Battle of Diu
Battle of Diu | |||||||
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Part of the Mamluk–Portuguese conflicts
, Lithograph by Maurício José do Carmo Sendim, 1840 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Portuguese Empire |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
332 total[4]
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The Battle of Diu was a
The Portuguese victory was critical: the great Muslim alliance was soundly defeated, easing the Portuguese strategy of controlling the
The Battle of Diu was a
Background
Just two years after
Thus, the Portuguese signed an alliance with a sworn enemy of Calicut instead, the Raja of
When
Unable to oppose the Portuguese, the Muslim communities of traders in India as well as the sovereign of
The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt
The
Mamluk soldiers had little expertise in naval warfare, so the Mamluk Sultan,
Command of the expedition was entrusted to a
The fleet left Suez in November 1505, 1100 men strong.
Diu and Malik Ayyaz
At the time of the arrival of the Portuguese in India, the Gujarati were the main long distance dealers in the Indian Ocean, and an essential intermediary in east–west trade, between Egypt and Malacca, mostly trading cloths and spices. In the 15th century, the Sultan of Gujarat nominated Malik Ayyaz, a former bowman and slave of possible Georgian or Dalmatian origin, as the governor of Diu. A cunning and pragmatic ruler, Malik Ayyaz turned the city into the main port of Gujarat (known to the Portuguese as Cambaia) and one of the main entrepôts between India and the Persian Gulf, avoiding Portuguese hostility by pursuing a policy of appeasement and even alignment – up until Hussain unexpectedly sailed into Diu.[20]
Malik Ayyaz received Hussain well, but besides the Zamorin of Calicut, no other rulers of the Indian subcontinent were forthcoming against the Portuguese, unlike what the Muslim envoys to Egypt had promised. Ayyaz himself realized the Portuguese were a formidable naval force whom he did not wish to antagonize. He could not, however, reject Hussain for fear of retaliation from the powerful Sultan of Gujarat – besides obviously Hussain's own forces now within the city. Caught in a double bind, Ayyaz decided to only cautiously support Hussain.[21]
Battle of Chaul
In March 1508, Hussain's and Ayyaz's fleets sailed south and clashed with Portuguese ships in a three-day naval engagement within the harbour of Chaul. The Portuguese commander was the captain-major of the seas of India, Lourenço de Almeida, tasked with overseeing the loading of allied merchant ships in that city and escort them back to Cochin.[22]
Although the Portuguese were caught off-guard (the distinctively European-like ships of Hussein were at first thought to belong to the expedition of Afonso de Albuquerque, assigned to the Arabian Coast), the battle ended as a Pyrrhic victory for the Muslims, who suffered too many losses to be able to proceed towards the Portuguese headquarters in Cochin.[23] Despite fortuitously sinking the Portuguese flagship, the rest of the Portuguese fleet escaped, while Hussain himself barely survived the encounter because of the unwilling committal of Malik Ayyaz to the battle. Hussain was left with no other choice but to return to Diu with Malik Ayyaz and prepare for a Portuguese retaliation. Hussain reported this battle back to Cairo as a great victory; however, the Mirat Sikandari, a contemporary Persian account of the Kingdom of Gujarat, details this battle as a minor skirmish.[24]
Nevertheless, among the dead was the viceroy's own son, Lourenço, whose body was never recovered, despite the best efforts of Malik Ayyaz to retrieve it for the Portuguese viceroy.
Portuguese preparations
Upon hearing in Cochin of the death of his only son,
Nevertheless, the monsoon was approaching, and with it the storms that inhibited all navigation in the Indian Ocean until September. Only then could the viceroy call back all available Portuguese ships for repairs in dry dock and assemble his forces in Cochin.[25]
Before they could depart though, on 6 December 1508 Afonso de Albuquerque arrived in Cannanore from the Persian Gulf with orders from the King of Portugal to replace Almeida as governor. Dom Francisco had a personal vendetta against Albuquerque, as the latter had been assigned to the Arabian Coast specifically to prevent Muslim navigation from entering or leaving the Red Sea. Yet his intentions of personally destroying the Muslim fleet in retaliation of his son's death became such a personal issue that he refused to allow his appointed successor take office. In doing so, the viceroy was in official rebellion against royal authority, and would rule Portuguese India for another year as such.[26]
On 9 December, the Portuguese fleet departed for Diu.[27]
Armada da Índia on the move
From Cochin, the Portuguese first passed by Calicut, hoping to intercept the Zamorin's fleet, but it had already left for Diu. The armada then anchored in
At Angediva, the fleet fetched freshwater and Dom Francisco met with an envoy of Malik Ayyaz, though the details of such rendezvous are unknown.[28] While there, the Portuguese were attacked by oar ships of the city of Dabul, unprovoked.
Dabul
From
According to Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, the sack of Dabul gave rise to a 'curse' on the western coast of India, where one might say: "may the wrath of the franks befall you".[29]
Chaul and Bombay
From Dabul, the Portuguese called at Chaul, where Dom Francisco ordered the governor of the town to prepare a tribute to be collected on the return from Diu. Moving towards Mahim, close to Bombay, the Portuguese found the town deserted.[30]
At Bombay, Dom Francisco received a letter from Malikk Ayyaz. Doubtlessly aware of the danger facing his city, he wrote to appease the viceroy, stating that he had the prisoners and how bravely his son had fought, adding a letter from the Portuguese prisoners stating that they were well treated.[31] The viceroy answered Malik Ayyaz (referred to as Meliqueaz in Portuguese) with a respectful but menacing letter, stating his intention of revenge, that they had better join all forces and prepare to fight or he would destroy Diu:
I the Viceroy say to you, honored Meliqueaz captain of Diu, that I go with my knights to this city of yours, to take the people who were welcomed there, who in Chaul fought my people and killed a man who was called my son, and I come with hope in God of Heaven to take revenge on them and on those who assist them, and if I don't find them I will take your city, to pay for everything, and you, for the help you have done at Chaul. This I tell you, so that you are well aware that I go, as I am now on this island of Bombay, as he will tell you the one who carries this letter.[32][33]
Difficulties on the Muslim side
In the ten months between the Battle of Chaul and Diu, important developments took place on the Muslim field: Hussain took the chance to careen his ships and recovered a straggled carrack with a reinforcement of 300 men. Notwithstanding, the relationship between Hussain and Ayyaz worsened, with Hussain now plainly aware of the duplicity of Ayyaz, who had taken custody of the Portuguese prisoners at Chaul – which Hussain apparently intended "to send back to Cairo stuffed". Unable to pay the remaining of his troops, Hussain was forced to pawn his own artillery pieces to Ayyaz himself. Presumably, only either the hope of fresh reinforcements or fear of the reaction of the Sultan now prevented him from returning to Egypt.[25]
At this point, should Malik Ayyaz assist Amir Hussain, he risked his city and his life; should he choose to turn on Hussain, the Sultan might take Ayyaz' head. If Hussain stood his ground, he risked annihilation and should he retreat, risked being executed by the Sultan of Egypt.
Now in a quadruple bind, they faced the Portuguese forces.
Order of battle
Mamluk-Gujarat-Calicut fleet
- 6 Mediterranean carracks; 6 galleys (overall command of Amir Hussain)
- 4 carracks of Diu (Malik Ayyaz)
- 30 light galleys of Diu (Sidi Ali)
- 70–150 war-boats of Calicut (Kunjali Marakkar)
Portuguese fleet
- 5 large Flor de la mar (Viceroy's flagship; captain João da Nova), Espírito Santo (captainNuno Vaz Pereira), Belém (Jorge de Melo Pereira), Rei Grande (Francisco de Távora), and Taforea Grande (Pêro Barreto de Magalhães)
- 4 smaller naus: Taforea Pequena (Garcia de Sousa), Santo António (Martim Coelho), Rei Pequeno (Manuel Teles Barreto) and Andorinha (Dom António de Noronha)
- 4 square-rigged caravels: Flor da Rosa (António do Campo), Espera (Filipe Rodrigues), Conceição (Pero Cão), Santa Maria da Ajuda (Rui Soares)
- 2 caravels: Santiago (Luís Preto), – (Álvaro Pessanha)
- 2 galleys: São Miguel (Diogo Pires), São Cristóvão (Paio Rodrigues de Sousa)
- 1 brigantine: Santo António (Simão Martins)
Battle of Diu
On 2 February 1509, the Portuguese sighted Diu from atop the crow nests. As they approached, Malik Ayyaz withdrew from the city, leaving overall command to Hussain. He ordered the oar ships to sally out and harass the Portuguese fleet before they had time to recover from the journey, but they did not pass beyond the range of the fortress' cannon. As night fell the Muslim fleet retreated into the channel, while the viceroy summoned all his captains to decide on the course of action.[30]
As day broke, the Portuguese could see that the Muslims had decided to take advantage of the harbour of Diu protected by its fort, latching their carracks and galleys together close to shore and await the Portuguese attack, thus relinquishing the initiative.[34] Portuguese forces were to be divided in four: one group to board the Mamluk carracks after a preliminary bombardment, another to attack the stationary Mamluk galleys from the flank, a 'bombardment group' that would support the rest of the fleet, and the flagship itself, which would not participate in the boarding, but would position itself in a convenient position to direct the battle and support it with its firepower. The brigantine Santo António would ensure communications.[35]
Santo António then ran through the fleet delivering the viceroy's speech, in which he detailed the reasons for which they sought the enemy, and the rewards to be granted in case of victory: the right to the sack, knighthood to all soldiers, nobility to the knights, criminals banished from the realm would be pardoned and slaves would receive the condition of squires if they were freed within a year.[36]
Battle starts
The wind turned, and by about 11:00 am, the royal banner was hoisted atop the Flor do Mar and a single shot fired, signaling the start of the battle.[36] At the general cry of Santiago! the Portuguese began their approach, with the galley São Miguel at the head of the formation, probing the channel. A general bombardment between the two forces preceded the grapple, and within the calm waters of the harbour of Diu, the Portuguese employed an innovative gunnery tactic: by firing directly at the water, the cannonballs bounced like skipping stones. A broadside from the Santo Espírito hit one of the enemy ships by the waterline, sinking it instantly.[37]
As the carracks made contact, Hussain's flagship was grappled by the Santo Espírito. When their forecastles crossed, a group of men led by Rui Pereira jumped onto the enemy forecastle, and before the ships were secured, the Portuguese had already stormed all the way to midship. Before the flagship was captured though, another Mamluk carrack came to its aid, boarding the Santo Espírito from the opposite side. Hussain had strengthened his forces with a great number of Gujarati soldiers, distributed across the ships, and the heavily armoured Portuguese infantry suddenly risked being overwhelmed. Rui Pereira was killed, but at this crucial moment, the Rei Grande slammed against the free side of Hussain's flagship, delivering direly needed reinforcements, which tipped the scales in favour of the Portuguese.[38]
Up on the crow's nests, Ethiopian and Turkish bowmen proved their worth against Portuguese matchlock crews. Many of the other Muslim mercenaries "fled at the first sight of the Portuguese".[39]
Hussain had expected the Portuguese to commit their entire forces to the grapple, so he kept the light oar ships back within the channel, to attack the Portuguese from behind when they engaged the carracks. Comprehending the stratagem, João da Nova maneuvered the Flor do Mar to block the channel entrance and prevent the oar ships from sallying out. The compact mass of oar ships provided an ideal target for Portuguese gunners, who disabled many ships that then blocked the path of the ones following. Unable to break through, the Zamorin's boats turned around after a short exchange, and retreated to Calicut. Throughout the course of the battle, the Flor do Mar fired over 600 shots.[40]
Meanwhile, the faster group of galleys and caravels grappled the flank of the stationary enemy galleys, whose guns were unable to respond. An initial Portuguese assault was repelled, but a Portuguese salvo set three of the galleys adrift.[38]
Slowly but surely, the Portuguese secured most of the carracks, half-blinded by the smoke. Hussain's flagship was overpowered and many crewmen began jumping ship. The galleys were defeated, and the shallow caravels positioned themselves between the ships and the coast, cutting down any who attempted to swim ashore.[41]
Eventually, only a single ship remained – a great carrack, larger than any other vessel in the battle, anchored too close to shore for most of the deep-draught Portuguese vessels to reach. Its reinforced hull was impervious to Portuguese cannon fire and it took a continuous bombardment from the whole fleet to finally sink it by dusk, thus marking the end of the Battle of Diu.[41]
Aftermath
The battle ended in victory for the Portuguese, with the Gujarat-Mamluk-Calicut coalition all but defeated. The Mamluks fought bravely to the very end, but were at a loss as to how to counter a naval force the like of which they had never seen before. The Portuguese had modern ships crewed by seasoned sailors, better equipped infantry – with heavy plate armour, arquebuses, and a type of clay grenade filled with gunpowder – more cannon and gunners more proficient in an art the Mamluks could not hope to match.
After the battle, Malik Ayyaz returned the prisoners of Chaul, well dressed and fed. Dom Francisco refused to take over Diu, claiming that it would be expensive to maintain, but signed a trade agreement with Ayyaz and opened a feitoria in the city.[42] The Portuguese would later seek ardently the construction of a fortress at Diu, but the Malik managed to postpone this for as long as he was governor.
The spoils of the battle included three galleys, three carracks, 600 bronze artillery pieces, and three royal flags of the Mamlûk Sultan of Cairo that were sent to Portugal to be displayed in the
The treatment of the Mamluk captives by the Portuguese however, was brutal. The Viceroy ordered most of them to be hanged, burned alive, or torn to pieces, tied to the mouths of cannon, in retaliation for his son's death. Commenting in the aftermath of the battle, Almeida reported to King Manuel: "As long as you may be powerful at sea, you will hold India as yours; and if you do not possess this power, little will avail you a fortress on the shore."
Hussain survived the battle, and managed to flee Diu along with 22 other Mamluks on horseback. He returned to Cairo, and several years later was put in charge of another fleet with 3,000 men to be sent against the Portuguese, but he was murdered on the Red Sea, by his Turkish second-in-command – future Selman Reis of the Ottoman navy. The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt would collapse to an Ottoman invasion shortly after.[43]
Of all the leading participants of the Battle of Diu, Malik Ayyaz would be the only one not to die a violent death; he died a wealthy man in his estate in 1522.[46]
Legacy
The Battle of Diu is considered one of the most important battles in history. It marked the beginning of Western European dominance in the Indian Ocean. The author William Weir in his book 50 Battles That Changed the World, ranks this battle as the 6th most important in history, losing only to the Battle of Marathon, the Nika Rebellion, the Battle of Bunker Hill, the Battle of Arbela (Gaugamela) and the Battle of Hattin.[47] He says: "When the 15th century began, Islam seemed about ready to dominate the world. That prospect sank in the Indian Ocean off Diu."[48] The historian Rainer Daehnhardt says that this battle is compared only to the Battles of Lepanto and Trafalgar in terms of importance and legacy.[49] According to the scholar Michael Adas, this battle "established European Naval superiority in the Indian Ocean for centuries to come."[50]
See also
- Afonso de Albuquerque
- Portuguese conquest of Goa
- Capture of Malacca (1511)
- Portuguese India
- History of Kerala
- Siege of Diu (1538)
References
- ISBN 9781566390682.
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power p. 273
- ^ Conquerors: How Portugal seized the Indian Ocean and forged the first Global Empire by Roger Crowley
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.96–97
- ^ a b Malabar manual by William Logan p.316, Books.Google.com
- ^ Conquerors: How Portugal seized the Indian Ocean and forged the first Global Empire by Roger Crowley p.228
- ^ Rogers, Clifford J. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, San Francisco:Westview Press, 1995, pp. 299–333 at Angelfire.com
- ISBN 978-1-317-04546-5.
- ISBN 978-1-000-48800-5.
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power p. 273
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power p. 153-155
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power p. 200-206
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.25
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power p. 207
- ^ a b c Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.26
- ^ a b Foundations of the Portuguese empire, 1415–1580 Bailey Wallys Diffie pp. 230–31 ff
- ^ Ozbaran, Salih, "Ottomans as 'Rumes' in Portuguese sources in the sixteenth century" Portuguese Studies, Annual, 2001
- ISBN 0-7914-1701-8, pp. 35, 171,22
- ^ Porter, Venetia Ann (1992) The history and monuments of the Tahirid dynasty of the Yemen 858-923/1454-1517, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5867/ p. 100
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.27
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.32–33
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.33–35
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.61
- ^ Bayley, Edward C. The Local Muhammadan Dynasties: Gujarat, London, 1886, 222
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 68
- ^ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.66
- ^ a b Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu −1508 e 1509 – O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.70
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 71
- ^ "Dõde antre os indios naceo aquela maldição que dizem a ira dos frangues venha sobre ti", in Castanheda, Fernão Lopes de (1551) História do Descobrimento e Conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses, 1833 edition, Rolland, Pg 312.
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 74
- ISBN 0-520-02809-0
- ^ "Dancing with Dolphins - the Age of Discoveries".
- ^ http://www.ancruzeiros.pt/anchistoria-comb-1509.html Archived 3 June 2010 at the Wayback Machine (in Portuguese)
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 76
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 77–78
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 80
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 81
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 84–85
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 88
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 89–92
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 92
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power pg. 272
- ^ a b Pissarra, 2002, pg. 93
- ^ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power pg. 273
- ISBN 81-7530-047-7, 377pp, 107
- ^ Pissarra, 2002, pg. 57
- ISBN 9781442976443.
- ISBN 9781442976566.
- ^ Daehnhardt, Rainer (2005). Homens, Espadas e Tomates. Portugal: Zéfiro – Edições, Actividades Culturais, Unipessoal Lda. p. 34.
- ISBN 9781566390682.
Further reading
- de Camões, Luís (2002), The Lusiadas, Oxford: ISBN 0-19-280151-1.
- Subrahmanyan, Sanjay (1993), The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700 – A Political and Economic History, London: Longmans, ISBN 0-582-05068-5.
- Brummett, Palmira (1994), Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, New York: SUNY Press, ISBN 0-7914-1701-8.
- Kuzhippalli-Skaria, Mathew (1986), Portuguese and the Sultanate of Gujarat, 1500-1573, New Delhi: Mittal Publishers & Distr..
- Monteiro, Saturnino (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I – The First World Sea Power, Lisbon: Editora Sá da Costa.
- Kerr, Robert (1881), General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels, arranged in a systematic order, University of Columbia.
- Pissarra, José (2002), Chaul e Diu, 1508 e 1509: O Domínio do Índico, Lisbon: Tribuna da História, ISBN 9789728563851