Anglo-Polish alliance
Events leading to World War II |
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The military alliance between the
Background
The
British assurance to Poland
On 31 March 1939, in response to
...in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government.[7]
The British Chiefs of Staff at the time however noted that "we could give no direct help by land, sea or air."[8]
On 6 April, during a visit to
That assurance was extended on 13 April to Greece and Romania, after Italy's invasion of Albania.[12]
Agreement of Mutual Assistance
On 25 August, two days after the
Failed Soviet–Franco–British alliance
After the German occupation of Prague in March 1939 in violation of the Munich agreement, the Chamberlain government in Britain sought Soviet and French support for a Peace Front. The goal was to deter further German aggression by guaranteeing the independence of Poland and Romania. However, Stalin refused to pledge Soviet support for the guarantees unless Britain and France first concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Although the British cabinet decided to seek such an alliance, the western negotiators in Moscow in August 1939 lacked urgency. The talks were conducted poorly and slowly by diplomats with little authority, such as William Strang, an assistant under-secretary. Stalin also insisted on British and French guarantees to Finland, the Baltic states, Poland and Romania against indirect German aggression. Those countries, however, became fearful that Moscow wanted to control them. Although Hitler was escalating threats against it, Poland refused to allow Soviet troops to cross its borders for fear that they would never leave. Historian Michael Jabara Carley argues that the British were too committed to anticommunism to trust Stalin.
Meanwhile, both Great Britain and USSR were separately involved into secret negotiations with Germany. Declassified documents show that after France demonstrated little interest in upholding the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Great Britain did not respond to Soviet requests for a defensive attack on Germany with the Soviet Union pledging one million Soviet troops on the Polish-German border. However no deployment would be possible without Polish agreement, which was not forthcoming. The Soviet Union then decided to hold off on war with Germany and signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[16][17][18][19]
Ever since it had been sent to Britain in mid-1939 in Operation Peking, the Polish Navy remained in British waters. In November 1939, after the Invasion of Poland, the Polish-British Naval Agreement allowed Polish sailors to wear their Polish uniforms and to have Polish commanding officers on board even though the ships were of British make.[20] The agreement would later be revised on August 5, 1940 to encompass all Polish units.
Anglo–Polish Agreement Respecting Polish Land and Air Forces
On August 5, 1940, an agreement was signed that "the Polish Armed Forces (comprising Land, Sea, and Air Forces) shall be organized and employed under British Command" but would be "subject to Polish military law and disciplinary ruling, and they [would] be tried in Polish military courts".[21] The only change came on 11 October 1940, when the Polish Air Force was made an exception and became subject to British discipline and laws.[22]
Analysis
The alliance committed Britain, for the first time in history, to fight on behalf of a European country other than France or Belgium.
In May 1939, Poland signed a secret
On 17 September, the Soviet Union invaded Poland through the eastern Polish border in keeping with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocol specifying the division of Poland. According to the Polish–British Common Defence Pact, the United Kingdom should give Poland "all the support and assistance in its power" if Poland was "engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter". The Polish ambassador in London, Edward Bernard Raczyński, contacted the British Foreign Office to point out that clause 1(b) of the agreement, which concerned an "aggression by a European power" on Poland, should apply to the Soviet invasion. Halifax responded that the obligation of British government towards Poland that arose out of the Anglo-Polish Agreement was restricted to Germany, according to the first clause of the secret protocol.[3]
Criticism
The Polish historian Paweł Wieczorkiewicz wrote, "Polish leaders were not aware of the fact that England and France were not ready for war. They needed time to catch up with the Third Reich, and were determined to gain the time at any price". The publicist Stanisław Mackiewicz stated in the late 1940s, "To accept London's guarantees was one of the most tragic dates in the history of Poland. It was a mental aberration and madness". On the same day that Britain pledged its support of Poland, Lord Halifax stated, "We do not think this guarantee will be binding".[citation needed] Another British diplomat, Alexander Cadogan, wrote in his diary: "Naturally, our guarantee does not give any help to Poland. It can be said that it was cruel to Poland, even cynical".
Polish-British military negotiations were carried out in London but ended up in a fiasco. After lengthy talks, the British reluctantly pledged to bomb German military and installations if the Germans carried out attacks of that kind in Poland. Polish military leaders failed to obtain any other promises. At the same time, the Polish side negotiated a military loan. The Polish ambassador to Britain, Edward Raczyński, called the negotiations "a never-ending nightmare". Józef Beck wrote in his memoirs, "The negotiations, carried out in London by Colonel Adam Koc, immediately turned into theoretical discussion about our financial system. It was clear that Sir John Simon and Frederick Leith-Ross did not realize the gravity of the situation. They negotiated in purely financial terms, without consideration for the rules of the wartime alliance. As a result, the English offer gave us no grounds for quick reinforcement of our army".
On 2 August 1939, Britain finally agreed to grant Poland a military loan of £8 million, which was less than Turkey received at the same time. Poland had asked for a loan of £60 million.[26]
See also
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Franco-Polish Military Alliance
- Western betrayal
Notes
- ISBN 978-0313260070.
- ^ Paul W. Doerr. 'Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Winter War, 1939. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 423–439
- ^ a b c Keith Sword. "British Reactions to the Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939". The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 81–101.
- ^ Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1954). Germany and the Soviet Union. Studies in East European history. Brill Archive. pp. 49–50.
- ISBN 978-0710050212. Retrieved 21 March 2022.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - ^ Martin Collier, Philip Pedley. Germany, 1919–45
- ^ "European Situation", Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 345, cc2415-20, 31 March 1939
- ^ Henderson, Nicholas (October 1997). "A Fatal Guarantee: Poland, 1939". History Today. 47 (10).[dead link]
- ^ Andrew J. Crozier. The Causes of the Second World War, p. 151
- ^ Anglo-Polish communiqué issued on April 6, 1939 (full text)
- ^ "Anglo-Polish Agreement", British War Blue Book Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939) – via Hyperwar Foundation
- ^ Michael G. Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne. Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy
- ISBN 978-0521529389.
- ^ Jerzy Jan Lerski. Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966–1945, p. 49
- ^ Frank McDonough. Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, p. 86
- ^ Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939 (1989) pp. 362–384.
- ^ G. Bruce Strang, "John Bull in Search of a Suitable Russia: British Foreign Policy and the Failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance Negotiations, 1939." Canadian Journal of History 41.1 (2006): 47–84.
- ^ Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II (2009)
- ^ Holdsworth, Nick (18 October 2008). "Stalin 'planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact'". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 23 January 2024. Retrieved 30 March 2024.
- ^ Peszke, Michael (2011). "The British-Polish Agreement". Journal of Slavic Military Studies: 654.
- ^ Kacewicz, G.V. (1979). Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. p. 61.
- ^ Olson, Lynne, & Stanley Cloud (2003). A Question of Honour. New York: Alfred A Knopf. p. 98.
- ^ Gunther, John (1940). Inside Europe. New York: Harper & Brothers. p. 133.
- ^ Though see also Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and Treaty of Windsor (1899) in which Britain agreed to defend Portugal from "future and present" enemies.
- ISBN 0-415-07905-5
- ^ Wojciech, Mazur (n.d.). "Dozbrojenie last minute". Polityka. 3/2009 (3/2009): 103.
References
- Raczyński, Count Edward (1948). The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning. London: Mellville Press.
- Piotr Zychowicz, ISBN 978-83-7510-921-4
Further reading
- ISBN 0-521-33148-X
- Władysław W. Kulski. (1976). "The Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 25, 1939: Highlight of My Diplomatic Career," The Polish Review, 21 (1/2): 23–40.