al-Mu'tazz
al-Mu'tazz المعتز | |
---|---|
Sunni Islam |
Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar (
Originally named as the second in line of three heirs of his father
His reign marks the apogee of the decline of the Caliphate's central authority, and the climax of centrifugal tendencies, expressed through the emergence of the autonomous dynasties of the
Early life
The future al-Mu'tazz was born to the Caliph
In October 861, the Turkish commanders began a plot to assassinate the Caliph. They were soon joined, or at least tacitly supported, by al-Muntasir, whose relations with his father deteriorated rapidly. On 5 December, al-Muntasir was bypassed in favor of al-Mu'tazz for leading the Friday prayer at the end of Ramadan, at the end of which his father's advisor al-Fath and the vizier Ubayd Allah demonstratively kissed his hands and feet, before accompanying him on the return to the palace; and on 9 December al-Mutawakkil, among other humiliations inflicted on him, threatened to kill his eldest son.[7][8] As a result, on the night of 10/11 December, the Turks killed al-Mutawakkil and al-Fath, and al-Muntasir became caliph.[9][10] Almost immediately, al-Muntasir sent for his brothers to come and give the oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to him.[11] Thus, when the vizier Ubayd Allah, upon being informed of al-Mutawakkil's death, went to the house of al-Mu'tazz, he did not find him there; and when his supporters, including the abna al-dawla and others and numbering several thousand, gathered in the morning and urged him to storm the palace, he refused, with the words "our man is in their hands".[12] The murder of al-Mutawakkil began the tumultuous period known as "Anarchy at Samarra", which lasted until 870 and brought the Abbasid Caliphate to the brink of collapse.[13]
Pressured by the Turkish commanders
Caliphate
Rivalries between the Turkish leaders led to a split in 865, when al-Musta'in, Wasif, and Bugha left Samarra for
The siege dragged on until December 865, when a combination of privations, lack of money to pay its supporters, and the price hikes caused by the siege eroded support for al-Musta'in's regime. As a result, Muhammad ibn Tahir opened negotiations with the besiegers, and a settlement was reached, which amounted to a mutual compromise over the sharing of the empire's proceeds: the Turks and other troops of Samarra received two-thirds of annual state revenue, while the remainder would go to Ibn Tahir and his Baghdad forces. As part of the agreement, al-Musta'in would abdicate, in exchange for an annual pension of 30,000 dinars.[22] Thus on 25 January 866, after the surrender of Baghdad, al-Mu'tazz became officially the sole, legitimate caliph.[3]
Although he was placed on the throne by the Turks, al-Mu'tazz proved a capable ruler and was determined to restore the authority and independence of his office.
Despite these successes, the Caliph could not overcome the main problem of the period: a shortage of revenue with which to pay the troops. The financial straits of the Caliphate had become evident already at his accession—the customary accession
As a result, by 869 the Turkish leaders Salih ibn Wasif (the son of Wasif al-Turki) and Ba'ikbak were again in the ascendant and secured the removal of Ahmad ibn Isra'il.[30] Finally, unable to meet the financial demands of the Turkish troops, in mid-July a palace coup deposed al-Mu'tazz. He was imprisoned and maltreated to such an extent that he died after three days, on 16 July 869.[30] He was succeeded by his cousin al-Muhtadi.[30]
Legacy
Despite his efforts to strengthen his position and restore control over the military, al-Mutazz's reign is marked by instability and insecurity, and by his ultimate failure to subdue the military. This weakness in the center fed the centrifugal tendencies already evident in the Caliphate's provinces.
References
- ISBN 978-1-4798-0477-1.
- ISBN 978-1-78672-959-0.
- ^ a b c d e Bosworth 1993, p. 793.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 167.
- ^ Gordon 2001, p. 82.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, p. 169.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, pp. 171–173, 176.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 168–169.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, pp. 171–182, 184, 195.
- ^ Kennedy 2006, pp. 264–267.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, pp. 197–199.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, pp. 182–183.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 169–173.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, pp. 210–213.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2004, p. 171.
- ^ Saliba 1985, pp. 3–5.
- ^ Saliba 1985, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Saliba 1985, pp. 28–44.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 135.
- ^ Kennedy 2004, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 149ff..
- ^ a b Kennedy 2001, pp. 138–139.
- ^ a b c Kennedy 2004, p. 172.
- ^ Kraemer 1989, p. 164.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 149.
- ^ Saliba 1985, pp. 122–124.
- ^ Bosworth 1993, pp. 793–794.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 138.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 139.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bosworth 1993, p. 794.
- ^ Bianquis 1998, pp. 86–119.
- ^ Bosworth 1975, pp. 102–103, 108ff..
Sources
- ISBN 978-0-521-47137-4.
- ISBN 0-521-20093-8.
- ISBN 978-90-04-09419-2.
- Gordon, Matthew S. (2001). The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Military of Samarra (A.H. 200–275/815–889 C.E.). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-4795-2.
- ISBN 0-415-25093-5.
- ISBN 978-0-582-40525-7.
- ISBN 978-0-306814808.
- Kraemer, Joel L., ed. (1989). The History of al-Ṭabarī, Volume XXXIV: Incipient Decline: The Caliphates of al-Wāthiq, al-Mutawakkil and al-Muntaṣir, A.D. 841–863/A.H. 227–248. SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-88706-874-4.
- ISBN 978-0-87395-883-7.