated on 12 May that he wanted to enlarge the bridgehead to at least 20 km (12 mi). His superior, General Ewald von Kleist, ordered him, on behalf of Hitler, to limit his moves to a maximum of 8 km (5.0 mi) before consolidation. At 11:45 on 14 May, Rundstedt confirmed this order, which implied that the tank units should now start to dig in.^[139] Guderian was able to get Kleist to agree on a form of words for a "reconnaissance in force", by threatening to resign and behind-the-scenes intrigues. Guderian continued the advance, despite the halt order.^[140] In the original Manstein plan, as Guderian had suggested, secondary attacks would be carried out to the south-east, in the rear of the Maginot Line. This would confuse the French command and occupy ground where French counter-offensive forces would assemble. This element had been removed by Halder but Guderian sent the 10th Panzer Division and Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland south over the Stonne plateau.^[141]

The commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntziger, intended to carry out a counter-attack at the same spot by the 3e Division Cuirassée (3e DCR, 3rd Armoured Division). The intended attack would eliminate the bridgehead. Both sides attacked and counter-attacked from 15 to 17 May. Huntziger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting the flank. Success in the Battle of Stonne and the recapture of Bulson would have enabled the French to defend the high ground overlooking Sedan and bombard the bridgehead with observed artillery-fire, even if they could not take it. Stonne changed hands 17 times and fell to the Germans for the last time on the evening of 17 May.^[142] Guderian turned the 1st Panzer Division and the 2nd Panzer Division westwards on 14 May, which advanced swiftly down the Somme valley towards the English Channel.^[143]

On 15 May, Guderian's motorised infantry fought their way through the reinforcements of the new French

Rommel lost contact with General Hermann Hoth, having disobeyed orders by not waiting for the French to establish a new line of defence. The 7th Panzer Division continued to advance north-west to Avesnes-sur-Helpe, just ahead of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions.^[147] The French 5th Motorised Infantry Division had bivouacked in the path of the German division, with its vehicles neatly lined up along the roadsides and the 7th Panzer Division dashed through them.^[148] The slow speed, overloaded crews and lack of battlefield communications undid the French. The 5th Panzer Division joined in the fight. The French inflicted many losses on the division. However, they could not cope with the speed of the German mobile units, which closed fast and destroyed the French armour at close range.^[149] The remaining elements of the 1st DCR, resting after losing all but 16 of its tanks in Belgium, were also engaged and defeated. The 1st DCR retired with three operational tanks, while defeating only 10 per cent of the 500 German tanks.^[150][151]

By 17 May, Rommel claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners while suffering only 36 losses.^[148] Guderian was delighted with the fast advance and encouraged XIX Korps to head for the channel, continuing until fuel was exhausted.^[152] Hitler worried that the German advance was moving too fast. Halder recorded in his diary on 17 May,

Führer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would pull the reins on us ... [he] keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the way to ruin the whole campaign.

Through deception and different interpretations of orders to stop from Hitler and Kleist, the front line commanders ignored Hitler's attempts to stop the westward advance to Abbeville.^[140]

The French High Command, slow to react because of its strategy of "methodical warfare", reeled from the shock of the German offensive and was overtaken by defeatism. On the morning of 15 May, the

"Aucune" [None]

— Gamelin, according to Churchill

After the war, Gamelin claimed he said "There is no longer any."^[154] Churchill later described hearing this as the most shocking moment in his life. Churchill asked Gamelin where and when the general proposed to launch a counter-attack against the flanks of the German bulge. Gamelin simply replied "inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equipment, inferiority of methods."^[155]

Some of the best Allied units in the north had seen little fighting. Had they been kept in reserve, they might have been used in a counter-attack. Pre-war General Staff Studies had concluded that the main reserves were to be kept on French soil to resist an invasion of the Low Countries. They could also deliver a counterattack or "re-establish the integrity of the original front".^[156] Despite having a numerically superior armoured force, the French failed to use it properly or to deliver an attack on the vulnerable German bulge. The Germans combined their fighting vehicles in divisions and used them at the point of main effort. The bulk of French armour was scattered along the front in tiny formations. Most of the French reserve divisions had by now been committed. The 1st DCr had been wiped out when it had run out of fuel and the 3rd DCr had failed to take its opportunity to destroy the German bridgeheads at Sedan. The only armoured division still in reserve, the 2nd DCr, was to attack on 16 May west of Saint-Quentin, Aisne. The division commander could locate only seven of its twelve companies, which were scattered along a 49 mi × 37 mi (79 km × 60 km) front. The formation was overrun by the 8th Panzer Division while still forming up and was destroyed as a fighting unit.^[157]

The

The German land forces could not remain inactive any longer, since it would allow the Allies to reorganise their defence or escape. On 19 May, Guderian was permitted to start moving again and smashed through the weak 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division and the 23rd (Northumbrian) Division (both Territorial divisions) on the Somme river. The German units occupied Amiens and secured the westernmost bridge over the river at Abbeville. This move isolated the British, French, Dutch and Belgian forces in the north from their supplies.^[162] On 20 May, a reconnaissance unit from the 2nd Panzer Division reached Noyelles-sur-Mer, 100 km (62 mi) to the west of their positions on 17 May. From Noyelles, they were able to see the Somme estuary and the English Channel. A huge pocket, containing the Allied 1st Army Group (the Belgian, British and French First, Seventh and Ninth armies), was created.^[163]

Fliegerkorps VIII covered the dash to the channel coast. Heralded as the finest hour of the Ju 87 (Stuka), these units responded via an extremely efficient

On the morning of 20 May, Gamelin ordered the armies trapped in Belgium and northern France to fight their way south and link up with French forces attacking northwards from the Somme river.^[167] On the evening of 19 May, the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, had sacked Gamelin and replaced him with Maxime Weygand, who claimed his first mission as Commander-in-Chief would be to get a good night's sleep.^[168] Gamelin's orders were cancelled and Weygand took several days during the crisis to make courtesy visits in Paris. Weygand proposed a counter-offensive by the armies trapped in the north combined with an attack by French forces on the Somme front, the new French 3rd Army Group (General Antoine-Marie-Benoît Besson).^[167][169]

The corridor through which Panzergruppe von Kleist had advanced to the coast was narrow and to the north were the three DLMs and the BEF; to the south was the 4th DCR. Allied delays caused by the French change of command gave the German infantry divisions time to follow up and reinforce the panzer corridor. Their tanks had also pushed further along the channel coast. Weygand flew into the pocket on 21 May and met Billotte, the commander of the 1st Army Group and

Gort doubted that the French could prevail. On 23 May, the situation was worsened by Billotte being killed in a car crash, leaving the 1st Army Group leaderless for three days. He was the only Allied commander in the north briefed on the Weygand plan. That day, the British decided to evacuate from the Channel ports. Only two local offensives, by the British and French in the north at Arras on 21 May and by the French from Cambrai in the south on 22 May, took place. Frankforce (Major-General Harold Franklyn) consisting of two divisions, had moved into the Arras area. Franklyn was not aware of a French push north toward Cambrai and the French were ignorant of a British attack towards Arras. Franklyn assumed he was to relieve the Allied garrison at Arras and cut German communications in the vicinity. He was reluctant to commit the 5th Infantry Division and 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, with the 3rd DLM providing flank protection, in a limited objective attack. Only two British infantry battalions and two battalions of the 1st Army Tank Brigade, with 58 Matilda I and 16 Matilda II tanks and an attached motorcycle battalion, took part in the main attack.^[172]

The

In the early hours of 23 May, Gort ordered a retreat from Arras. By now, he had no faith in the Weygand plan, nor in Weygand's proposal at least to try to hold a pocket on the Flemish coast, a so-called

Frieser wrote that the Franco-British counter-attack at Arras had a disproportionate effect on the Germans because the German higher commanders were apprehensive about flank security. Kleist, the commander of Panzergruppe von Kleist, perceived a "serious threat" and informed Halder that he had to wait until the crisis was resolved before continuing. Colonel-General Günther von Kluge, the 4th Army commander ordered the tanks to halt, with the support of Rundstedt. On 22 May, when the attack had been repulsed, Rundstedt ordered that the situation at Arras must be restored before Panzergruppe von Kleist moved on Boulogne and Calais. At OKW, the panic was worse and Hitler contacted Army Group A on 22 May, to order that all mobile units were to operate either side of Arras and infantry units were to operate to the east.^[182]

The crisis among the higher staffs of the German army was not apparent at the front and Halder formed the same conclusion as Guderian, that the real threat was that the Allies would retreat to the channel coast too quickly and a race for the channel ports began. Guderian ordered the 2nd Panzer Division to capture Boulogne, the 1st Panzer Division to take Calais and the 10th Panzer division to seize Dunkirk. Most of the BEF and the French First Army were still 100 km (60 mi) from the coast but despite delays, British troops were sent from England to Boulogne and Calais just in time to forestall the XIX Corps panzer divisions on 22 May. Frieser wrote that had the panzers advanced at the same speed on 21 May as they had on 20 May, before the halt order stopped their advance for 24 hours, Boulogne and Calais would have fallen. (Without a halt at Montcornet on 15 May and the second halt on 21 May after the Battle of Arras, the final halt order of 24 May would have been irrelevant, because Dunkirk would have already been captured by the 10th Panzer Division.)^[183]

The British launched Operation Dynamo, which evacuated the encircled British, French and Belgian troops from the northern pocket in Belgium and Pas-de-Calais, beginning on 26 May. About 28,000 men were evacuated on the first day. The French First Army – the bulk of which remained in Lille – fought the Siege of Lille owing to Weygand's failure to pull it back along with other French forces to the coast. The 50,000 men involved capitulated on 31 May. While the First Army was mounting its sacrificial defence at Lille, it drew German forces away from Dunkirk, allowing 70,000 Allied soldiers to escape. Total Allied evacuation stood at 165,000 on 31 May. The Allied position was complicated by Belgian King Leopold III's surrender on 27 May, which was postponed until 28 May. The gap left by the Belgian Army stretched from Ypres to Dixmude. A collapse was averted at the Battle of Dunkirk and 139,732 British and 139,097 French soldiers were evacuated by sea across the English Channel in Operation Dynamo. Between 31 May and 4 June, another 20,000 British and 98,000 French were saved; about 30,000 to 40,000 French soldiers of the rearguard remained to be captured.^[184] The total evacuated was 338,226, including 199,226 British and 139,000 French.^[185]

During the Dunkirk battle, the Luftwaffe did its best to prevent the evacuation. It flew 1,882 bombing missions and 1,997 fighter sorties. British losses at Dunkirk made up 6 per cent of their total losses during the French campaign, including 60 precious fighter pilots. The Luftwaffe failed in its task of preventing the evacuation but inflicted serious losses on the Allied forces. 89 merchantmen (of 126,518 grt) were lost; the navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers sunk or seriously damaged. The Germans lost around 100 aircraft; the RAF lost 106 fighters.

By the end of May 1940, the best and most modern French armies had been sent north and lost in the resulting encirclement; the French had also lost much of their heavy weaponry and their best armoured formations. Overall, the Allies had lost 61 divisions in Fall Gelb. Weygand was faced with the prospect of defending a long front (from Sedan to the channel), with a greatly depleted French Army now lacking significant Allied support. Weygand had only 64 French divisions and the

The Germans began their second offensive on 5 June on the Somme and the Aisne. During the next three weeks, far from the easy advance the Wehrmacht expected, they encountered strong resistance from a rejuvenated French Army.[193] The French armies had fallen back on their lines of supply and communications and were closer to repair shops, supply dumps and stores. About 112,000 French soldiers from Dunkirk were repatriated via the Normandy and Brittany ports, a partial substitute for the lost divisions in Flanders. The French were also able to make good a significant amount of their armoured losses and raised the 1st and 2nd DCR (heavy armoured divisions). The 4th DCR also had its losses replaced. Morale rose and was very high by the end of May 1940. Most French soldiers that joined the line only knew of German success by hearsay.^[194]

French officers had gained tactical experience against German mobile units and had more confidence in their weapons after seeing that their artillery and tanks performed better than German armour. The French tanks were now known to have better armour and armament. Between 23 and 28 May, the French Seventh and Tenth armies were reconstituted. Weygand decided to implement defence in depth and use delaying tactics to inflict maximum attrition on German units. Small towns and villages were fortified for all-round defence as tactical hedgehogs. Behind the front line, the new infantry, armoured and half-mechanised divisions formed up, ready to counter-attack and relieve the surrounded units, which were to hold out at all costs.^[195]

The 47 divisions of Army Group B attacked either side of Paris with the majority of the mobile units.^[191] After 48 hours, the German offensive had not broken through.^[196] On the Aisne, the XVI Panzerkorps employed over 1,000 AFVs in two Panzer divisions and a motorised division against the French. German offensive tactics were crude and Hoepner soon lost 80 out of 500 AFVs in the first attack. The 4th Army captured bridgeheads over the Somme but the Germans struggled to get over the Aisne.^[197][198] At Amiens, the Germans were repeatedly driven back by French artillery-fire and realised that French tactics were much improved.^[199]

The German Army relied on the Luftwaffe to silence French artillery, to enable German infantry to inch forward.

On 10 June, Reynaud declared Paris an open city.^[204] The German 18th Army then deployed against Paris. The French resisted the approaches to the capital strongly but the line was broken in several places. Weygand asserted it would not take long for the French Army to disintegrate.^[205] On 13 June, Churchill attended a meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council at Tours and suggested a Franco-British Union but this was refused.^[206] On 14 June, Paris fell.^[11] Parisians who stayed in the city found that in most cases the Germans were extremely well mannered.^[207]

The Luftwaffe gained

To the east,

German attempts to break open or into the Maginot line prior to Tiger had failed. One assault lasted for eight hours on the extreme north of the line, costing the Germans 46 dead and 251 wounded for two French killed (one at Ferme-Chappy and one at Fermont fortress). On 15 June, the last well-equipped French forces, including the Fourth Army, were preparing to leave as the Germans struck. The French force now holding the line was exiguous; the Germans greatly outnumbered the French. They could call upon the I Armeekorps of seven divisions and 1,000 artillery pieces, although most were First World War vintage and could not penetrate the thick armour of the fortresses. Only 88 mm (3.5 in) guns could do the job and 16 were allocated to the operation. To bolster this, 150 mm (5.9 in) and eight railway batteries were also employed. The Luftwaffe deployed the Fliegerkorps V.^[211]

The battle was difficult and slow progress was made against strong French resistance. Each fortress was overcome one by one.^[212] One fortress (Schoenenbourg) fired 15,802 75 mm (3.0 in) rounds at attacking German infantry. It was the most heavily shelled of all the French positions but its armour protected it from fatal damage. On the day that Tiger was launched, Unternehmen Kleiner Bär (Operation Little Bear) began. Five divisions of the VII Armeekorps crossed the Rhine into the Colmar area with a view to advancing to the Vosges Mountains. The force had 400 artillery pieces, reinforced by heavy artillery and mortars. The French 104th Division and 105th Division were forced back into the Vosges Mountains on 17 June. On the same day, XIX Korps reached the Swiss border the Maginot defences were cut off from the rest of France. Most units surrendered on 25 June and the Germans claimed to have taken 500,000 prisoners. Some main fortresses continued the fight, despite appeals for surrender. The last only capitulated on 10 July, after a request from Georges and only then under protest. Of the 58 main fortifications on the Maginot Line, ten were captured by the Wehrmacht.^[213]

The evacuation of the second BEF took place during Operation Aerial between 15 and 25 June. The Luftwaffe, with air supremacy, was determined to prevent more Allied evacuations after the Dunkirk débâcle. Fliegerkorps 1 was assigned to the Normandy and Brittany sectors. On 9 and 10 June, the port of Cherbourg was subject to 15 long tons (15 t) of German bombs, while Le Havre received 10 bombing attacks that sank 2,949 GRT of Allied shipping. On 17 June, Junkers Ju 88s – mainly from Kampfgeschwader 30 – sank a "10,000 tonne ship", the 16,243 GRT liner RMS Lancastria off St Nazaire, killing about 4,000 Allied troops and civilians. This was nearly double the British killed in the Battle of France, yet the Luftwaffe failed to prevent the evacuation of 190,000–200,000 Allied personnel.^[214]

Discouraged by his cabinet's hostile reaction to a British proposal for a

On 21 June 1940, Hitler visited the site to start the negotiations, which took place in the same railway carriage in which the 1918 Armistice was signed. It had just been removed from a museum building and placed on the spot where it was located in 1918. Hitler sat in the same chair in which Marshal Ferdinand Foch had sat when he faced the defeated German representatives.^[219] After listening to the reading of the preamble, Hitler left the carriage in a calculated gesture of disdain for the French delegates and negotiations were turned over to Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of staff of OKW. The armistice was signed on the next day at 18:36 (French time), by General Keitel for Germany and Huntziger for France. The armistice and cease-fire went into effect two days and six hours later, at 00:35 on 25 June, once the Franco-Italian Armistice had also been signed, at 18:35 on 24 June, near Rome.^[220] On 27 June, German troops occupied the coast of the Basque Country between France and Spain.^{[citation needed]}

This section relies largely or entirely upon a single source. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please help improve this article by introducing citations to additional sources at this section. (October 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this message )

The title of Ernest May's book Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (2000) nods to an earlier analysis, Strange Defeat (written 1940; published 1946) by the historian Marc Bloch (1886–1944), a participant in the battle. May wrote that Hitler had better insight into the French and British governments than vice-versa and knew that they would not go to war over Austria and Czechoslovakia, because he concentrated on politics rather than the state and national interest. From 1937 to 1940, Hitler gave his views on events, their importance and his intentions, then defended them against contrary opinion from the likes of the former Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck and Ernst von Weizsäcker. Hitler sometimes concealed aspects of his thinking but he was unusually frank about priority and his assumptions. May referred to John Wheeler-Bennett (1964),

Except in cases where he had pledged his word, Hitler always meant what he said.^[221]

May asserted that in Paris, London and other capitals, there was an inability to believe that someone might want another world war. He wrote that, given public reluctance to contemplate another war and a need to reach consensus about Germany, the rulers of France and Britain were reticent (to resist German aggression), which limited dissent at the cost of enabling assumptions that suited their convenience. In France, Édouard Daladier withheld information until the last moment and in September 1938 presented the Munich Agreement to the French cabinet as a fait accompli, thus avoiding discussions over whether Britain would follow France into war or if the military balance was really in Germany's favour or how significant it was. The decision for war in September 1939 and the plan devised in the winter of 1939–1940 by Daladier for war with the USSR followed the same pattern.^[222]

Hitler had miscalculated Franco-British reactions to the invasion of Poland in September 1939, because he had not realised that a shift in public opinion had occurred in mid-1939. May wrote that the French and British could have defeated Germany in 1938 with Czechoslovakia as an ally and also in late 1939, when German forces in the West were incapable of preventing a French occupation of the Ruhr, which would have forced a capitulation or a futile German resistance in a war of attrition. France did not invade Germany in 1939 because it wanted British lives to be at risk too and because of hopes that a blockade might force a German surrender without a bloodbath. The French and British also believed that they were militarily superior, which guaranteed victory. The run of victories enjoyed by Hitler from 1938 to 1940 could only be understood in the context of defeat being inconceivable to French and British leaders.^[223]

May wrote that when Hitler demanded a plan to invade France in September 1939, the German officer corps thought that it was foolhardy and discussed a

German casualties are hard to determine but commonly accepted figures are: 27,074 killed, 111,034 wounded and 18,384 missing.^[6][7][8] German deaths may have been as high as 45,000 men, due to non-combat causes, such as death from wounds and missing who were later listed as dead.^[6] The battle cost the Luftwaffe 28 per cent of its front line strength; some 1,236–1,428 aircraft were destroyed (1,129 to enemy action, 299 in accidents), 323–488 were damaged (225 to enemy action, 263 in accidents), making 36 per cent of the Luftwaffe strength lost or damaged.^[6][236][24] Luftwaffe casualties amounted to 6,653 men, including 4,417 airmen; of these 1,129 were killed and 1,930 were reported missing or captured, many of whom were liberated from French prison camps upon the French capitulation.^[9] Italian casualties amounted to 631 or 642 men killed, 2,631 wounded and 616 reported missing. A further 2,151 men suffered from frostbite during the campaign. The official Italian numbers were compiled for a report on 18 July 1940, when many of the fallen still lay under snow and it is probable that most of the Italian missing were dead. Units operating in more difficult terrain had higher ratios of missing to killed but probably most of the missing had died.^[237]

According to the French Defence Historical Service, 85,310 French military personnel were killed (including 5,400 Maghrebis); 12,000 were reported missing, 120,000 were wounded and 1,540,000 prisoners (including 67,400 Maghrebis) were taken.^[16] Some recent French research indicates that the number of killed was between 55,000 and 85,000, a statement of the French Defence Historical Service tending to the lower end.^[7][k] In August 1940, 1,540,000 prisoners were taken into Germany, where roughly 940,000 remained until 1945, when they were liberated by advancing Allied forces. At least 3,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were murdered after being taken prisoner.^[239] While in captivity, 24,600 French prisoners died; 71,000 escaped; 220,000 were released by various agreements between the Vichy government and Germany; several hundred thousand were paroled because of disability and/or sickness.^[240] Air losses are estimated at 1,274 aircraft destroyed during the campaign.^[24] French tank losses amount to 1,749 tanks (43 per cent of tanks engaged), of which 1,669 were lost to gunfire, 45 to mines and 35 to aircraft. Tank losses are amplified by the large numbers that were abandoned or scuttled and then captured.^[5]

The BEF suffered 66,426 casualties, 11,014 killed or died of wounds, 14,074 wounded and 41,338 men missing or taken prisoner.^[241] About 64,000 vehicles were destroyed or abandoned and 2,472 guns were destroyed or abandoned. RAF losses from 10 May – 22 June, amounted to 931 aircraft and 1,526 casualties. The Allied naval forces also lost 243 ships to Luftwaffe bombing in Dynamo.^[242] Belgian losses were 6,093 killed, 15,850 wounded and more than 500 missing.^[21][20] Those captured amounted to 200,000 men, of whom 2,000 died in captivity.^[21][243] The Belgians also lost 112 aircraft.^[244] The Dutch Armed forces lost 2,332 killed and 7,000 wounded.^[245] Polish losses were around 5,500 killed or wounded and 16,000 prisoners, nearly 13,000 troops of the 2nd Infantry Division were interned in Switzerland for the duration of the war.^{[246][citation needed]}

Hitler had expected a million Germans to die in conquering France; instead, his goal was accomplished in just six weeks with only 27,000 Germans killed, 18,400 missing and 111,000 wounded, little more than a third of the German casualties in the Battle of Verdun during World War I.^[247] The unexpectedly swift victory resulted in a wave of euphoria among the German population and a strong upsurge in war-fever.^[248] Hitler's popularity reached its peak with the celebration of the French capitulation on 6 July 1940.

"If an increase in feeling for Adolf Hitler was still possible, it has become reality with the day of the return to Berlin", commented one report from the provinces. "In the face of such greatness," ran another, "all pettiness and grumbling are silenced." Even opponents to the regime found it hard to resist the victory mood. Workers in the armaments factories pressed to be allowed to join the army. People thought final victory was around the corner. Only Britain stood in the way. For perhaps the only time during the Third Reich there was genuine war-fever among the population.

— Kershaw^[249]

On 19 July, during the 1940 Field Marshal Ceremony at the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, Hitler promoted 12 generals to the rank of field marshal.

• Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army
• Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)
• Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in chief of Army Group A
• Fedor von Bock, Commander in chief of Army Group B
• Wilhelm von Leeb, Commander in chief of Army Group C
• Günther von Kluge, Commander of the 4th Army
• Wilhelm List, Commander of the 12th Army
• Erwin von Witzleben, Commander of the 1st Army
• Walther von Reichenau, Commander of the 6th Army
• Albert Kesselring, Commander of Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2)
• Erhard Milch, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe
• Hugo Sperrle, Commander of the Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3)

This number of promotions to what had previously been the highest rank in the Wehrmacht (Hermann Göring, Commander in chief of the Luftwaffe and already a Field Marshal, was elevated to the new rank of Reichsmarschall) was unprecedented. In the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II had promoted only five generals to Field Marshal.^[250][251]

• From Lemberg to Bordeaux (Von Lemberg bis Bordeaux), written by Leo Leixner, a journalist and war correspondent, is a witness account of the battles that led to the fall of Poland and France. In August 1939, Leixner joined the Wehrmacht as a war reporter, was promoted to sergeant and in 1941 published his recollections. The book was originally issued by Franz Eher Nachfolger, the central publishing house of the Nazi Party.^[252]
• Tanks Break Through! (Panzerjäger Brechen Durch!), written by Alfred-Ingemar Berndt, a journalist and close associate of propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, is a witness account of the battles that led to the fall of France. When the 1940 attack was in the offing, Berndt joined the Wehrmacht, was sergeant in an anti-tank division and afterward published his recollections.^[253] The book was originally issued by Franz Eher Nachfolger, the central publishing house of the Nazi Party, in 1940.^[254]
• Escape via Berlin (De Gernika a Nueva York), written by José Antonio Aguirre, president of the Basque Country, describes his passage through occupied France and Belgium on his way to exile. Aguirre supported the loyalist side during the Spanish Civil war and was forced to exile in France, where the German invasion took him by surprise. He joined the wave of refugees trying to flee France and finally managed to escape to the United States through a long journey involving disguise.
• foreign correspondent for CBS World News Roundup
  before the war, gives a day-by-day account of his reporting before, during, and after the Battle of France, including conversations with military and political leaders – as well as ordinary soldiers and civilians – on both sides. Unable to continue reporting the war honestly from Berlin due to increasing German censorship, Shirer returned to the United States in December 1940.

See also

• British Expeditionary Force order of battle (1940)
• Polish Army in France (1939–40)
• Historiography of the Battle of France
• Military history of France during World War II
• List of French World War II military equipment
• List of British military equipment of World War II
• List of Belgian military equipment of World War II
• List of Dutch military equipment of World War II
• List of German military equipment of World War II
• Timeline of the Battle of France
• Western Front (World War II)

Notes

1. ^ ^{a b} Until 17 May
2. ^ From 17 May
3. Freiburg. Luftwaffe strength included gliders and transports used in the assaults on the Netherlands and Belgium.^[3]
4. ^ Hooton used the National Archives in London for RAF records, including "Air 24/679 Operational Record Book: The RAF in France 1939–1940", "Air 22/32 Air Ministry Daily Strength Returns", "Air 24/21 Advanced Air Striking Force Operations Record" and "Air 24/507 Fighter Command Operations Record". For the Armée de l'Air Hooton used "Service Historique de Armée de l'Air (SHAA), Vincennes".^[3]
5. Steven Zaloga wrote, "Of the 2,439 panzers originally committed 822, or about 34 per cent, were total losses after five weeks of fighting.... Detailed figures for the number of mechanical breakdowns are not available and are not relevant as in the French case, since, as the victors, the Wehrmacht could recover damaged or broken-down tanks and put them back into service".^[12]
6. ^ Official Italian report on 18 July 1940: Italian casualties amounted to 631 or 642 men killed, 2,631 wounded and 616 reported missing. A further 2,151 men suffered from frostbite during the campaign.^[13][14][15]
7. ^ French:
   ≈60,000 killed
   200,000 wounded
   12,000 missing^[16][17]
   British:
   3,500–5,000 dead
   16,815 wounded
   47,959 missing or captured^[6][18][19]
   Belgian:
   6,093 killed
   15,850 wounded
   500 missing^[20][21]
   Dutch:
   2,332 killed
   7,000 wounded
   Polish:
   5,500 killed or wounded^[22]
   Luxembourg:
   7 wounded^[23]
8. ^ Steven Zaloga notes that "According to a postwar French Army study, French tank losses in 1940 amounted to 1,749 tanks lost out of 4,071 engaged, of which 1,669 were lost to gunfire, 45 to mines and 35 to aircraft. This amounts to about 43 per cent. French losses were substantially amplified by the large numbers of tanks that were abandoned or scuttled by their crews".^[5]
9. ^ Jonathan Fennell notes "Losses 'included 180,000 rifles, 10,700 Bren guns, 509 two-pounder anti-tank guns, 509 cruiser tanks and 180 infantry tanks'."^[25]
10. ^ On 26 February 1945, Hitler claimed he had let the BEF escape as a "sporting" gesture, in the hope Churchill would come to terms. Few historians accept Hitler's word in light of Directive No. 13, which called for "the annihilation of French, British and Belgian forces in the Dunkirk pocket".^[190]
11. ^ "Combat losses amounted in reality to 58,829 deaths, excluding marine however, whose deaths were registered under different procedures."^[238]

Footnotes

1. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Scheck 2010, p. 426.
2. ^ ^{a b c} Umbreit 2015, p. 279.
3. ^ ^{a b c d} Hooton 2007, pp. 47–48.
4. ISBN 978-0-7566-6817-4
   . Retrieved 14 June 2024.
5. ^ ^{a b c} Zaloga 2011, p. 73.
6. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Frieser 1995, p. 400.
7. ^ ^{a b c} L'Histoire, No. 352, April 2010 France 1940: Autopsie d'une défaite, p. 59.
8. ^ ^{a b} Sheppard 1990, p. 88.
9. ^ ^{a b} Hooton 2010, p. 73.
10. ^ Murray 1983, p. 40.
11. ^ ^{a b c} Healy 2007, p. 85.
12. ^ Zaloga 2011, p. 76.
13. ^ Sica 2012, p. 374.
14. ^ Porch 2004, p. 43.
15. ^ Rochat 2008, para. 19.
16. ^ ^{a b} Gorce 1988, p. 496.
17. ^ Quellien 2010, pp. 262–263.
18. ^ French 2001, p. 156.
19. ^ Archives, The National. "The National Archives | World War II | Western Europe 1939–1945: Invasion | How worried was Britain about invasion 1940–41?". archive.wikiwix.com. Archived from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved 14 January 2023.
20. ^ ^{a b} Dear & Foot 2005, p. 96.
21. ^ ^{a b c} Ellis 1993, p. 255.
22. ^ Jacobson, 2015, nopp
23. ^ "Inauguration du Monument érigé à la Mémoire des Morts de la Force Armée de la guerre de 1940–1945" (PDF). Grand Duché de Luxembourg Ministére D'État Bulletin D'Information (in French). Vol. 4, no. 10. Luxembourg: Service information et presse. 31 October 1948. p. 147. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 January 2017. Retrieved 22 May 2020.
24. ^ ^{a b c} Hooton 2007, p. 90.
25. ^ Fennell 2019, p. 115.
26. ^ Donnell 2017.
27. ^ ^{a b} Jackson 2003, p. 33.
28. ^ Roth 2010, p. 6.
29. ^ Kaufmann & Kaufmann 2007, p. 23.
30. ^ Jackson 2003, pp. 32–33.
31. ^ Baliszewski 2004.
32. ^ Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin) Archived 2 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine Cited in the British Blue book
33. ^ "Chronology 1939". indiana.edu. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011. Retrieved 12 December 2015.
34. ^ ^{a b} Shirer 1990, p. 715.
35. ^ Full text of the speech Archived 26 September 2022 at the Wayback Machine (in German, pdf)
36. ^ archive.org: Video of his speech (77 min)
37. ^ ^{a b} Frieser 2005, p. 61.
38. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 32.
39. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 74.
40. ^ "Directive No. 6 Full Text". Archived from the original on 29 July 2016. Retrieved 5 December 2015.
41. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 717.
42. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 67.
43. ^ Megargee 2000, p. 76.
44. ^ ^{a b} Shirer 1990, p. 718.
45. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 25.
46. ^ Atkin 1990, pp. 42–43.
47. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 62.
48. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 63.
49. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 79.
50. ^ ^{a b} Frieser 2005, p. 60.
51. ^ ^{a b} Frieser 2005, p. 65.
52. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 87.
53. ^ Frieser 1995, p. 76.
54. ^ Hinsley et al. 1979, pp. 114, 128, 130.
55. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 65–67.
56. ^ Bond 1990, pp. 43–44.
57. ^ Melvin 2010, pp. 148, 154–155.
58. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 88, 94–95, 113, 116.
59. ^ ^{a b} Beevor 2013, p. 97.
60. ^ Doughty 2014a, pp. 5–6.
61. ^ Doughty 2014a, p. 7.
62. ^ Doughty 2014a, pp. 6–7.
63. ^ Doughty 2014a, pp. 7–8.
64. ^ Doughty 2014a, p. 11.
65. ^ Doughty 2014a, p. 12.
66. ^ ^{a b} Doughty 2014a, pp. 8–9.
67. ^ Bond 1990, pp. 36, 46.
68. ^ Atkin 1990, p. 53.
69. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 35–37.
70. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 29.
71. ^ DiNardo & Bay 1988, pp. 131–132.
72. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 29–30.
73. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 71, 101.
74. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 323.
75. ^ ^{a b} Healy 2007, p. 23.
76. ^ Corum 1995, p. 70.
77. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 37–42.
78. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 861.
79. ^ Citino 1999, p. 249.
80. ^ Corum 1992, p. 203.
81. ^ French 2001, pp. 16–24.
82. ^ ^{a b} Hooton 2007, p. 47.
83. ^ Buckley 1998, pp. 126–127.
84. ^ Corum 1995, p. 54.
85. ^ For details see de:8,8-cm-Flak 18/36/37#Die 8,8 als Panzerabwehrkanone.
86. ^ ^{a b} Harvey 1990, p. 449.
87. ^ ^{a b c d} Dear & Foot 2005, p. 316.
88. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 35.
89. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 36–37.
90. ^ Christofferson & Christofferson 2006, pp. 18–19.
91. ^ Porch 2022, pp. 72–76.
92. ^ Blatt 1997, p. 23.
93. ^ ^{a b} Christofferson & Christofferson 2006, p. 18.
94. ^ Tooze 2006, p. 372.
95. ^ Corum 1992, pp. 204–205.
96. ^ Atkin 1990, p. 58.
97. ^ Citino 2005, p. 284.
98. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 90, 153.
99. ^ Schuker 2014, pp. 111–112.
100. ^ Stout 2010, p. 19.
101. ^ Taylor & Mayer 1974, p. 72.
102. ^ ^{a b} Harvey 1990, p. 448.
103. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 81.
104. ^ Facon 1996, pp. 54–62.
105. ^ Belgium 1941, p. 32.
106. ^ Ellis 2004, pp. 359–371.
107. ^ Weinberg 1994, p. 122.
108. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 49–54.
109. ^ Evans 2000, pp. 33–38.
110. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 48–49.
111. ^ ^{a b} Hooton 1994, p. 244.
112. ^ de Jong 1970.
113. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 244, 50, 52.
114. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 723.
115. ^ Evans 2000, p. 38.
116. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 48.
117. ^ Dunstan 2005, pp. 31–32.
118. ^ Dunstan 2005, pp. 45–54.
119. ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 215.
120. ^ Gunsburg 1992, pp. 209–210, 218.
121. ^ ^{a b} Healy 2007, p. 38.
122. ^ Gunsburg 1992, pp. 207–244 [236–237, 241].
123. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 246–248.
124. ^ Gunsburg 2000, pp. 97–140, 242, 249.
125. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 137.
126. ^ ^{a b} Frieser 2005, pp. 137–142.
127. ^ Jackson 1974, p. 56.
128. ^ Mansoor 1988, p. 68.
129. ^ Citino 1999, p. 250.
130. ^ ^{a b} Frieser 2005, p. 192.
131. ^ Mansoor 1988, p. 69.
132. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 64.
133. ^ Frieser 1995, p. 193.
134. ^ Weal 1997, p. 46.
135. ^ ^{a b} Hooton 2007, p. 65.
136. ^ Frieser 1995, pp. 216, 244.
137. ^ Krause & Phillips 2006, p. 172.
138. ^ Weal 1997, p. 22.
139. ^ Frieser 1995, p. 258.
140. ^ ^{a b} Strawson 2003, p. 108.
141. ^ Frieser 1995, p. 259.
142. ^ Healy 2007, p. 67.
143. ^ Taylor & Mayer 1974, p. 55.
144. ^ Evans 2000, p. 70.
145. ^ Citino 2002, p. 270.
146. ^ Evans 2000, pp. 70, 72.
147. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 271.
148. ^ ^{a b} Krause & Phillips 2006, p. 176.
149. ^ Healy 2007, p. 75.
150. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 269, 273.
151. ^ Evans 2000, pp. 66–67, 69, 72.
152. ^ Evans 2000, p. 73.
153. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 720.
154. ^ L'Aurore 1949.
155. ^ Churchill 1949, pp. 42–49.
156. ^ Blatt 1997, p. 326.
157. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 262–263.
158. ^ Evans 2000, pp. 75–76.
159. ^ Corum 1997, p. 278.
160. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 265.
161. ^ Neave 2003, pp. 31–32.
162. ^ Bond 1990, p. 69.
163. ^ Sheppard 1990, p. 81.
164. ^ Weal 1997, p. 47.
165. ^ Corum 1997, pp. 73, 277–280.
166. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 67, 70.
167. ^ ^{a b} Gardner 2000, p. 10.
168. ^ Bond 1990, pp. 66, 69.
169. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 278–280.
170. ^ Ellis 2004, p. 105.
171. ^ Bond 1990, p. 70.
172. ^ Ellis 2004, p. 89.
173. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 283–286.
174. ^ Bond 1990, p. 71.
175. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 286–287, 36.
176. ^ Healy 2007, p. 81.
177. ^ Gardner 2000, pp. 9–10.
178. ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 234, 236–237.
179. ^ Longden 2008, pp. 87–88.
180. ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 238–239.
181. ^ Longden 2008, p. 89.
182. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 287.
183. ^ Frieser 2005, pp. 287–288.
184. ^ Bond 1990, pp. 89–98, 106–107, 115.
185. ^ Umbreit 2015, p. 293.
186. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 74.
187. ^ Murray 1983, p. 39.
188. ^ Chappel 1985, p. 21.
189. ^ Harman 1980, p. 82.
190. ^ Bond 1990, p. 105.
191. ^ ^{a b} Healy 2007, p. 84.
192. ^ Jackson 2001, pp. 119–120.
193. ^ Alexander 2007, p. 219.
194. ^ Alexander 2007, pp. 225–226.
195. ^ Alexander 2007, pp. 227, 231, 238.
196. ^ Alexander 2007, p. 248.
197. ^ Alexander 2007, p. 245.
198. ^ Umbreit 2015, p. 297.
199. ^ ^{a b} Alexander 2007, p. 249.
200. ^ Alexander 2007, p. 250.
201. ^ Alexander 2007.
202. ^ David 2018, chpt. 13.
203. ^ Alexander 2007, p. 240.
204. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 738.
205. ^ Umbreit 2015, p. 300.
206. ^ Umbreit 2015, p. 301.
207. ^ Shirer, William (1941). Berlin Diary. Alfred A. Knopf.
208. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 86.
209. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 84–85.
210. ^ Romanych & Rupp 2010, p. 52.
211. ^ Romanych & Rupp 2010, p. 56.
212. ^ Romanych & Rupp 2010, pp. 56–80.
213. ^ Romanych & Rupp 2010, pp. 90–91.
214. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 88.
215. ^ Taylor & Mayer 1974, p. 63.
216. ^ De Waal 1990, p. 244.
217. ^ Evans 2000, p. 156.
218. ^ Taylor & Mayer 1974, p. 57.
219. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 326.
220. ^ Frieser 2005, p. 317.
221. ^ May 2000, p. 453.
222. ^ May 2000, pp. 453–454.
223. ^ May 2000, pp. 454–455.
224. ^ May 2000, pp. 455–456.
225. ^ May 2000, pp. 456–457.
226. ^ May 2000, pp. 457–458.
227. ^ May 2000, pp. 458–460.
228. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, pp. 336–339.
229. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 317.
230. ^ Reynolds 1993, pp. 248, 250–251.
231. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 635.
232. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 634.
233. ^ Imlay & Toft 2007, p. 227.
234. ^ Carswell 2019, p. 92.
235. ^ Dear & Foot 2005, p. 321.
236. ^ Murray 1983.
237. ^ Sica 2012, p. 374; Porch 2004; Rochat 2008, p. 43, para. 19.
238. ^ servicehistorique (20 November 2017)
239. ^ Scheck 2010, p. 58.
240. ^ Durand 1981, p. 21.
241. ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 506.
242. ^ Churchill 1949, p. 102.
243. ^ Keegan 2005, p. 96.
244. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 52.
245. ^ Goossens, Balance Sheet, waroverholland.nl Archived 17 September 2011 at the Wayback Machine
246. ^ Jacobson.
247. ^ Atkin 1990, pp. 233–234.
248. ^ Neitzel & Welzer 2012, pp. 193, 216.
249. ^ Kershaw 2002, p. 407.
250. ^ Deighton 2008, pp. 7–9.
251. ^ Ellis 1993, p. 94.
252. ^ Leixner, Leo; Lehrer, Steven (2 March 2017). "From Lemberg to Bordeaux: a German war correspondent's account of battle in Poland, the low countries and France, 1939–40". SF Tafel Publishers. Archived from the original on 20 August 2017. Retrieved 2 June 2017 – via catalog.loc.gov Library Catalog.
253. ISBN 9781539810971. Archived
     from the original on 10 May 2024. Retrieved 18 November 2018 – via Google Books.
254. ^ Berndt, Alfred-Ingemar (2 March 2016). "Tanks break through! a German soldier's account of war in the Low Countries and France, 1940". SF Tafel. Archived from the original on 18 January 2021. Retrieved 2 June 2017 – via catalog.loc.gov Library Catalog.

References

Books

• Atkin, Ronald (1990). Pillar of Fire: Dunkirk 1940. Edinburgh: Birlinn.
  ISBN 1-84158-078-3
  .
• ISBN 978-0-7538-2824-3
  .
• Belgium: The Official Account of What Happened 1939–1940 [Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (in French). London: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la Belge. 1941.
  OCLC 4025429
  . LCOC 42016037. Retrieved 15 September 2015.
• Blatt, Joel, ed. (1997). The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments. Providence, RI: Berghahn.
  ISBN 1-57181-109-5
  .
• ISBN 0-08-037700-9
  .
• ISBN 1-85728-589-1
  .
• Carswell, Richard (2019). The Fall of France in the Second World War: History and Memory. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
  ISBN 978-3-030-03954-7
  .
• Chappel, Michael "Mike" (1985). The Canadian Army at War. Men at Arms. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 978-0-85045-600-4
  .
• Christofferson, Thomas R.; Christofferson, Michael S. (2006). France during World War II: From Defeat to Liberation. Fordham University Press.
  ISBN 0-8232-2562-3
  .
• OCLC 396145
  .
• ISBN 1-55587-714-1
  .
• Citino, Robert M. (2002). Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
  ISBN 0-7006-1176-2
  .
• Citino, Robert M. (2005). The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
  ISBN 978-0-7006-1624-4
  .
• Corum, James (1992). The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
  ISBN 0-7006-0541-X
  .
• Corum, James (1997). The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
  ISBN 978-0-7006-0836-2
  .
• David, Saul (2018) [1994]. After Dunkirk: Churchill's Sacrifice of the Highland Division (Kindle ed.). Sharpe Book.
  ISBN 978-1-911445-44-9
  .
• de Jong, Loe (1970). Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog 1939–1945 Deel 3 Mei '40 [The Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Second World War 1939–1945 Part 3 May '40] (PDF) (in Dutch). Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut Voor Oorlogsdocumentatie.
  OCLC 926786827. Archived
  (PDF) from the original on 3 April 2022. Retrieved 27 May 2022.
• Donnell, Clayton (2017). The Battle for the Maginot Line, 1940. Barnsley: Pen and Sword.
  ISBN 978-1-4738-7728-3
  .
• Gorce, Paul-Marie de la (1988). L'aventure coloniale de la France – L'Empire écartelé, 1936–1946 [The French Colonial Adventure] (in French). Paris: Denoël.
  ISBN 978-2-207-23520-1
  .
• De Waal, Frans (1990). Peacemaking Among Primates. New York: Harvard University Press.
  ISBN 0-674-65921-X
  .
• Dear, Ian; Foot, M. (2005). The Oxford Companion to World War II. London: Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 978-0-19-280666-6
  .
• ISBN 978-1-84595-106-1
  .
• ISBN 978-0-8117-1460-0
  .
• Dunstan, Simon (2005). Fort Eben Emael: The Key to Hitler's Victory in the West. Bloomsbury USA.
  ISBN 1-84176-821-9
  .
• OCLC 417568776
  .
• Ellis, John (1993). The World War II Data Book. Aurum Press.
  ISBN 978-1-85410-254-6
  .
• Ellis, Major L. F. (2004) [1st. pub.
  ISBN 978-1-84574-056-6. Archived
  from the original on 17 December 2020. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
• Evans, Martin Marix (2000). The Fall of France: Act of Daring. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 1-85532-969-7
  .
• Fennell, Jonathan (2019). Fighting the People's War. The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  ISBN 978-1-107-03095-4
  .
• French, David (2001). Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919–1945. London: Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 978-0-19-924630-4
  .
• ISBN 3-486-56124-3
  .
• Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2005). The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Translated by Greenwood, J. T. (eng. trans. ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
  ISBN 978-1-59114-294-2
  .
• Gardner, W. J. R. (2000). The evacuation from Dunkirk: Operation Dynamo, 26 May – 4 June 1940. London: Routledge.
  ISBN 978-0-7146-8150-4
  .
• Harman, Nicholas (1980). Dunkirk: The Necessary Myth. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
  ISBN 0-340-24299-X
  .
• Haslam, J.; Urbach, K., eds. (2014). Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918–1989. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
  ISBN 978-0-8047-8891-5
  .
  • Schuker, S. A. "Seeking a Scapegoat: Intelligence and Grand Strategy in France". In Haslam & Urbach (2014).
• Healy, Mark (2007). Prigent, John (ed.). Panzerwaffe: The Campaigns in the West 1940. Vol. I. London: Ian Allan.
  ISBN 978-0-7110-3239-2
  .
• ISBN 978-0-11-630933-4
  .
• Hooton, E. R. (1994). Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe. London: Brockhampton Press.
  ISBN 1-86019-964-X
  .
• Hooton, E. R. (2007). Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West. London: Chevron/Ian Allan.
  ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6
  .
• Hooton, E. R. (2010). The Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power 1933–1945. Classic.
  ISBN 978-1-906537-18-0
  .
• Imlay, Talbot C.; Toft, Monica Duffy (2007). The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning Under Uncertainty. Cass: Strategy and History. London: Routledge.
  ISBN 978-1-134-21088-6
  .
• Jackson, Robert (1974). Air War Over France, 1939–1940. London: Ian Allan.
  ISBN 978-0-7110-0510-5
  .
• ISBN 978-0-192-80550-8
  .
• Jackson, Julian (2001). France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944. London: Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 0-19-820706-9
  .
• Kaufmann, J. E.; Kaufmann, H. W. (2007). Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II. Stackpole Military History. Stackpole Books.
  ISBN 978-0-811-73395-3
  .
• ISBN 978-0-14-303573-2
  .
• Kershaw, Ian (2002). Hitler, 1936–1945. Munich: Pantheon.
• Krause, M.; Phillips, C. (2006). Historical Perspectives of Operational Art. Fort McNair, Washington DC: Center of Military History.
  ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7
  .
• Longden, Sean (2008). Dunkirk: The Men They Left Behind. London: Constable.
  ISBN 978-1-84529-520-2
  .
• Maier, Klaus A.; Rohde, Horst; Stegemann, Bernd; Umbreit, Hans (2015) [1991]. Falla, P. S. (ed.).
  ISBN 978-0-19-873834-3
  .
  • Umbreit, B. "German Victory in Western Europe". In Maier et al. (2015).
  • Maier, K. "Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (The establishment of hegemony on the European continent)". In Maier et al. (2015).
• ISBN 978-1-85043-329-3. online
• ISBN 0-7006-1015-4
  .
• Melvin, Mungo (2010). Manstein: Hitler's Most Controversial General. W&N.
  ISBN 978-0-297-84561-4
  .
• Murray, Williamson (1983). Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945 (online ed.). Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press (US National Government Publication).
  ISBN 978-1-4294-9235-5
  .
• Neave, Airey (2003) [1972]. The Flames of Calais: A Soldiers Battle 1940 (Pen & Sword, Barnsley ed.). London: Hodder & Stoughton.
  ISBN 978-0-85052-997-5
  .
• Neitzel, Sönke; Welzer, Harald (2012). Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing and Dying: The Secret World War II Tapes of German POWs. London: Simon & Schuster.
  ISBN 978-1-84983-948-8
  .
• ISBN 978-0-374-20518-8
  .
• Porch, Douglas (2022). Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939–1942. Armies of the Second World War. Cambridge University Press.
  ISBN 978-1-107-04746-4
  .
• Quellien, Jean (2010). "Les pertes humaines". La France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale – Atlas historique (in French) (online scan ed.). éd. Fayard, ministère de la Défense.
  OCLC 812049413
  .
• Reynolds, David (1993). "Churchill in 1940: The Worst and Finest Hour". In Blake, Robert B.; Louis, William Roger (eds.). Churchill. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  ISBN 0-19-820626-7
  .
• Roth, Ariel Ilan (2010). Leadership in International Relations: The Balance of Power and the Origins of World War II. Palgrave Macmillan.
  ISBN 978-0-230-10690-1
  .
• Romanych, M.; Rupp, M. (2010). Maginot Line 1940: Battles on the French Frontier. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 978-1-84603-499-2
  .
• ISBN 978-0-670-91082-3
  .
• Sheppard, Alan (1990). France, 1940: Blitzkrieg in the West. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 978-0-85045-958-6
  .
• ISBN 0-671-72868-7
  .
• Strawson, John (2003). Hitler as Military Commander. Military Classics. Barnsley: Pen & Sword.
  ISBN 978-0-85052-956-2
  .
• Stout, Jay. A (2010). The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe: The U.S Army Air Forces against Germany (1st ed.). Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books.
  ISBN 978-0-8117-0659-9
  .
• Taylor, A. J. P.; Mayer, S. L., eds. (1974). A History of World War Two. London: Octopus Books.
  ISBN 0-7064-0399-1
  .
• ISBN 0-7139-9566-1
  .
• Weal, John (1997). Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937–41. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 1-85532-636-1
  .
• ISBN 978-0-521-44317-3
  .
• ISBN 978-1-84908-378-2
  .

Journals

• Alexander, Martin (2007). "After Dunkirk: The French Army's Performance Against 'Case Red', 25 May to 25 June 1940". War in History. 14 (2): 219–264.
  S2CID 153751513
  .
• ISSN 0209-1747. Archived from the original
  on 14 May 2007. Retrieved 24 March 2005.
• Corum, James (January 1995). "The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941". The Journal of Military History. 59 (1): 53–76.
  JSTOR 2944364
  .
• DiNardo, R. L.; Bay, Austin (January 1988). "Horse-Drawn Transport in the German Army". Journal of Contemporary History. 23 (1): 129–142.
  S2CID 159871841
  .
• Facon, Patrick (March 1996). "Slowing Down Blitzkrieg: A Curtiss Fighter Ace in the Battle of France". Air Fan International. Publitek.
  ISSN 1083-2548
  .
• Gunsburg, Jeffery A. (April 1992). "The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12–14 May 1940: The First Great Tank Battle". The Journal of Military History. 56 (2): 207–244.
  JSTOR 1985797
  .
• ——— (January 2000). "The Battle of Gembloux, 14–15 May 1940: The 'Blitzkrieg' Checked". The Journal of Military History. 64 (1): 97–140.
  JSTOR 120789
  .
• Harvey, D. (October 1990). "The French Armée de l'Air in May–June 1940: A Failure of Conception". Journal of Contemporary History. 25 (4): 447–465.
  S2CID 159795712
  .
• Mansoor, Peter R. (June 1988). Childress, P. W. (ed.). "The Second Battle of Sedan, May 1940". Military Review. LXVIII (6). Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 64–75.
  ISSN 0026-4148. PB-100-88-6. Archived from the original
  on 25 August 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2016.
• Rochat, Giorgio (1 January 2008). "La campagne italienne de juin 1940 dans les Alpes occidentales". Revue historique des armées. 250. Translator: Anne Pilloud. Vincennes: Service historique de la défense: 77–84.
  S2CID 161280892. Archived
  from the original on 1 September 2017. Retrieved 9 December 2015.
• Sica, Emanuele (2012). "June 1940: The Italian Army and the Battle of the Alps". Canadian Journal of History. 47 (2). Saskatoon, SK: University of Toronto Press: 355–378.
  ISSN 0008-4107
  .
• Scheck, Raffael (2010). "French Colonial Soldiers in German Prisoner-of-War Camps (1940–1945)".
  doi:10.1093/fh/crq035
  .

Websites

• Jacobson, Douglas. "Article 9: Polish Army in France". Douglas W. Jacobson. Archived from the original on 11 December 2015. Retrieved 9 December 2015.

Newspapers

• "Communications Secretes du G.Q.G." [Secret Communications from G.Q.G.]. L'Aurore (in French). Paris. 21 November 1949. p. 4. Retrieved 27 May 2022.

Further reading

Books

• d'Avout, Aurélien (2023). La France en éclats. Écrire la débâcle de 1940, d'Aragon à Claude Simon. Bruxelles: Les Impressions Nouvelles.
  ISBN 978-2-39070-025-8
  .
• ISBN 0-393-31911-3
  .
• Cooper, M. (1978). The German Army 1933–1945, Its Political and Military Failure. Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day.
  ISBN 0-8128-2468-7
  .
• Doughty, R. A. (2014) [1990]. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Stackpole Military History (pbk. repr. Stackpole, Mechanicsburg, PA ed.). Hamden, CN: Archon Books.
  ISBN 978-0-8117-1459-4
  .
• Fantom, Paul (2021). A Forgotten Campaign: The British Armed Forces in France, 1940 – From Dunkirk to the Armistice. Warwick: Helion.
  ISBN 978-1-914059-01-8
  .
• Martin, J.; Martin, P. (2001). Ils étaient là: l'armée de l'Air septembre 39 – juin 40 [They Were There: The Air Force September 39 – June 40] (in French). Aero-Editions.
  ISBN 2-9514567-2-7
  .
• Jowett, Philip S. (2000). The Italian Army 1940–45: Europe 1940–1943. Vol. I. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 978-1-85532-864-8
  .
• Kershaw, Ian (2008). Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940–1941. London: Penguin.
  ISBN 978-0-14-101418-0
  .
• Nord, Philip (2015). France 1940: Defending the Republic. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  ISBN 978-0-300-19068-7
  .
• Raffael, Scheck (2005). Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940. London: Cambridge University Press.
  ISBN 0-521-85799-6
  .
• Winchester, Charles (1998). Ostfront: Hitler's War on Russia 1941–45. Oxford: Osprey.
  ISBN 978-1-84176-066-7
  .

Theses

• Connors, Joseph David (1977). "Bibliography". Paul Reynaud and French National Defense, 1933–1939 (PhD thesis) (online scan ed.). Loyola University of Chicago. pp. 265–283.
  OCLC 10499727
  .
• de Konkoly Thege, Michel (2015). "Bibliography". Paul Reynaud and the Reform of France's Economic, Military and Diplomatic Policies of the 1930s (MALS/MPhil thesis) (online scan ed.). Graduate Liberal Studies Works. pp. 171–176.
  doi:10.14418/wes01.4.6
  . Docket Paper 6.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of France.

• Brooke, Alan (1946). Despatch on Operations of the British Expeditionary Force in From 12th June, 1940 to 19th June, 1940. London: War Office. In "No. 37573". The London Gazette
  (Supplement). 22 May 1946. pp. 2433–2439.
• The Battle of France 1940 (Official Nazi propaganda account of the Battle of France)
• The invasion of Holland in May 1940
• London Gazette
  , Number 35305. Retrieved 6 November 2009.