Anti-Comintern Pact

At the time of the negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Japanese government was also in negotiations with the Soviet government over fishing rights in the Sea of Japan. As the Anti-Comintern Pact's secret additional protocol between Germany and Japan against the USSR was to forbid political treaties by either state with the Soviet Union without the express consent of the other party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese ambassador Mushanokōji was concerned whether the Pact would result in consequences for the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. He inquired about it in a letter to Ribbentrop after the signing of the treaty on 25 November, and also mentioned the issue of border questions between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and the USSR. Ribbentrop confirmed the German government's assent that Japan was autonomous and free to proceed in the matters mentioned by Mushanokōji his reply on the same day.^[7]: 198

The Anti-Comintern Pact was more of a statement than an actual political commitment, and the statement was one of mutual ideological alignment and diplomatic attachment to one another.^{[30]: 7 [31]: 27} Both countries shared examples of very politically significant racial ideologies, with Alfred Rosenberg in Germany and Shūmei Ōkawa in Japan becoming the leading racialist ideologues. Whereas Rosenberg enjoyed government backing and was a central party figure after the Nazis' rise to power in 1933, Ōkawa's audience was more limited. Ōkawa found his main support base with young nationalistic military officers, particularly those in the Kwantung Army, the military unit that instigated Japan's initial invasion of North East China in 1931.^[20]: 608 Ōkawa's work was in late 1936 furthered by Takeo Nimiya's influential foreign policy pamphlet "The Unique Principles Guiding Japanese Diplomacy", in which Takeo laid out a vision of a long-term orientation of Japanese diplomacy around a racially justified expansionist policy based on traditional Japanese spiritual values rather than western-style imperialism. Nimiya's pamphlet was especially popular with young bureaucrats and students who were about to enter Japanese state politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s.^[23]: 16

The two countries shared a common ideological antagonist in the communism, which was extensively covered in the German and Japanese media and perceived as a real threat of subversion among German and Japanese political elites.[25]^: 143 As a result of Japanese reservations about an outright military alliance, the Anti-Comintern Pact was conceptualized as an anti-communist agreement rather than an outright military alliance.^[13]: 53 However, the Japanese military establishment was concerned about the growth of Soviet military strength, and Japanese military attachés in Europe had held conferences about the potential threat coming specifically from the USSR as early as 1929 to discuss potential countermeasures.^{[18]: 314–315} The Japanese government on 8 August 1936 issued an internal document that specifically justified the German–Japanese alliance as a response to the growing threat that the Soviet Union posed in Asia and the close parallels between Japanese and German interests regarding the USSR. This document also revealed intentions to include other European, Islamic and Asian countries in the anti-Soviet pact and specifically named Poland as a potential candidate for pact membership.^[23]: 31

Both the Japanese and German movements shared an aversion towards the League of Nations, and both countries left the League during the year 1933.^[20]: 609 The two countries shared a similar list of diplomatic adversaries: The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.^[17]: 1

While the German and Japanese racial ideologies of the supposed superiority of the

Diplomatically, the Seventh World Congress also brought on the 'collective security' policy in the Soviet Union, wherein the USSR would attempt to align with the western democracies to counteract the fascist regimes.^{[33]: 52–59} The Seventh World Congress specifically declared fascist Germany and Japan, next to Poland, to be among the world's chief instigators of war.

This declaration accelerated Ribbentrop's efforts to secure a German–Japanese alliance against the USSR, or at least a promise of non-support for the Soviet Union in case of a war between one of the countries against it.^[17]: 18 This change in Comintern policy also made it urgent for the European fascists to prevent the strengthening of leftist popular fronts against them.^[34]: 595

The

During his time as Japanese ambassador to Germany, Mushanokōji made it one of his goals to undermine Sino–German economic and diplomatic relations.[13]^: 51 Within Germany's foreign service, Ribbentrop favored cooperation with Japan, whereas Neurath preferred alignment with China.^{[16]: 262–263}

One of the major questions in the German foreign service in regards to Germany's diplomatic ambivalence between China and Japan was the recognition of the Japanese puppet state in Manchukuo, installed after the 1931 Japanese invasion of North East China. A recognition of Manchukuo, as suggested by German ambassador in Tokyo Herbert von Dirksen beginning in early 1934, would have clearly presented a German statement in favor of Japanese expansionism and would have disturbed Germany's Chinese partners. As a result of the possible irritation of the Chinese government and the potential misgivings of the Soviet government about the potential perception of an attempted encirclement by a German–Japanese entente, such a recognition of Manchukuo was initially opposed by Neurath and the foreign ministry.^[17]: 16 In response to his initial request to recognize Manchukuo, Dirksen was instructed to avoid "any close relations with Japan which might lay [Germany] open to being suspected of wishing to render assistance against Russia". This German caution towards any offense cast against the Soviet Union resulted from the impression in Berlin that Japan during the year 1934 was under serious threat of diplomatic and military encirclement. Specifically, Dirksen was also instructed to pay close attention to any signs of a potential war between Japan and the USSR, which the Germans assumed the Soviet Union would probably receive the aid of the western democracies if it were to break out, although this potential war was not perceived as immediately imminent. Regardless, the German foreign service sought at all costs to avoid entanglement in such a conflict.^{[36]: 466–467}

For their part, the Japanese political and military establishments were by 1934 also less than certain about the usefulness of the new Hitler government in Germany, which Tokyo assumed would attempt to maintain a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and avoid any open alignment with Moscow's enemies. The distrust that Japan felt was partially caused by the close relationship between Germany and China, which in turn was perceived as an ally of the Soviet Union against Japan.^[17]: 17

After the Anti-Comintern Pact's signing, Falkenhausen was recalled to Germany against his will after Japanese pressure in 1938.

The domestic situation in the French Third Republic was unstable. This provided the opportunity for France's rivals, especially Germany, to expand their influence, while at the same time weakening France's European partners, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The cabinet of Léon Blum, supported by France's popular front, had taken the reins in June 1936. The social instability and political violence within France made the French government careful and ineffective in applying France's otherwise extensive diplomatic and military power.^[39]: 88 Hitler, who expected France's popular front to result in a situation similar to the Spanish Civil War, openly announced to the French ambassador on 6 October 1936 that a communist takeover in France would not be treated by Germany as a domestic affair.^[40]: 150

In French foreign policy, the 1934

The Spanish Civil War, in which Germany supported the Nationalists and the Soviet Union the Republicans, reinforced the urgency in the mind of the German leadership to create some sort of anti-Soviet military arrangement to counteract a potential aggression by the Soviet Union.^[40]: 210 The Spanish nationalists also received aid from Mussolini's Italy (Corpo Truppe Volontarie), but the Italian attitude to a potential anti-communist or anti-Soviet agreement was initially the opposite of the German position: the Italians viewed the signing of an anti-communist treaty as superfluous, as Italy's anti-communist commitment was in the Italian viewpoint sufficiently proven in their support for the Spanish nationalists.^[41]: 115

The Spanish Civil War was viewed by the Germans as concrete proof that the teachings of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, which had been specifically aimed against Germany (and Japan), were indeed affecting geopolitics.^[17]: 20

After the

Originally, the treaty was scheduled for November 1935, and invitations were to be extended to China, the United Kingdom, Italy and Poland. However, the German military and diplomatic leadership stalled the treaty's realization, as they feared a breakdown in the German relations with China.[35]^{: 342–346} Furthermore, foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath was jealous of Ribbentrop's exalted position in foreign policy outside of the ministry's control.^[13]: 63

While the initial designs for the pact came from Dienststelle Ribbentrop,^{[35]: 342–346} Hiroshi Ōshima, who would himself become Japan's ambassador to Germany in 1938–1939 and 1941–1945, became very influential in the pact's outline on the Japanese side. While the government in Tokyo was not particularly proactive in the pact's creation, Ōshima and the staff of the Japanese embassy in Berlin were. When Mushanokōji stated his suspicions of the German intentions to the embassy personnel on 4 July 1935, Ōshima was the main source of disagreement within the staff.

Regardless, Mushanokōji ended up making the recommendation to the Japanese government to only pursue an alliance with German insofar as it did not lead to the deterioration of Japanese relations with the United Kingdom and United States.^[13]: 53 Ōshima was a staunch anti-communist and veteran of the Japanese intervention in Siberia, and used his good connections within Germany – namely Wilhelm Canaris of the Abwehr, among others – to, without authorization from ambassador Mushanokōji, further his pro-German and anti-Soviet agenda within the embassy. Initially disgusted with the military and political weakness of the Weimar Republic when he first arrived in Germany in 1922, he became an admirer of Adolf Hitler following the National Socialists' rise to power in 1933, and concluded that "there were things in the new Germany which were worthy of serious consideration".^{[13]: 55–56} Ōshima was aided by the fact he spoke the German language with a high degree of fluency.^[18]: 312

His positive predispositions towards the NSDAP government made him useful in the anti-Soviet designs of the Imperial Japanese Army, which aimed to envelop the Soviet Union through an alliance with Germany, eventually planning to strike into Siberia to secure its natural resources for Japan (Hokushin-ron). Ōshima's instructions from the high command were to investigate the German government's stability, the future of the German military, and the state of German–Soviet military and diplomatic relations.^{[17]: 16 [18]: 313}

Ōshima followed his assignment diligently, and the high frequency of his visits to and inspections of the German military establishment was noted even by the American military attaché

Starting with the meetings in October, which at some point involved Hitler himself, Ōshima presented his idea of a promise of mutual assistance in case of an attack on one of the two countries by the Soviet Union.[13]^: 59 At this point, Ōshima's telegrams to the Japanese army were enthusiastic about the diplomatic potential of the negotiations, up to and including the possibility of an open German–Japanese military alliance, even though both sides were more immediately comfortable at that point with a less impactful agreement to not aid the Soviet Union in case of a Soviet war against the other party. Such a 'no aid'-agreement was easier to fit into each country's respective grand strategies.^[18]: 319 Ōshima's extensive involvement was essential to the formation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but was also the source of some discomfort among the Japanese military and diplomatic leaderships, as Ōshima had far overextended his military assignment with his unauthorized diplomatic cooperation with Ribbentrop and even Hitler himself. But instead of the severe punishment that a junior officer like Ōshima might have otherwise received for his reckless dealings with a foreign head of government, Ōshima's advance was acknowledged positively by the Japanese hyper-militarists, who were sympathetic to Hitler's policies and impressed by Ōshima's successes.^[13]: 60

In late October 1935, the chief of the Japanese army's general staff, Prince Kan'in Kotohito, signalled that the army was positively disposed towards a pact with Germany.^[13]: 60 Kotohito had been a close associate of Hiroshi Ōshima's father Ken'ichi Ōshima, Japan's Minister of the Army in 1916–1918, and was thus positively predisposed towards Hiroshi Ōshima's activity in Europe, and likely one of Ōshima's protectors in the question of Ōshima overstepping his initial assignments.^[18]: 313

Kotohito assigned a general staff intelligence officer, Tadaichi Wakamatsu, with a mission in Berlin that involved ascertaining the German attitude towards a German–Japanese agreement directed against the Soviet Union. Meetings between Wakamatsu, Ōshima and Blomberg in November and December 1935 achieved little,^[13]: 61 although Wakamatsu signalled the general willingness of the Japanese army to negotiate a treaty with Germany.^[17]: 19 He was sceptical of the Dienststelle's semi-official status within the German foreign service.

However, the IJA in principle remained open to the idea, and Wakamatsu left Germany for Japan in December 1935 with the understanding that both sides would seek government approval for the pact.^[13]: 61 Wakamatsu and Kotohito were overall unprepared to deal with the remarkable progress that Ōshima reported in his messages and the potential magnitude of the resulting German–Japanese treaty.^{[18]: 319–320}

Near the end of 1935, Soviet Red Army intelligence intercepted several secret telegrams between Ōshima and the Japanese General Staff. This information was forwarded to the Soviet embassy in Japan, from which the American embassy also heard news of the ongoing secret negotiations between Germany and Japan. This marked the first time that the Soviet Union is confirmed to have received word of the ongoing negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.^{[23]: 37–39}

The inconsistencies between the German foreign ministry and Dienststelle Ribbentrop showed themselves again in the course of the negotiations. Dirksen, ambassador in Tokyo, was informed about the ongoing talks not by the German foreign service, but instead by the Japanese General Staff. German foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath, when informed about the situation by Hitler, argued against the creation of a German–Japanese pact. Firstly, he was concerned with Sino–German relations and thought Japan less important to Germany than China, and secondly, he wanted to avoid having foreign policy authority slip away from the foreign ministry towards Dienststelle Ribbentrop, where he saw Ribbentrop as a rival to his own position. In Japan, the matter was stalled, as the important documents got lost between January and February 1936 in the bureaucratic apparatus of the Japanese foreign ministry, as they were discarded by low-ranking officials before reaching foreign minister Kōki Hirota or his deputy Mamoru Shigemitsu.^[13]: 62

Only in March 1936, following the turmoil in Japan related to

However, the German diplomatic ambivalence between the ideological proximity and military potential of Japan and the economic value of China continued, and Neurath remained in favor of German alignment with China. In April 1936, Germany signed a major commercial treaty with China and gave them a credit of 100,000,000 marks for China to purchase German industrial and other products. It was Hitler himself who, unbeknownst to Neurath and the foreign ministry, began to reassess the importance of China and Japan in German foreign relations over the course of the summer of 1936. Hitler sanctioned new negotiations with the Japanese.[16]^{: 262–263}

Later that year, when German military attaché in Tokyo Eugen Ott temporarily returned to Germany to attend army maneuvers, he expressed his optimism about the Japanese army's willingness to conclude the pact to Hitler.^[17]: 22

Terauchi in May 1936 informed Ōshima that the army was yielding control of the negotiations to the foreign ministry in order to restore harmony between the two factions, but unofficially, Ōshima would remain Japan's key negotiator and Mushanokōji's role would be more ceremonial. In July, Mushanokōji requested a draft of the proposed treaty from Dienststelle Ribbentrop, which was drawn up by one of the Dienststelle's East Asian specialists, Dr. Hermann von Raumer. But instead of taking this draft immediately to Mushanokōji, Raumer, who probably acted on Ribbentrop's instructions, first presented it to Ōshima, who was attending the Bayreuth Festival at the time. On 22 July, Ōshima, Ribbentrop, Raumer and Hitler met in Bayreuth, where Hitler made some personal edits to Raumer's draft. Only then was the draft shown to ambassador Mushanokōji.^{[13]: 65–66 [18]: 321}

This initial draft signed off on by Hitler appears to be lost to history, as the Japanese ambassador made some changes to it that were intended, according to Shigenori Tōgō's testimony at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, to make it less 'propagandistic' and more 'business-like'. Tōgō, acting on behalf of Arita, who was once again Japanese foreign minister, wanted to scrap all of Hitler's envisioned military provisions. Because Hitler's draft was lost, it is impossible to say what these were, but from the context, it seems likely that they were both a defensive as well as an offensive alliance against the Soviet Union, because Tōgō, when he was unable to have all military provisions scrapped outright, instead took the position that any such provisions should be purely defensive, implying that they were offensive as well at some point.^{[13]: 65–67}

On 24 July 1936, the Japanese government after some deliberation formally requested that the Anti-Comintern Pact should be limited only to an intelligence and information exchange as to avoid unnecessary diplomatic complications with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government also specifically requested to avoid any direct alliance and to instead only require consultation in case of attack, even in the secret protocol. Furthermore, the Japanese government requested clarification to make any obligation in case of a war of one of the parties against the Soviet Union specifically defensive (to avoid being drawn into a German offensive war against the USSR at an inopportune time), and to avoid specifically naming the Soviet Union in the treaty, even in the secret protocol. The first two requests made their way into the final version of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but the third did not. The Soviet Union's name was only avoided in the public parts of the treaty, and the secret protocol of the finalized Anti-Comintern Pact still specifically referred to the USSR.[23]^: 32–33

Additionally, the Japanese government also requested clarification on the prohibition on bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union without former consent, fearing that the wording of the treaty would allow Germany to maintain existing bilateral treaties with the USSR, including the Treaty of Rapallo (1922) and the Treaty of Berlin (1926). Specifically the latter treaty, which was a German–Soviet neutrality pact that had been upheld even by the anti-communist Nazis, was viewed in Japan as contradictory to the proposed terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The German government viewed the Anti-Comintern Pact as sufficient to override the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, and the Japanese government was satisfied with this explanation as long as it was attached to the treaty as a secret appendix.^{[23]: 32–33}

The Japanese government in its internal memoranda also stressed the vital necessity to avoid a deterioration of Anglo–Japanese relations as a result of the pact. There was a hope in Japan that the Anti-Comintern Pact could appeal to anti-communist circles in the United Kingdom and mend the two countries' relationship. After the pact's conclusion, this would prove to be a miscalculation.^{[23]: 39–41}

Ōshima, in a final act of insubordination to the foreign ministry, suggested to Hitler that the foreign ministry's objections could be salvaged if the anti-Soviet clauses of the treaty were added to the agreement in secret. Eventually, the foreign ministry yielded to the army's pressure, and agreed to a secret military addendum to the pact. On 16 August 1936, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that negotiations with ambassador Mushanokōji and with Ōshima had resulted in the ambassador's declaration that the Japanese government was willing in principle to approve the agreement.^{[17]: 27–29 [18]: 322} In a note to Hitler, Ribbentrop commented on the Japanese government's aversion to and the Japanese army's support for publication of the treaty .^[45]: 836

However, some minor adjustments were still made between August and October, when the pact was formally initialed. Its length was reduced to 5 years, down from 10 as had originally been planned. And, against Ōshima's and Hitler's hopes, the military leadership in Japan insisted that the military provisions could be only defensive and not offensive, even if agreed upon in a secret addendum. The military leadership was concerned that, if Japan was caught in a war against China, an offensive clause to the treaty would diplomatically force Japan into a war against the Soviet Union that it was militarily unwilling to fight. As a result, the first article of the secret additional protocol spoke specifically of "unprovoked attack" by the Soviet Union and had no offensive provisions.^{[13]: 65–67}

On the other hand, the Japanese side was unable to gain the upper hand on the topic of the pact's publication, which was advocated for by the Germans and which Japan had attempted to avoid. Furthermore, the secret protocol remained explicitly aimed at the Soviet Union, something that the Japanese had felt was an ineffective provision.^{[17]: 27–29}

The treaty draft was finalized on 23 October 1936.^[23]: 35

The Anti-Comintern Pact required the approval of the Privy Council of Japan to allow Japanese accession to the treaty. Prime Minister Hirota had expressed his personal relief upon hearing the treaty draft's conclusion on 23 October 1936, and compared the achievement of the IJA in its advancement of the Anti-Comintern Pact to the IJN's success in forging the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The elder Japanese statesman Saionji Kinmochi, last of the genrō, had disagreed with the Japanese government's diplomatic step and denounced the Anti-Comintern Pact as exclusively useful to Germany and as without benefit for Japan. Kinmochi instead would have preferred a diplomatic course more in line with Japanese public opinion and geography, both of which made a positive relationship with UK and USA desirable. However, Kinmochi's critical stance remained unheard in the Privy Council.^[23]: 35

In the view of the proponents of the treaty within Japan, spearheaded by the IJA, Japan was militarily threatened by the Soviet Union's meddling in China, just as Germany was threatened by Soviet support for France and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, both countries feared subversion by communist forces. This, as a result, made Germany and Japan natural allies against the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The opponents, who gathered around the IJN, cited the likelihood that the Anti-Comintern Pact would increase rather than decrease the threat posed by the USSR and that there would be considerable domestic resistance against the agreement. Ultimately, the supporters won out in the discussions that took place on 13 November and 18 November,^[23]: 35 and the Privy Council gave the treaty its unanimous support on 25 November 1936.^[17]: 25

On the German side, all that was required for German accession to the pact was Hitler's approval, which was given quickly, and subsequently supported by a wave of anti-communist propaganda in the state-controlled German press.^[17]: 25

The treaty, which outlined a joint German and Japanese policy to counteract the activities of the Communist Internationale, was initially to be in force for five years, until November 1941.^[5]: 333 Two additional protocols were signed, one of which was public. The other, which was specifically aimed against the Soviet Union, was secret. The treaty was signed in the offices of Dienststelle Ribbentrop rather than the German foreign ministry.^[17]: 25 Ribbentrop, in his Nuremberg testimony, attributed this to Hitler's desire to avoid the usage of official channels of German politics for what Ribbentrop referred to as an "ideological question" rather than a political one.^[43]: 240

The full text was considered in its original form in both the German and Japanese versions, and the date was specified in both countries' versions as 25 November 1936 as well as 25 November in the 11th year of the

In the first article of the treaty, Germany and Japan agreed to share information about Comintern activities and to plan their operations against such activities jointly. In the second article, the two parties opened the possibility of extending the pact to other countries "whose domestic peace is endangered by the disruptive activities of the Communist Internationale". Such invitations to third parties would be undertaken jointly and after the expressed consent by both parties. German state media referred to this provision of endangerment by Comintern disruption when, among other examples, the Völkischer Beobachter recounted various communist activities in Hungary and Manchukuo as the reason for the two countries to join the pact in February 1939.[47]

A supplementary protocol was signed along with the agreement on the same day, 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11. Just like the main agreement, it bears the signatures of Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji.[3]^{: 188–189 [39]: 327–328 [48]}

In the first article, German and Japan agreed to have their competent authorities "closely co-operate in the exchange of reports on the activities of [...] and on measures of information and defense against" the Comintern. The two contracting parties also agreed, in the second article, to have their competent authorities "within the framework of the existing law [...] take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work on direct or indirect duty" of the Comintern.^[48]

In addition to the main treaty and the public additional protocol ("Protocol Supplement"), there was also another additional protocol on 25 November 1936/Shōwa 11, this one kept in strict secrecy from the public, which specifically dealt with the establishment of Germany's and Japan's military and diplomatic partnership against the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was alluded to with the public protocol's references to Comintern activity, the secret additional protocol is the only one where the USSR is actually mentioned by name. Just like the main agreement and the public additional protocol, the secret additional protocol was signed by Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji.[39]^{: 327–328 [7]: 200}

The latter protocol's secrecy was agreed upon in a separate document signed by both Ribbentrop and Mushanokōji, in which the two states created the option to inform third parties about the contents of the secret agreement with mutual consent. Ambassador Mushanokōji informed Japanese foreign minister Hachirō Arita of the successful conclusion of negotiations later on in the day.^{[7]: 200–201}

The secret additional protocol reveals the true intention of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Rather than a vague ideological crackdown on the alleged overreach of communist activists, it was a specific defensive alliance direct particularly against the Soviet Union as a country.^{[49]: 52 [6]: 22}

Due to its covert nature, the secret additional protocol remained exclusive between Germany and Japan, whereas other countries joined only the two public clauses of the treaty. Starting with Italy, the other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact did not sign the secret additional protocol.^[21]: 641

To the international community, the Anti-Comintern Pact signalled the beginning of the German–Japanese partnership,^[6]: 22 as it marked the first formal alliance between the two countries.^[50]: 368

The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was a direct threat to China, which relied on German military assistance against the threat of the imminent Japanese invasion. The German foreign ministry, which had been opposed to Dienststelle Ribbentrop's alignment with Japan, made significant efforts to reassure China of German assistance. This lasted until the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in July 1937, after which Germany, keeping with Ribbentrop's agenda, aligned clearly with Japan,^[21]: 640 including the German compliance with Japanese requests to recall the military mission of Alexander von Falkenhausen.^[37]

In France, the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially after Italy's entry, was viewed as a German power grab in Eastern Europe, particularly to the detriment of Czechoslovakia and Poland.^[51]: 50

The German public was informed of the treaty's entry into legislation by the German Reichsgesetzblatt in 1937.^[52] Ribbentrop justified the Anti-Comintern Pact as a joint German–Japanese act to defend Western civilization.^[14]: 299 The existence of the secret additional protocol and the treaty's anti-Soviet nature was denied in Nazi Germany even after the beginning of the German–Soviet War in 1941.^[53]

The German government launched a pro-Japanese publicity campaign to improve the general opinion of the German public about Japan.^[17]: 27 This was part of the German government's attempt to forge a tighter cultural relationship.^[54]

The Italian government, which had still viewed Germany as a potential rival well into the year 1935, had initially abstained from the negotiations of the Anti-Comintern Pact.^[41]: 115 But starting with the 1936 October Protocols, Germany and Italy had begun a diplomatic rapprochement against the backdrop of the Italian war in Ethiopia and the resulting failure of the Italian Stresa Front with the UK and France. Still, Italy was keen to, at least initially, avoid the implication that it would soon adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact itself, even though Ribbentrop heavily implied that "Italy will hoist the anti-Bolshevist banner in the south" soon after the pact's creation. Hitler shared that same impression.^[17]: 27 Italy would end up joining the pact in November 1937.^{[55]: 257 [14]: 353}

The Japanese public as a whole did not receive the Anti-Comintern Pact with any particular enthusiasm.^{[17]: 27 [56]: 359–360} In the aftermath of the agreement, the influx of national socialist ideology into Japanese society after the alignment with Germany caused an increase in antisemitism in Japan.^{[25]: 280–281} The Japanese press, less restricted than its German counterpart, was even partially critical of the pact's apparently sudden and rushed conclusion (the negotiations had been kept in strict secrecy from the public until the pact's publication), and there were doubts in the newspapers' opinion pieces about the willingness of Germany to sacrifice its soldiers in the case of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union.^[17]: 28

In Tokyo, the government was reluctant to attract any unwanted international antagonists, while it remained focussed on its aims in mainland China. As such, the government had been initially cautious, reluctant to cause a diplomatic incident with the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, but eventually saw itself driven into the treaty when the Soviet Union signed a

As a result of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the military influence within the government was strengthened.[13]^: 69–71 The Japanese government, in response to the upsurge of antisemitism that resulted from the influx of European-style national socialist ideology into Japanese society, began using antisemitic imagery in its media campaigns, particularly those directed against western-style capitalism.^{[25]: 280–281} Prime Minister Hirota called Germany Japan's foremost diplomatic partner after the treaty, but stressed that the Anti-Comintern Pact did not imply ideological support for Germany's domestic policy.^[23]: 36

The IJA, which traditionally was an admirer and imitator of German military systems, which employed hundreds of German military experts and advisors by the 1920s,^[18]: 311 and sent Japanese army hopefuls to Germany for study,^[58]: 122 was the treaty's main proponent. Prince Kotohito had signalled the army's positive predisposition towards Ōshima's efforts in Berlin.^[13]: 60 The IJA was closely aligned with its German counterpart and a strong proponent of a joint Japanese-German action against the Soviet Union.^[25]: 308

The IJN, by contrast, was among the treaty's greatest critics. While the IJN officer class was not necessarily denouncing the pact,

Soviet diplomats quickly came to the same opinion that had been implied by Litvinov on 26 November: the Anti-Comintern Pact was specifically directed against the USSR. Soviet ambassador in Tokyo Konstantin Yurenev believed (correctly) that the pact, behind its facade, contained military provisions against the Soviet Union.^{[61]: 488–489} Yurenev had even contacted Japanese foreign minister Arita before the pact's publication, on 16 November and 20 November. While Arita had on the first request dodged the issue by pointing to the fact that the negotiations were only concerned with the Comintern and not the Soviet Union, he did not respond to the latter contact by Yurenev, in which the ambassador accused the Japanese foreign service of holding secret negotiations with Germany specifically aimed against the USSR.^[23]: 38

The Anti-Comintern Pact politically accelerated the downward trend of the Soviet Union's trade relations with Japan. Alarmed by the Anti-Comintern Pact, the USSR had cut down sales to and purchases from Japan: in 1939, Japanese imports from European Russia were the lowest since 1914 and exports to European Russia the lowest since 1926, whereas Japanese imports from Asiatic Russia were the lowest since 1887 and exports to Asiatic Russia the lowest since 1914. The Anti-Comintern Pact's restrictive policy towards bilateral treaties between Japan and the USSR without German consent made this downward spiral hard to fix. Only after the German-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the subsequent decrease of Japanese trust in Germany did the mutual political and economic attitude improve.^[62]

The United Kingdom also saw its colonial empire in Asia and eventually Africa threatened by the Japanese and later also the Italian alliance with Germany.^[63]: 30 This view was not completely unjustified in the context of the Axis Powers' navies, as the naval high commands of Germany, Italy and Japan mainly aimed their common considerations against the United Kingdom, not the Soviet Union.^{[8]: 39–40} In the House of Commons, the Anti-Comintern Pact became a subject of debate multiple times.^[d] The British armed forces were concerned about a potential military conflict with Germany and Japan, and this feeling was escalated upon Italian accession to the agreement.^{[40]: 177–178}

In the United States, the German-Japanese agreement was viewed as an indication that Germany might follow Japan's path of satisfying territorial claims with military action, as Japan had done in Manchuria in 1931. In a September 1937 report to the Treasury (after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War), it was argued that the long-term consequence of a Japanese victory in China would result in other "dissatisfied" powers, such as Germany and Italy, seeking the fulfillment of their objectives in military endeavors of their own. The American armed forces were concerned about the prospect of Japan gaining military allies in the form of Germany and later Italy, as that posed a potential threat to the American War Plan Orange.^{[51]: 34–36}

In 1937, American ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew analyzed the Anti-Comintern Pact's anti-communist rhetoric as a mere banner for "have-not" countries to unite under while in truth aiming primarily against the British Empire's global dominance.^[15]: 268

Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. president from 1933 to 1945, shared French concerns about the safety of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Roosevelt believed that the pact contained secret clauses outlining an alliance that was both defensive and offensive, and that it divided the world into spheres of influence for each of the signatories.^[51]: 50 Eventually, the USS Panay incident of 1937 resulted in the President's attempt to break the Anti-Comintern Pact by appeasing Germany and Italy with the goal of isolating Japan from its allies to hinder its progress in China.^[51]: 62

Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs that "[n]othing could have been more logical and natural than an alliance of Berlin and Tokyo", citing shared values of militarism, conquest and disregard for international treaties as the reason for his conclusion.^{[61]: 488–489}

The Anti-Comintern Pact's original provisions had included a specific provision that allowed Germany and Japan to jointly invite additional members into the pact.^{[39]: 327–328} In Japan, the Anti-Comintern Pact was seen as possibly groundbreaking in freeing the country from its international isolation and to acquire new diplomatic and military partners. Countries whose membership Japan was interested in included the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and especially Poland.^{[23]: 39–42}

The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan met its first trial when Japan and China, both of whom were important partners with Germany, went to war. The

While Germany's policy in regards to the war between Japan and China was one of strict neutrality,[64]^{: 599–600} it made no particular effort, diplomatic or otherwise, to stop the Japanese aggression against China. The German government and foreign service still remained privately critical of the Japanese course of action. When Japanese ambassador to Germany Mushanokōji explained to state secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that the Japanese invasion of China kept in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact in its attempt to vanquish Chinese communism, Weizsäcker dismissed Mushanokōji's explanation on the basis of the German view that the Japanese action would foster rather than stifle the growth of communism in China.^{[17]: 31–32} Weizsäcker, in his notes with regards to this conversation with Mushanokōji, expressed the fear that the Japanese aggression could lead directly to an alliance between the Soviet Union and China.^{[64]: 607–608}

On 6 November 1937,

Japan, concerned that Germany might actually take the side of France and the Netherlands, possibly then reshaped to be German vassal states, in the colonial question, sought to assure Germany's support for a Japanese annexation of French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. Ribbentrop was indeed willing to support such Japanese annexations, which had been part of his initial idea regarding the four-power pact's advantages from the Japanese perspective. He painted Japanese acquisitions in East Asia as preparations for a world order where all of Afro-Eurasia would be divided between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union.

Again, Ribbentrop thus tried to realize his vision of a four-power coalition directed against the United Kingdom. With France eliminated and the Battle of Britain going in Britain's favor, it became more and more clear that the United Kingdom, although on the back foot, would neither seek a truce nor be knocked out by German invasion. As a result, the role of the still neutral United States and the American support for the UK became more and more important for the conduct of Germany's war effort. Ribbentrop still deluded himself that cooperation with the Soviet Union could be permanent or at least last until the war with the United Kingdom had concluded. This opinion was not shared by Adolf Hitler, who still viewed the 'Jewish-Bolshevist' Soviet Union as Germany's inevitable final enemy.^{[19]: 281–282}

Differences between Germany and Japan, including the Japanese war in China, economic differences, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, led to a growing distance between Germany and Japan. Germany's victories over the European allies in 1940 led to a desire for a reconciliation between the parties.^[78] This came to pass as part of the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. However, the Japanese distrust in the German partner remained, and Japan avoided entanglement in Germany's eventual war against the Soviet Union to fully focus on its own struggle in China.^[49]: 63 In the Tripartite Pact, the Germans and Italians recognized the Japanese leadership in East Asia, and Japan conversely recognized German and Italian leadership in Europe.^[14]: 802

The Anti-Comintern Pact was scheduled to be renewed on 25 November 1941, as its five-year lifespan since 25 November 1936 was about to run out. One of Germany's primary aims was to keep Japan close and to encourage Japan to intervene in the German–Soviet War on Germany's side, but Japan refused to do so for the rest of the war. The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed in April 1941, would hold up until August 1945, when the Soviet Union violated the pact and invaded Japanese Manchuria.^{[79]: 230 [14]: 887}

The convention of the various signatories between 24 and 25 November 1941 in Berlin that led to the renewal of the pact was described by Ciano in his diaries as affirmation of the Germans as "masters of the house" within the Axis Powers. Attendants included Galeazzo Ciano of Italy, Serrano Suñer of Spain, László Bárdossy of Hungary and Mihai Antonescu of Romania, among others.^[67]: 411

The extension protocol was signed on 25 November 1941 and bears the signatures of representatives of the six previous signatories: Ribbentrop (Germany), Ōshima (Japan), Ciano (Italy), Bárdossy (Hungary), Lü Yiwen (Manchukuo), and Suñer (Spain).^{[70]: 671–672}

The previous signatories rejoined the pact.^{[5]: 49 [70]: 671–672}

•  Germany
•  Japan
•  Italy
•  Hungary
•  Manchukuo
•  Spain

In addition, several new countries that had not done so before 25 November 1941 joined the Anti-Comintern Pact.^{[5]: 49 [70]: 671–672 [80]: 1713} China under Wang Jingwei submitted its signature ahead of time on 22 November 1941, the other countries submitted theirs on the day of signing, the 25th.^{[f][70]: 671–672}

•  Bulgaria^[81]
•  Croatia^[82]: 272
•  Denmark^{[83]: 388 [84]: 54–55}
•  Finland^[85]: 101
• Nanjing China^[70]
  ^{: 671–672}
•  Romania^[15]: 268
•  Slovakia^[70]: 674

The reaction to the extension in the German state-controlled press, unlike with the previous protocol, was very cold towards Japan and instead emphasized the sacrifices and successes of the European Axis against the Soviet Union in the German–Soviet War. This would not change significantly until 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.^[30]: 156

Bulgaria had been a country that was stuck between its own expansionist ambitions in the Balkans for which it relied on Italian and German military assistance and diplomatic support, while also trying to avoid major entanglement in Axis operations. Its leader

As part of this pro-German position, Bulgaria was essentially forced into membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. Soon after, on 13 December, the country declared war on the United Kingdom and the United States. Bulgaria tried to maintain neutrality towards the Soviet Union until the end, but after Romania switched sides in favor of the Allies and allowed the Red Army to pass through Romanian territory to invade Bulgaria, the 1944 Bulgarian coup d'état paved the way to the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Tsar Simeon II's regents were executed.^[81]

Croatia, Germany's most important partner on the Balkans during the anti-partisan campaigns,^[81] had been created in 1941 following the German occupation of Yugoslavia.^[74] It joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941. Such an accession was done with the goal to legitimize the Croatian state and make it look more independent, but also to take a clear stand against the Soviet Union.^[82]: 272

Denmark had, along with

Still, any notion of Danish independence was merely a sham for the purpose of foreign propaganda, and the German authorities watched their Danish counterparts closely.^{[83]: 62–66} While there was a considerable spectrum of sympathy for the German cause among the Danish public, most Danish civilians resented their occupiers and the German military authorities doubted Danish compliance and loyalty.^{[84]: 42–130} German attempts to improve their standing in public opinion in Denmark, through measures such as the establishment of the Danish-German Society with Peter Knutzen as chairman, were unsuccessful.^{[84]: 54–55}

The Danish government requested four key exemptions specific to Denmark.^{[86]: 173–180}

• Denmark takes up no military obligations.
• Anti-communist action in Denmark should be limited to police operations.
• The treaty should be limited to Danish territory.
• Denmark will remain neutral in World War II.

The Germans, somewhat unhappy with these requests, moved them into a secret addendum as a compromise, making Denmark appear as a full member of the pact from the outside. This damaged the international reputation of the Danish civilian government among the Allies.^{[86]: 173–180}

In Finland, the status of the country during the Second World War remains controversial into the modern day, as historians debate whether Finland was a full member of the Axis Powers or was, as was claimed by the wartime Finnish government, just in a state of co-belligerence (Finnish: kanssasotija, Swedish: medkrigförande) with Germany in the shared Finnish–German struggle against the Soviet Union. Finnish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941, alongside other elements such as the Finland's explicit acknowledgement of having been an ally of "Hitlerite Germany" in the 1947 Peace Treaty, form the case in favour of arguing that Finland was part of the Axis Powers.^[85]: 101

The "

Romania was Germany's most militarily important partner in the war against the Soviet Union, but its German partners had done little to actively earn that loyalty. Germany had in quick succession overseen three territorial losses in Romania, when it first awarded the Bessarabia region to the Soviet Union in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, then granted large parts of the Transylvania region to Hungary as part of the Second Vienna Award, and finally approved of Bulgarian territorial gains in the Dobruja region as part of the Treaty of Craiova.^[81] Romania, under the leadership of the fascist Iron Guard, thus had its main enemies not only in the Soviet Union, but also among the ranks of the Axis Powers, especially in the form of Hungary. Still, the Iron Guard, which had before the territorial losses advocated a pro-German position, now viewed alignment with Germany as the only way to avoid another German intervention against Romania and in favor of Hungary. The Romanian participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941 thus arose out of the necessity to please the German partner and to further the Romanian campaign against the Soviet Union, to hopefully regain Bessarabia, and to make territorial acquisitions in Soviet Ukraine.^[15]: 268

Slovakia, established in 1939 after the German-instigated dissolution of Czechoslovakia, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941.^[70]: 674

Between 1936 and 1945, the Axis Powers used the Anti-Comintern Pact as a diplomatic tool to increase their political and diplomatic leverage, but were often unsuccessful.

There were efforts by Germany to involve the South American ABC-Staaten (''ABC States"), consisting of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, into the pact.^[60]: 687

Brazilian President

China was part of Ribbentrop's vision for the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1935, and had been courted by both Germany and Japan to join the Anti-Comintern Pact as early as 1936.[35]^{: 342–346} By late 1935, Wang Jingwei was in favor of joining the pact, but Chiang Kai-shek was careful not to offend the Soviet Union, which was China's only potential partner in case of a Japanese attack.^[87]: 237

After serious consideration, the Chiang administration refused.^[42]: 76 They were unwilling to align with Japan without a retreat of Japanese forces from China. Such a retreat was rejected by Japan, which meant that China was unwilling to offend the Soviet Union, the only major power that would be able to effectively aid them in the case of a war against Japan. This war became reality in the following year.^{[49]: 54, 77} On 3 November 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in a public broadcast offered peace terms that included Chinese accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.^[59]: 113

Between December 1939 and March 1940, preliminary peace talks were carried out under the Japanese Kiri Project. The drafted terms involved Chinese accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Chinese government stalled for time and did not give a definitive answer to the proposal. By 7 September, the Japanese side declared further negotiation useless and Kiri Project was terminated on 8 October 1940.^[88]: 176 Another attempt at exploratory peace talks was made by Qian Yongming [zh] for the Chinese side, who had two delegates with Yōsuke Matsuoka in Tokyo on 12 October 1940. Their proposal for peace between Japan and China and the unification of the Wang and Chiang governments also included the entry of the unified Chinese state into the Anti-Comintern Pact.^[88]: 178

Czechoslovakia's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact was part of the German demands in the run-up to the establishment of the Protectorate. These demands were designed by Germany to be rejected.^[14]: 439

The Netherlands were a candidate of choice for the Japanese for inclusion in the Anti-Comintern Pact.^[23]: 41 Japanese ambassador Iwao Yamaguchi hoped that Dutch concerns about the situation in China and the potential dissent of the ethnic Chinese inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies, as well as communist insurgents in the colony, would lead the Dutch government to attempt to stabilize the relationship with Japan through accession to the pact.

Yamaguchi contacted the Dutch foreign minister

Although the Netherlands remained interested in secretive intelligence exchanges, the Dutch government was hesitant to officially undertake a diplomatic alignment with Japan, caused by the fear of domestic and diplomatic backlash.[23]^: 41–42

As part of the German occupation of Norway and Norway's collaborationist Quisling regime, the accession of Quisling Norway to the Anti-Comintern Pact was discussed, most notably in the German Memorandum über die Neuordnung in Norwegen ("Memorandum Regarding the Reorganization of Norway"), issued in Oslo on 10 February 1942.^{[89]: 465–470}

In 1935, Poland had been one of the countries that Ribbentrop had hoped to induce to join the pact.

When Ribbentrop and Neurath were in contact with Józef Lipski and Józef Beck about German-Polish anti-communist cooperation, Beck rejected a Polish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact as impractical.^{[60]: 31–33, 38–39} The Polish entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact was part of the eight-point plan presented to Poland by Joachim von Ribbentrop.^{[60]: 88 [90]: 8} Poland rejected this proposal.^[14]: 455 The reasons for Poland's rejection of the proposal were the Polish desire for a diplomatic equidistance between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as military concerns about encroaching encirclement by Germany after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.^[90]: 8

Portugal was of interest as a possible member state, especially after Spain joined. As one of the only three countries to have voted against the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations on 18 September 1934 (in addition to the Netherlands and Switzerland),

Yugoslavia was Axis-friendly during the tenure of Milan Stojadinović as Prime Minister, and Germany and Italy were optimistic about its accession in January 1939.^[67]: 13 Stojadinović was however ousted in February 1939, and the subsequent Cvetković administration was more cautious and non-aligned.^[67]: 22 The Cvetković administration, pressured by the diplomatic alignment of Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria with the Axis Powers, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact's successor, the Tripartite Pact, on 25 March 1941. Dušan Simović, in response, Yugoslav coup d'état on 27 March, cancelling Yugoslavia's entry into the Tripartite Pact. In response, the Axis Powers initiated the invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April.^[74]: 71

The Anti-Comintern Pact ended up playing a significant role at the Nuremberg trials and was specifically mentioned in the verdict that sentenced Joachim von Ribbentrop to death.^[66]: 285

American historian

As part of the German Bundeswehr's Military History Research Office's series Germany and the Second World War, German military historian Manfred Messerschmidt states in the first volume, The Build-up of German Aggression (1990), that the Anti-Comintern Pact, just like the Axis Powers as a whole, was just a "patching together of divergent political interests". Messerschmidt also comments on Hitler's ambivalence between including either Italy or the United Kingdom in the pact.^[21]: 639 In regards to the role of Japan, Messerschmidt, like Schroeder, sees the Anti-Comintern Pact as a continuation of established Japanese policy, but also notes that Japan's internal political apparatus was so divided between the interests of the Japanese army, navy and government that almost by definition no action by the Tokyo leadership could be seen as any sort of unified opinion of the entire Japanese establishment. Messerschmidt also disagrees with the notion that Italy's accession to the pact necessarily gave it an anti-British thrust, but that Italian accession established a basis of the treaty in the first place. The interests of Germany and Japan were too different and the Japanese position after the beginning of the war against China in 1937 too weak to pose a threat to any enemy, Soviet Union or United Kingdom. As a result, Messerschmidt disagrees with the idea that the pact went from anti-Soviet to anti-British on the basis that it effectively already stopped being anti-Soviet as soon as Japan invaded China in June 1937, not when Italy joined the agreement in November of that same year.^[21]: 641

However, Messerschmidt does agree that Hitler's support for Japan, which followed from Ribbentrop's agenda in the far east, was destined to hurt Anglo-German relations, whether Hitler intended it or not. The actions that Germany took that favored Japan and disfavored China included the cessation of aid deliveries to the Chiang government, the recall of advisors from China and open declarations of political support for Japanese actions starting in October 1937. All of these actions, according to Messerschmidt's argument, were bound to offend the pro-Chinese position of the United Kingdom.^{[21]: 640–642}

• German–Japanese industrial co-operation before and during World War II
• Germany–Japan relations
• Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941
• Monsun Gruppe
• Japan–Soviet Union relations
• Japanese military modernization of 1868–1931
• Specific Events
  • Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance (27 March 1936)
  • Soviet–Japanese Border War (May–September 1939)
  • Pact of Steel (22 May 1939)
  • Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939)
  • Tripartite Pact (27 September 1940)
  • Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact (13 April 1941)
  • Soviet invasion of Manchuria (August 1945)